Maverick Philosopher

Maverick Philosopher FAQ Page and Site Introduction

Welcome to the latest incarnation of Maverick Philosopher.  This post will remain at the top of the queue to give new and some old readers an idea of what this site is and isn't, what goes on here, and what is not permitted to go on here.   Like the site itself, this introductory page is  under permanent construction and reconstruction.  It will take shape bit by bit over the coming weeks and months. 

1. Why 'Maverick Philosopher'?  Since I am a philosopher and what is done here is mainly philosophy, it is appropriate that 'philosopher' be in the title.  As for 'maverick,' this word derives from the name of the Texas lawyer Samuel Augustus Maverick (1803-1870) who for a time was a rancher who ran cattle that bore no brand. These unbranded animals of his came to be known as mavericks.  The term was then extended to cover any unbranded stock and later any person who holds himself aloof from the herd, bears no 'brand,' resists classification, strives to be independent in his thinking or mode of living, is religiously or politically unaffiliated, and the like.  (Cf. Robert Hendrickson, QPB Encyclopedia of Word and Phrase Origins, p. 473.)

Catblogging Friday

As you know, Friday is official catblogging day here in the blogosphere, a tradition started in aught-four by Kevin Drum. So, in lieu of a substantial post, I present you with:

Adapted from Teilhard de Chardin

We are not human beings on a spiritual journey; we are spiritual beings on a human journey.

A Review of Barry Miller's From Existence to God

I have reviewed two of Barry Miller's books. My review of A Most Unlikely God appeared in Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review (vol. XXXVIII, no. 3, Summer 1999, pp. 614-617). My review of From Existence to God appeared in American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly (Summer 1993), pp. 390-394, I post a version of the latter here.

Barry Miller, From Existence to God: A Contemporary Philosophical Argument (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. x + 206. $42.50.

I

Arguments for the existence of God a contingentia mundi usually proceed by way of some version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), where this embraces principles of intelligibility and causality. Professor Miller's book is a bold but rigorous defense of a contingency argument that makes no use of any of these controversial principles. He thus evades the standard objections to PSR-based arguments. The engine driving Miller's argument is Non- Contradiction, a principle he deploys at various stages of his treatment. (cf. pp. 172-174) Accordingly, his central thesis is that there is "a hidden contradiction in claiming both that, say, Fido exists and that God does not." (p. ix)

If so, the existence of God should follow by dint of sheer analysis of what it is for a concrete individual to exist, in the presence of the uncontroversial premise that concrete individuals do in fact exist. By 'God' Miller understands the god of classical theism, a being that is the uncaused sustaining cause of the universe, where "The Universe is everything existing which either is a concrete individual or is individuated by individuals." (p. 131) This uncaused cause is unique, identical with its existence (and thus subsistent existence), metaphysically (not logically) necessary, and an individual only in an analogical sense of this term. (p. 137) Thus the above definition of 'universe' does not imply that God is in the universe. God cannot be an individual in the strict sense since He is not distinct from his existence; but He is nevertheless a concrete entity since capable of causal activity. (p. 126) The 'omni-properties' (omniscience, etc.) are not discussed. Thus Miller starts here below with existing concrete individuals, works his way up to the uncaused cause of their existence, and only then embarks on a discussion of those of the divine attributes relevant to the analysis of existence. This in marked contrast to the usual procedure of beginning with a definition of 'God' and then considering whether anything satisfies the definition.

A central challenge Miller faces is to show that the existence of concrete individuals is not a brute fact, where "a brute fact is by definition one for which any explanation is simply unnecessary." (p. 79) He meets this challenge by arguing that the existence of concrete individuals would harbor a contradiction if taken to be a brute fact. Given this putative contradiction, an inquiry into how it is possible that any such individual exist becomes logically inescapable. It turns out that the contradiction can only be removed if the existence of concrete individuals is not a brute fact but is dependent on something
external to them. (p. 84)

Wherein lies the contradiction? Consider Fido's existing. On Miller's preferred analysis, Fido's existing has two constituents, Fido and Fido's existence. Whereas Fido is a complete entity, one capable of independent existence, Fido's existence is a property-instance and therefore incomplete: incapable of independent existence, it requires a complete entity for its "individuation." (p. 38, n. 22) As constituents, Fido and his existence are ontologically, not chronologically, prior to Fido's existing in the sense that "...Fido's existing must be constructible conceptually from Fido and his existence." (p. 10) But such a construction would make no sense if Fido could not be conceived prior to Fido's existing. Yet chapter 3 ("The Inconceivability of Future Individuals") issues in precisely this conclusion: "Fido could neither be referred to nor conceived of before he existed." (p. 11)

Thus a contradiction emerges at the heart of concrete individuals: Fido's existing is a complex whose ontological constituents are such that one of them (Fido) must be and cannot be conceived prior to Fido's existing. Fido must be independently conceivable if he is to be available for the conceptual construction; but he cannot be so conceivable since "prior to its existing no concrete individual could be conceived of by anyone or in any way." (p. 42)

To establish that there is this contradiction, Miller must first of all develop a constituent ontology of individuals. This he does in chapter 2, "Sense Structure and Ontology." The analysis is pushed further in chapter 4, "Existence is a Real Property." Here he argues (convincingly to my mind) against the dominant Frege-Russell line that 'exists' and cognates are never legitimately predicable of individuals. The upshot is that existence is a first-level property.

Further argument is to the effect that it is a real (as opposed to a 'Cambridge') first-level property. Miller is now in a position to think of Fido's existing as built up from two constituents, Fido and Fido's existence. But what is Fido in distinction from his existence? One way to think of this is in terms of the question, What was Fido before he came to exist? Was he conceivable or referrable-to before he existed?

Chapter 3 defends the thesis that concrete individuals can neither be conceived of nor referred to prior to their existence, not even by God. This implies that, prior to Socrates' coming to exist, there was no de re possibility of his coming to exist. Thus there are no singular propositions about future individuals; all such propositions are general. (p. 42) Further implications are that the coming into existence of an individual is not the actualization of a merely possible individual, or the exemplification of any such exotic property as a Plantingian haecceity.

Now if Fido is inconceivable before he existed, then, "he cannot be conceived of except as existing or as having existed..." (p. 62) If so, how can Fido be a constituent of his existing? The result of chapters 2 and 4 thus contradicts that of chapter 3.

Given the obvious fact that Fido does exist, the contradiction in Fido's existing must be merely apparent. But if the analyses in chapters 2, 3 and 4 are correct, Fido's existing can neither be a brute fact needing no explanation, nor a fact explainable in terms of its constituents. So Fido's existing must be "dependent upon something other than either it or its constituents." (p. 84) This is the thesis of chapter 5, "Why existence? The penultimate answer."

The ultimate answer is provided in chapter 6, where it is argued that nothing is amiss in the idea of a causal regress that terminates necessarily in an uncaused cause. A causal series terminates necessarily if its members are intrinsically such that the series must terminate. (pp. 98-99) I take it that the series of causes that reaches back some 13-15 billion years ago to the Big Bang (assuming the truth of current cosmology) is a contingently terminating series: there is nothing in the nature of an ordinary physical event-cause that necessitates that a series of such causes should terminate, or should not terminate. So if there are no necessarily terminating causal series, there is no hope for a contingency argument that does not apply some version of PSR to an initial event like the Big Bang.

The main challenge Miller faces in showing the possibility of necessarily terminating causal series derives from Hume's contention that in an infinite series of causes each member is wholly explained
by the preceding member without any member being uncaused. If so, there is no a priori reason why a causal regress must terminate. To the objection that this would leave the series itself unexplained, the Humean rejoinder is that the explanation of each member by the preceding member suffices to explain the series as a whole. Miller responds to Hume's challenge by distinguishing five types of causal series. The justice of Hume's remarks is admitted with respect to types I-III. But types IV and V are argued to escape Humean censure.

It is impossible in the short space allotted to summarize Miller's intricate and carefully argued discussion of causal series. But perhaps the gist of it can be rendered as follows.

Miller needs a causal series that is both explanatory and necessarily terminating. But if a series is such that each of its members is caused by that which precedes it and causes that which succeeds it, then that series cannot be necessarily terminating. "Series IV and V, however, are cases of causal series in which each part neither is caused by that which precedes it, nor causes that which succeeds it . . ." (p. 111) How? Let a be the cause of Fido's existing, and suppose (to put it roughly) a is caused to exist by b, b by c, c by d, and d by m. Miller's idea is that when properly formulated, what causes a to exist is not b, but b inasmuch as it is caused to exist by c inasmuch as it is caused to exist by d inasmuch as it is caused to exist by m. (p. 112) Now m must be an uncaused cause, says Miller, on pain of the series' no longer being able to cause anything. (p. 112)

Having thus arrived at the uncaused cause, the remaining chapters consolidate and elaborate this result. Chapter 7, "The Uncaused Cause," argues that the ground of the uncaused cause's status as uncaused is in the lack of "any distinction between itself and its existence" (p. 117) and defends this consequence of the doctrine of divine simplicity against charges of incoherence. Miller also addresses the question whether the universe might be the uncaused cause, and concludes that it cannot since it is distinct from its existence, and what is so distinct can exist only if caused to exist. (p. 135)

Chapter 8 ("Necessary Existence") explains the sense in which God's existence is necessary "in terms of the more basic notion of something's lacking any distinction from its existence." (p. 148)

Chapters 9 and 10 treat, respectively, "Objections to the Contingency Argument" and "The Contingency Argument Misconceived." The book concludes with three appendices in support of chapters 2, 3 and 4 respectively, and a useful index.

The production job is reasonably good, although the quality of the paper inspires little confidence in its ability to resist the onset of yellowing. I note only four typographical errors: p. 1 has 'prologomena' instead of 'prolegomena.' P. 35, line 16 sports 'Fido's existing' in place of 'Fido's blackness.' P. 38, n. 22, line 6 shows 'predicate' where it should have 'property.' And a spot check of the index revealed on p. 202, col. I, line 7 a reference to p. 74 when it should be to p. 76.

II

Miller's book is a significant contribution not only to philosophical theology, but also to metaphysics and the philosophy of language. He engages a fundamental question ("How ever can it be that the Universe does exist?" (p. 1)) and he does so in a clear and rigorous manner. Equally important, he develops a line of reasoning which has been largely ignored in the theistic renaissance of recent decades. Along the way, a number of dogmas come under fire, among them the dogma held by atheists and theists alike that the doctrine of divine simplicity is incoherent. Miller leaves no doubt that he is historically informed, but does not allow himself to be led down exegetical sidetracks. All in all, an exciting and important work.

I conclude with a couple of critical comments, offered in the spirit of a request for clarification.

Miller's contingency argument is motivated by "the recognition that to accept Fido's existing as a brute fact would be to accept that Fido and his existence were simultaneously both constituents and non-constituents of Fido's existing."(p. 116) Suppose we take a closer look at this putative contradiction. Given that they are constituents, Fido and his existence are ontologically, not chronologically, prior to Fido's existing. (p. 10) But if Fido is ontologically prior to Fido's existing, how is this priority contradicted by the fact, if it is one, that Fido is inconceivable until he exists? Fido's being nothing, not even a possible entity, chronologically prior to his existing seems logically compatible with his being ontologically prior to his existing, and therefore a constituent of his existing. The fact that "...Fido's existing should be conceptually constructible from Fido and his existence" (p. 83) seems consistent with Fido's being "disqualified [from being the starting point of the construction] by being inconceivable until he has completed his existence." (p. 83) A conceptual construction is presumably not a temporal process, despite Miller's talk of "beginning" the construction, moving through its "steps" and "stages," (p. 81) and "finishing" it. (p. 82) This talk is surely to be taken nontemporally. If so, it is not clear why Fido cannot be both ontologically prior and chronologically simultaneous with his existing. Surely Miller is not equivocating on 'prior'?

A second point concern's Miller's oft-made admission that Fido's existing admits of more than one legitimate analysis. (p. 37, n. 18, p. 81) Miller's analysis generates a contradiction; but if there is a legitimate analysis that does not generate a contradiction, would this not undercut Miller's argument? He would not think so, since "The nub of the argument is that a legitimate analysis cannot generate an insoluble paradox." (p. 81) But isn't the fact, assuming it is a fact, that Miller's analysis issues in a contradiction, together with the fact that alternative legitimate analyses are available, prima facie evidence that his analysis is illegitimate? It seems that for Miller's argument to work he must show, or at least render credible, the view that his analysis is the only legitimate analysis.

W. F. Vallicella

Abbreviations, Place-Holders, and Logical Form

It is one thing to abbreviate an argument, another to depict its logical form. Let us consider the following argument composed in what might be called 'canonical English':

1. If God created some contingent beings, then he created all contingent beings.
2. God created all contingent beings.
-----
3. God created some contingent beings.

The above  is an argument, not an argument-form. The following abbreviation of the argument is also an argument, not an argument-form: 

1. P --> Q
2. Q
---
3. P

Both are arguments; it is just that the second is an abbreviation of the first in which sentences are replaced with upper-case letters and the logical words with symbols from the propositional calculus. But it is easy to confuse the second argument with the following argument-form:

1. p --> q
2. q
---
3. p

An argument-form is a one-over-many: many arguments can have the same form. And the same goes for its constituent propositional forms: each is a one-over-many. 'p --> q' is the form of indefinitely many conditional statements. But an argument, whether spelled out or abbreviated, is a particular, and as such uninstantiable. One cannot substitute different statements for the upper-case 'P' and 'Q' above.

Some of you will call this hair-splitting. But I prefer to think of it as a distinction essential to clear thinking in logic. For suppose you confuse the second two schemata. Then you might think that the original argument, the one in 'canonical English,' is an instance of the formal fallacy of Affirming the Consequent. But the second schema, though it is an instance of the third, is also an instance of a valid argument-form:

(x)(Cgx)
---
(Ex)(Cgx).

In sum, the confusion of abbreviations with place-holders aids and abets the mistake of thinking that an argument that instantiates an invalid form is invalid. Validity and invalidity are asymmetrical: if an argument instantiates a valid form, then it is valid; but if it instantiates an invalid form, then it may or may not be invalid.

'The Wrong Side of History'

I once heard a prominent conservative tell an ideological opponent that he was 'on the wrong side of history.' But surely this is a phrase that no self-aware and self-consistent conservative should use. The phrase suggests that history is moving in a certain direction, toward various outcomes, and that this direction and these outcomes are somehow justified by the actual tendency of events. But how can the mere fact of a certain drift justify that drift? For example, we are moving in the United States, and not just here, towards more and more intrusive government, more and more socialism, less and less individual liberty. This has certainly been the trend from FDR on regardless of which party has been in power. Would a self-aware conservative want to say that the fact of this drift justifies it?  I think not.

'Everyone today believes that such-and-such.' It doesn't follow that such-and-such is true. 'Everyone now does such-and-such.' It doesn't follow that such-and-such ought to be done. 'The direction of events is towards such-and-such.' It doesn't follow that such-and-such is a good or valuable outcome. In each of these cases there is a logical mistake. One cannot validly infer truth from belief, ought from is, or values from facts.

One who opposes the drift toward socialism, a drift that is accelerating under President Obama, is on the wrong side of history. But that is no objection unless one assumes that history's direction is the right direction. Now an Hegelian might believe that, one for whom all the real is rational and all the rational real. Marxists and 'progressives' might believe it. But no conservative who understands conservatism can believe it.

The other night a conservative talk show host told a guest that she was on the wrong side of history in her support for same-sex marriage.    My guess is that in a generation the same-sex marriage issue will be moot,  the liberals having won.  The liberals will have been on the right side of history.  The right side of history, but wrong nonetheless. 

As I have said more than once, if you are a conservative don't talk like a liberal. Don't validate, by adopting, their question-begging phrases.

Singular Concepts and Singular Negative Existentials

London Ed seems to be suggesting that we need irreducibly singular concepts (properties, propositional functions) if we are properly to analyze grammatically singular negative existence statements such as

1. Vulcan does not exist.

But why do we need to take 'Vulcan' to express a singular concept or haecceity property?  Why isn't the following an adequate analysis:

1A. The concept Small, intra-Mercurial planet whose existence explains the peculiarities of Mercury's orbit is not instantiated.

Note that the concept picked out by the italicized phrase is general not singular.  It is general even though only one individual instantiates it if any does.  The fact that different individuals instantiate it at different possible worlds suffices to make the concept general, not irreducibly singular.

Profiling

Moral Failure

Repeated moral failure has at least this salutary effect: it teaches us to be humble.  Moral success can have the opposite effect of conducing toward spiritual pride -- which undermines the very success of which it is the upshot.  So, while regretting one's failures, one can derive a little consolation from the realization that they are contributing to one's humility.

Down With Evil Corporations!

Down with greed!
Down with human nature!
Power to the rabble!

More on Translating 'Something Exists' and a Response to Brightly

I issued the following challenge: translate 'Something exists' into standard first-order predicate logic with identity. This is the logic whose sources are Frege and Russell. So I call it Frege-Russell logic, or, to be cute, 'Fressellian' logic.  My esteemed commenters don''t see much of a problem here.  So let me first try to explain why I see a problem.  I then  consider David Brightly's proposal.

1. First of all, 'Something exists' cannot be rendered as 'For some x, x exists.'  This is because 'exist(s)' is not an admissible first-level predicate in Frege-Russell logic.  The whole point of the Fressellian approach is to make 'exist(s)' disappear into the machinery of quantification. There is no such propositional function as 'x exists.'  'For some x, x exists' is gibberish, syntactic nonsense in Frege-Russell logic. 

2. But the following is not gibberish: 'For some x, x = x.'  So one will be tempted to say that 'Something exists' can be rendered as 'For some x, x = x,' ('Something is self-identical') and 'Everything exists' as 'For all x, x = x' ('Everything is self-identical'). 

But this won't work either.  It is true that everything that exists is self-identical, and vice versa.  But it doesn't follow, nor is it true, that existence is self-identity. Here is one consideration.  When I say of Tom that he exists, I am not saying that he is self-identical. Suppose I hear a false rumour to the effect that Tom is no more.  But then I encounter him in the flesh.  I exclaim, "You still exist!"  Clearly, "You are still self-identical" does not mean the same.  If I said that, Tom might retort, "What the hell, man, were you worried that I had become legion?"  In some circumstances, that a man should continue in existence is surprising.  But we are never surprised by a man's continuing in self-identity.

Furthermore, when Tom ceases to exist, he does not become self-diverse.  Loss of existence is not loss of self-identity.  To put the point in formal mode, after his demise 'Tom' continues to refer to one and the same individual, Tom.  The bearer of the name is gone, but not the reference. Otherwise it could not be true that Tom is gone.  There is also a modal consideration.  Tom is a contingent being: he exists but he might not have existed.  If existence is self-identity, then Tom's possible nonexistence is Tom's possible self-diversity -- which is absurd.  It makes prima facie sense to say of an individual that it might not have existed or that it no longer exists; but it make no sense at all to say of an individual that it might not have been self-identical or that it is no longer self-identical.  If Tom might not have existed, then it is Tom who might not have existed.  But if Tom might not have been self-identical, then it is not Tom who might not have been self-identical.

So, even if everything that exists is self-identical and conversely, existence is not self-identity.  When we say that something exists we are not saying that something is self-identical, and when we say that everything exists we are not saying that everything is self-identical.  I conclude that 'Something exists' is not expressible in the terms of the Frege-Russell system.  As for 'Everything exists,' it is surely a presupposition of the whole Frege-Russell approach: the approach presupposes that Meinong was wrong to speak of nonexistent objects.  But this presupposition cannot be expressed, cannot be 'said,' in Fressellian terms.

We are in the following curious predicament.  Something that must be true if if the Fresselian system is to be tenable -- that everything exists, that there are no nonexistent objects -- is not expressible within the system.

3. David Brightly accepts my challenge to give a Frege-Russell translation of 'Something exists.'  He writes:

And as a Fressellian I accept the challenge. That property is Individual aka Object, the concept at the root of the Porphyrean tree. We can say 'Something exists' with ∃x.Object(x), ie, there is at least one object. Likewise ∀x.Object(x) (which is always true, even when the box is empty) says 'Everything exists' and its negation (which is always false) says 'Some thing is not an object'. But both these last are unenlightening---because always true and always false, respectively, they convey no information, make no distinction, are powerless to change us.

I asked: which property  is it whose instantiation is the existence of something?  David's answer is that it is the property or concept Individual or Object.  And so I take David to be saying something like the following. "Just as the existence of cats is the being-instantiated of the concept cat, the existence of something is the being-instantiated of the concept Object."

David mentions the tree of Porphyry:

David speaks of the 'root' of the tree where I speak of its apex. No matter.  However we visualize it, upside down or right side up, David's suggestion is that Object or Substance (as above) is a summum genus, a supreme genus. It is a concept superordinate to every concept, a concept under which everything falls.

Operating with a scheme like this, we can, in the spirit of Frege's dialogue with the illustrious Puenjer, reduce every existential proposition (or at least every general existential proposition) to a predication by climbing Porphyry's tree.  Thus:

Cats exist --> Some mammal is a cat
Mammals exist --> Some animal is a mammal
Animals exist --> Some  living thing is an animal
Living things exist --> Some  body is a living thing
Bodies exist --> Some  substance is a body
Substances exist --> Some Objects are substances.

The point of these translations is to dispense with 'existst(s)' by showing how propositions of the form Fs exist can be replaced salva veritate with propositions of the form Some G is a F, where G is superordinate to F.  This amounts to the elimination of existence in favor of the logical quantity, someness.

We have now climbed to the tippy-top of the tree of Porphyry. We have ascended to a concept superordinate to every concept (except itself) a genus generalissimum, a most general genus.  And what concept might that be? Such a concept must have maximal extension and so will have minimal intension. It will be devoid of all content, abstracting as it does from all differences. Frege in his dialog with Puenjer suggests something identical with itself as the maximally superordinate concept. 'There are men' and 'Men exist' thus get rendered as 'Something identical with itself is a man.' (63)  Something identical with itself is equivalent to Brightly's Object.

4. Now why can't I accept the Frege-Brightly view? Well, I've already shown that 'Everything exists' cannot be translated as 'Everything is self-identical.'  But this is tantamount to having established that the concept whose instantiation is the existence of everything cannot be the concept self-identical something or the concept Object.

Another way to see this is by considering two individuals at the very bottom of the Porphyrean tree.  So consider my cats, Max and Manny.  In respect of being cats, mammals, beasts, animals, living things, material substances, and self-identical somethings, they do not differ.  They do not differ quidditatively.  But they do differ: they differ in their very existence.  Each has his own existence.  Max is not Manny, and Manny is not Max.  That is not a mere numerical difference; it is a numerical-existential difference.  Since each cat has its own existence, the existence of either cannot be the being-instantiated of any quidditative concept. All such concepts abstract from existence.  The same goes for all individuals.  Individuals exist.  But the existence of individuals is not the being-instantiated of any concept. If you want, you can think of existent (self-identical something) as a highest genus, but Existence -- that in virtue of which things  exist and are not nothing -- is not a highest genus.  And it is Existence that is the topic.  There are no instances of Existence.  Existing things are not a kind of thing.

The Frege-Russell theory fails utterly as a theory of Existence.

As sure as I am sitting here, I am sure that I will not convince the Londonistas.  That fact is more grist for the (meta)philosophical mill.

First John Derbyshire, then Naomi Riley

John Fund in Censoring Naomi Riley comments on the latter's dismissal by the The Chronicle of Higher Education:

Earlier this week, the Chronicle of Higher Education, the trade paper for faculty members and administrators in universities, fired Naomi Schaefer Riley, a paid blogger for its website. Her crime? She had the courage to respond to a Chronicle story called “Black Studies: ‘Swaggering Into the Future,’” which stated that “young black-studies scholars . . . are less consumed than their predecessors with the need to validate the field or explain why they are pursuing doctorates in their discipline.” The article used five Ph.D. candidates as examples of those “rewriting the history of race.” Riley looked at the subject areas of the five proposed dissertations and concluded that they were “obscure at best . . . a collection of left-wing victimization claptrap at worst.”

John Fund goes on to make a number of obvious points in protest of the illiberalism of contemporary liberals.

But Fund neglects to comment on the irony of publishing his piece in National Review Online, which recently defenestrated John Derbyshire.  (My posts on Derbyshire are in the Race category.)  What makes it worse is that NRO is supposedly a conservative publication.  We have a supposedly conservative publication publishing a piece that criticizes The Chronicle for dumping a blogger who bravely  spoke her mind and expressed some unpleasant truths that many acknowledge but few have the courage to express.  But this same publication did exactly the same thing to John Derbyshire.  We expect craven acquiescence to race-baiters from politically correct liberals, but not from so-called conservatives such as Rich Lowry and Andrew McCarthy.

Why doesn't Fund stick up for Derbyshire? (Perhaps he has in some other venue.)  I could be wrong, but Derbyshire is a more substantial commentator on the passing scene than the blogger Riley.

Saturday Night at the Oldies: Travel, Travail, Transition

Johnny Cash, I've Been Everywhere, man, crossed the deserts bare, man/I've breathed the mountain air, man/Of travel I've had my share, man/I've been everywhere.
Pete Seeger, Passing Through.  "Yankee, Russian, white or tan, Lord a man is just a man/We're all brothers and we're only passing through."
Soggy Mountain Boys, I am a Man of Constant Sorrow
Peter, Paul, and Mary, 500 Miles
EmmyLou Harris, Wayfaring Stranger
Ralph Stanley, Will the Circle be Unbroken
Karla Bonoff, The Water is Wide.  Is there a better treatment?
Tom Waits, Shiver Me Timbers.  If you've read Jack London's Martin Eden, you will figure out what this song is about.

More on Asserting and Arguing

James Anderson comments astutely via e-mail:

I have a worry about your post Asserting and Arguing.

You seem to affirm all of the following:

(1) An assertion is a mere assertion unless argued.
(2) Mere assertions are gratuitous.
(3) The premises of arguments are assertions.
(4) One cannot argue for every premise of every argument.

This is an accurate summary except for (3).  I did not say that the premises of arguments are assertions since I allow that the premises of an argument may be unasserted propositions.  The constituent propositions of arguments considered in abstracto, as they are considered in formal logic, as opposed to arguments used in concrete dialectical situations to convince oneself or someone else of something, are typically unasserted.

Since the conclusion of an argument cannot be any stronger (or less gratuitous) than its premises, doesn't it follow from these claims that the conclusion of every argument is gratuitous?

Well, if the conclusion follows from the premises, then it has the support of those premises, and is insofar forth less gratuitous than they are.  Your point is better put by saying that, if the premises are gratuitious, then the conclusion canot be ultimately non-gratuitous, but only proximately non-gratuitous.

You distinguish between 'making' arguments and 'entertaining' arguments, but that doesn't offer a way out here because the kind of argument required in (1) and (3) is a 'made' argument rather than an 'entertained' argument.

Isn't the answer here to reject (1) and to grant that some assertions (e.g., the assertion that your cats are on the desk) can be neither mere assertions nor argued assertions?  We need a category like 'justified' assertions:  no justified assertion is a mere assertion and not every justified assertion is an argued assertion.

Professor Anderson has put his finger on a real problem with the post, and I accept his criticism.  I began the post with the sentence, "Mere assertions remain gratuitous until supported by arguments."  But that is not quite right.  I should have written:  "Mere assertions remain gratuitous until supported, either by argument, or in some other way."  Thus my assertion that two black cats are lounging on my writing table  is not a mere assertion although it is and must be unargued; it is an assertion justified by sense perception.

Expressed more clearly, the main point of the post was that ultimate justification via argument alone cannot be had.  Sooner or late one must have recourse to propositions unsupportable by argument.  Argument does not free us of the need to make assertions.  (I am assuming that there is no such thing as infinitely regressive support or circular support.  Not perfectly obvious, I grant: but very plausible.)

 

Keezer on Kats

Bill Keezer writes,

I had a cat once like which there will never be another. He supposedly was my wife’s cat. He decided I was his human. He considered it his divine right to walk up in my lap when I was studying statistical mechanics and lie down on the book. I would walk up the street to cross the highway to the convenience store and he would come up to me, let me carry him across and then once down, go hunt in the field until it was time to come back. At such time he would come up to me, let me pick him up and carry him back across the highway. Once down on the other side, he would disappear until we reached home. He was a phenomenal hunter. He grew up on a farm and until was sent to us would produce several mouse heads a day. A mouse got in the house once and hid behind the refrigerator. I pulled the fridge out, dropped the cat in, and came back a bit later. Problem solved. When we lived in San Francisco, we had a stair with right angles to a glass front outside door. He would scare all the callers because he was pure panther-black and moved like a much bigger cat. The pumas in the zoo remind me of his walk. He died of infectious feline anemia and rather broke my heart. 

So I envy you your cats. We now have my son’s dog and very expensive living room furniture. I don’t think cats are in our future. But that is OK. We had cats afterwards and it wasn’t the same.

 Enjoy them.

Asserting and Arguing

Mere assertions remain gratuitous until supported by arguments. Quod gratis asseritur, gratis negatur.  That which is gratuitously assertible is gratuitously deniable.  Thus one is right to demand arguments from those who make assertions.  It is worth pointing out, however, that  the difference between making an assertion and giving an argument is not absolute. Since no argument  can prove its own premises, they must remain mere assertions from within the context of the argument. No doubt they too can be supported by further arguments, but eventually one comes to ultimate premises that can only be asserted, not argued.

Argument cannot free us of assertion since every argument has premises and they must be asserted if one is making an argument as opposed to merely entertaining one.  One who makes an argument is not merely asserting its conclusion; he is asserting its conclusion on the basis of premises that function as reasons for the assertion; and yet the premises  themselves are merely asserted.  There is no escaping the need to make assertions.

If you refuse to accept ultimate premisses, then you are bound for a vicious infinite regress or a vicious circle, between which there is  nothing to choose.    (The viciousness of a logical circle is not mitigated by increasing its 'diameter.') This shows the limited value of argument and discursive rationality. One cannot avoid the immediate taking of something for true.  For example, I immediately take it to be true, on the basis of sense perception, that a couple of  black cats are lounging on my desk:

 

A Wittgenstein Paradox

Ludwig Wittgenstein had no respect for academic philosophy and steered his students away from academic careers.  For example, he advised Norman Malcolm to become a rancher, a piece of advice Malcolm wisely ignored.  And yet it stung his vanity to find his ideas recycled and discussed in the philosophy journals.  Wittgenstein felt that when the academic hacks weren't plagiarizing his ideas they were misrepresenting them.

The paradox is that his writing can speak only to professional philosophers, the very people he despised.  Ordinary folk, even educated ordinary folk, find the stuff gibberish. When people ask me what of Wittgenstein they should read, I tell them to read first a good biography like that of Ray Monk, and then, if they are still interested, read the aphorisms and observations contained in Culture and Value (Vermischte Bemerkungen).

Only professional philosophers take seriously the puzzles that Wittgenstein was concerned to dissolve.  And only a professional philosopher will be exercised by the meta-problem of the origin and status of philosophical problems.  So we have the paradox of a man who wrote for an audience he despised.

"There is less of a paradox that you think.  Wittgenstein was writing mainly for himself; his was a therapeutic conception of philosophy.  His writing was a form of self-therapy.  He was tormented by the problems.  His writing was mainly in exorcism of his demons." 

This connects with the fly and fly bottle remark in the Philosophical Investigations.

Why does the bug need to be shown the way out? Pop the cork and he's gone.

Why did Wittgenstein feel the need to philosophize his way out of philosophy? He should have known that metaphilosophy and anti-philosophy are just more philosophy with all that that entails: inconclusiveness, endlessness . . . . He should have just walked away from it.

If the room is too smoky, there is no necessity that you remain in it. You are free to go, the door is unlocked. This figure's from Epictetus and he had the quitting of life in view. But the same holds for the quitting of philosophy. Just do it, if that's what you want. It can be done.

What cannot be done, however, is to justify one's exit. (That would be like copulating your way to chastity.) For any justification proffered, perforce and willy-nilly, will be just more philosophy. You cannot have it both ways. You either walk away or stay.

Adapted from Pascal

There is light enough for those who wish to see, and darkness enough for those who don't.

On Translating 'Some Individual Exists' Fressellianly

An astute reader comments:

You write:

2. But can this presupposition be expressed (said) in this logic? Here is a little challenge for you Fressellians: translate 'Something exists' into standard logical notion. You will discover that it cannot be done. Briefly, if existence is instantiation, which property is it whose instantiation is the existence of something? Same problem with 'Nothing exists.' If existence is instantiation, which property is it whose non-instantiation is the nonexistence of anything? Similarly with 'Everthing exists' and 'Something does not exist.'

But couldn't we translate those expressions this way (assuming  we have only two properties: a, b)?
1. "something exists" -> "there is an x that instantiates either a or b or ab"
2. "everything exists" -> "there is an x that instantiates a and there is a y that instantiates b and there is a z that instantiates ab"
3. "nothing exists" -> 1 is false
4. "something doesn't exist" -> 2 is false

I am afraid that doesn't work.   We need focus only on on 'Some individual exists.'  The reader's proposal could be put as follows.  Given the properties F-ness and G-ness,

What 'Some individual exists' says is exactly what 'Either F-ness is instantiated or G-ness is instantiated' says.

I would insist however that they do not say the same thing, i.e., do not have the same meaning.  The expression on the left says that some individual or other, nature unspecified, exists.  The expression on the right, however, makes specific reference to the 'natures' F-ness and G-ness.  Surely, 'Some individual exists' could be true even if there are are no individuals that are either Fs or Gs. 

Note that it is not a matter of logic what properties there are.  This is an extralogical question.

On the Frege-Russell treatment of existence, 'exist(s)' is a second-level predicate, a predicate of concepts, properties, propositional functions and cognate items.  It is never an admissible  predicate of individuals.  Thus in this logic every affirmation of existence must say of some specified concept or property that it is instantiated, and every denial of existence must say of some specified concept or property that it fails of instantiation.

This approach runs into trouble when it comes to the perfectly meaningful and true 'Something exists' and 'Some individual exists.'  For in these instances  no concept or property can be specified whose instantiation is the existence of things or the existence of individuals.  To head off an objection: self-identity won't work.

That there are individuals is a necessary presupposition of the Frege-Russell logic in that without it one cannot validly move from 'F-ness is instantiated' to 'Fs exist.'  But it is a necessary presupposition that cannot be stated in the terms of the system.  This fact, I believe, is one of the motivations for Wittgenstein's distinction between the sayable and the showable.  What cannot be said, e.g., that there are individuals, is shown by the use of such individual variables as 'x.'

The paradox, I take it, is obvious.  One cannot say  that 'There are individuals' is inexpressible without saying 'There are individuals.'  When Wittgenstein assures us that there is the Inexpressible, das Unaussprechliche,  he leaves himself open to the retort: What is inexpressible? If he replies, 'That there are individuals,' then he is hoist by his own petard.

Surely it is true that there are individuals and therefore expressible, because just now expressed.

"The suicide of a thesis," says Peter Geach (Logic Matters, p. 265), "might be called Ludwig's self-mate . . . . "  Here we may have an instance of it.

'Blacklisted' Blacklisted

Here: "POLICE chiefs have banned IT staff from using the word blacklist over fears it is RACIST." (Via VFR)

This sort of thing is insane, of course. And so I suspect that to argue against it is foolish: it only lends credibility to a view that ought to be mocked and derided. 

But I do argue it out here.  One late-night comic lampooned the 'crispy critter' tanning lady (who brought her child into the tanning booth with her) by saying that the she is so dark it's racist!  That's the way to go.  You PeeCee liberals are so stupid it's racist! What is the antecedent of the last two occurrences of 'it'?  Don't worry, we be in PeeCee land now.  We don't need to talk no sense.

Cosmologists are going to have to be careful what with their talk of black holes.  Someone might take that as 'code' for 'black ho' a phrase that in PeeCee logic (and no, I'm not talking about the propositional calculus) implies that all black females are whores.

Wittgenstein and Rejectionism

I characterized Rejectionism with respect to the question why there is anything at all as follows:  "The rejectionist rejects the question as ill-formed, as senseless."  London Ed suggests that Wittgenstein may be lumped in with the rejectionists.  He has a point, though I do insist on the distinction between taking 'Why is there anything at all?' as an explanation-seeking why-question and taking it as a mere expression of wonder at the sheer existence of things.  We know that Wittgenstein was struck with wonder at the sheer existence of things.  What is now to be discussed is whether Wittgenstein can be read as making a rejectionist response to the ultimate explanation-seeking why-question.

 Ed quotes from Anthony Kenny's book, Wittgenstein:

Logic depends on there being something in existence and there being facts; it is independent of what the facts are, of things being thus and so. That there are facts is not something which can be expressed in a proposition. If one wants to call there being facts a matter of experience, then one can say logic is empirical. But when we say something is empirical we mean that it can be imagined otherwise; in this sense every proposition with sense is a contingent proposition. And in this sense the existence of the world is not an empirical fact, because we cannot think it otherwise.

This passage cries out for commentary.

1. Does logic depend on there being something in existence?  Yes, if we are talking about the Frege-Russell logic that young Ludwig cut his teeth on.    In 'Fressellian' logic, existence is instantiation.  To say that cats exist is to say that something is a cat.  (The concept cat is instantiated.)  To say that dragons do not exist is to say that nothing is a dragon. (The concept dragon is not instantiated.)  This works nicely -- but only on the assumption that individuals exist.    So Kenny is surely right that (Frege-Russell) logic requires that something exists, in particular that individuals exist.

2. But can this presupposition be expressed (said) in this logic? Here is a little challenge for you Fressellians: translate 'Something exists' into standard logical notion.  You will discover that it cannot be done.  Briefly, if existence is instantiation, which property is it whose instantiation is the existence of something?  Same problem with 'Nothing exists.'  If existence is instantiation, which property is it whose non-instantiation is the nonexistence of anything?  Similarly with 'Everthing exists' and 'Something does not exist.'

3. I surmise that this is one of the motivations for Wittgenstein's infamous and paradoxical saying/showing distinction. What can be said can be said clearly.  But not everything can be said.  It cannot be said that there are beings or that there are objects or that there are individuals.  For again, how does one express (say) that there are beings (existents) in Frege-Russell logic?  This system of logic rests on presuppositions that cannot be expressed within the system.  The presuppositions cannot be said but thay can be shown by the use of variables such as the individual variable 'x.'  That is the Tractarian line.

4. Kenny also says that logic depends on there being facts.  That's not clear.  Near the beginning of the Tractatus, LW affirms the existence of facts.  He tells us that the world is the totality of facts (Tatsachen) not of things (Dinge).  But does the Frege-Russell logic require that there be facts?  Not as far as I can see.  The mature Frege certainly did not posit facts.  Be that as it may.

5. Is Wittgenstein a rejectionist?  Does he reject the question 'Why is there anything at all?' as senseless or ill-formed? The case can be made that he does or at least could within his framework.

When I raise the question why anything at all exists, I begin with the seemingly empirical fact that things exist: me, my cat, mountains, clouds . . . .   I then entertain the thought that there might have been nothing at all.  I then demand an explanation as to why there is something given (a) that there is something and (b) that there might not have been anything.

A Wittgensteinian rejection of the question might take the following form. "First of all, your starting point is inexpressible: it cannot be said that things exist.  That is a nonsensical pseudo-proposition. You can say, sensibly, that cats exist, but not that things exist. That things exist is an unsayable presupposition of all thinking.  As such, we cannot think it away.  And so one cannot ask why anything exists."

6. This form of rejectionism is as dubious as what it rests upon, namely, the Frege-Russell theory of existence and the saying/showing distinction.

Obama's Historical Howlers

Here.  The funniest is Obama's reference to the construction of the "Intercontinental Railroad" in the 19th century.  That would be something, a railroad that crossed oceans.  Think of all the pontoons that would be needed to float the tracks on. 

The article documents Obama and his gang's unconcern with truth -- as if we needed more evidence of that.

Cabinets Gone Wild

Another outstanding column by Victor Davis Hanson.  Excerpt:

Attorney General Eric Holder dropped charges against the New Black Panther Party for voter intimidation. That may explain why he said nothing when the same group put out a dead-or-alive bounty poster on George Zimmerman in the Trayvon Martin shooting case. Holder's department is suing the state of Arizona for passing a law to enforce the largely unenforced federal immigration law. Holder suggested that the Arizona law was racially inspired even as he admitted that he had never read it. Holder has praised the race-baiting Al Sharpton for his "partnership" and called the country "cowards" for not holding a national conversation on race on his terms. The attorney general has referred to African-Americans as "my people," and he has characterized congressional oversight of his office's failure to rein in the Fast and Furious scandal as racially motivated attacks on himself.

Some Inaccurate Negative Stereotypes About Stereotypes

• People ascribe a stereotype to everybody in the subject group. "All Germans are efficient." "All English people have bad teeth." In fact, these researchers were not able to locate anybody who believes that a stereotype is true of all members of the stereotyped group. Stereotypes are probabilistic tools, and even the most dull-witted human beings seem to know this. People who believe that Mexicans are lazy or that the French don't wash, understand perfectly well that there are lots of industrious Mexicans and fragrant Frenchmen.

• Stereotypes exaggerate group characteristics. No, they don't. Much more often, the opposite is true. For example, the racial stereotypes that white Americans hold of black Americans are generally accurate; and where they are inaccurate, they always under-estimate a negative characteristic. The percentage of black American families headed by a female, for example, was 21 at the time of one survey (1978): the whites whose stereotypes were being investigated offered estimates of from 8 to 12 per cent. It is not true that stereotypes generally exaggerate group differences. As in this example, they are much more likely to downplay them.

• Stereotypes blind us to individual characteristics. Nope. It is not the case that when we pass from a situation where we have nothing to go on but a stereotype (cab driver being hailed by young black male) to one where a person's individuality comes into play (interviewing a black job applicant), our stereotypes blind us to "individuating traits." On the contrary, researchers have found that the individuating traits are seized on for attention, and stereotypes discarded, with rather more enthusiasm than the accuracy of stereotypes would justify. Teachers' judgments about their students, for example, rest almost entirely on student differences in performance, hardly at all on race, class or gender stereotypes. This is as one would wish, but not as one would expect if the denigrators of stereotyping were to be believed.

• The real function of stereotypes is to bolster our own self-esteem. Wrong again. This is not a factor in most stereotyping. The scientific evidence is that the primary function of stereotypes is what researchers very prettily call "the reality function." That is, stereotypes are useful tools for dealing with the world. Confronted with a snake or a faun, our immediate behavior is determined by generalized beliefs — stereotypes — about snakes and fauns. Stereotypes are, in fact, merely one aspect of the mind's ability to make generalizations, without which science and mathematics, not to mention much of everyday life, would be impossible. Researcher Clark R. McCauley:

Standing next to the bus driver, we are more likely to ask about traffic patterns than about the latest foreign film. On the highway, we try to squeeze into the exit lane in front of the man driving a 10-year-old station wagon rather than trying to pull in on the man driving a new Corvette. Looking for the school janitor, we are more likely to approach a young man in overalls than a young woman in overalls. This kind of discrimination on the basis of group differences can go wrong, but most of us probably feel that we are doing ourselves and others a favor when we respond to whatever cues and regularities our social environment affords us.

Taken verbatim from John Derbyshire, Stereotypes Aren't So Bad

On the Word 'Racism' and Some of its Definitions

'Racism' and 'racist' are words used by liberals as all-purpose semantic bludgeons.  Proof of this is that the terms are never defined, and so can be used in wider or narrower senses depending on the polemical and ideological purposes at hand.  In common parlance 'racism' and 'racist'  are pejoratives, indeed, terms of abuse.  This is why it is foolish for conservatives such as John Derbyshire to describe themselves as racists while attempting to attach some non-pejorative connotation to the term.  It can't be done.  It would be a bit like describing oneself as as an asshole, 'but in the very best sense of the term.'  'Yeah, I'm an asshole  and proud of it; we need more assholes; it's a good thing to be.'  The word has no good senses, at least when applied to an entire human as opposed to an orifice thereof.  For words like 'asshole,' 'child molester,' and 'racist' semantic rehabilitation is simply not in the cards.  A conservative must never call himself a racist.  (And I don't see how calling himself a racialist is any better.)  What he must do is attack ridiculous definitions of the term, defend reasonable ones, and show how he is not a racist when the term is reasonably defined.

Let's run through some candidate definientia of 'racism':

1. The view that there are genetic or cultural differences between racial groups and that these differences have behavioral consequences.

Since this is indeed the case, (1) cannot be used to define 'racism.'  The term, as I said, is pejorative: it is morally bad to be a racist.  But it is not morally bad to be a truth-teller.  The underlying principle here is that it can't racism if it is true.  Is that not obvious?

Suppose I state that blacks are 11-13% of the U.S. population.  That cannot be a racist statement for the simple reason that it is true.  Nor can someone who makes such a statement be called a racist for making it.  A statement whose subject matter is racial is not a racist statement.  Or I inform you that blacks are more likely than whites to contract sickle-cell anemia.  That too is true.  But in this second example there is reference to an unpleasant truth.  Even more unpleasant are those truths about the differential rates of crime as between blacks and whites.  But pleasant or not, truth is truth, and there are no racist truths. (I apologize for hammering away at these platitudes, but in a Pee Cee world in which people have lost their minds, repetition of the obvious is necessary.)

2. The feeling of affinity for those of one's own racial and ethnic background.

It is entirely natural to feel more comfortable around people of one's own kind than around strangers.  And of course there is nothing morally objectionable in this. No racism here.

3. The view that it is morally justifiable  to put the interests of one's own race or ethnic group above those of another in situations of conflict or limited resources.  This is to be understood as the analog of the view that it it morally justifiable to put the interests of oneself and one's own family, friends, and neighbors above the interests of strangers in a situation of conflict or limited resources.

There is nothing morally objectionable in his, and nothing that could be legitimately called racism.

4. The view that the genetic and cultural differences between races or ethnic groups justifies genocide or slavery or the denial of political rights.

Now we arrive at an appropriate definiens of 'racism.'  This is one among several  legitimate ways of defining 'racism.'  Racism thus defined is morally offensive in the extreme.  I condemn it and you should to.  I condemn all who hold this. 

Saturday Night at the Oldies: Cinco de Mayo

In observance of Cinco de Mayo, I scrounge up some Latin-flavored tunes.

Gary U. S. Bonds, Twist, Twist Senora
Righteous Bros., Little Latin Lupe Lu
Bill Medley, The Story of Little Latin Lupe Lu
Nana Mouskouri, La Paloma
Elvis Presley, Blue Spanish Eyes
Warren Zevon, Carmelita
Flying Burrito Bros., Juanita
Los Lobos, La Bamba
And finally a visit to Rosa's cantina and wicked Felina

Siger of Brabant on Why Something Rather Than Nothing

London Ed offers this quick, over-breakfast but accurate as far as I can tell translation from the Latin (available at Ed's site):

For not every being has a cause of its being, nor does every question about being have a cause. For if it is asked why there is something in the natural world rather than nothing, speaking about the world of created things, it can be replied that there is a First immoveable Mover, and a first unchangeable cause. But if it is asked about the whole universe of beings why there is something there rather than nothing, it is not possible to give a cause, for it's the same to ask this as to ask why there is a God or not, and this does not have a cause. Hence not every question has a cause, nor even every being.

Ed comments, "I'm not sure how Siger's reply falls into the categories given by Bill."  Note first that the question that interests me is in the second of Siger's questions, the 'wide-open' question: not the question why there are created things, but the question why there is anything at all.   To that wide-open question Siger's response falls under Rejectionism in my typology of possible responses.  Siger rejects the question as unanswerable when he says, idiosyncratically to our ears, "it is not possible to give a cause," and "not every question has a cause."  That could be read as saying that not every interrogative form of words expresses a genuine question.

Ed also mentions Wittgenstein and suggests that he "had a go" at the Leibniz question.  I don't think so.  We must distinguish between 'Why is there anything at all?' as an explanation-seeking why-question and the same grammatically interrogative formulation as a mere expression of wonderment equivalent to 'Wittgenstein's "How extraordinary that anything should exist!"  Wittgenstein was not raising or trying to answer the former.  He was merely expressing wonder at the sheer existence of things.

I would be very surprised if someone can find in the history or philosophy, or out of his own head, a response to the wide-open explanation-seeking Leibniz question that cannot be booked under one of my rubrics.  (Credit where credit is due: my catalog post is highly derivative from the work of N. Rescher.)

Four Dead in Ohio

Today is the 42nd anniversary of the shootings at Kent State in 1970.  Here is what happened. Here is Neil Young's song performed by Crosby, Stills, Nash and Young about the events of the day.

Maverick Philosopher Eighth Blogiversary

I began this weblog eight years ago today in 2004.

The rumors of blogging's demise have been vastly exaggerated.  What has happened is that those whose purposes all along were more social and less serious have moved on to the so-called social media, Facebook and Twitter.   Read or unread, whether by sages or fools, I shall blog on. A post beats a tweet any day, and no day without a post. Nulla dies sine linea. It is too early to say of blogging what Etienne Gilson said of philosophy, namely, that it always buries its undertakers, but I am hopeful. After all, a weblog is just an online journal, and journal scribbling has flourished most interestingly for centuries.

To put it romantically, blogging is a vehicle for the relentless, quotidian sifting, seeking, and questing for sense and truth and reality without which some of us would find life meaningless.

This, the fourth version of Maverick Philosopher, was begun on 31 October 2008. Traffic is good, with 1.3 million total pageviews for this version alone.  That averages out to 1024 page views per day since Halloween 2008. This incarnation sports 3,333 posts.  I thank you for your patronage.

Cat and Mouse

Introducing to the worldwide readership of MavPhil, Manny K. Black, the brother and litter mate of Max Black who will be making his debut later:

 

A Catalog of Possible Types of Response to 'Why Is There Anything At All?'

By my count there are seven possible types of response to the above question, which I will call the Leibniz question.  I will give them the following names: Rejectionism, Mysterianism, Brutalism, Theologism, Necessitarianism,  Nomologism/Axiologism, and Cosmologism.  As far as I can see, my typology, or rather my emendation of Rescher's typology,  is exhaustive.  All possible solutions must fall under one of these heads.  You may send me an e-mail if you think that there is an eighth type of solution.

Either the Leibniz question is illegitimate, a pseudo-question, or it is a genuine question.  If the   former, then it cannot be answered and ought to be rejected.  Following Rescher, we can call this first response  

Rejectionism.  The rejectionist rejects the question as ill-formed, as senseless.  Compare the question, 'How fast does time flow?'  The latter is pretty obviously a pseudo-question resting as it does on a false presupposition, namely, that time is a  measurable process within time.  Whatever time is, it is not a process in time. If it flows, it doesn't flow like a river at some measurable rate.  One does not answer a pseudo-question; one rejects it.  Same with such complex questions as 'When did you stop smoking dope?' The Leibniz question in its contrastive formulation -- Why is there something rather than nothing? -- may well be a pseudo-question. I gave an argument for this earlier.

If the the Leibniz question is legitimate, however, then it is either unanswerable or answerable.  If unanswerable, then the question points to a mystery.  We can call this response

Mysterianism.  On this approach the  question is held to be genuine, not pseudo as on the rejectionist approach, but unanswerable.  The question has a clear sense and does not rest on any false presupposition.  But no satisfying answer is available.

If the question is answerable, then there are five more possible responses.

Brutalism or Brute Fact Approach.  On this approach there is no explanation as to why anything at all exists.  It is a factum brutum.  As Russell said in his famous BBC debate with the Jesuit Copleston, "The universe is just there, and that is all." (Caveat lector: Quoted from memory!)  A brute fact may be defined as an obtaining state of affairs that obtains without cause and without reason.  If the Principle of Sufficient Reason holds, then of course there are no brute facts.  The principle in question, however, is contested.

Theologism or Theological Approach.  There is a metaphysically necessary and thus self-explanatory  being, God, whose existence and  activity explains the existence of everything other than God.  Why is there anything at all?  Because everything is either self-explanatory (causa sui) or caused to exist by that which is self-explanatory.

Necessitarianism.  On this approach, the metaphysical necessity that traditional theology ascribes to God is ascribed to the totality of existents: it exists as a matter of metaphysical necessity.  It is necessary that there be some totality of existents or other, and (what's worse) that there be precisely this totality and no other. There is no real contingency. Contingency is merely epistemic.  Why is there anything at all?  Because it couldn't have been otherwise!

Nomologism/Axiologism. Theories of this type have been proposed by A. C. Ewing (Value and Reality, 1973), John Leslie (Universes, 1989), and Nicholas Rescher, The Riddle of Existence, 1984).  I will provide a rough sketch of Rescher's approach. 

For Rescher, there is a self-subsistent realm of real possibilities or "proto-laws" whose mode of being is independent of the existence of substances.  This realm of real possibilities is  not nothing, but it is not a realm of existents.  Rescher's claim is that the proto-laws account for the existence of things "without being themselves embodied in some existing thing or things." (27)  Some facts, e.g., that there are things (substances) at all, is "Grounded in the nature of possibility." (27)  What is the nature of this grounding? R. speaks of "nomological causality" as opposed to "efficient causality." (21)  Somehow -- and I confess to finding this all rather murky -- the proto-laws nomologically cause the existence of physical substances.  How does this explain why there is something rather than nothing?

R. argues, p. 31: (a) If every R-possible world is F, then the actual world is F. (b) Every R-possible world is nonempty. Therefore, (c) The actual world is nonempty: there is something rather than nothing (31).  That is, only nonempty worlds are really possible. As R. remarks, the reasoning here is like the ontological argument: only an actual God is really possible.  Rescher's view seems to be that, while there is a plurality of possible worlds, there is no possible world empty of physical existents.  But how does Rescher support premise (b): Every R-possible world is nonempty?  He gives a ridiculous question-begging argument (p. 32) that I won't bother to reproduce.

Cosmologism.  The above six approaches are listed by N. Rescher (The Riddle of Existence, 1984, Ch. 1).  But I believe there is a seventh approach which I learned from my old friend Quentin Smith. (A later post will deal with this in detail.)    On this approach the Leibniz question is genuine (contra Rejectionism) and has an answer (contra Mysterianism).  Moreover, the answer has the form of an explanation (contra Brutalism).  But the answer do not involve any necessary substance such as God, nor does it take the line that the universe itself exists of necessity.  Nor does the answer ascribe any causal efficacy to abstract laws or values.  The idea is that the universe has the resources to explain its own existence:  it caused itself to exist.  Roughly, everything (space-time, matter, laws) came into existence 13.7 billion years ago; it was caused to come into existence; but it was not caused to come into existence by anything distinct from the universe.  How?  Well, assume that the universe is just the sum total of its states.   Assume further that if each state has an explanation, then this suffices as an explanation of the sum total of states.  Now each state has a causal explanation in terms of an earlier state.  There is no first state despite the fact that the universe is metrically finite in age: 13.7 billion years old.   There is no first state because of the continuity of time and causation: for every state there are earlier states in its causal ancestry.  Because every state has a cause, and the universe is just the sum-total of its states, the universe has  a cause.  But this cause is immanent to the universe.  So the universe caused itself to exist!