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Sunday, August 14, 2016

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It's been a while since I last read WaPF, but I would have said that Plantinga's position is that belief in the numerical identity of the yesterday- and today-trees is properly basic.

Plantinga would presumably say that we know (if we, in fact, know) that the trees are identical only if the belief is produced by a properly functioning and reliable belief-producing mechanism that is aimed at truth-acquisition, operating in the appropriate cognitive environment, etc. (I can't recall all of the qualifying nuances that he introduces over the course of the book.)

My understanding of Plantinga's discussion of (Reid on) induction, was that Plantinga was only pointing out that Reid's principle could not be noncircularly confirmed, and not that it accurately describes how we come to know the results of the principle's operation; I believe Plantinga goes to some lengths to avoid using "know" or its cognates in those passages, sticking to phrases such as "we take X to be Y", instead.

But I could be wrong.

"To perceive change, I must perceive diachronic identity, identity over time. I do not perceive the latter; so I do not perceive change. "

What about those flip books where if you flick sufficiently fast, there is the illusion or appearance of movement. I agree we are not perceiving movement (since there is none), but the illusion is completely involuntary, i.e. there is no judgment in the standard sense: it’s all presentation.

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