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Monday, October 02, 2017


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>>The problem, however, is that these haecceity-properties – of which Plantinga has made heavy use in recent years – are simply unintelligible.

As we agreed in the other post, right?

We have agreed on this for some time now. I have been maintaining it for a couple of decades.

But what about this *ratio particularis* notion Hennessey refers us to? You have a better grip on medieval philosophy than I do. How would you explain it, *ratio particularis,* I mean, and what do you think of it?

>>How would you explain it, *ratio particularis,* I mean,

This is almost exclusively used by Thomas. E.g. Metaphysics comm. Book I

Supra memoriam autem in hominibus, ut infra dicetur, proximum est experimentum, quod quaedam animalia non participant nisi parum. Experimentum enim est ex collatione plurium singularium in memoria receptorum. Huiusmodi autem collatio est homini propria, et pertinet ad vim cogitativam, quae ratio particularis dicitur: quae est collativa intentionum individualium, sicut ratio universalis intentionum universalium.

Now, as is stated below (18), in men the next thing above memory is experience, which some animals have only to a small degree. For an experience arises from the association of many singular [intentions] received in memory. And this kind of association is proper to man, and pertains to the cogitative power (also called particular reason), which associates particular intentions just as universal reason associates universal ones.

Make of that what you will.

>>and what do you think of it?

Either that, or not exactly pellucid.

I invite Richard Hennessey to respond to your comment.

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