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Tuesday, May 08, 2018

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Thanks for the post, Bill. It’s relevant to something I’ve been thinking about lately.

You wrote “Not even God can do it.”

According to Molinism, God has middle knowledge. On this view, logically prior to creation God knows all counterfactual propositions, including those about the libertarian choices of his creatures in any freedom-permitting situation.

According to the grounding objection to Molinism, there are no true counterfactuals about the libertarian choices of human beings, since there is no ground for the truth of such counterfactuals.

Several responses to this objection have been proposed. One is relevant to your post: true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are grounded in individual human essences which exist logically prior to creation. As Erik Baldwin put it: “Logically prior to creation, the truth of a true counterfactual of creaturely freedom can be explained in terms of God’s knowledge of actually existing individual human person essences.” (Putting Uninstantiated Human Person Essences to Work, Philosophia Christi 15, no. 2, 2013, p. 449)

Now, if you’re correct that it’s impossible to conceive of an individual that has not yet come into existence, then isn’t Baldwin’s response to the grounding objection unsuccessful?

Moreover, it seems to me your thesis is itself an objection to Molinism. Am I understanding your thesis?

Excellent comment, Elliot. It relates what I am saying to a debate I am not well-versed in, namely, the one about middle knowledge.

To answer your question, yes. If there is no individual essence of Socrates prior to his coming into existence, then there are no counterfactuals involving him prior to his coming onto existence.

>>At best there was the possibility that some man or other come into existence possessing the properties that Socrates subsequently came to possess.
So why can’t an individual come into existence possessing the attribute of Socrateity? You haven’t yet given an argument that there can’t be such an attribute.

>>To conceive of some man or other is to think a general thought: it is not to think a singular thought that somehow reaches an individual in its individuality.
This is not clear. What is your definition of ‘singular thought’? What is reaching an individual in its individuality?

Scotus argues that a singular conception is a common nature conceived as ‘this’, i.e. as singular and ‘not predicable of many’ (indicibilis de pluribus), and bears the same relation to the nature conceived under the aspect ‘predicable of many’ (dicibilis de pluribus), whether it is conceived of as existing or not. I.e. individuation is prior to existence.

My argument that an individual has no individual essence prior to its coming to exist is precisely an argument against haecceity properties. It seems from various e-mails that you agree with me, but now I am not sure you understand my argument.

>>>>To conceive of some man or other is to think a general thought: it is not to think a singular thought that somehow reaches an individual in its individuality.
This is not clear. What is your definition of ‘singular thought’? What is reaching an individual in its individuality?<<

It's perfectly clear to me.

What you are reporting as Scotus' view strikes me as utter nonsense. An irreducibly singular concept cannot be "common." What could that mean?

The whole point is that individuation is NOT prior to existence! Are you claiming that it is? Then give an argument!

Thanks for addressing the question, Bill.

I wonder if it's plausible to construe God’s middle knowledge of the counterfactuals of human libertarian freedom as general rather than singular.

For example:

Logically prior to creation, God’s middle knowledge doesn’t enable him to know that if the actual man Socrates were to converse with the actual man Laches, then actual Socrates would freely choose to question actual Laches about the nature of courage. Such knowledge is impossible; logically prior to creation, actual Socrates (Laches) cannot be conceived because he has not come into existence. And there is no Socrateity (Lacheity) for God to know.

However, logically prior to creation, God’s middle knowledge enables him to know that if some man, a master dialectician possessing the other properties that Socrates would come to possess, were to converse with some other man, a general with the other properties that Laches would come to possess, then the man with the property of being a dialectician would freely question the man with the property of being a general. And the questioning would be about courage.

Then, after creation, at the coming into being of actual Socrates and actual Laches, God’s knowledge is specific and future-oriented (not merely counterfactual); he knows that in the future actual Socrates will (not merely would) freely question actual Laches, etc.

But if this argument proves anything, doesn't it prove too much? Since each concrete member of this universe is a specific individual (this rock, this person, this planet), and if God can't, arguendo, conceive of any of them as individuals prior to creating them, what was He creating?

More abstractly, if there are no (true) counterfactuals about specific individuals prior to their coming-to-be, then in what sense would possible worlds have been "possible" prior to creation?

Take any putatively possible world, W, and any individual, WI, in that world, how would it make sense to say "WI has F in WI, but lacks F in WI' ", before any world was actual? But worse, since every world is itself a particular, concrete world, how would it make sense to say of any such world that that specific world might have been different?

Well clarity is a subjective concept. What you are saying may be clear to you, but not clear to me. It was ‘reaching an individual in its individuality’ that I found difficult.

On Scotus’s claim, he means that e.g. ‘blue’ can be conceived as predicable of many, or as ‘this blue’, i.e. this blue thing. This is a singular conception. But conception does not imply existence. E.g. I can conceive of a golden mountain, but this does not imply a golden mountain exists. Scotus argues in the same place that a thing is conceived in the same way when it does not exist, as when it does exist. He cites a passage from Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, saying that there can be scientific demonstrations of things (e.g. eclipses) which have periodic or regular existence.

>> An irreducibly singular concept cannot be "common." What could that mean?
Read carefully Scotus actually says that a singular conception is a common nature conceived as ‘this’.

>>It seems from various e-mails that you agree with me, but now I am not sure you understand my argument.
I think a singular properties are absurd, on the other hand that’s different from an argument against them. I don’t really follow your argument. Try stating it in a few numbered propositions. If you can’t do this, I win.

E.g. you argue that no ‘complete description’, by which you mean a set of non-haecceity properties, can correspond to a haecceity property. Well of course. But that does not prove there is no haecceity property, merely that no set of non-haecceity properties can be that.

‘His prophecy would be singular, or, if you prefer, de re: it would involve Socrates himself.’ You have given no argument for this. You have made a set of different claims, but an argument consists of a set of premises or assumptions which logically imply the conclusion you want.

‘Let us say that the conjunctive property of Socrates mentioned above is a qualitative essence of Socrates if it entails every qualitative or pure property of Socrates whether essential, accidental, monadic, or relational..’ Again, you have merely shown that no set of non-haeccity properties can be a haeccity property.

John Doran writes,

>>But if this argument proves anything, doesn't it prove too much? Since each concrete member of this universe is a specific individual (this rock, this person, this planet), and if God can't, arguendo, conceive of any of them as individuals prior to creating them, what was He creating?<<

You seem to be assuming that when God creates Socrates, he causes the instantiation of a haecceity-property *identity-with-Socrates*, or Socrateity, a property that exists in every possible world and at every time in every world that has time. You seem to be assuming that before Socrates comes to exist Socrateity already existed.

But that is not the only way to think about divine creation.

It could be that God causes the co-instantiation of a complete set of properties none of which is an haecceity property.

On this way of looking at it, Socrates is not an individual essence individuated *in se* that merely needs existence to achieve full reality. Rather, Socrates becomes a genuine individual only when he comes to exist.

In a slogan: Individuation does not precede existence, either temporally or logically. Individuation and existence are achieved simultaneously (both temporally and logically) in the divine creative act.

OK, taking your paragraphs in turn, my numbering, to see where the argument is.

(1) What the prophet could not have prophesied was the very man that subsequently came to possess the properties in question. OK, but what is your argument for this claim?

(2) Some other individual, call him 'Schmocrates,' could satisfy the description. This depends on the description. If a set of non-haecceity properties, I agree that some other individual could satisfy the description. But if the description is ‘identical with Socrates’, only Socrates can satisfy that. For by assumption Schmocrates is not identical with (is other than) Socrates.

(3) What the prophet prophesied was general, not singular: he prophesied that a certain definite description would come to be satisfied by some man or other. OK, but what if he prophesied that Socrates, i.e. that very person, would come into existence? How do you prove this is not possible?

(4) ‘We can call this view I am espousing anti-haecceitist’ – this is a definition, fair enough.

(5) The haecceity of an individual cannot exist apart from the individual whose haecceity it is, ergo the haecceity of an individual cannot exist before the individual exists. Very well, but what is your argument that the haecceity of an individual cannot exist apart from the individual whose haecceity it is

(6) ‘how could the non-qualitative thisness of a concrete individual be thought to antedate the individual whose thisness it is?’ By supposing that the haecceity of an individual can exist apart from the individual whose haecceity it is, which you have not proved.

(7) ‘Consider the putative property, identity-with-Socrates’. OK, this paragraph sets up a thought experiment.

(8) ‘What do I mean by "involve Socrates himself"?’ The key argument here is ‘It [Socrateity] cannot be instantiated without being instantiated by Socrates.’ This is what you need to prove, see (5) above.

(9/10) ‘If Socrates has an indiscernible twin, Schmocrates, then both individuals instantiate the same qualitative essence.’ OK, then you say ‘It follows that, qua instances of this qualitative essence, they are indistinguishable.’ Two points. (1) why are they not distinguishable? For one has the property of being Socrates, the other the property of being Schmocrates. These are different properties (for no single individual can possess both), ergo if we possessed the power of discerning these properties, they would be distinguishable. (2) If you argue we possess no such power, this is an epistemic argument. God is not distinguishable from the universe in this life, but that does not mean God is identical with the universe, nor that we cannot conceive of God as separate from the universe.

(11) ‘My claim, then, is that one cannot conceive of an individual that has not yet come into existence.’ As yet unproved. ‘At best there was the possibility that some man or other come into existence possessing the properties that Socrates subsequently came to possess.’ But why not the possibility of Socrates coming into existence? You have nowhere established this!

Bill,

what would you say to this argument:

A non-individual is impossible to be actual.
But to be a (merely) possible item is to be possible to be actual.
Therefore, no (merely) possible item is non-individual.

And conversely:
Whatever is actual, must have been possible to be actual first.
But there are actual individuals.
Therefore, these individuals must first have been possible (to be actual).

In short, it seems to me that it is incoherent to say that the difference between the actual and the possible involves anything over and above the actuality itself (note: this does not entail ascribing any ontological status to the possibilia).

It seems to me that any reasonable modal semantics would fall apart if only the actual world contained individuals. Specifically, in S5, the actual world is merely possible from the perspective of any other possible world. Therefore, the S5-mere-possibility is indifferent ot actuality and is compatible with individuality.

Or am I missing something?

But if the Socrates just is the co-instantiation of a complete set of properties, then wouldn't that entail that all of those properties were essential to Socrates, and that, for instance, it would not have been possible for Socrates not to have been snub-nosed?

How do you preserve the intuition that there are some properties that individuals have essentially, and some that are had accidentally? Or, modally, properties that individuals possess in all possible worlds in which they exist, and those that they lack in some worlds in which they exist?

But that is as may be: even if you're right, and what God does when he creates Socrates, is to create Socrates-with-all-his-properties, that does not seem to entail that individuation does not precede existence, since the following counterfactuals seem obviously to follow, for God: "If I create W11, then snub-nosed-Socrates-with-all-his-properties will come into existence"; "If I create W34, then aquiline-nosed-Schmocrates-and-all-his-properties will come into existence."

And if that's true, then why can't the prophet have foresight of that truth, also? If what it is to be Socrates is simply to be created by God with a certain set of properties, P, then what the prophet is doing in foretelling the coming of Socrates is simply to foretell the creation of some individual instantiating P.


>>If what it is to be Socrates is simply to be created by God with a certain set of properties, P, then what the prophet is doing in foretelling the coming of Socrates is simply to foretell the creation of some individual instantiating P.

Right, but a haecceity property H is such that no other individual does have H, or could have H, apart from any individual that has H. That’s the point of Bill’s argument about Schmocrates.

Dark Ostrich writes,

>>(5) The haecceity of an individual cannot exist apart from the individual whose haecceity it is, ergo the haecceity of an individual cannot exist before the individual exists. Very well, but what is your argument that the haecceity of an individual cannot exist apart from the individual whose haecceity it is<<

Identity-with-Socrates (Socrateity) is a putative haecceity property. Either this property has its content by having Socrates himself as a constituent or it does not. If the former, then it is obvious that the property cannot exist unless Socrates exists. The property would then behave like Socrates' singleton which exists iff Socrates exists.

If the latter, then the only way the putative property, Socrateity, can have content is by being a qualitative essence as described above. But that essence could just as well be instantiated by an indiscernible twin of Socrates. But then it is not the haecceity of Socrates.

Why does the Ostrich fail to appreciate my argument? Perhaps he assumes the Identity of Indiscernibles.

Suppose the Identity of Indiscernibles is true. And suppose God has before his mind a wholly determinate, but merely possible, concrete individual. Let it be an iron sphere. Equivalently, he has before his mind a conjunctive property the conjuncts of which are the properties of the sphere he is contemplating creating. Call this conjunctive property a qualitative individual essence (QIE). It is qualitative in that it makes no reference to any actual individual in the way identity-with-Socrates does. It is an individual essence in that only one thing in the actual world has it, and this thing that has it must have it. If creation is actualization, all God has to do to create the wholly determinate mere possible iron sphere is add existence to it, or else bring it about that the qualitative individual essence is instantiated.

But then how could God create Max Black's world in which there are exactly two indiscernible iron spheres? He couldn't. There would be nothing to make the spheres numerically distinct. If x and y are instances of a QIE, then x = y. For there is nothing that could distinguish them. Contrapositively, if x is not identical to y, then it is not the case that x and y are instances of the same QIE. That is what you are committed to if you uphold the Identity of Indiscernibles.

On my view of creation, divine creation is not the bestowal of actuality upon pre-existent individuals; God creates the very individuality of individuals in creating them. In doing so he creates their numerical difference from one another. This is equivalent to the view that existence is a principle of numerical diversification, a thesis Aquinas held, as it would not be if existence were merely the being instantiated of a property. Thus individuals differ in their very existence: existence and individuality are bound up with each other. This view of creation involves God more intimately in what he creates: he creates both the existence and the identity of the things he creates. Thus he does not create out of mere possibles, or out of haecceity properties, whether qualitative or nonqualitative: he creates out of nothing!

On Plantinga's scheme, as it seems to me, creation is not ex nihilo but out of a certain 'matter,' the 'matter' of haecceity properties. Since they are necessary beings, there are all the haecceity properties there might have been, and what God does is cause some of them to be instantiated.

>>If the latter, then the only way the putative property, Socrateity, can have content is by being a qualitative essence as described above. But that essence could just as well be instantiated by an indiscernible twin of Socrates. But then it is not the haecceity of Socrates.<<
To repeat, I haven’t seen your argument for this. A qualitative essence by definition is such that more than one individual could possess it. Why can’t there be a ‘bare haecceity’, i.e. simply being Socrates. In that case, it logically follows that no other person can have that property.

>> how could God create Max Black's world in which there are exactly two indiscernible iron spheres? He couldn't. There would be nothing to make the spheres numerically distinct.<<
Why can’t one just be numerically different from the other? What does indiscernibility have to do with it. Scotus (I will look for the reference) gives the example of two angels which are co-extensive, i.e. occupy exactly the same region of space, and which have all the same properties. The only difference is that they are numerically different, period. Is that a logical impossibility? Why?

>>That is what you are committed to if you uphold the Identity of Indiscernibles.
Ah I see. But do you mean perceptually indiscernible or absolutely indiscernible? By the latter, I mean x and y have absolutely all properties in common, including haecceity properties. Then of course they are numerically identical. If y has the property of being one and the same thing as x, then of course y=x.
If you mean the former, then is it logically impossible that there could be two perceptually identical, but numerically different individuals? Why?

The Ostrich is recalcitrant: >> Why can’t there be a ‘bare haecceity’, i.e. simply being Socrates. In that case, it logically follows that no other person can have that property.<<

I refuted that in the first horn of the dilemma. If Socrates himself is a constituent of the bare haecceity, then this haecceity exists iff Socrates does.

Besides, there is the Ineffability Objection. If there is such a property as *being Socrates* and it is not a qualitative essence, then it is simple and unthinkable by our prophet or anyone.

These haecceities are philosophical monstrosities that result from trying to turn concrete individuals into properties.

This makes sense: Individuum qua individuum ineffabile est. This makes no sense: there are properties that are ineffable, that cannot be grasped or conceived, even partially.

'Indiscernible' sounds epistemological, but as standardly used it is not. Black's balls are two not one, but they share all relational and monadic properies, e.g. each is ten meters from an iron sphere. They differ solo numero. They differ as particulars.

If you tell me that they differ numerically because he has its own haecceity property, then you are going to have to explain to me how these supposed properties differ from bare particulars.

>>I refuted that in the first horn of the dilemma. If Socrates himself is a constituent of the bare haecceity, then this haecceity exists iff Socrates does.<<

I didn't say that Socrates himself is a constituent of the bare haecceity, rather that the bare haecceity is the property of being Socrates. Of course, if the property is instantiated, Socrates must exist. But the claim is that it may not be instantiated.

>>Besides, there is the Ineffability Objection. If there is such a property as *being Socrates* and it is not a qualitative essence, then it is simple and unthinkable by our prophet or anyone.<<

I.e. not repeatable. Why unthinkable?

>>If you tell me that they differ numerically because he has its own haecceity property, then you are going to have to explain to me how these supposed properties differ from bare particulars. <<

A bare particular is an individual, no? A haecceity property is a property.

I am kind of with you that such properties are absurd. Scotus says (somewhere) that we cannot grasp them in this life.

I can't quite put my finger on why they are absurd, however.

Fascinating discussion!

Bill originally wrote: "Before Socrates came into existence, there was no possibility that he, that very man, come into existence."

This seems quite paradoxical. If there was no antecedent possibility that Socrates come into existence, how on earth did he come into existence? Does not the actual presuppose the possible?

I suppose one response would be that before Socrates came into existence, the proposition It is possible that Socrates come into existence lacked a truth value altogether rather than being false (which would entail the impossibility of his coming into existence). But here's a modal argument to the contrary. Consider this proposition:

(S) Socrates exists at t (where t is the time he comes into existence).

In S5, S is not only possible but necessarily possible. In other words, the following proposition is necessarily true:

(P) Possibly Socrates exists at t.

But if P is necessarily true, then it must be true at all times, including all times prior to t. Yet it can only be true prior to t if Socrates -- "that very man" -- can (somehow) serve as the referent or constituent of a proposition prior to t.

What am I missing?

Hi James,

I'm glad you stopped by and I hope you are well.

>>This seems quite paradoxical. If there was no antecedent possibility that Socrates come into existence, how on earth did he come into existence? Does not the actual presuppose the possible?<<

What I am maintaining is controversial and not obvious, but also not paradoxical or self-contradictory. Nor does it fly in the face of the usual truisms about the possible and the actual, e.g., everything actual is possible, but not conversely.

Of course it was possible, before Socrates came into existence, that a man having the properties we associate with Socrates come into existence. We can all agree on that. What I am maintaining (drawing on Barry Miller who drew on A. N. Prior) is different.

Let us agree that PURE descriptions are qualitative in that they include no references to specific individuals. IMPURE descriptions are then nonqualitative in that they do include references to specific individuals. Thus 'person identical to Socrates' is a nonqualitative description. Same with 'spouse of Xanthippe.' But 'married philosopher and master dialectician' is pure.

Now if God has before his mind a complete pure description of the individual he wills to create then that description could apply to precisely one individual after creation without being restricted to any precise one. (Cf. Barry Miller, "Future Individuals and Haecceitism," Review of Metaphysics 45, September 1991, p. 14) This is a subtle distinction but an important one. It is possible that Socrates have an indiscernible twin. Call him 'Schmocrates.' So the complete description 'snub-nosed, rationalist philosopher, etc. etc.' could apply to precisely one individual without applying to Socrates, the man in the actual world that we know and love as Socrates. This is because his indiscernible twin Schmocrates would satisfy it just as well as he does. The description would then apply to precisely one individual without being restricted to any precise one. So there is a clear sense in which God, prior to creation, would not know which individual he would get. Prior to creation, God knows that there will be an individual satisfying a complete description. But until the individual comes into existence, he won't know which individual this will be.

As I see it, creation understood Biblically as opposed to Platonically is not the bestowal of existence upon a pre-existent, fully-formed, wholly determinate essence. It is not the actualization of a wholly determinate mere possible. There is no individual essence or haecceity prior to creation. Creation is the creation ex nihilo of a new individual. God creates out of nothing, not out of pre-existent individual essences or pre-existent mere possibles. Thus the very individuality of the individual first comes into being in the creative act. Socrates' individuality and haecceity and ipseity do not antedate (whether temporally or logically) his actual existence.

The underlying metaphysical question here -- which arises whether or not God exists -- is whether the individuality of an individual can somehow pre-exist both logically and temporally its actual existence. This is what I am denying. I am claiming that individuation does not precede, either logically or temporally, existence. An individual becomes truly singular only when it comes to exist.

Existence is not a mere addition to a fully-formed, wholly determinate, individual essence. There are no individual essences prior to existence. Thus there are no such monstrosities as Plantinga's haecceity properties. There is no such critter as the property identity-with-Socrates that exists at times and in worlds where Socrates does not exist.

Whether or not this view is correct, it is not obviously mistaken or paradoxical or self-contradictory or contrary to obvious data.

So James, have I convinced you that there is at least a serious question here the answer to which is not obvious?

Thanks, Bill. I am indeed well, as I trust you are.

You didn't need to convince me that there's a serious question here to which there is no straightforward answer! I guess I'm presently agnostic on the question of haecceities, and I believe I do understand your position.

However, I'm not (yet) satisfied by your answer here.

"Of course it was possible, before Socrates came into existence, that a man having the properties we associate with Socrates come into existence. We can all agree on that."

Yes, we agree on that. But the paradox arises not from this proposition:

(1) It is possible that a man having the properties we associate with Socrates come into existence.

but this one:

(2) It is possible that Socrates come into existence.

My observation was simply that Socrates' entry into the world of existents seems to presupposes the truth of (2), and furthermore that (2) is a necessary truth (if we accept S5) which must have been true prior to Socrates coming into existence. It seems to me that you sidestepped my modal argument.

I realize that my argument depends on various non-trivial theses (e.g., that the axioms of S5 are true, that propositions are real, that propositions can have individuals as referents). I suppose the question is whether your thesis requires us to jettison one of those theses! (Surely there must be an aporetic triad or tetrad for the taking here.)

I should perhaps say a little more about why I think Socrates coming into existence presupposes (2) and not merely (1). I'm assuming the principle that if a proposition is true then it is possibly true (P→◇P). When we follow that entailment, we can't equivocate on the proposition in question. (1) does not have the same meaning as (2). If P is Socrates comes into existence at t then ◇P must be Possibly Socrates comes into existence at t rather than Possibly a man having the properties we associate with Socrates comes into existence at t.

James,

My lengthy response was to your first three sentences only.

Your first claim @ 1:03 is that Socrates' coming into existence presupposes that it is possible that Socrates come into existence.

But that is not obvious. Or do you perhaps find it obvious? Of course it is possible now that S. come into existence since what is actual is possible. But what you mean is that, before S. came into existence, it was possible then that Socrates, the very same individual that we know and love, come into existence.

So you are saying that there are de re possibilities involving Socrates himself at times prior to his coming into existence.

That implies that at those pre-Socratic times a person such as the prophet I mentioned or God could make an irreducibly singular direct reference to S.

To which I reply: One can only refer to what exists or existed; S. did not exist at pre-Socratic times; ergo, no one, not even God, could have made a direct singular reference to S.

So why do you say that S's coming into existence presupposes the truth of (2)?

OK, now I see you have given an argument.

>>If P is *Socrates comes into existence at t* then ◇P must be *Possibly Socrates comes into existence at t* rather than *Possibly a man having the properties we associate with Socrates comes into existence at t.*<<

That's right, but not to the point. For the question is whether *Possibly Socrates comes into existence at t* is true at times before t. I say it isn't.

James,

You are of course right that on S5, if it is possible that p, then necessarily it is possible that p.

But I am in effect denying that there is the proposition *It is possible that Socrates come into existence* at times prior to his coming into existence. So you can't plug it in for 'p.'

Obviously, Socrates himself cannot be a constituent of the proposition. So it is the sense of 'Socrates' that is the constituent. But it is general, not singular.

If you tell me that Socrateity is the constituent, then I will point out, as I have done above to the Recalcitrant Ostrich, that that haecceity property cannot exist unless Socrates does.

Bill,

That's interesting. So are you saying that prior to the time Socrates comes into existence the proposition It is possible that Socrates come into existence doesn't exist at all? Are you thereby committed to the contingent existence of propositions? Or would you favor full-blown nominalism about propositions?

Here's my reasoning laid out step by step. Perhaps you can tell me where you would want to jump out of the cab.

1. Socrates came into existence at t.

2. It is possible that Socrates come into existence at t. [actuality entails possibility]

3. The proposition It is possible that Socrates come into existence at t is true. Call this proposition P. (P is a tenseless proposition, although it makes reference to a particular time.)

4. P is necessarily true. [by S5]

5. P is true at all times. [because necessary truths cannot fail to be true]

6. P is true prior to t (i.e., before Socrates comes into existence).

7. Prior to t, it is possible that Socrates come into existence (at t).

I'm not arguing for haecceities here (at least, not intentionally!). I'm just answering your earlier question: "So why do you say that S's coming into existence presupposes the truth of (2)?"

See new post.

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