Maverick Philosopher

Caesar Is No More: The Aporetics of Reference to the Past

Here is London Ed's most recent version of his argument in his own words except for one word I added in brackets:

1. There is no such thing as Caesar any more.

2. The predicate 'there is no such thing as -- any more' is satisfied by
Caesar.

3. If a relation obtains [between] x and y, then there is such a thing as y.

4. (From 2) the relation 'is satisfied by' obtains between the predicate '--
is not a thing any more' and Caesar.

5. (3, 4) There is such a thing as Caesar.

6. (1, 5) contradiction.

Premiss (1) is Moorean. There is no longer any such thing or person as Caesar. (Or if you dispute that for reason of immortality of Caesar, choose some mortal or perishable object). (2) is a theoretical. (3) is a logical truth, and the rest is also logic. You must choose between (1) and (2), i.e. choose between
a Moorean truth, and a dubious theoretical assumption.

(1) is indeed 'Moorean,' i.e., beyond the reach of reasonable controversy.  (2) is indeed theoretical inasmuch as it involves an optional albeit plausible parsing in the Fregean manner of the Moorean sentence.

Ed tells us that (3) is a logical truth.  I deny that it is.  A logical truth is a proposition true in virtue of its logical form alone.  'Every cat is a cat' is an example of a logical truth as are 'No cat is a non-cat' and 'Either Max is a cat or Max is not a cat.'  One can test for logical truth by negating the proposition to be tested.  If the result is a logical contradiction, then the proposition is a logical truth.  For example, if we negate 'Every cat is a cat' we get 'Some cat is not a cat.' The latter sentence is a logical contradiction, so the former sentence is a logical truth. The latter is a logical contradiction because its logical form -- Some F is not an F -- has only false substitution-instances.

Negating (3) yields 'A relation obtains between x and y, but there is no such thing as y.'  But this is not a logical contradiction in the strict and narrow sense defined above.  Suppose I am thinking about the Boston Common which, unbeknownst to me, ceases to exist while I am thinking about it.  I stand in the 'thinking about' relation to the Common during the whole period of my thinking despite the fact that at the end of the period there is no such thing as the Boston Common.  There are philosophers who hold that the intentional relation is a genuine relation and not merely relation-like as Brentano thought, and that in some cases it relates an existing thinker to a nonexisting object. 

Now there are good reasons to reject this view as false, but surely it is not false as a matter of formal logic.  If it is false, it is false as a matter of metaphysics.  A philosopher such as Reinhardt Grossmann who holds that the intentional relation is a genuine relation that sometimes relates an existent thinker to a nonexistent object is not contradicting himself. 

Since (3) is not a logical truth, one way to solve Ed's problem is by rejecting (3) and holding that there are genuine relations that relate the existent to the nonexistent.  One could hold that the relation of satisfaction is such a genuine relation: it relates the existing predicate to the nonexistent emperor: Caesar satisfies the predicate despite his nonexistence.

Note that I am not advocating this solution to the puzzle; I am dismissing Ed's dismissal of this putative solution.  I am rejecting Ed's claim that one is forced to choose between (1) and (2).  One can avoid the contradiction by denying (3), and one is not barred from doing so by logic alone.

Ed claims that (1) and (5) are logical contradictories.  But they are not.  Just look carefully at both propositions and you will see.  Ed thinks they are contradictories because he assumes that 'There is no such thing as y any more' is logically equivalent to 'There is no such thing as y.'  But to make that assumption is to to assume the substantive metaphysical thesis known in the trade as

Presentism:  Necessarily, only temporally present concrete objects exist.

Given Presentism, (1) and (5) are indeed contradictory.  This is why I said earlier  that Ed's argument cannot get off the ground without Presentism.  For suppose we reject Presentism in favor of the plausible view that both past and present concreta exist, i.e., are within the range of our unrestricted quantifiers.  Then Ed's puzzle dissolves.  For then there is such a thing as Caesar, it is just that he is past.  The relation of satisfaction connects a present item with a past item both of which exist. Or, since Ed is allergic to 'exist': both of which are such that there such things as them.

So a second way to solves Ed's puzzle is by rejecting the Presentism that he presupposes.

So I count at least three ways of solving Ed's puzzle: reject (2), reject (3), reject the tacit assumption of Presentism which is needed for (1) and (5) to be contradictory.

My inclination is to say that the puzzle is genuine, but insoluble. And this because the putative solutions sire puzzles as bad as the one we started with.  Of course, I haven't proven this.  But this is what my metaphilosophy tells me must be the case.

Metaphysical Grounding and the Euthyphro Dilemma

The locus classicus of the Euthyphro Dilemma (if you want to call it that) is Stephanus 9-10 in the early Platonic dialog, Euthyphro. This aporetic dialog is about the nature of piety, and Socrates, as usual, is in quest of a definition. Euthyphro proposes three definitions, with each of which Socrates has no trouble finding fault. According to the second, "piety is what all the gods love, and impiety is what all the gods hate." To this Socrates famously responds, "Do the gods love piety because it is pious, or is it pious because they love it?" In clearer terms, do the gods love pious acts because they are pious, or are pious acts pious because the gods love them?

 

What interests me at the moment is the notion of metaphysical grounding which I want to defend against London Ed and other anti-metaphysical types.  (For it is his failure to understand metaphysical grounding that accounts for Ed's failure to appreciate the force of my circularity objection to the thin theory of existence.)  Thus I will not try to answer a question beyond my pay grade, namely:

 

Q. Does God command X because it is morally obligatory, or is X morally obligatory because God commands it?

 

My concern is with the preliminary question whether (Q) is so much as intelligible.  It is intelligible only if we can make sense of the 'because' in it.   Let' s start with something that we should all be able to agree on (if we assume the existence of God and the existence of objective moral obligations), namely:

 

1.  Necessarily, God commands X iff X is morally obligatory.

(1) expresses a broadly logical equivalence and equivalence is symmetrical: if p is equivalent to q, then q is equivalent to p.  But metaphysical grounding  is asymmetrical: if M metaphysically grounds N, then it is not the case that N metaphysically  grounds M.  For example, if fact F is the truth-maker of sentence s, then it is not the case that s is the truth-maker of F.  Truth-making is a type of metaphysical grounding: it is not a causal relation and its is not a logical relation (where a logical relation is one that relates propositions, examples of logical relations being consistency, inconsistency, entailment, and logical independence.)

(1) leaves wide open whether God is the source of the obligatoriness of moral obligations, or whether such obligations are obligatory independently of divine commands.  Thus the truth of (1) does not entail an answer to (Q).

The 'because' in (Q) cannot be taken in a causal sense if causation is understood as a relation that connects physical events, states, or changes with other physical events, states, or changes.  Nor can the 'because' be taken in a logical sense.  Logical relations connect propositions, and a divine command is not a proposition.  Nor is the obligatoriness of the content of a command a proposition.

So I say this:  if the content of a command is morally obligatory because God issued the command, then the issuing of the command is the metaphysical ground of the the moral obligatoriness of the content of the command.  If, on the other hand, the content of the command is morally obligatory independently of the issuing of the divine command, then the moral obligatoriness of the command is the metaphysical ground of the correctness of the divine command.

Either way, there is a relation of metaphysical grounding.

My argument in summary:

1. (Q) is an intelligible question.

2. (Q) is not a question about a causal relation.

3. (Q) is not a question about a logical relation.

4. There is no other ordinary (nonmetaphysical) candidate relation such as a temporal relation or an epistemic relation for (Q) to be about.

5. (Q) is an intelligible question if and only if 'because' in (Q) expresses metaphysical grounding.

Therefore

6. 'Because' in (Q) expresses metaphysical grounding.

Therefore

7. There is a relation of metaphysical grounding.

OK, London Ed, which premise will you reject and why? 

The Problems of Order and Unity and Their Difference

Last Thursday, Steven N. and I had a very enjoyable three-hour conversation with ASU philosophy emeritus Ted Guleserian on Tempe's Mill Avenue.  We covered a lot of ground, but the most focused part of the discussion concerned the subject matter of this post.  If I understood Guleserian correctly, he was questioning whether there is any such problem as the problem of the unity of a fact.  I maintained that there is such a problem and that it is distinct from the problem of order.

................

The problem of order arises for relational facts and relational propositions in which there is a relation R that is either asymmetrical or nonsymmetrical. If dyadic R is asymmetrical, and x stands in R to y, then it follows that y does not stand in R to x. For example, greater than and taller than are asymmetrical relations. If I am taller than you, then you are not taller than me. If dyadic R is nonsymmetrical, and x stands in R to y, then it does not follow, though it may be the case, that y stands in R to x. For example, loves and hates are nonsymmetrical relations. If I love you, it does not follow that you love me, nor does it follow that you do not love me. But if I weigh the same as you, then you weigh the same as me: 'weigh the same as' picks out a symmetrical relation.

Well, suppose R is either asymmetrical or nonsymmetrical. Then the relational facts Rab and Rba will be distinct. For example, Al's loving Bill, and Bill's loving Al are distinct facts. A fact is a complex. Now the following principle seems well-nigh self-evident:

   P. If two complexes, K1 and K2, differ numerically, then there exists
   a constituent C such that C is an element of K1 but not of K2, or vice
   versa.

In other words, if two complexes differ, then they differ in a constituent. 'Complex' is intended quite broadly. Mathematical sets are complexes and it is clear that they satisfy the principle. There cannot be two sets that have all the same members.  Ditto for mereological sums.

Now if Rab and Rba are distinct, then, by principle (P), they must differ in a constituent. But they seem to have all the same constituents. Both consist of a, b, and R, and if you think there must also be a triadic nexus of exemplification present in the fact, then that item too is common to both. And if you think there is a benign infinite regress of exemplification nexuses in the fact, then those items too are common to both. Since both facts have all the same constituents, what is the ontological ground of the numerical difference of the two facts?  What makes them different?  The question is not whether they differ; it is obvious that they do.  The question concerns the ground of their difference.  What explains their difference?  Of course, I am not asking for an explanation in terms of empirical causes.  Consider {1, 2} and {1, 2, 3}.  What is the ontological ground of the difference of these two sets?  It would be a poor answer to say that they just differ, that their difference is a factum brutum.  The thing to say is that they differ in virtue of one set's having a member the other doesn't have.  When I say that 3 makes the difference between the two sets I am obviously not giving a causal explanation.  I am specifying a factor in reality that 'makes' the two entities numerically different.

So what, if anything, is the ontological ground of the difference between aRb and bRa when R is either asymmetrical or nonsymmetrical?  This, I take it,  the problem of order, or, in the jargon of Gustav Bergmann, the problem of providing an 'assay' of order.  It may be that no assay is possible.  It may be that the difference is a brute difference.  But that cannot be assumed at the outset.

It seems to me that the problem of unity is different although related.  What is the difference between the fact aRb and the set or sum of its constituents?  If a contingently stands in R to b, then it is possible that a, R, and b all exist without forming a relational fact.  So what is the difference between aRb and {a, R, b}?  Here we have two complexes that share all their constituents,  but they are clearly different complexes: one is a fact while the other is not.  What is the ground of fact-unity, that peculiar form of unity found in facts but not it other types of complex?

Suppose you deny that they share all constituents.  Suppose you maintain that the fact includes a triadic exemplification nexus that is not present in the set.  I will then re-formulate the problem as follows.  What is the difference between aRb and {a, R, NEX, }?

The problem of order is different from the problem of unity. The latter is the problem of accounting for the peculiar unity of those complexes that attract such properties as truth, falsity, and obtaining. For some of these complexes, no problem of order arises. For example, a monadic fact of the form, a's being F, precisely because it is nonrelational does not give rise to any problem of order. Since the problem of unity can arise in cases where the problem of order does not arise, the two problems are distinct.

The unity problem is the more fundamental of the two. The question as to the ground of the difference of a fact and the mere collection of its consituents is more fundamental than the question as to the ground of the difference between two already constituted facts which appear to share all their constituents.

Related:  Is the Difference Between a Fact and its Constituents a Brute Difference?

The Reference Relation: Internal or External?

What is (linguistic) reference?  Is it a relation?  Edward the Ockhamist assumes that it is and issues the following request:  "To clarify, could I ask both you and Bill whether you think the reference relation is ‘internal’ or ‘external’?"

Here is an inconsistent tetrad:

1. 'Frodo' refers to Frodo
2. 'Frodo' exists while Frodo does not. 
3. Reference is a relation.
4. Relations are existence-symmetrical:  the terms (relata) of a relation are such that either all exist or none exist. 

Since the members of this quartet cannot all be true, which one will Edward reject?  Given what he has said already, he must reject (4).  But (4) is exceedingly plausible, more plausible by my lights than (1).  I myself would reject (1) by maintaining that there is no linguistic reference to the nonexistent.  It is not there to be referred to!

For me, reference is a relation. Is it internal or external?  Being the same color as is an example of an internal relation.  If a and b are both red, then that logically suffices for a and b to stand in the same color as relation.  Suppose I paint ball a red and then paint ball b (the same shade of) red;  I don't have to do anything else to bring them into the aforementioned relation.  You could say that an internal relation supervenes upon the intrinsic properties of its relata. 

But to bring the two balls into the relation of being two feet from each other, I will most likely have to do more than alter their intrinsic properties.  So being two feet from is an external relation.  If the balls fall out of that relation they needn't change in any intrinsic respect.  But if the balls cease to stand in the same color as relation, then they must alter in some intrinsic respect.

In sum, internal relations supervene on the intrinsic properties of their relata while external relations do not.

Suppose 'Max' is the name of my cat.  Then 'Max' as I use it has a definite meaning.  The sound I make when I say 'Max' and the cat are both physical items.  Surely they do not stand in a semantic relation.  No physical item by itself means anything.  So the semantic relation must connect a meaningful word (a physical item such as a sound or marks on paper 'animated' by a meaning) with the physical referent, the cat in our example.  Suppose the meaning (sense, connotation) of 'Max' is given by a definite description: the only black male feline that enjoys linguine in clam sauce.  Then the relation between the meaningful word 'Max' and the cat will be external since that meaning (sense, connotation) is what it is whether or not the cat exists.

If, on the other hand, the meaning of 'Max' = Max, then the semantic relation of reference is internal.  For then the relation is identity, and identity is an internal relation.

So it seems that whether reference is external or internal depends on whether reference is routed through sense or is direct. I incline toward the view that reference, since routed through sense, is an external relation. 

A Common Misunderstanding of So-Called Cambridge Changes

There are philosophers who think that 'Cambridge' changes and real changes are mutually exclusive. Thus they think that if a change is Cambridge, then it is not real. This is a mistake. Real changes are a  proper subset of Cambridge changes.

Consider an example. Hillary gets wind of some tomcat behavior on the part of Bill and goes from a state of equanimity to that lamp-throwing fury the Bard spoke about. ("Hell hath no fury like a woman scorned!"). Bill, on the other hand, as the object of Hillary's fury, also changes: at one time he has the property of being well thought of by Hillary, and the contradictory property at a later time. Common to both the real change (in Hillary) and the relational change (in Bill) is the following: x changes if and only if there are distinct times, t₁ and t₂, and a property P such that x  exemplifies P at t₁ and ~P at t₂, or vice versa. Change thus defined is Cambridge change. The terminology is from Peter Geach:

     The great Cambridge philosophical works published in the early
     years of this [the 20th] century, like Russell's  Principles of
     Mathematics and McTaggart's Nature of Existence, explained change
     as simply a matter of contradictory attributes' holding good of
     individuals at different times. Clearly any change logically
     implies a 'Cambridge' change, but the converse is surely not true.
     . . . (Logic Matters, University of California Press, 1980, p.
     321.)

In sum, every (alterational) change is a Cambridge change, but only some of the latter are real changes. The rest are mere Cambridge  changes. It is therefore a mistake to think that Cambridge and real   changes form mutually exclusive classes. What one could correctly say, however, is that mere Cambridge changes and real changes form mutually  exclusive classes.

But what about existential (as opposed to alterational) change, as when a thing comes into existence, or passes out of existence? Are such changes real changes in the things that pass in and out of   existence? Are they merely Cambridge changes? Or neither?

Presentism and Existence-Entailing Relations: An Aporetic Tetrad

It is plausibly maintained that all relations are existence-entailing. To illustrate from the dyadic case: if R relates a and b, then both a and b exist.   A relation cannot hold unless the things between which or among which it holds all exist.  A weaker, and hence even more plausible, claim is that all relations are existence-symmetric: if R relates a and b, then either both relata exist or both do not exist. Both the stronger and the weaker claims rule out the possibility of a relation that relates an existent and a nonexistent. (So if Cerberus is eating my cat, then Cerberus exists. And if I am thinking about Cerberus, then, given that Cerberus does not exist, my thinking does not relate me to Cerberus.  This implies that  intentionality is not a relation, though it is, as Brentano says, relation-like (ein Relativliches).)

But if presentism is true, and only temporally present items exist, then no relation connects a present with a nonpresent item. This seems hard to accept for the following reason.

I ate lunch  an hour ago. So the event of my eating (E) is earlier than the event of my typing (T). How can it be true that E bears the earlier than relation to T, and T bears the later than relation to E, unless both E and T exist? But E is nonpresent. If presentism is true, then E does not exist.  And if E does not exist, then E does not stand in the earlier than relation to T.  If, on the other hand, there are events that exist but are nonpresent, then presentism is false.

How will the presentist respond? Since E does not exist on his view, while T does, and E is earlier than T, he must either (A) deny that all relations are existence-symmetric, or deny (B) that earlier than is a relation. He must either allow the possibility of genuine relations that connect nonexistents and existents, or deny that T stands in a temporal relation to E.

To  fully savor the problem we  cast it in the mold of an aporetic tetrad:

1. All relations are either existence-entailing or existence-symmetric.

2. Earlier than is a relation.

3. Presentism: only temporally present items exist.

4. Some events are earlier than others.

Each limb of the tetrad is exceedingly plausible.  But they cannot all be true:  any three, taken together, entail the negation of the remaining limb.  For example, the first three entail the negation of the fourth.  To solve the problem, we must reject one of the limbs.  Now (4) cannot be rejected because it is a datum.

Will you deny (1) and say that there are relations that are neither existence-entailing nor existence-symmetric?  I find this hard to swallow because of the following argument.  (a) Nothing can have properties unless it exists.  Therefore (b) nothing can have relational properties unless it exists. (c) Every relation gives rise to relational properties:  if Rab, then a has the property of standing in R to b, and b has the property of standing in R to a.  Therefore, (d) if R relates a and b, then both a and b exist.

Will you deny (2) and say that earlier than is not a relation?  What else could it be?

Will you deny presentism and say that that both present and nonpresent items exist?  Since it is obvious that present and nonpresent items cannot exist in the present-tense sense of 'exists,'  the suggestion has to be that present and nonpresent (past or future) items exist in a tenseless sense of 'exist.'  But what exactly does this mean?

The problem is genuine, but there appears to be no good solution, no solution that does not involve its own difficulties.