Maverick Philosopher

Welcome to Maverick Philosopher

UPDATE: 3 June 2022. I began posting at Substack in early 2021 under the rubric "Philosophy in Progress." The Substack entries are intended to assist educated non-philosophers in clarifying their thinking about matters of moment.  My PhilPeople page links to my Substack articles and my weblog Maverick Philosopher: Strictly Philosophical, and provides a list of my professional publications. 

 

Two-line biography: A recovering academician, I taught philosophy at various universities in the USA and abroad. At the relatively young age of 41 I resigned from  a tenured position to live the eremitic life of the independent philosopher in the Sonoran desert. More including contact information on the About page on the right sidebar.

Interests: Everything. Homo sum: humani nihil a me alienum puto. from Terentius. "I am a man: I consider nothing human foreign to me." Nothing human, but also nothing nonhuman. 

Much more below the fold. Best wishes to all men and women of good will who love truth, seek it, and strive to incorporate it in their lives.

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Welcome to the third and latest incarnation of Maverick Philosopher.  I began this weblog in May of 2004 and have kept it up continuously on different servers, missing only a few days. I'm in this game 'for the duration,' as long as health and eyesight hold out.  It has proven to be deeply satisfying, not the least reason for which being that my writing has attracted a large number of like-minded individuals, some of whom I have met in person, and have come to value highly as friends.  

What you need to know is that this weblog is just one philosopher's online journal, notebook, common place book, workshop, soapbox, sandbox, literary litter box, and online filing cabinet.    A lot of what I write here is unpolished and tentative.  I explore the cartography of ideas along many paths.  Here below we are in statu viae, and it is fitting that our thinking should be exploratory, meandering, and undogmatic.  Nothing human, and thus nothing philosophical, is foreign to me. 

Saturday Night at the Oldies: Fools and Useful Idiots

These go out this April Fool's Day to all those who voted for Joey B and Kamala the Clown.  WTF were you thinking? You weren't. But most of you are 'nice people.'  Useful idiots are often very nice people. Would that being 'nice' were enough! 

The Who, Won't Get Fooled Again

Sam Cooke, Fool's Paradise

Ray Charles, I'm a Fool to Care

Johnny Winter, Be Careful with a Fool. Cultural appropriation by an albino!  White supremacy on stilts!

Beatles, The Fool on the Hill

Elvis Presley, A Fool Such as I

Ricky Nelson, Poor Little Fool.  Those "carefree devil eyes" will do it every time. 

Brenda Lee, Fool #1

The Shirelles, Foolish Little Girl

Ricky Nelson, Fools Rush In.  "Fools rush in/Where wise men never go/But wise men never fall in love/So how are they to know?" 

"Wise men say/Only fools rush in/ But I can't help/ Falling in love with you. Andrea Bocelli's live in Las Vegas version.

Elvin Bishop, Fooled Around and Fell in Love

Kingston Trio, Some Fool Made a Soldier of Me

Quicksilver Messenger Service, The Fool

Bill Evans, Foolish Heart

Connie Francis, Everybody's Somebody's Fool

Grateful Dead, Ship of Fools

"The fool who persists in his folly becomes wise" (William Blake)

Civility is for the Civil

A reader sent me a graphic to accompany one of my aphorisms:

Civility is no virtue if a cover for cowardice.

The meme is crude, but I see little point these days in being polite to our enemies. As another of my aphorisms has it, 

Be kind, but be prepared to reply in kind.

But don't be misled by what I am about to post.  You must heed Glenn Beck's GRAVE WARNING. 

 

Wokeassery Update

Alex Berenson on mRNAs

Black Female DEI Director Cancelled by DEI. De Anza College, Cupertino, California.  Not 'woke' enough, not 'diverse' enough to be 'included.' No 'equity' for her! Insufficient 'wokeness' = white supremacy.

From the beginning, efforts to obstruct my work were framed in terms that might seem bizarre to those outside certain academic spaces. For instance, simply attempting to set an agenda for meetings caused my colleagues to  accuse me of “whitespeaking,” “whitesplaining,” and reinforcing “white supremacy”—accusations I had never faced before. I was initially baffled, but as I attended workshops led by my officemates and promoted by my supervising dean, I repeatedly encountered a presentation slide titled “Characteristics of White-Supremacy Culture” that denounced qualities like “sense of urgency” and “worship of the written word.” Written meeting agendas apparently checked both boxes.

Maybe she should move to Florida where DEI goes to die.

Berkeley's Unperceived Table

Ed writes,

A question: if Berkeley is out of his study, and says ‘My table is in my study’, is he speaking truly or falsely? If truly, then ‘my table’ and ‘my study’ must have referents, and the referents must stand in the relation ‘in’. But neither referent is perceived, so neither exists, according to B’s first definition of ‘exist’, and so ‘My table is in my study’ is false. According to B’s second (counterfactual) definition of ‘exist’, the statement can be true, but then we have to drop the first definition. Then what else do we lose of B’s philosophical system?

For example, is the statement ‘the table in my study is brown’ true or false, given that if B were seeing the table, he would perceive it to have the sensible quality of brown, and given that B is now outside his study? If true, then he must concede that the referent of ‘the table in my study’ is bearing the visible quality signified by ‘brown’, and so concede that everything he says about the impossibility of material substance is wrong, e.g. in §9 of the Treatise.

Indeed the whole project of Idealism collapses once we allow the possibility of language, and thence the possibility of successfully referring to objects and states of affairs that are not perceived.

My valued interlocutor is being a bit quick here. Let's sift through this carefully starting with definitions of 'exist(s)' either found in or suggested by a charitable reading of Berkeley's writings.

D1. X exists =_df x is being perceived. (Esse est percipi.)

D2. X exists =_df x is such that, were a perceiver P on the scene, P would perceive x.

D3. X exists =_df either x is being perceived or x is such that, were a perceiver P on the scene, P would perceive x.

(D3) is the disjunction of (D1) and (D2). It is suggested by this passage:

The table I write on, I say, exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed, meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. (PHK 3, quoted here) 

God would be the best candidate for 'some other spirit.'  The author of the SEP entry, Lisa Downing, writes,

If the other spirit in question is God, an omnipresent being, then perhaps his perception can be used to guarantee a completely continuous existence to every physical object. In the Three Dialogues, Berkeley very clearly invokes God in this context. Interestingly, whereas in the Principles, as we have seen above, he argued that God must exist in order to cause our ideas of sense, in the Dialogues (212, 214–5) he argues that our ideas must exist in God when not perceived by us.^[20] If our ideas exist in God, then they presumably exist continuously. Indeed, they must exist continuously, since standard Christian doctrine dictates that God is unchanging.

There is much more to it than this, of course, but what I have said suffices to neutralize Ed's objection.  He thinks he has refuted Berkeleyan idealism. He has done no such thing. He ignores (D3).

I must also object to Ed's apparent identification of idealism with Berkeleyan idealism. Ed is being unduly insular. A little to the East of where he lives there is this land mass called The Continent where other forms of idealism have been known to thrive.

I am also puzzled by Ed's talk of phrases like 'my table' needing referents when he himself denies (in his book) that there is extra-linguistic reference and affirms that all reference is intra-linguistic.  As I read him, Ed is a linguistic idealist. Linguistic idealism, however, is by my lights much less credible than Berkeleyan idealism.

The Double Denial by the 'Woke'

It is not unreasonable to maintain that there is no God and that nature alone exists. But suppose you take it a step further and deny nature as well. Then you are in the precincts of 'woke' lunacy.  Call it the Double Denial.

One way to deny nature is by denying that the biotic underpins the social and that as a consequence the difference between men and women is a matter of social construction and not a matter of biology.  But any sane person will grasp instantly that one cannot change one's sex by merely thinking of oneself as belonging to the opposite sex. It is also obvious that sartorial and cosmetic modifications will not turn the trick.

Less obvious, but equally true, is that chemical and surgical alteration of one's body cannot change one's sex even if the surgical alteration is of a deeply structural sort:  reduction of muscle mass, heart and lung volume,  bone density, size of hands, and length of limbs even unto the removal of portions of bones to make the altered person shorter.

But of course the 'transgendered' biological men who compete in, and win, women's sporting events do not and would not submit to the modern-day equivalent of the Bed of Procrustes: they are not about to be modified in the drastic ways just mentioned.  And yet such men are allowed to pass themselves off as women.  To add insult to injury, some of these impostors are then awarded 'woman of the year' titles.

What is going on here? It is one thing to condemn the injustice to women and overall idiocy of this, quite another to understand how it could arise and be taken seriously by otherwise sane people.

One thing that needs explaining is how leftists, who are supposedly for women and against their oppression by men and 'the patriarchy,' could embrace something so antifeminist as the allowance of male interference with women's sports. I suggest that what we are witnessing here is a collision of motifs on the Left. One such is the oppressor-oppressed motif. Another is the hyper-constructivist denial-of-reality motif. These motifs are in tension with each other. If men oppress women, then women need their 'safe spaces' where they can feel secure against real or merely perceived micro- and macro-aggression. Accordingly, there is obvious need for  sexual segregation in certain areas such as sports competitions, locker rooms, restrooms, prisons, etc.  But if everything is a matter of social construction, as per the second motif, then so are sexual differences in which case they are not innate and immutable, but malleable. A man can 're-identify' as a woman with or without chemical and surgical alteration. Add in a third motif that of expressive individualism and for good measure throw in the 'my truth' meme.  If 'my truth' is that I am a woman, then I am a woman and can compete against women. (There is little or no chance that any woman will 're-identify' as a man so as to compete against them.)

The conflict of leftist motifs explains the utter absurdity of wokesters who tolerate the grotesquely unjust penetration of biological males into female spaces.

Dialogue and Monologue

A dialogue is not a confrontation between two monologues. (Inspired by Frithjof Schuon)

Can one see that one is not a brain-in-a-vat?

This is a repost from 21 December 2009, slightly emended. I've added a clarifying addendum.

................................

John Greco, How to Reid Moore:

So how does one know that one is not a brain in a vat, or that one is not deceived by an evil demon? Moore and Reid are for the most part silent on this issue. But a natural extension of their view is that one knows it by perceiving it. In other words, I know that I am not a brain in a vat because I can see that I am not. [. . .] Just as I can perceive that some animal is not a dog, one might think, I can perceive that I am not a brain in a vat. (21)

Really?

A bobcat just walked past my study window. I see that the critter is a bobcat, and seeing that it is a bobcat, I see  that it is not a dog, or a deer or a javelina.  So far, so good. But then John Greco comes along and tells me that in the same sense of 'see' — the ordinary visual-perceptual sense — I can see that I am not a brain-in-a-vat, a BIV. But 'surely' one cannot see or otherwise perceive such a fact. Or so I will argue.

None of us really believe that we are BIVs, and only some really believe that we are creatures of God. Pursuing this parallel may shed some light. So consider:

Q1: How do you know you are not a BIV?
A1: I see that I am not.

Q2: How do you know that you are not a creature of God?
A2: I see that I am not.

These question-answer pairs seem on a par. If the atheist says that he sees that he is not a creature of God, or more generally, sees that the manifest world is not a divine artifact, then we point out to him that this is not the sort of state of affairs that can either be seen to be the case or seen not to be the case. For no matter how intently one observes (whether visually or in any other sense-modality) anything in the natural world, one will not be able to discern whether or not it has creature-status. (By 'creature-status' I mean the ontological status of being a product of divine creative activity.) This is true of the objects of outer perception as well as the objects of (Brentano calls) inner peception, e.g. memories, desires, sensations, etc. And of course nothing is changed by the use of instruments. If I study the moon through a telescope, I will be in no better position to determine that it is a divine artifact than if I view it with the naked eye. Landing on the moon, taking geological selenological samples, won't help either. And the same goes for any instrumental extension of the human senses.

In sum, using 'see' to cover inner and outer sense-perception, whether 'naked' or instrumentally extended, one cannot see whether or not our world is a divine artifact. The same is true with respect to our BIV-status: one cannot see whether or not one is a BIV. For what would one look at, or look for, in order to make this out? Would I stare at the bobcat outside my window and try to isolate a property of the critter that would entail that its appearance to me is solely the result of the machinations of an evil scientist? Or would I look for a property that would entail the animal's not being such a result?

Or is there perhaps some particular thing I must search for the finding or non-finding of which would resolve the question of whether I am a BIV? You may recall Soviet cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin's suborbital flight in April, 1961. He beat the American astronaut Alan Shepard to the punch by a couple of months. What remains with me from the news reports is Gagarin's claim to the effect that he didn't see God out there in outer space.

I thought to myself at the time, "That dumb Commie thinks that God is a physical object floating around in outer space!" Later on it occurred to me that Gagarin might have made his statement just to please the Party ideologues back on the ground in Moscow. Now just as one cannot resolve the God question by poking around in outer space, one cannot resolve the BIV question by poking around in outer sublunary space or inner space.

The atheist who thinks that theism can be refuted by sense-perception is not understanding the issue. The same goes for the theist who thinks that theism can be proven by sense-perception. For the question does not concern observables, but the ontological status of observables. In Heideggerian jargon, it does not concern das Seiende, that-which-is, but das Sein, the Being of that-which-is. In particular, it concerns the ontological status, God-dependent existence.

Similarly, one who thinks that the problem of the external world, which is essentially the problem of the ontological status of the objects of outer perception, can be solved by perception, does not understand the issue. One cannot see that one is or is not a BIV, or dreaming, or being deceived by an evil demon, etc. The question is not about observables, but about their ontological status, their dependence on or independence of our minds or some Mind.

I can see that the animal in front of me is a bobcat. So seeing, I see that the animal is not a dog. But no amount of observation can disclose that the object appearing to me either has or does not have the ontological status of mind-independent existence.

My point is connected with the one I made yesterday, namely, that one cannot refute an idealist such as Berkeley in some quick Moorean way by appealing to some obvious fact of sense-perception.  The good bishop cannot be refuted by kicking a stone.  For Berkeley is not denying that there are stones and such: he is forwarding a theory of their ontological status, and this status cannot be discerned by seeing or touching or experiencing resistance to kicking.

Addendum (3/30/2023)

My adducing of the BIV Gedankenexperiment -- which is usually presented  as an updated Cartesian dream argument -- perhaps unnecessarily complicates the main point I want to make. And this for reasons I won't go into lest I complicate things still further. So consider these parallel questions:

Q3: How do you know that the tree in the quad exists independently of any mind?

A3: Just by looking at it!  It is evident to the senses (and not just the sense of sight) that it exists an sich, in itself, and would so exist even if there were no minds at all whether ectypal or archetypal.

Q4: How do you know that the tree in the quad exists independently of divine creative action?

A4: Just by looking at it!  It is evident to the senses (and not just the sense of sight) that it exists an sich, in itself, and would so exist even if there were no minds as all whether ectypal or archetypal.

Here the parallel is very close indeed. For however we construe divine creation (whether as creatio ex nihilo or as creatio ex deo along Neoplatonic emanationist lines, or even deistically) we absolutely cannot construe divine creation as the production of a material world by a material world-maker. God cannot be a material thing. We are forced to think of him as a mind or spirit who immaterially creates material things, but not out of any pre-existent or pre-given matter.  

If this is intelligible, then Berkeleyan idealism is intelligible. In particular, it is intelligible how a material thing such as the tree in the quad can have an ideal mode of being.  If so, Berkeley is not an eliminativist who denies that there are material beings, but a a sort of metaphysical reductionist who reduces them to ideas in, or rather before, the mind of God.

This is a repost from 21 December 2009, slightly emended. I've added a clarifying addendum.

................................

John Greco, How to Reid Moore:

So how does one know that one is not a brain in a vat, or that one is not deceived by an evil demon? Moore and Reid are for the most part silent on this issue. But a natural extension of their view is that one knows it by perceiving it. In other words, I know that I am not a brain in a vat because I can see that I am not. [. . .] Just as I can perceive that some animal is not a dog, one might think, I can perceive that I am not a brain in a vat. (21)

Really?

A bobcat just walked past my study window. I see that the critter is a bobcat, and seeing that it is a bobcat, I see  that it is not a dog, or a deer or a javelina.  So far, so good. But then John Greco comes along and tells me that in the same sense of 'see' — the ordinary visual-perceptual sense — I can see that I am not a brain-in-a-vat, a BIV. But 'surely' one cannot see or otherwise perceive such a fact. Or so I will argue.

None of us really believe that we are BIVs, and only some really believe that we are creatures of God. Pursuing this parallel may shed some light. So consider:

Q1: How do you know you are not a BIV?
A1: I see that I am not.

Q2: How do you know that you are not a creature of God?
A2: I see that I am not.

These question-answer pairs seem on a par. If the atheist says that he sees that he is not a creature of God, or more generally, sees that the manifest world is not a divine artifact, then we point out to him that this is not the sort of state of affairs that can either be seen to be the case or seen not to be the case. For no matter how intently one observes (whether visually or in any other sense-modality) anything in the natural world, one will not be able to discern whether or not it has creature-status. (By 'creature-status' I mean the ontological status of being a product of divine creative activity.) This is true of the objects of outer perception as well as the objects of (Brentano calls) inner peception, e.g. memories, desires, sensations, etc. And of course nothing is changed by the use of instruments. If I study the moon through a telescope, I will be in no better position to determine that it is a divine artifact than if I view it with the naked eye. Landing on the moon, taking geological selenological samples, won't help either. And the same goes for any instrumental extension of the human senses.

In sum, using 'see' to cover inner and outer sense-perception, whether 'naked' or instrumentally extended, one cannot see whether or not our world is a divine artifact. The same is true with respect to our BIV-status: one cannot see whether or not one is a BIV. For what would one look at, or look for, in order to make this out? Would I stare at the bobcat outside my window and try to isolate a property of the critter that would entail that its appearance to me is solely the result of the machinations of an evil scientist? Or would I look for a property that would entail the animal's not being such a result?

Or is there perhaps some particular thing I must search for the finding or non-finding of which would resolve the question of whether I am a BIV? You may recall Soviet cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin's suborbital flight in April, 1961. He beat the American astronaut Alan Shepard to the punch by a couple of months. What remains with me from the news reports is Gagarin's claim to the effect that he didn't see God out there in outer space.

I thought to myself at the time, "That dumb Commie thinks that God is a physical object floating around in outer space!" Later on it occurred to me that Gagarin might have made his statement just to please the Party ideologues back on the ground in Moscow. Now just as one cannot resolve the God question by poking around in outer space, one cannot resolve the BIV question by poking around in outer sublunary space or inner space.

The atheist who thinks that theism can be refuted by sense-perception is not understanding the issue. The same goes for the theist who thinks that theism can be proven by sense-perception. For the question does not concern observables, but the ontological status of observables. In Heideggerian jargon, it does not concern das Seiende, that-which-is, but das Sein, the Being of that-which-is. In particular, it concerns the ontological status, God-dependent existence.

Similarly, one who thinks that the problem of the external world, which is essentially the problem of the ontological status of the objects of outer perception, can be solved by perception, does not understand the issue. One cannot see that one is or is not a BIV, or dreaming, or being deceived by an evil demon, etc. The question is not about observables, but about their ontological status, their dependence on or independence of our minds or some Mind.

I can see that the animal in front of me is a bobcat. So seeing, I see that the animal is not a dog. But no amount of observation can disclose that the object appearing to me either has or does not have the ontological status of mind-independent existence.

My point is connected with the one I made yesterday, namely, that one cannot refute an idealist such as Berkeley in some quick Moorean way by appealing to some obvious fact of sense-perception.  The good bishop cannot be refuted by kicking a stone.  For Berkeley is not denying that there are stones and such: he is forwarding a theory of their ontological status, and this status cannot be discerned by seeing or touching or experiencing resistance to kicking.

Addendum (3/30/2023)

My adducing of the BIV Gedankenexperiment -- which is usually presented  as an updated Cartesian dream argument -- perhaps unnecessarily complicates the main point I want to make. And this for reasons I won't go into lest I complicate things still further. So consider these parallel questions:

Q3: How do you know that the tree in the quad exists independently of any mind?

A3: Just by looking at it!  It is evident to the senses (and not just the sense of sight) that it exists an sich, in itself, and would so exist even if there were no minds at all whether ectypal or archetypal.

Q4: How do you know that the tree in the quad exists independently of divine creative action?

A4: Just by looking at it!  It is evident to the senses (and not just the sense of sight) that it exists an sich, in itself, and would so exist even if there were no minds as all whether ectypal or archetypal.

Here the parallel is very close indeed. For however we construe divine creation (whether as creatio ex nihilo or as creatio ex deo along Neoplatonic emanationist lines, or even deistically) we absolutely cannot construe divine creation as the production of a material world by a material world-maker. God cannot be a material thing. We are forced to think of him as a mind or spirit who immaterially creates material things, but not out of any pre-existent or pre-given matter.  

If this is intelligible, then Berkeleyan idealism is intelligible. In particular, it is intelligible how a material thing such as the tree in the quad can have an ideal mode of being.  If so, Berkeley is not an eliminativist who denies that there are material beings, but a a sort of metaphysical reductionist who reduces them to ideas in, or rather before, the mind of God.

We Need a Fitter Man

Argumentum ad Lapidem?

No way, I say.  Over at Substack.

Ed comments:

"He did not maintain that rocks and trees do not exist; he did not deny or even question whether they are; he offered an unusual ontological account of what they are, namely, ideas in minds, including the divine mind." (BV)

True, but careful examination of Berkeley’s argument shows that he provides no clear definition or explanation of what “ideas” are.

He opens the Treatise as follows:

It is evident to any one who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses; or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind; or lastly, ideas formed by help of memory and imagination -- either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways.

But is it “evident”? I look at the brown and black colours of the surface of my desk. These appear to be qualities of the desk surface itself, and not “imprinted on the senses” at all. Is Berkeley saying that the desk surface itself is imprinted on my senses? But that strange claim has to be clarified. Later on he offers a critique of the idea of substance, arguing that ideas are mental items, therefore cannot be supported by an immaterial item, substance. But that begs the question. If ideas are sensible qualities like colours, what evidence is there for their being mental items?

As for Johnson’s argument, what is the quale corresponding to resistance? Resistance, i.e. Newtonian force, is the most material of qualities. How can there be a quale of resistance without resistance itself?

BV: Newton's First Law of Motion implies that a stone, say, will remain at rest unless acted upon by an external force such as Johnson's kick.  An object at rest thus resists being moved.  This resistance is a (dispositional) property of physical things.  The quale corresponding to this resistance could be called felt resistance.  It is a mental in nature and cannot exist without a perceiver who, for example, tries to move a rock with his foot.

"How can there be a quale of resistance without resistance itself?"  An idealist of the Berkeleyan sort could say that there can't be a quale of resistance without resistance itself but then go on to say that (i) physical things are nothing more than objects of the divine mind, and (ii) resistance qualia exist only in finite (creaturely) minds. In this way the distinction between resistance qualia and resistance itself could be upheld.

The point I was making in my Substack article was that the good bishop cannot be refuted by kicking a stone. This is because Berkeley is not denying that there are stones; he is making a claim about the mode of being of stones, namely that their being/existence is ideal: they are accusatives of divine awareness and nothing more.  As I read him, Berkeley is not an eliminativist about stones and trees in quads, etc.  You could call him an ontological reductionist about such and sundry.

Daniel Dennett, by comparison is an eliminativist about qualia.  He I can refute by kicking 'stones,' namely his cojones. If I kick him in the groin, he will be brought to understand that felt pain, phenomenal pain, lived pain, is the most real thing in the world, and cannot be denied. I am assuming, of course, that he is not a zombie (as philosophers use this term). But that leads us in a different direction.

Is Hoplophobia an Element in Biden's Dementia?

Recent events  suggest that it is. But you decide. Logically prior question: What is hoplophobia?

Climate 'Theology'

Tucker Carlson has a bad habit of referring to climate alarmism as climate 'theology.'  I know what he is trying to say, but it is unseemly for a conservative to misuse a perfectly good word and denigrate that to which it refers. Natural theology, which is a branch of philosophy, is a legitimate inquiry, as is theology proper, which is not a branch of philosophy. A second example:

In the left-wing rag of record, the NYT, we find:

“When you buy gold you’re saying nothing is going to work and everything is going to stay ridiculous,” said Mackin Pulsifer, vice chairman and chief investment officer of Fiduciary Trust International in New York. “There is a fair cohort who believes this in a theological sense, but I believe it’s unreasonable given the history of the United States.”

So to believe something 'in a theological sense' is to believe it unreasonably.  It follows that liberals have plenty of 'theological' beliefs.  In the 'theology' of a liberal, theology can be dismissed unread as irrational.

And then there is the misuse of 'metaphysics.' I'll save that rant for later.

The wider pattern is the secularization of religious language.

Take ‘retreat.’ Time was, when one went on a retreat to get away from the world to re-collect oneself, to meditate on the state of one's soul and on first and last things. But now one retreats from the world to become even more worldly, to gear up for greater exertions in the realms of business or academe. One retreats from ordinary busy-ness to prepare for even greater busy- ness. 

Another perfectly good word has been destroyed. 

As I have said more than once, if you are a conservative, don't talk like a damned 'liberal.' Why the sneer quotes? Because there is nothing classically liberal about contemporary liberals who are ever on the slouch toward leftism, and its most noxious variant, 'wokery.' 

Realize that we are in a war, and in a war one does not give ammo to the enemy. Do not validate, by employing, the Left's obfuscatory terminology. Never use 'woke' without sneer quotes. Never use words like 'homophobic' or 'transphobic.' Never use 'Islamophobia' as I once caught the great Victor Davis Hanson doing. A phobia is an irrational fear, and there is nothing irrational about fear of radical Islam. 

Language matters. Some battles are won and lost on linguistic ground. Leftists understand this. They understand that he who controls the language controls the debate. This explains the Left's unremitting  Orwellian abuse of language and their asinine question-begging and question-burying neologisms.

2 + 2 = White Supremacy

No doubt.

 

Are There Any Decent Democrats?

There is at least one. His name is Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. I recommend his A Letter to Liberals: Censorship and COVID: An Attack on Science and American Ideals (Skyhorse Publishing, 2022). It is mercifully short,  x + 110 pages long, and well worth your time. It is extremely well-documented. The text itself runs to x + 87 pp. with 239 endnotes, most of them with hyperlink info.  Here is something I didn't know:

At the outset of the pandemic, most of the world's leading news organizations -- BBC, Reuters, AP, AFD, CBC, CNN, CBS, ABC, Washington Post, Financial Times, Facebook, Google/YouTube, Microsoft, Twitter, and others -- organized themselves into a collusive antidemocratic and anticompetitive cartel known as the Trusted News Initiative (TNI) -- pledged to squelch and censor all reports about government COVID countermeasures that challenged official proclamations. (p. 52 f; endnote 153 points us to the BBC, December 10, 2020.)

I don't believe that there is any chance that  RFK Jr. will 'pull a Tulsi' and quit the Democrat Party, although he should. He won't because he's  a Kennedy, and I am guessing that he  already has enough trouble with his extended family.  (See here.) Like many old-time Dems, he fancies he will wrest the leadership of his party away from the 'woke'-left totalitarians who now control it. If that's what he thinks, he's fooling himself.  

The irony is that RFK fils, despite his speech impediment and lack of charisma, has a better chance of beating either Trump or DeSantis in 2024 than any other Dem I can think of.

Expressive Individualism

Is Trump an example?

Substack latest.

Is Graduate School Really That Bad?

Top of the Stack.

A Response to My Is Sin a Fact?

Brian Bosse is not convinced by my Substack article, Is Sin a Fact? A Passage from Chesterton Examined.   Brian writes,

Your Argument Against Chesterton

(1) If the existence of sin is a fact one can see in the street, then the existence of God is a fact one can see in the street. 

(2) It is not the case that the existence of God is a fact one can see in the street.

From (1) and (2), it follows that

(3) It is not the case that the existence of sin is a fact one can see in the street.  

Bill’s Prior Commitments

(4) The existence of moral evil is a fact one can see in the street.

(5) There are objective moral values/laws.

It seems to me that from (4) and (5) one must conclude that…

(6) The existence of objective moral values/laws is a fact one can see in the street.

Bill, do you accept (6)?  If so, do you think it is possible for there to be objective moral laws in a non-theistic worldview? 

I endorse the first argument. It is obviously valid in point of logical form, instantiating as it does modus tollens.  And I claim that both premises are true. You will agree with me that the first is true if you agree that sin is an offense against God, which implies that if there is no God, then there is no sin.  The first premise is uncontroversially true because true ex vi terminorum, which is a fancy way of saying that it is true by definition. You will agree with me that the second premise is true if you agree that the existence of sinful acts and sinful omissions is not perceivable via the senses. (More on this in a moment.)

As for the second argument, I did not give it and I do not endorse it. I do not consider (4) to be true. And I reject (6). Brian is omitting some important distinctions I make. I affirm the existence of moral evil (evil that comes about through the actions and omissions of free agents), but I say nothing in that Substack article about how the fact of moral evil is known. Is there moral evil? is one question. How do we know that there is moral evil? is a different question. 

Do we literally see moral evil? Is there any empirical access to it? Can we build a 'ponerometer,' an evil detector?  Do we humans possess a non-empirical sensus moralitatis whereby we discern the existence of moral evil? These are just some of the questions that naturally arise.  I deny that we literally see instances of moral evil.  I will give a graphic example in a moment. 

It is also important not to leave out the distinction I make between two senses or uses of fact.' On one use of 'fact,' a fact is a true proposition. On a second use, a fact is a true proposition known to be true.  If  the existence of moral evil is a fact in the second sense, that leaves open the question as to how we know that moral evil is a fact in this second sense. I deny that we can see it (with our eyes) "in the street." The fact of moral evil is not "as plain as potatoes," to use Chesterton's expression. I know that the vegetable on my counter is a potato by seeing it (with my eyes). I do not see moral evil with my eyes. I maintain that there are actions that are morally evil, but I deny that their being morally evil is a fact that one can literally see. Now for the example. 

There is a video online that depicts a black thug nonchalantly loading his semi-automatic pistol and shooting  in the back of the head a homeless man sitting on a curb.  What do you see? You see a man shooting another man in the head. You do not see the evil of the act. (You do not see the illegality of the act either. You see a killing; you do not see a murder.) That is not to say that the act is not evil; it is to say that the evilness of the act is not visible or in any other way empirically detectable by our outer senses even when instrumentally extended.  Suppose you saw the shooting from different angles in great detail, with the blood surging out of the wound, etc. You would still not thereby know by empirical means that the the act of shooting is an evil act.  Suppose you had a videotape of the entire execution and then analyzed it frame-by-frame. Would you then see (with your eyes) the evilness of the act? Of course not.

In sum, I affirm the existence of moral evil.  But I deny both that the existence of moral evil is a fact one can see in the street, and that the existence of sin is a fact that one can see in the street. The crucial point however, as Brian appreciates, is that moral evil is not the same as sin.  It is perfectly plain that sin presupposes the existence of God. It is not perfectly plain that objective moral evil presupposes the existence of God.  

Brian asks, "Do you think it is possible for there to be objective moral laws in a non-theistic worldview? [i.e., in a world in which God does not exist?]"  Well, there cannot be objectively binding moral commandments without a very special commander, or objectively binding moral imperatives without an Imperator.  But why couldn't there be objectively true moral declaratives -- e.g., it is wrong always and everywhere to torture innocent human beings for one's sexual gratification -- in the atheist's world?

But these questions go well beyond the topic of my article which was merely to show that Chesterton was blustering when he claimed that it is empirically obvious -- "plain as potatoes," a fact in the second sense -- that there are sinful deeds and omissions. That could be true only if it is empirically obvious that God exists. But the latter is not empirically obvious.  

Saturday Night at the Oldies: Coffee

October 1st is International Coffee Day.  But we are still  in March. So I'm jumping the gun as one might do under the influence.  Herewith, some tunes in anticipatory celebration.  Not that I'm drinking coffee now: it's a morning and afternoon drink.  I am presently partaking of a potent libation consisting of 3/4 Tequila Añejo and 1/4 Aperol with a non-alcoholic St. Pauli Girl as chaser. Delicioso!

Ella Mae Morse, Forty Cups of Coffee

Cream, The Coffee Song

Johnny Cash and Ramblin' Jack Elliot, A Cup of Coffee

 

Commander Cody, Truck Drivin' Man.  This one goes out to Sally and Jean and Mary in memory of our California road trip nine years ago.   "Pour me another cup of coffee/For it is the best in the land/I'll put  a nickel in the jukebox/And play that 'Truck Drivin' Man.'"

Dave Dudley, Coffee, Coffee, Coffee

Calexico & Roger McGuinn, Another Cup of Coffee.  A good version of this old Dylan tune.

Mississippi John Hurt, Coffee Blues

Patricia Kaas, Black Coffee

Annette Hanshaw, You're the Cream in My Coffee, 1928

Johann Sebastian Bach, Coffee Cantata

What is wrong with people who don't drink or enjoy coffee?  They must not value consciousness and intensity of experience.  Poor devils! Perhaps they're zombies (in the philosophers' sense).

Patrick Kurp  recommends Rick Danko and Paul Butterfield, Java Blues, one hard-driving, adrenalin-enabling number which, in synergy with a serious cup of java will soon have you banging hard on all synaptic 'cylinders.'  

Chicory is a cheat.  It cuts it but doesn't cut it.

"The taste of java is like a volcanic rush/No one is going to stop me from drinking too much . . . ."

Warren Zevon, I'll Sleep When I'm Dead

A Hot Sauce Rant from 2013

A hot (sauce rant) or a (hot sauce) rant? Both. Parentheses  matter!  Scope matters. All scope distinctions matter. Mind your p's and q's. Discriminate operators and operands. (Am I sending a coded message?)

Substack latest.

Don't complain about 'old news.' What are you, a Twitterized 'woke' presentist?

There is presentism in the philosophy of time and there is what I will call, for want of a better term, historical presentism. This, roughly, is the conceit that the present alone matters  and that we have little or nothing to learn from the past.  It is not so much a view as an attitude, a 'bad 'tude' if you will, one shared by adolescents of all ages. There is the punk who, ignorant of great literature, installs Bukowski in the literary pantheon. Self-insulation from the past and its achievements is one of the ways wokesters self-enstupidate. 

And there are those who ought to know better, spineless university administrators in the grip of fashionable obsessions, who are thereby rendered incapable of just judgments of past times and individuals. Case in point: the Flannery O'Connor unnaming.

Pasta Puttanesca

Pasta Puttanesca is a good Lenten meal for a Friday night despite its being 'in the style of the whore.' Italian la puttana means whore, harlot, slut. Didn't Jesus suffer all to come unto him, even the ladies of the evening? 

Make it with sardines: 'meatier' than anchovies. Pour some extra virgin olive oil into a pan. Don't ask how much. Eyeball it like a man. Dump some chopped-up garlic onto the  olio d'oliva  lube job.  Set the heat to moderate.  Crack open the can of sardines and dump the contents, oil, water, and all into the pan. Break the formerly-sentient sea critters into small pieces. Add a can of  diced tomatoes. Throw in your Italian spices and fresh-ground pepper.  Chop up some olives and add to the mix. Stir. Simmer.

You knew without my telling you to get a righteous quantity of  water boiling. Dump the pasta into the boiling water. Capellini cooks quickly thus comporting well with the celerity with which this dish is supposed to be thrown together at the end of a long day. Cook the pasta a little shy of al dente. It will cook further when you add it to the sauce. Eat it topped with freshly-grated Parmigiana Reggiano or Pecorino Romano.  Wash it down with a glass or two of Dago Red. Think with compassion of the ladies of the evening. But do not avail yourself of their services.

To the scholarly among you I recommend Benedicta Ward, SLG, Harlots of the Desert: A Study of Repentance in Early Monastic Sources, Cistercian Publications, 1987. With chapters on Mary Magdalene, Mary of Egypt, Pelagia, Thais, and Maria the Niece of Abraham.

It Pays to Publish . . .

. . . but don't pay to publish. Leader of the Stack.

Anarcho-Tyranny in the USA

Here by Auron MacIntyre at The Total State (Substack):

The city of Philadelphia has announced an agreement to pay a $9.25 million settlement in connection with the police response to protests after the death of George Floyd in 2020. While dozens were killed and billions of dollars of damage were done during the riots that raged across America for weeks in the summer of 2020, it is the participants themselves who will be paid restitution by the government.

Law and order in the United States have now descended to a level of anarcho-tyranny in which the government funds rioters with the tax money of their victims. The slow death of the rule of law in America would be ugly enough, but what we are witnessing instead is the twisted, grimacing corpse of a system that was once designed to protect the safety of Americans now being used to punish us for disagreeing with our political elites.

UPDATE 3/24

This fellow and I so far appear to be 'on the same page.' Two days ago, before I had heard of him, I spoke of our time as 

. . . a time when those in control of the state apparatus have forgotten, or rather willfully ignore, the purposes that justify government in the first place, namely, the tasks of securing the life, liberty, and property of those governed. But the Orwellian wokesters now in charge invert these values in the Orwellian manner and aid and abet those who aim at the opposite.

As MacIntyre points out, what we are witnessing is "more than the slow death of the rule of law," but the inversion of our founding values. And yet brazen liars such as Nancy Pelosi yammer on about the rule of law while her shills in the media intone in unison the scripted mantra, "No one is above the law," as they pervert the law Soviet-style to destroy Donald J. Trump.  Thankfully, Nancy dear is no longer with us (nor against us) politically speaking; others, however, far worse and more dangerous because less stupid, will take her place.

And as usual the Left Coast leads the way. (Because it is closer to China?) Here is Substacker David Zweig on lockdown and surveillance Santa Clara-style.

Buckner Clarifies his Terminology

Terminological fluidity is one of the banes of philosophy. What follows is an admirable exercise in terminological fixation by the Worthy Opponent.  My comments are in blue.

I have been discussing toothbrushes [mirror images] with David but it’s clear we are being held back by semantics. I am not clear what we respectively mean by “reflection” or “appearance”, or of the green colour of these things. So I will try to set out what I mean or understand by the different terms.

“Phenomenal green”, “green as we see it”, “green as it appears to us”, also David’s “sensation of green” I think all mean the same thing, namely what I mean by green(ness), but let me explain what I understand by “green”.

BV: So far, so good.

1) Greenness is a visible quality of certain objects such as leaves, avocados, algae, brussel sprouts, [some] toothbrushes etc.

BV: The point needs to be put more precisely. Green (greenness) is a determinable with a range of corresponding  determinates.  (See here for the distinction.) The latter are the specific shades of green. The determinable green is arguably not a visible quality; only the lowest determinates are, the infima species. 

2) It is extended. I mean that a green patch is composed of green patches, which are in turn composed of further green patches ad infinitum. i.e. The greenness is continuous, or consists of a set of green points.

BV: This is not quite right either. Yes, a visible green patch can be subdivided, but not to infinity, for soon enough we arrive at sub-patches that cannot be seen, and this long before we get to points. A point is dimensionless: it has a location but no extension. And surely it is true that no color-determinate is visible if unextended.

3) Only a surface, i.e. a two dimensional thing can be green. However the surface is extended in 3D space, because each point can be a different distance from me.

BV: This sounds right to me. Visible green is given only two-dimensionally, even if the 'green' thing in the external world is 'green' all the way through.

4) The green quality is mind-independent, for the following reasons. (i) It exists outside me, (ii) it is a quality of the object which is green, and not a quality of me. (iii) I can no longer see it when I shut my eyes, but it is still there.

BV: Here is where the going gets tough.  If 'exists outside me' just means 'mind-independent,' then the first reason begs the question, or is circular. If, however, 'exists outside me' means 'appears outside me,' then the visible need not be mind-independent. 

As for (ii), what is the object? 'Object' is notoriously ambiguous. The thing in the external world? But then it hasn't been shown that the visible quality is a property of the object. It might just be a property of the phenomenon in Kant's sense which, though empirically real, is transcendentally ideal.

As for (iii),  if the visible quality is still there when I close my eyes, then it would have to be part of the thing itself in the external world, right? But that seems to comport none too well with the visible quality's being a phenomenal item.

5) It is inert, namely unlike heat it has no causal power to affect my senses.

BV: Seem right.  The seen green has no causal power. But how can  the visible two-dimensional phenomenal quality be both causally inert, and yet still be there when I close my eyes, given that the latter implies that the quality is part and parcel of the thing itself in the external world?  

Unlike heat? But surely there is phenomenal heat in contradistinction to heat-scientifically-understood. The felt heat of the hot coffee when I take a sip is not the same as the mean molecular kinetic energy of the coffee-water molecules. 

6) Thus it is not equivalent to reflectance properties of leaves or algae, which are powers to affect my senses, as far as we know, but greenness is an inert, non-causal quality. The leaf just is green.

BV: Yes.  The reflectance properties are dispositional properties, but there is nothing dispositional about the seen green, the phenomenal sense quality (sensory quale).  It is wholly occurrent or actual. 

7) It follows that greenness cannot be a reflectance property of green objects, although there may be some unknown causal connection between the property and the quality.

BV: Seems so.  Seen green cannot be a reflectance property of 'green' things themselves in the external world, things we call 'green' because they have the power to cause in us sensory qualia that are phenomenally green.

If, as science suggests, the green quality ‘out there’ is caused by neural processes, the greenness of “green” objects is an illusion, for it cannot be a quality of the green object. The causation cannot work in reverse. There is no way that a neural process in the brain can change or affect the quality of any object outside the brain.

BV: So when I am outside looking at my green palo verde tree in the backyard I am under an illusion because the tree in nature (in the external world) cannot be phenomenally green: that visible quality cannot be a property of the tree itself. It is conjured up in my brain by neural processes.

Is there not something dubious in the view that our direct sensory perception (in optimal conditions of lighting, etc.) of things like trees is illusory? If the seen green is illusory, then so is the smelt scent of the blossoms (The Sonoran spring is in full swing.)  And so on for all the other so-called secondary qualities/properties.  Can we keep the illusoriness from spreading to the primary qualities?

Kato Crews: 'Wokified' but not Qualified

Another example of how qualifications do not matter to wokesters. 

UPDATE 3/26.  In the related case of the 'wokified' but not qualified Phil Washington, sanity has prevailed.

Academentia in excelsis

DEI and the collapse of the universities.

Substack latest.

Three Senses of 'Peace'

There is the divine peace that "surpasseth all understanding." (Philippians 4:7) It is the most difficult to achieve.

There is peace among people who love, or at least tolerate, one another. It is moderately difficult to achieve.

There is finally the peace most easily achieved, that based on deterrence and mutual fear. (Our enemies do not respect us, but they can be made to fear us, and for most practical purposes fear suffices.) This is the peace guaranteed by the strength of a Reagan or a Trump but undermined by the weakness of a Carter, an Obama, or (worst of all) a Biden.  This is the peace about which it is wisely said, "If you want peace, prepare for war."  Si vis pacem, para bellum.

Credible deterrence assures peace between nations. Never forget: Nations are in the state of nature vis-à-vis one another, and nature is "red in tooth and claw."  This is not pessimism; it is realism.

A well-armed and well-trained populace assures peace  between it and the state apparatus which is ever lusting to increase its power. The will to power wills not merely its preservation but its continuous increase.

The peace purchased by credible deterrence is the foundation of the other, loftier, two. You will not be able to achieve the peace that "surpasseth all understanding,' or even peace with your brothers if your monastery is being bombed to smithereens.  This is why the Luftmensch must know how to fight, why the bookman must needs also be a rifleman. This is especially so at a time when those in control of the state apparatus have forgotten, or rather willfully ignore, the purposes that justify government in the first place, namely the tasks of securing the life, liberty and property of those governed. But the Orwellian wokesters now in charge invert these values in the Orwellian manner and aid and abet those who aim at the opposite. I trust my meaning is clear.

By the way, now you know why the 9mm pistol round is sometimes referred as the parabellum round. Also, and coincidentally, Pb is the designation on the Periodic Table for the element, lead, which I might add, nowadays counts as a 'precious metal.' A wise man in these trying times stocks up on such 'precious metals' as Au and Pb. 

On Prejudice

The word has two senses; only one is pejorative.

Leader of the Stack.

American Restoration

Substack articles by Bruce Abramson. From his About page:

Suppose you think that it’s wrong to discriminate based on race. To the Woke, you’re a racist.

Suppose you say that humans are either male or female. To the Woke, that’s dehumanizing.

Suppose you champion free speech. To the Woke, you’re promoting hatred.

Suppose you think that the ends don’t justify the means. To the Woke, you’re impeding justice.

Suppose you believe in God. To the Woke, you’re an unstable superstitious bigot.

The list of such absurd defamations is long, and it grows longer every day. But it’s no joke. Once the woke have labeled you a hateful, dehumanizing, unstable racist whose mere existence stands in the way of justice, they will treat you as if that’s who you really are. They will work to destroy you—terminate your personal relationships, professional aspirations, and financial possibilities.

Worst of all, the Woke are winning. The United States is mired in a Second Civil War. The country no longer functions as either a free society or a constitutional republic. Every single one of our major institutions has been corrupted: Academia, K-12 education, the media, the civil service, Hollywood, Silicon Valley, Wall Street, the legal and medical professions, and nearly every important professional society. Recent years have even uncovered deep Woke rot running corporate boardrooms, the IRS, FBI, CIA, NSA, and the military.

Leaders and organizations that are not Woke themselves cower in fear and fall in line. More than 60% of American report being afraid to voice their opinions; they fear woke reprisal.

This situation is neither tolerable nor sustainable. If we don’t move quickly to restore the free society America was born to be, we will slide irretrievably into an autocratic, elitist oligarchy.

We are beyond the time of timidity and prudence. We have become both the counterculture and counterrevolutionaries. Very little of what we have done in the past is suited to those roles. If we are to restore America, we will need new lessons, strategies, tactics, and priorities.

This essay series is for those who want to master the techniques we need.

Is Abramson exaggerating? I'd say he isn't. What say you?

Consciousness is an Illusion . . .

. . . but truth is not?  An inconsistency in Dennett.

Over at the Stack.

Can Consciousness be Explained?

Top o' the Stack. Dennett debunked! 

Saturday Night at the Oldies: A Temporary Retreat into the Past; Back to the Fray Tomorrow

Freddy Fender, Cielito Lindo.  Tex-Mex version of a very old song.

Arizona's own Marty Robbins, La Paloma.  Another old song dating back to 1861. 

Barbara Lewis, Hello Stranger, 1963. 1963 was arguably the best of the '60s years for pop compositions. 

Emmylou Harris, Hello Stranger. Same title, different song.  This one goes out to Mary Kay F-D. Remember the Fall of 1980, Mary Kay? 

Get up, rounder/Let a working girl lie down/ You are rounder/And you are all out and down.

Carter Family version from 1939.

Joan Baez, Daddy, You've Been on My Mind. The voice of an angel, the words of a poet, and Bruce  Langhorne's guitar.

Joan Baez, It's All Over Now, Baby Blue. The voice of an angel, the words of a poet, and Langhorne's guitar.

Joan Baez, A Hard Rain's A Gonna Fall. The voice of an angel, the words of a poet, and Langhorne's guitar. The incredible mood of this version, especially the intro, is made by Langhorne and the bass of Russ Savakus, another well-known session player from those days. I've been listening to this song since '65 and it gives me chills every time. 

And now the fifteen-year-old is an old man of 73, and tears stream from his eyes for the nth time as he listens to this and we are once again on the brink of nuclear war as we were back in October of '62.  It'll be a hard rain indeed, should it fall. 

Carolyn Hester, I'll Fly Away.  Dylan on harp, a little rough and ragged. Langhorne on guitar? Not sure.

Joan Baez and her sister, Mimi Farina, Catch the Wind. Fabulous.

Joan Baez, Boots of Spanish Leather.  Nanci Griffith also does a good job with this Dylan classic. 

Betty Everett, You're No Good, 1963.  More soulful than the 1975 Linda Ronstadt version.

The Ikettes, I'm Blue, 1962. 

Lee Dorsey, Ya Ya, 1961.  Simplicity itself. Three chords. I-IV-V progression. No bridge.

Best Amazon Comment I've Read So Far This Year

While poking around for a reliable, powerful, bicycle tire pump to keep my mid-sized mountain bike tires up to around 65 psi, I found the following. Comments enabled for anyone who has a pump to recommend. The reviewer is recommending this device.

Andy's Reviews

5.0 out of 5 stars This pumps me up more than DJ Khalid

Reviewed in Canada on July 15, 2019

Color: Navy Blue Style: Air Center Plus 

 

My bike has tires. Yes, surprising, I know. Not even the most pessimistic person in 1903 thought we would still be using rubber tires. But here we are, the year is 2019, and we still need to have air filled butyl tyres. This pump works great - filled my 27.5x2.4 tires in like 7 pumps. If you asked my wife she would say something like "that's not the only thing that works in 7 pumps" or "maybe I should be sharing my bed with this pump instead". But this is why we ride bikes -- to avoid the wife, and try to forget the continuous string of affairs she has with her yoga instructors.

 

The Phenomenal Principle

Ed Buckner sends this:

“If there sensibly appears to a subject to be something which possesses a particular sensible quality then there is something of which the subject is aware which does possess that sensible quality”. (Howard Robinson, Perception, 1994, London: Routledge, p. 32)

That is the question. If it sensibly appears to Jake that there is a green after-image, does it follow that there is something green of which Jake is aware?

I’m inclined to answer yes. But then we have the problem that there is nothing green and physical outside Jake’s brain, nor inside Jake’s brain. So what is it that is green? We agree that it can’t be a physical item, if Robinson’s Principle is true.

I recommend Robinson’s 1994 book, and also his November 2022 book Perception and Idealism.

Ed seems to be coming around. Robinson is asking the right question, and Ed answers in the affirmative or at least is so inclined. (By the way, I read Robinson's excellent Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism, Cambridge UP, 1982, when it first came out. I expect his later work, which I haven't read, is equally good.)

It is best to approach the question from the first-person point of view. A green after-image sensibly appears to me. (It appears visually and so sensibly.) Does something appear or does nothing appear? The datum is not nothing, so it is something.  It is indubitably something. And it is a describable, definite something: green, pulsating, etc. The green item is not outside my head. But it is not inside my head either. (As Bill Lycan says, if I have something green inside my head, then I am in big trouble.)

It follows that the indubitable phenomenal datum cannot be a physical item that is green, pulsating, etc. The inference is correct and the conclusion is true.  What Ed should do is simply admit that there are sensory qualia.  But he appears loathe to do so. He needs to explain why. Is he ideologically committed to materialism? I don't think that's it. 

We know that Ed reasonably rejects the characteristic Meinongian thesis that (i) some of the items to which we refer both in thought and in language have no being (Sein) whatsoever (not Dasein, not Bestehen, not intentionales QuasiSein, not any Seinsmodus) but nevertheless (ii) are mind-independent Soseine that actually (not merely possibly) instantiate properties. But this rejection of Meinong cannot be a good reason for Ed to refuse to countenance the green after-image, and this for two  reasons. First, the sensory quale in question is not mind-independent. Second, it exists. In its case, esse est percipi, to be is to be perceived. The green after-image is perceived, and by the same stroke, it is/exists.

But it may be that Ed is confusing the green after-image with the green unicorn. And we did catch him in that confusion in an earlier thread. Suppose I am thinking about a green unicorn. Let's use 'thinking' in the broad Cartesian way to refer to any object-directed act of awareness, including imagining. Imagining a green unicorn, I am not imagining an image since a unicorn is an animal, not an image; I am imagining a unicorn. The object-directed act of mind purports to display a mind-independent animal,  not a mind-dependent image. 

But of course there are/exist no unicorns!  For that very reason, a sensory quale such as a green after-image cannot be assimilated to a green unicorn. What's more, unicorns are not mind-dependent. Qualia are; ergo, etc. 

Your move, Ed. Give us some good reasons why you will not admit qualia. If your reasons are neither pro-materialist not anti-Meinongian, what are they?

Of Wokery and Merit

Destructive, anti-civilizational wokesters are not just against merit, they are positively for anti-merit, dysfunction, incompetence, stupidity, corruption, malevolence, and more. Qualifications don't matter; 'wokifications' matter: being black, female, lesbian, cognitively impaired, truth-insensitive, reality-denying, physically feeble, morally corrupt.  Mayorkas, Fetterman, Buttigieg, practically the whole of the Biden administration.  After watching this C-SPAN video will you tell me that Phil Washington is qualified to head the Federal Aviation Administration? Qualified or 'wokified'? Is being 'woke' and 'diverse' a qualification? 

Suppose you question whether John Fetterman is qualified to be a U. S. Senator given his mental and physical impairment. You will be called an 'ableist.' What's next? 'Qualificationist?' "You're a white-spremacist qualificationist! You believe people need to be qualified for the positions they apply for!"

You will never understand the Left until you understand that they reliably take the side of losers, underdogs, and criminals, who comprise their clientele and path to power.  And with lefties it is always about power, first and forever.

Here we read about a 78-year-old Englishman who, in defending himself against a screwdriver-wielding home invader, caused the miscreant's death and is now facing a murder charge.

Dear old England, the mother country. It is sad to see your mother, senile and decrepit, go down the toilet, having lost all her moral sense and the will to live.

Once again one sees the justification for my political burden of proof:

As contemporary 'liberals' become ever more extreme, they increasingly assume what I call the political burden of proof.  The onus is now on them to defeat the presumption that they are so  morally and intellectually obtuse as not to be worth talking to.

Actually, that is far too mild a statement. Perhaps tomorrow I will tell you what I really think.

UPDATE (3/17).  I say above that leftists reliably take the side of criminals. More proof, as if more proof is needed:

THE AGE OF REASON?

I wrote here about Hennepin County, Minnesota’s left-wing prosecutor who let off two juveniles (the older aged 17) who murdered a woman in the course of a home invasion. This was part of her stated rationale:

[County Attorney Mary] Moriarty has said she is simply “following the science,” which she says is conclusive about adolescent brain development. According to Moriarty, the human brain is not fully developed until 25 years old.

Which is why, according to Moriarty, “we need to treat kids like kids.” As opposed to treating murderers like murderers.

Read it all. Why is 'Minnesnowta' such a hot-bed of anti-civilizational wokeassery? Does the cold clime freeze their brains unto willful self-enstupidation?

A Five-Second Test to See Whether You're Aging Well

Here’s how it works:

• Start in a standing position with 10 points
• Sit down into a cross-legged position on the floor
• Rise back up into a standing position

Simple, right? Only for each time you used a hand, knee or forearm to accomplish the task, you have to subtract a point. If you sat down and stood back up using only your core and leg strength, that’s a perfect 10. The goal is to land around eight points or better.

Your humble correspondent is 73 years of age.  He used his right hand twice: once to get onto the floor, and once to get up off the floor. So his score is eight points. Now you tell us your age and your score.

The Purpose of Schooling

According to Anthony Esolen,

The purpose of schooling—which is not the same as education—is to encourage people to express confident platitudes, which they are pleased to call their opinions, about things they know nothing of. This is far worse than ignorance. 

Esolen is (usually) a good writer and a clear thinker who often communicates important truths. So why does he begin his essay so irresponsibly? Journalistic responsibility requires that the writer not tamper with the established meanings of words and phrases. (See Merriam-Webster.) That's what wokesters do, as witness their hijacking  of the word 'equity.' (See Merriam-Webster.)

Has Esolen suffered a reverse-metanoia? I rather doubt it.  Am I being overly punctilious? I don't think so.

Once again, language matters!  (587 entries and counting) Dismounting my high horse, I now return to ruminating over modal collapse arguments against the doctrine of divine simplicity.