Existence as a Property: A Response to David Brightly

David Brightly commented: "Why bother with existence as a property since everything has it and it does not help distinguish individuals? Is there an argument that convinces you that existence is a property, or is this in some way a matter of 'philosophical taste'?"

1. Existence can be a property without being a property of individuals. It might be a property of properties or concepts or propositional functions or Tichian offices or some cognate item. But our concern is whether, and in what sense, existence is a property of individuals.

2. If existence is a property of individuals, then one can ask whether it classifies individuals into two groups, the existent and the nonexistent. If existence is classificatory in this way, then the individuals it classifies cannot, in themselves, be existent: they must be nonexistent individuals. But I mention this (Meinongian) theory only to set it aside for the space of this post. I maintain that there are no nonexistent individuals, that all individuals exist. This is not self-evident. Nor is it a logical truth that every individual exists. If it were, then it would be a formal-logical contradiction to say that some individuals do not exist, but it is not. For more on this topic, and a critique of van Inwagen, see here.

3. Now if every individual exists, then in Brightly's words, "it does not help distinguish individuals." That is right: if every individual exists, then (ontologically) no individual differs from any other individual in respect of existence, and (epistemologically) no individual can be distinguished (told apart) from any other individual by its having existence.

4. Now suppose you accept #3. Does it follow straightaway that existence is not a property of individuals? By no means. It would follow only if you made some such dubious assumption as this: No genuine property is such that, if it is possessed by something, then it is possessed by everything. But I see no reason to accept this assumption. Is not self-identity a perfectly good property, a property possessed by everything? Everything is self-identical and nothing is self-diverse. How does it follow that there is no property of self-identity? Or consider the property of having properties. Absolutely everything has this property since absolutely everything has properties. From the fact that everything has this property it does not follow that there is no such property. Or imagine a world in which every colored individual is green. Being green in this world "would not help distinguish individuals." But surely it would not follow that green is not a property of these individuals.

5. Suppose you grant me that there is the property of having properties. Call this property 'P.' I once heard a philosopher identify existence with P. But we needn't go so far as to say that to exist is to have properties. Suppose we make a weaker equivalence claim:

a. Necessarily, for any x, x exists iff x exemplifies P.

Pace Meinong, (a) is true. Surely everything that exists has properties, and (less surely) everything that has properties exists. I subscribe to (a). But whether or not you subscribe to (a), you understand it. Since you understand it, you must admit that there is a property of existence -- even if you go on to deny that the property of existence is necessarily equivalent to the property of having properties.

6. There are many existing individuals, and they all have something in common, namely their existence. Does this not suffice to show that there is a property of existence in a suitably broad sense of 'property'?
Since there are many existents, but they have one thing in common, their existence, this one thing they have in common cannot be identical to any one of them or to each of them. Existence is one to their many. Does this not show that, in a broad sense of 'property,' existence is a property?

7. But who cares about this property if everything has it? Why bother with it, as Brightly asks? In one sense existence is perfectly inane (empty) and insignificant since, again, everything has it and nothing lacks it. But in another sense no property is more important. For if a thing lacks existence it is nothing at all. To think properly about existence we need to balance these two points:

i. From the point of view of essence, existence adds nothing. ii. From the point of view of existence, existence adds everything.

It is onesided to seize upon one of these points while ignoring the other. As for the first, existence adds nothing to a thing's description. Predications of existence are utterly uninformative. Asked to describe the assailant, I might say; he is a male, about 20 years old, with a shaven head and a tatoo on his right forearm, etc. But I won't end the litany of descriptors with, "and he exists!" But of course, what doesn't exist cannot assault anyone. And that is precisely the second point: although existence adds nothing quidditatively, adds nothing to what the thing is, , it 'adds' the most important thing of all, namely, existence. Without existence, the thing is nothing at all and cannot have properties or stand in relations.

8. "But if everything exists, there is no contrast between existence and nonexistence!" Yes there is. It is the contrast between an individual's actual existence and its possible nonexistence. 'Everything exists' is consistent with 'Everything is possibly such that it does not exist.'

9. "But when I say that existence is not a property of individuals, all I mean is that existence s not a property the predication of which could serve to distinguish one individual from another." Well, if that is all you mean, then I wholeheartedly agree with you. Surely it is obvious that existence is no part of what a thing is. Existing things are not a kind of thing as Aristotle said long ago. But how is it supposed to follow that existence is not a property of individuals? All that follows is that it is not a quidditative propertyof individuals.

10. Dropping the word 'property,' my thesis is that existence belongs to individuals in the way it would not belong to them if it were a property of properties, or concepts, or propositional functions, or Tichian offices. In brief, my thesis is that existence, in the primary sense of the term, belongs to individuals. This is not a matter of 'taste' since I have exposed some of the non sequiturs of those who think otherwise and have given some positive arguments above.

Companion post: Existence: Some Responses to Pavel Materna

Comments

[David Brightly]

Many thanks for that reply, Bill, which has given me a lot to ponder on. I'm delighted you have reopened the discussion from earlier this year.

I agree that to argue that existence, self-identity, property-bearing, etc, are not properties merely because everything possesses them would indeed be to commit a non-sequitur. But it seems to me that there are good Kantian reasons for ruling them out, namely that they are all inter-related ideas that arise together and form a pre-requisite for subject-predicate logic. Referring to your critique of PVI, I'd agree that it's not a formal-logical contradiction to say that some individuals do not exist. Rather, it breaks implicit assumptions that we need before we can begin to do formal logic, or perhaps even speak. I'd be interested to hear of a property possessed by all individuals that does not fit into this category. Greenness in an all-green world doesn't convince me because we can at least conceive of an individual in such a world being non-green, whereas we cannot conceive of a non self-identical individual at all.

You give some positive arguments for a Yes answer.
In (5) I don't see how my understanding "(a) Necessarily, for any x, x exists iff x exemplifies P" implies that I must accept existence as a property. To me, (a) seems yet another Kantian pre-requisite. Can you tease this argument out?

In (6), I'm not sure individuals do have their existence in common. Is my existence identical to yours? 'BV has a beard' and 'DB has a beard' are both true but is my beardedness the same as your beardedness?

In (7) you say "Without existence, the thing is nothing at all". This seems to me to exemplify the danger of thinking of existence as a property. For how can the thing, whatever it is, be nothing at all? Can we not think of a thing having an 'ordinary' property subtracted away, but leaving the thing intact as an individual?

In (10) I agree that existence primarily seems 'to belong to individuals' or 'goes with individuals' but the conclusion I draw from this is that existence and individuality are so closely related that they amount to the same idea. And since we are unable to think of an individual without assigning it a kind the idea is also inseparable from the notion of instantiation of a concept or equivalent formulation.

I'm interested in the possibility that our question has no right answer, that it makes no difference whether we accept existence, etc, as properties or not. This situation arises quite often in maths and physics when we find two or more equivalent representations of a structure or phenomenon. Are there differing consequences to answering Yes and No to our question?

Finally, inverting the question, as it were, we can ask 'Do properties exist?' From the longstanding range of answers on this question is it possible to draw any conclusions about the world or our thinking? I'd be interested to hear your views.

With apologies for hugely broadening the present topic, DB.

[Bill Vallicella]

David,

We'll have to come back to this later. This post is about to scroll off into archival oblivion, and in any case I am preparing for a conference in Geneva in a few days and so my blogging (apart from reposts) will be concerned with that.

But I appreciate your interest and I will undoubtedly be returning to this topic.

[David Brightly]

Thanks, Bill, I'll look forward to that. Safe trip to Europe.

[David Brightly]

Thanks, Bill, I'll look forward to that. Safe trip to Europe.