Is the Existence of God Entailed by Alternative Ways Natural Things Might Have Been?

This post is a sequel to Ayn Rand on Necessity, Contingency, and Dispositions.  There we were examining this quotation:

What do you mean by "necessity"? By "necessity," we mean that things are a certain way and had to be.  I would maintain that the statement "Things are," when referring to non-man-made occurrences, is the synonym of "They had to be."  Because unless we start with the premise of an arbitrary God who creates nature, what is had to be. (IOE, 2nd ed., p. 299)

Rand's argument may be set forth as follows:

1. If there are alternative ways non-man-made things might have been, then an arbitrary (free) God exists.

2. It is not the case that an arbitrary (free) God exists. Ergo,

3. There are no alternative ways non-man-made things might have been.

I rigged the argument so that it is valid in point of logical form: the conclusion follows from the premises.  But are the premises true?  A more tractable question: Do we have good reason to accept them?

I will grant arguendo the truth of (2) the better to focus on (1). Why should we accept (1)? It is not at all obvious that real contingency requires the existence of God.   There are any number of prominent atheist philosophers who maintain that there are alternative ways things might have been, David Lewis being one of them. And among prominent theist philosophers who accept that there are alternative ways things might have been, I can't think of one who maintains that this acceptance entails the existence of God. It is safe to say that a majority of contemporary philosophers, both atheist and theist, would reject (1).  This suggests that (1) is in need of argumentative support.

It cannot be claimed that (1) is obvious or self-evident.  Consider the negation of (1), namely, (~1) 'There are alternative ways non-man-made things might have been and an arbitrary God does not exist.'  The latter sentence is not a formal contradiction.  Nor is it analytically false.  Therefore, (1) is neither obvious nor self-evident.  Is there an Objectivist argument for (1)?  If there is, I would like to know what it is.

Note Rand's restriction of what is has to be to "non-man-made occurrences."  This suggests that a man-made occurrence, if it occurs, did not have to occur, might not have occurred.  Suppose at t that I scratch my beard, and that this beard-scratching originates from a free decision, where 'free' implies 'could have done otherwise.'  I take it that Rand and Co. have no trouble understanding how an event that occurs at time t might not have occurred at t, or how an event that did not occur at t might have occurred at t, when the event is man-made.  But they do have trouble when the event is non-man-made.  This suggests that they think that the contingency of an event derives from the power of a free agent to either bring it about or not.

Now I think I understand what is behind (1).  My exegetical hypothesis is that Rand thinks that (1) is true because she thinks that the contingency of an event or fact  E can only derive from the power of a free agent to either bring about E or refrain from bringing it about.  This makes it understandable why Rand thinks that the existence of God is entailed by the possibility of nature (the non-man-made) being other than it is.  Since we do not have the power to bring about the existence of the non-man-made or the power to alter the natures of non-man-made things, real contingency in nature can exist only if there are gods or a God.  Holding as she does that God or gods do not exist, she concludes that nature cannot be other than it is.

If this is right, then at the root of (1) is the 'red thesis' above.  There are, however, considerations that speak against the acceptance of the 'red thesis.'

A. If nature is indeterministic, then some events just occur without cause. A photon passes though slit A rather than slit B at time t without without being caused to do so. It could just as well have passed though slit B at t. So both events are possible at t, although only one is actual. It follows that the photon's passing though slit A is contingent.  This is a real (not merely excogitated) contingency, one ingredient in rerum natura.  If so, then it is not the case that the contingency of an event or fact  E can only derive from the power of a free agent to either bring about E or refrain from bringing it about. For in the case before us the contingency has nothing to do with any event- or agent-cause.

B. But perhaps nature is deterministic at both micro- and macro-levels and every event is causally necessitated by earlier events all the way back to the Big Bang. So Rand might insist that everything in nature had to be the way it was. If you tell her that the laws of nature and the physical constants might have been different, she might stamp her foot and insist that they too have to be they way they are: what is nomologically necessary is broadly-logically (metaphysically) necessary. But what about the initial conditions, the conditions at or right after the Big Bang? She might insist that they too had to be what they were. But isn't the Big Bang contingent? Isn't it such that it might not have occurred? If the Big Bang is contingent, and there is no God, then the 'red thesis' is false.

C. Rand might try to get around this objection by denying Big Bang cosmology and maintaining that the universe always existed through an infinite past, is deterministic, and is governed by metaphysically necessary laws. But even if all this is so, the universe having these wonderful attributes might not have existed at all. Surely it is a non sequitur to move from 'X always existed and always will exist' to 'X exists of metaphysical necessity.' The temporal 'always' does not get the length of the modal 'necessarily.' (The fact that these words are often conflated in ordinary language cuts no ice.)  At this point Rand could pound the lectern and announce that the universe which has existed though an infinite past exists of metaphysical necessity.  But why accept such a dogmatic pronouncement? 

D.  The red thesis attempts a reduction of  contingency to the power of free agents.  But the attempted reduction presupposes what it attempts to reduce, namely, contingency.  For a free agent is one that could have done otherwise with respect to any decision that it makes, which is to say that a free agent is one whose decisions are contingent.  The red thesis, far from reducing the modal to the nonmodal, contingency to the power of free agents, presupposes contingency.  But if contingency is irreducible to the power of free agents and is presupposed by the power of free agents, then there is no justification for the restriction of contingency to the man-made. The reason for the restriction is removed, and we must say either that there are contingent man-made and non-man-made events or that all events are necessary.

Whatever comes to exist via free agency is contingent.  But it does not follow that the contingency of what is contingent can be reduced to and understood in terms of the the power of free agents. For the latter presupposes contingency.  Since free agency is not the source of contingency, but merely of events that are contingent, there is no justification for restricting contingency to man-made events.  That restriction would be justified only if free agency were the source of the contingency of contingent events in addition to the contingent even themselves.  

The contingent is that which is possible to be and possible not to be. So my point could also be put as follows.  The man-made, that which originates by human free agency, is possible to be and possible not to be.  But its being possible to be and possible not to be does not originate by human free agency , but is presupposed by and logically prior to both human decisions and man-made facts that result from them.  So there is no justification for the restriction of contingency to the man-made.   Contingency, if it is found anywhere, is to be found both in the man-made and the non-man-made.

Comments

[John Farrell]

Bill, excellent post. You mention the contingency of the world being compatible with atheism, which is interesting. I've always thought myself that the only argument that would convince me to be an atheist is proof that the world is the way it is...because it can't be any other way. Not that I'm looking for contingency arguments for atheism; I'm more interested in the contingency of things as an argument for theism.

:)

Anyway, an enjoyable post.

[Bill Vallicella]

Hi John,

You raise an interesting question: If nature exists of metaphysical necessity, and could not have been other than it is (e.g., the laws of nature could not have been different, the values of the physical constants could not have been different, the geometry of spacetime could not have been different, etc.), does it follow that God (classically defined) does not exist? In other words, can one mount a necessity argument for atheism as a counter to contingency arguments for theism?

I suppose one could. If nature is necessary as to existence and structure, then God would have a lot less work to do inasmuch as there would be no need for an explanation of why the natural world exists. I am assuming that what exists of metaphysical necessity has no need of an explanation of its existence: its existence is 'self-explanatory.' But of course God has other jobs to do besides explaining why a world exists and why this particular world as opposed to some other one.

But is there a compelling reason to think that nature exists of metaphysical necessity? I can't think of one. Maybe the Objectivists can provide us with one. I should like to hear it.

[M_Frank]

The temporal 'always' does not get the length of the modal 'necessarily.'

I'm just a poor, ignorant statistician (and so encounter contingent events all the time), but I wonder if some of the confusion might lie with an equivocation on the word "always." In the Choctaw language, there are two words - time particles appended to verbs - to denote "always." billia means "always" in the sense of "continuously, without interruption." bieka means "always" in the sense of "on every occasion." I can see where if something happens bieka - on every occasion when I drop a stone, it will fall to the ground - it may imply a kind of necessity from which we induce a law of gravity. OTOH, if G(Mm)/d^2 is billia - it has always been the case without interruption that gravitational forces diminish with the square of the distance - it is actually easy to consider that it might have been G(Mm)/d^3 or G(Mm)/d^1 or some other relationship.

Maybe another way of thinking of it is that the consequences of a natural law, like Newton's, are necessary; but the natural law itself is not.

(I have recently discovered this site and find it interesting.)

[Kevin Currie]

What I've always been confused on (even having been a Randian objectivist many years ago)is that how she can hold non-made made truths as necessary, hold man-made actions as contingent, yet not in any way be a dualist (believing in some non-material soul that makes humans immune from the determinism she must see in nature).

Actually, the reason I long ago gave up objectivism was because I thought they thoroughly misunderstood evolutionary theory on this (and another) score. Evolution becomes a very strange theory when not seen as premised on a certain level of contingency; it becomes a theory peppered with words like "inevitability." If evolution does not function contra to the principle of "that which is, had to be," then I don't know what is.

[Edward]

Isn't there a logical problem in holding that man is both a product of the universe and that man, because of some particular property attributed to him (free will), is exempted from the unyielding necessity that everything else in the universe must, by default, possess. Stated in another way, our consciousness or mind is, according to any materialist dogma, composed solely of matter. This matter, in turn, is a part of the universe in the same way that the planets and the stars are. How can this matter somehow come together in a certain way to break from the chains of necessity into the realm of contingency. For the atheist, man is entirely a part of this universe. Why, then, should he be an exception? I think it should be obvious that the response "Because he has free will" is not sufficiently satisfactory.

[Bill Vallicella]

Kevin,

A good point. I wonder how Binswanger would respond. A key idea in evolutionary theory is natural selection which involves random variation, though it has deterministic aspects as well. So I agree with you: if evolutionary theory is true, 'that which is had to be' is false.

Evolutionary theory and quantum mechanics both pose serious threats to Rand's metaphysics.

[Kevin Currie]

Edward,

Just as a side-note, I think you make an interesting point when you say: "For the atheist, man is entirely a part of this universe. Why, then, should he be an exception? I think it should be obvious that the response "Because he has free will" is not sufficiently satisfactory."

I honestly don't recall Rand's solution to the problem of free will in a determined world (I only remember it stated that humans have free will).

Myself, I think that the best "solutions" have been offered by Karl William James (a weak solution by most any standard, but the best I've seen). James suggests that we simply don't know enough (and possibly can't know enough) to know whether we are determined, but the fact that we intutively feel free means that we might as well act that way (allowing for the possibility that this feeling and our actions may be determined).

Karl Popper says something similar, in suggesting that while determinism is a testable hypothesis, we could never know whether our failure at prediction proves indeterminacy or ignorance of variables in our prediction. Therefore, we tentatively assume determinacy but keep the position a tentative one.

Now, back to the Rand stuff.

[Edward]

I think that my comment was completely pertinent to the discussion. Thus there is no need to go "Back to the Rand stuff." I did not, in fact, ask for an answer to the problem of free will. Your response, though, has proven my point. The very idea of free will is inconsistent with both a materialist and determinist worldview. Randians appear to hold both of these and, therefore, my question to them still stands and has not been properly dealt with. If man is a purely material component of the universe, how is it that he escapes the absolute necessity that the rest of the universe must somehow logically possess? Let us use the simple example of a glass. Because a glass is man-made, according to Randians, its existence is contingent and not necessary. The process of making the glass, though, must also have a purely material explanation. The glass is a result of my hands working to form it, which in turn is a result of the impulses within my brain that direct the parts of my body to act. Working from a materialist basis, the glass has actually come into existence in the same way that all non man-made things have. The term "free will" used as a response to my inquiry becomes both a cop out and merely a linguistic trick that refuses to consider the issue thoughtfully.