Hypocrisy and Other Vices of Self-Presentation

My exposure of the Dictionary Fallacy was not intended to cast doubt on the utility of dictionaries. Far from it.  Some of their entries are excellent starting points for philosophical inquiry. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, hypocrisy is "assuming a false appearance of virtue or goodness, with dissimulation of real character or inclination, especially in respect of religious life or belief."  As a lexical definition, that is hard to beat.  Having been handed the OED ball, however, I now run with it.  What the philosopher wants is a theory of hypocrisy.  That will almost certainly involve a precisification of the lexical concept along with an adjustment of the concept so that it coheres with the concepts of other moral phenomena in the vicinity such as lying, self-deception, 'bullshitting,' bad faith, insincerity, and what all else.

The first point to be made is that a person who is occasionally hypocritical is not a hypocrite, any more than a person who has lied or been drunk a few times is a liar or a drunkard.  The hypocrite habitually assumes a false appearance of virtue or goodness, etc.  The hypocrisy of the hypocrite is therefore a vice, where vices are a species of habits and habits are dispositions of persons.  

What I want to explore is the taxonomic notion that hypocrisy is a vice of self-presentation.  Accordingly, the genus vices of self-presentation divides into various species, one of which is hypocrisy.  But perhaps we should back up a step or two.  To be a self at all is to be involved in self-presentation. Now one's presentation of self to others and to oneself can be more or less honest or sincere or 'authentic.'  (The scare quotes indicate that I am a bit skeptical of the jargon of authenticity, to borrow Adorno's title Jargon der Eigentlichkeit.) This suggests a distinction between morally acceptable and morally unacceptable modes of self-presentation, and perhaps even a distinction between virtuous and vicious modes of self-presentation.  Self-presentation thus divides into virtuous and vicious species with each of these dividing into various subspecies, with hypocrisy being one of the subspecies of vicious self-presentation.  Of course I am not saying that all vices (or virtues) are vices (or virtues) of self-presentation.

Gluttony is an example of a vice which is not a vice of self-presentation.  The glutton habitually eats in substantial excess of the requirements of health and (perhaps) conviviality.  (Suppose you are at a gathering where the hostess has gone to considerable trouble to present a lavish 'spread.'  That is not the occasion to practice abstemiousness.  Just by showing up at the party you incur an obligation of sorts to be sociable, which may justify a bit of overeating.)  But the glutton, in overeating, does not falsely present himself or represent himself as morally better than he is.  Strictly speaking, he is not engaged in self-presentation at all; he is merely stuffing his face.  He can do this on his own: he has no need for others to misrepresent himself to.  The same goes for the lazy bones.  Asleep on the bed of sloth, he is not in the business of self-presentation.

So there are vices which are not vices of self-presentation.  And it seems clear enough that hypocrisy is a vice of self-presentation.  The hypocrite presents himself to others (and perhaps also to himself) as other than he is, as morally better than he is.  My question is: Are there vices of self-presentation other than hypocrisy? 

The other day I mentioned hypocrisy in reverse.  Let's review that notion.  One sort of hypocrite fails to practice what he preaches.  By preaching, he presents himself to others as one who honors certain values or virtues or demands. But by failing to make an honest attempt at living in accordance with what what he preaches, the hypocrite dishonors in his life what he honors in his talk.   It is this discrepancy that constitutes him a hypocrite. But what should we say of the person who does not preach what he practices? 

Suppose a person manifests in his behavior such virtues as honesty, frugality, willingness to take responsibility for his actions, ability to defer gratification, respect for others, self-control, and the like, but refuses to advocate or promote these virtues even though their practice has led to the person's success and well-being. These hypocrites-in-reverse owe much to the old virtues and to having been brought up in a climate where they were honored and instilled; but they won't do their share in promoting them. They will not preach what they themselves practice. And in some cases, they will preach against, or otherwise undermine, what they themselves practice.

Here too is a discrepancy between practice and preaching, except that what is absent in the hypocrite in reverse is not the practice of virtues preached, but the preaching of virtues practiced.   What is honored in such a person's life and practice is not honored in his talk and profession.  But in this case the person is not making himself out to be morally better than he is.  He is not feigning virtues he lacks but concealing virtues he has.  My point is that we should not call such a person a hypocrite even though we can rightly tax him with a vice of self-presentation. 

A second way to fall into hypocrisy is by saying publically what one doesn't believe.  Plenty of this goes on among the spokesmen for organized religion, among politicians, and among the paid shills of business interests.  Corresponding to this there is the reverse phenomenon of not saying publically what one believes.  In some cases this is a morally dubious form of self-presentation: once conceals one's true beliefs, one fails to 'stand up' for what one really believes.  We all engage in such dissembling from time to time.  We go along to get along.  What we have here is a privative mode of self-presentation.  We reveal ourselves by way of concealing certain aspects of ourselves.  It is not easy to say when reticence and self-concealment are  morally acceptable and when not.  Sometimes we ought to be reticent in the interests of comity and tolerance.  Other times it would be wrong to be reticent.

We have here the phenomenon of competing values.  Tolerance is a value, but so is forthrightness.  They are values that often collide, especially in the pluralistic societies of the West.  In the spirit of tolerance, I may hide my disgust at your morally obnoxious opinions.  But in so doing I dissemble.  If your opinions are sufficiently obnoxious, however, I will be justified in denouncing you and your ideas in no uncertain terms.  Then I leave off dissembling but sin against tolerance.

Suppose one is reticent in the interests of comity and tolerance when it comes to (what one sincerely believes to be) some grave moral wrong such as partial-birth abortion.  I claim that one does not thereby exhibit hypocrisy, even though one is dissembling and wrongfully.  For one is not presenting a false appearance of moral probity, but doing something quite different, namely,  presenting a false appearance of acquiescence, if not endorsement, of views one finds morally obnoxious.

Much more can be said, but I think I have said enough to show that hypocrisy is only one type of morally unacceptable self-presentation.  Hypocrisy-in-reverse, in both of the two modes distinguished, is a second type.  But I need a better name that 'hypocrisy-in-reverse.' 

Comments

[Mike]

Wouldn't be a bad name to call hypocrisy in reverse 'hypercrisy', since it is culpably too critical of one's own values, etc.

[Mike]

But just to underscore an earlier point. It is not hypocritical to present oneself as favoring behaviors or practices that one never intends to pursue. One might be simply unable to pursue them. It is not even hypocritical to present oneself as favoring behaviors or practices that one can, but would not, pursue. Rock climbing and mountaineering are wonderful for a variety of reasons, including the virtues such practices instill. Still it might be possible, but too too risky, for some frailer advocates to engage in it. Hypocrisy is a very subtle concept, I think.

[Philoponus]

Dissembling virtue

I too despair of finding a felicitous name for the species of self-misrepresentation we are here calling “hypocrisy in reverse.” Perhaps for the purposes of this short comment you will permit me to call him the dissembler of virtue. I want simply to re-enforce the point that such people really exist and their deception is harmful.

Hiding one’s virtues cannot be accounted a vice in itself. Some people are by nature very modest and abhor any form of self-promotion ( not good character traits for a writer! ). Some winners of the VC and CMH reluctantly tell their stories of great courage with the utmost modesty. Sgt Erwin is an example that comes to mind. Sgt Erwin was the navigator on a B-17 flying over Germany in 1944. On his last mission, a large burning flare was blown back into his aircraft. Sgt Erwin picked it up, carried it some distance to the flight deck, and finally jettisoned it, saving the plane and his crewmates, but severely burning his face, arms and hands. If Sgt Erwin says he is not a brave man, I don’t call him a hypocrite.

The true dissembler of virtue disparages the virtues he takes care not to be seen practicing. He is follower of the old maxim, feign vice and dissemble virtue. If you encounter such a person and unmask him, he will say something like “I find that if people know that I am generous, honest, etc, they tend to exploit these traits or at least over-rely upon them. Whereas if they think I’m greedy and mean-spirited, they are much more scrupulous and careful in dealing with me.” We understand this thinking, but we see the fallacy in it, I’m sure. His pretense of vice or at least virtuelessness does not in fact induce virtuous conduct in others. Vice is extremely contagious (as the present of the world economy can testify!). The virtuous man who dissembles his good traits encourage popular cynicism about morals. Nor is the pretense good for the dissembler himself in ways I’m sure you understand. It is a vice.

[Bill Vallicella]

Mike,

'Hypercrisy' is an interesting suggestion. But it would be better if we could find an existing word in English or a foreign language. For example, we have no word in English for what the German *Schadenfreude* denotes so we borrow the latter.

I was playing with the following pseudo-etymology of 'hypocrite': from hypo and krinein. Accordingly, a hypocrite is one who is insufficiently self-critical.

I agree with the two main points you make. I was assuming all along a sort of analog of 'ought implies can': One cannot be a hypocrite with respect to a recommended behavior unless one is able in some measure to realize it. And perhaps also it must be a behavior that ceteris paribus it would be good for the particular individual who recommends it to pursue.

[Bill Vallicella]

Phil,

I was aware of the maxim, 'Feign virtue and dissemble vice.' The converse I learned from you. Source?

You point to an interesting moral phenomenon. A man who is reliable might try to get himself perceived as unreliable so that people won't ask him to do things. A philosopher who wants to avoid committee work and other administrivia may cultivate an air of abstractedness, absentmindedness, and impracticality so as to stay off committees. He feigns vice and dissembles virtue. Such dissembling of virtue is itself a vice (or at least something morally bad)and so can be classified as a vice of self-presentation. But it is not hypocrisy.

And yet good writers such as T Nagel and J Shklar refer to this as hypocrisy. But I'll have to check to be sure.

[Philoponus]

Dissembling Virtue 2

Vices are vices because they do harm, harm both to the unfortunate individual in whom they take up residence (perhaps incurably), and harm to the society that must deal with the conduct of “vicious” individual. I can’t recall any good discussions comparing the personal and social harm that even the common vices like intemperance, dishonesty, and cowardice cause. Presumably, we are going to want to compare harms if we are going to argue that one vice is worse than another.

As far as studying the harm they do, I think the vices of misrepresentation represent virgin territory. I regard hypocrisy is a devastating affliction, a cancer-like vice, that utterly corrodes and distorts any positive self-image and sense of self-worth. I understand that most hypocrites are hypocrites for profit, but the price is too high! What do you think a man like Jimmy Swaggart really thinks of himself? Why does he go living? I invoke the name of Swaggart also to raise the social costs of hypocrisy. What did those in his church who had trusted him and supported him financially suffer in the wake of his exposure? Jimmy liked his whores after services. I could ask the same question about Jimmy Barker and his church.

Bill has the raised the spectre of the man who conceals his virtues under a façade of feigned vice or at least virtuelessness. We must investigate the inner harm that wearing this kind of mask causes. This man wears his feigned vices as a kind of armor against the world which he believes will prey upon him or target him if he dares to profess his virtues. This defensive posture surely rests upon a view of the world that is deeply cynical and morally pessimistic. The burden of pretense is heavy here too. Much remains to be said.

[Michael Sullivan]

Gluttony is an excellent vice to contrast with hypocrisy. I was thinking about this earlier today when I was in a public place with a lot of fat people: gluttony is one of the hardest of vices to hide or dissemble, since one displays its results on one's person at all times if practiced enough.

[Bill Vallicella]

Lust, by contrast, is much easier to dissemble. It is a good thing that lust does not manifest itself in the size of one's genitalia in the way that gluttony manifests itself in the size of one's gut. Good for the body if not the soul.

[Philoponus]

I have a nominee in the category of Best Hypocrite in a major film or play. May I let the nominee introduce himself and give us a brief taste of his credentials:

It is as sure as you are Roderigo,
were I the Moor, I would not be Iago.
In following him I follow but myself—
heaven is my judge, not I for love and duty,
but seeming so for my peculiar end.
For when my outward actions doth demonstrate
in compliment extern, ‘tis not long after
but I will wear my heart upon my sleeve
for daws to peck at: I am not what I am.

What Iago shows us or reminds us is that sometimes a hypocrite can conceal a really bad character under the mask of virtue. “Honest” Iago spends four acts of the play convincing Othello that he is a loyal, trustworthy, honorable, and caring subordinate. He is constantly striking the pose of a virtuous man trying to help his general deal with the treachery & infidelity of others.

If we can separate parts of a man’s character, I think we would agree that the worst part of Iago’s character is not his hypocrisy, bad as that is, but rather his malevolent and murderous intent toward Cassio and Othello and Desdemona and anyone else he fancies might have slighted him. But Iago’s hypocrisy is certainly tainted and worsened by the evil it is concealing. This is another problem with comparing hypocrisy with other vices. Iago’s hypocrisy is an essential and indispensable part of his villainy, and he would not have had a chance to succeed without it.

(The quote is from Iago’s second speech in the play, Act 1, Scene 1. 56-66. A prize to anyone who can puzzle out the meaning of the counterfactual “were I the Moor, I would not be Iago”.)