To Oppose Relativism is not to Embrace Dogmatism

There is much popular confusion concerning the topic of relativism. One fallacy I exposed earlier, namely, the mistake of thinking that Einstein's Theory of Relativity implies either moral relativism or relativism about truth. Even more widespread, perhaps, is the notion that one who opposes relativism about truth must be a dogmatist. But there are two distinctions here and they must not be confused. One is the distinction between relativism and nonrelativism, and the other is the distinction between fallibilism and dogmatism. The first distinction has to do with the nature of truth, while the second pertains to the knowledge of truth.

I maintain that truth, by its very nature, cannot be relative to anything, whether individuals, groups of individuals, social classes, historical epochs, biological species, or any other index. To illustrate, consider the proposition P, Global warming is anthropogenic. I don't deny that one can say things like 'P is true for most liberals but false for most conservatives.' One can talk that way and no harm need come of it; but only if it is a loose way of saying that P is believed by liberals but not believed by conservatives. This, however, does not entail relativism; it is consistent with truth's being nonrelative. Indeed, someone who believes that P, believes that P is true, and indeed believes that P is nonrelatively true.

What is objectionable is the notion that there is such a property as relative truth, that the predicate 'true-for-X' picks out some property distinct from the property picked out by 'believed-by-X.' There is no such property as relative truth. There is just truth. Truth is truth and truth is absolute. There is no possibility of truth coming in two kinds, relative and absolute. In the phrase 'relative truth,' 'relative' is an alienans adjective: it functions like 'artificial' is 'artificial leather' and not like 'deciduous' in 'deciduous tree.' Artificial leather is not leather; relative truth is not truth.

More arguments could be given, but suppose you are convinced that truth is nonrelative. My main point is that it does not follow that one who maintains this must also maintain that he is in possession of the truth. For example, I maintain that the proposition P, Global warming is anthropogenic, if true is nonrelatively true, and indeed essentially nonrelatively true. But I am not thereby maintaining that I know that P is true. To maintain that a proposition, if true, cannot be relatively true but must be absolutely (nonrelatively) true, is not to maintain that the proposition in question is known to be true.

Suppose we define a dogmatist as someone who, with respect to a class C of reasonably controvertible propositions, or some proper subset S thereof, maintains that he knows with certainty that the members of C or the members of S are all of them true. An example of a reasonably controvertible proposition is the proposition that God exists. It is reasonable to maintain that God exists, but also reasonable to maintain that God does not exist. (Some atheists are unreasonable people, but not qua atheists.) This is because one can give good, though not compelling, arguments for both the affirmation and the negation. A nondenumerable infinity of propositions that are not reasonably controvertible can be culled from mathematics, not to mention other disciplines.

Having provided a rough, working definition of 'dogmatist,' I now attempt the same for 'fallibilist.' I suggest that a fallibilist is the opposite of a dogmatist. Suppose we agree on the identity of the class C of reasonably controvertible propositions. (Yes, I admit that this is a big 'if.') We can then say that a fallibilist is one who adopts the correct epistemic attitude to the members of C, or the members of C that he is aware of: he does not claim to be certain about what is intrinsically uncertain. He admits that he can be wrong about the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, the exact causes of global warming, and so on. He admits that he can be wrong, he admits his fallibility, but without falling into alethic relativism.

My main point, then, is that one can reject relativism about truth without embracing dogmatism. One can be both an absolutist and a fallibilist. Being a fallibilist does not entail being a relativist.   It is important to point this out because much of the opposition to absolutism about truth derives from a confusion of  absolutism with dogmatism.

Thus there are four possible positions one can occupy:

1. Nonrelativist dogmatism
2. Relativist fallibilism
3. Nonrelativist fallibilism
4. Relativist dogmatism.

Certain paleoconservatives exemplify (1). Not only do they maintain that truth is absolute, they also maintain that they are in possession of it with respect to items that are reasonably controvertible. If the Pope believes in Papal Infallibility then he would be one of these paleocons. I suppose most relativists exemplify (2), but I fear that many relativists exemplify (4). There are liberals, for example, who are relativists but are surprisingly dogmatic about questions of race and sex and religion. This would be a good topic for a separate entry. My position is (3). I am a nonrelativist about truth but also a fallibilist. I recommend this position to you.  It is reasonable, balanced, and civilized.

I seek the ultimate truth about the ultimate matters -- and it would make no sense to seek it if truth were relative -- but I love truth so much that I want to be sure that I have the genuine article: I fear confusing mere convictions with truths. There is some insight in the Nietzschean adage that "Convictions are more dangerous enemies of truth than lies." But see Nietzsche on Conviction.