Toleration and its Limits

Henry V. e-mails:

I have a question. Is there a technical philosophical term for the case when a principle, applied consistently, leads to its own negation? I have in mind the example of the principle of civic tolerance, that when consistently applied to groups such as Muslims who wish to see Sharia law instituted in the West, would lead to the destruction of tolerance. Many other examples can be found in contemporary politics.

This is a good question, Henry, and while I thank you for it, I am not sure of the answer, though 'fallacy of accident' is in the ball park as I explain below. You don't tell me what you mean by 'civic tolerance,' or how the principle of civic tolerance should read, and without a statement of the principle, it is hard to have a disciplined discussion. So let me extract a principle from the following UNESCO paragraph:

Tolerance is respect, acceptance and appreciation of the rich diversity of our world's cultures, our forms of expression and ways of being human. It is fostered by knowledge, openness, communication, and freedom of thought, conscience and belief. Tolerance is harmony in difference. It is not only a moral duty, it is also a political and legal requirement. Tolerance, the virtue that makes peace possible, contributes to the replacement of the culture of war by a culture of peace.

PT. It is morally obligatory, and ought everywhere to be legally obligatory, that everyone respect, accept, and appreciate the diversity of the world's cultures, forms of expression, and ways of being human.

No doubt there are other, and better, ways of formulating a principle of toleration, but (PT) seems close to what many if not most mean by the principle nowadays.

You speak of the 'consistent' application of some such principle as (PT). By that you mean the application of the principle to all cases without exception. You perceive, as I do, that a consistent application of (PT) and like principles would lead to disaster. For then Jews would be morally obliged to tolerate the false beliefs and murderous practices of Muslim fanatics whose repeatedly stated aim is to wipe them off the face of the earth. They would have to tolerate, accept, respect, and appreciate (!) a "way of being human" that is inhuman and incompatible with their very existence. Similar obnoxious consequences can be generated ad libitum.

The framers of the UNESCO document will of course not draw these morally obnoxious conclusions. But then they simply fail to perceive the logical consequences of their own logically inept statement. It is obvious to me and to you that a toleration worth having and promoting is a toleration subject to certain limitations. Surely, one cannot and must not tolerate those who refuse to accept some suitably formulated version of the good old classically liberal principle of toleration. One must act intolerantly toward them. Perpetrators of terrorist acts, for example, should be apprehended, tried, convicted, and incarcerated if not executed. Such intolerance is necessary so that a political climate can be maintained in which a tolerance worth having can flourish. So if one really values toleration, one  must be prepared to be intolerant on occasion.

Further down in the document we read that ". . . one's views are not to be imposed on others." But then one's views about the moral and legal obligatoriness of toleration ought not be imposed on others. In particular, the classically liberal views of the West concerning the importance and value of toleration ought not be imposed on illiberal Muslim societies. And yet we do condemn the "ways of being human" in these societies, as articulated in Sharia. By what right do we do this if all must be tolerated? Clearly, the UNESCO framers do think they have the right to impose some views on others. So even they recognize, however dimly and implicitly, that there must be some limits on toleration.

It is worth dwelling on the logical ineptitude of ". . . one's views are not to be imposed on others." This is an example of self-vitiating sentential self-reference. For if one's view are not to be imposed on others, then the very view that one's views are not to be imposed on others is not to be imposed on others. It follows that one must tolerate, and is in no position to oppose, those who maintain the view that some views are to be imposed on others.

The truth of the matter is that those who value toleration and are serious about it must legally enforce it, and this means using the power of the State, or of some international body, against those who would destroy the political climate within which alone toleration can flourish. Thus the authorities at Emory University should have dealt harshly with those who shouted down David Horowitz, and would have, had they not abdicated their authority. A toleration rightly understood, a toleration worth promoting, does not extend to the toleration of intolerant thugs who, taking the name of free speech in vain, violate the free speech rights of others.

There is a sort of incoherence in (PT), though its exact nature is hard to describe. (PT) implies that we are morally obliged to tolerate those who would put us to the sword for being infidels; but it also implies that the jihadis are morally obliged to tolerate us and our resistance to being put to the sword. But I don't have a handy label for this mode of incoherence.

The main thing, though, is that toleration, though a high value, has limits, and one is a damned fool if one doesn't appreciate this fact. Indeed one can accuse the one who fails to appreciate this of having committed the fallacy of accident. One commits this fallacy if one applies a general rule to cases whose special features render the rule inapplicable.

So maybe 'fallacy of accident' answers your question.