A guest post by Peter Lupu. Minor edits by BV. His comments in blue at the end.
Suppose I am a naturalist. Then I take science seriously just as Alex Rosenberg counsels.I also provisionally trust Rosenberg's argument, thereby, I find myself inclined to believe the conclusions of Rosenberg’s argument. One of these conclusions is
1) There are no beliefs.
Thus, having worked through Rosenberg's argument,
2) I believe there are no beliefs.
Upon reflecting upon my newly-acquired belief that there are no beliefs I realize that
3) If (1) is true (i.e., it is true that there are no beliefs), then (2) must be false: i.e., it must be false that I believe that there are no beliefs.
But if I know that (2) is false and I know that (2) follows from (1), then I must conclude that (1) is false. But if (1) is false, then either one of the premises from which it follows is false or Rosenberg’s argument is invalid. One of the premises which Rosenberg claims is involved in the inference to (1) is
(A) If you take science seriously, then there are no beliefs.
While I do certainly take science seriously, I realize that since (1) is false, the consequent of (A) is false. Hence, (A) is false.
The same argument applies to every one of the concepts which Rosenberg claims must be eliminated. This does not prove that naturalism is false. It only proves that eliminativist naturalism is either false or any argument on its behalf must be unsound. Therefore, eliminativism is either false or if it is true, it cannot be proven by a sound argument. Naturalism, however, may still be true, provided reductive naturalism can be successful. But Rosenberg thinks reductive naturalism cannot succeed. Therefore, Rosenberg paper can be at best a polemic to the effect that since reductive naturalism cannot work and eliminativist naturalism cannot be soundly proven, the best we can do is simply assert eliminativist naturalism and convert to it as an article of faith. And this is indeed what he ultimately does: Rosenberg preaches to naturalists the true canons of naturalism and the need to have faith in their purest form.
Your analysis is precise and I find it compelling. But let me try to play the devil's advocate. You seem to be assuming that Rosenberg's intention is to get you to acquire a belief, namely, the belief that there are no beliefs. That of course leads to his being hoist on his own petard. But if he is right, then there are no beliefs, and so it cannot be his intention, charitably interpreted, to get you to acquire a belief. His intention is to get you to stop using the concept of belief and all related concepts such as judgment, acceptance, affirmation, etc. His object is to move you into a state in which you eschew all belief-talk and abandon all belief-concepts. Presumably you are supposed to conceptualize the state you or your brain is now in in non-mentalistic terms, whatever the hell that could mean. Supposedly belief gives way to a successor concept, one that is non-folk-psychological and non-mentalistic. The whole project makes no sense, in my view, and rests on the extremely dubious notion that terms like 'belief are theoretical terms. When I tell you that I believe such-and-such, I am not theorizing folk-psychologically about some intercranial goings-on; I am telling you what I bloody believe and that's the end of it. The concepts of folk-psychology are datanic and 'bedrock' and here our spade is turned, to borrow a Wittgensteinian turn of phrase.
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