Is Folk Psychology a Theory? The Case of Desire

When one is in the grip of a desire one typically knows it. He who wants a cold beer on a hot day knows what he wants and is likely to deem unhinged anyone with the temerity to deny that there are desires. Anywhere on the scale from velleity to craving, but especially at the craving end, there is a qualitative character to desire that makes it phenomenologically undeniable. If the beer example doesn't move you, think of lust. Lust is an intentional state: one cannot lust unless one lusts after someone or something. But although lust flees itself, voids itself in a rush towards its object — as Sartre might have said — there is nonetheless something 'it is like' (T. Nagel) to be in the state of lust. In this respect, desire is more like the non-intentional state of pain than it is like the intentional state of belief. There is most decidedly something it is like for me to desire X; but what is is like for me to believe that you desire X? Is it like anything? Not so clear.

However matters stand with beliefs, it is hard to see how anyone could take an eliminativist line with respect to desires, which are intentional experiences,  and pains, which are (most of them) not.  I want to protest: my lust is a DATUM — a given in plain English — and neither a theoretical posit nor a product of conceptualization.  When I introspect my desire, I am not conceptualizing something as something; I am not subsuming under the mentalistic concept desire something which can be given apart from this concept.

 

Suppose you and I are looking at the same plant. You say, "That's a cactus!" I reply, "That is not a cactus, but a succulent; every cactus is a succulent, but not every succulent is a cactus." In this example, conceptualization is at work: one and the same physical object, whichis given to both of us as one and the same object in perception,  is being conceptualized differently by me and you. My conceptualization is more accurate than yours and functions as a replacement for it. But although my desire for a beer falls under the concept desire, my desire is not external to me in the manner of the plant; I live my desire. It is an Erlebnis as Husserl would say. And though it is directed to something transcendent of my consciousness, the act with its qualitative character is a real part of my consciousness. As immanent to my consciousness, it is not something I have a theory about. It is something I live through. I endure my desire; I don't gawk at it theoretically. It is not something about which I could be substantially mistaken, so mistaken that a day might come when I would say, "I used to think I desired women, but meanwhile I have become convinced that there are no desires at all."

 

I don't theorize about inner goings-on in the way I theorize about outer goings-on; I live though (er-leben) the former.  I am not a spectator of my mental states in the way I am a spectator of my body.  And so even if it makes sense to speak of alternative conceptualizations of what is outer, it makes no sense to speak of alternative conceptualizations of what is inner. 

One cannot replace folk psychology (FP) with a better theory (one couched in neuroscientific terms perhaps) unless it is a theory. What I have been suggesting, however, is that it is not a theory. If this is right, then there is just no chance that in the future we will re-conceptualize that in us which we now folk-psychologically conceptualize as desire in some radically different way that makes no mention of desire or cognate mentalistic notions.

But don't we give folk-psychological explanations, and doesn't the fact that we do this show that folk psychology is a theory? Suppose Sally is angry, and we want to figure out why. Talking to her we find out that she is in dire financial straits and needs a substantial raise in pay. Her boss promised her one, and in expectation of the fulfillment of the promise, Sally ran up some credit card debt. But it turns out that the boss was unable to deliver on his promise. Hence, Sally's anger. This suggests an explanation involving a folk-psychological 'law':

L. If a person P is promised X confidently by a person Q whom P trusts, and P needs/desires X and expects the fulfillment of the promise, and Q is unable to deliver on the promise, then, ceteris paribus, P will become angry at Q.

To get an explanation in the familiar deductive-nomological style, we simply instantiate the variables in (L) with 'Sally,' 'boss,' and 'raise' and add the premise that Sally is promised a raise by the boss.

But is this the only way to explain Sally's angry behavior? Must we assume that FP is a theory? There is also a mental simulation view of FP. Very roughly, on this model we would understand Sally's angry behavior by 'putting ourselves in her shoes,' by imagining ourselves in her situation and then running a simulation 'off-line' as it were. For details click on the above link.

The main point is that eliminativism in the philosophy of mind requires the notion that FP is a theory; so any considerations that speak against this assumption are considerations that speak against eliminativism. If FP is a theory, it is a theory of something which could be theoretically interpreted in some other way.  But what could that something be?  The fact of the matter is that desires and beliefs are phenomenological givens; they are not theoretic posits.  They are not theoretical but 'datanic.'