Truthmaker Maximalism Questioned

For Peter Lupu discussions with whom helped me clarify my thoughts on this topic.

0. What David Armstrong calls Truthmaker Maximalism is the thesis that every truth has a truthmaker.  Although I find the basic truthmaker intuition well-nigh irresistible, I have difficulty with the notion that every truth has a truthmaker.  Thus I question Truthmaker Maximalism.

1.  Compare *Peter is tired* and *Every concretum is self-identical.*  I will argue that propositions like the first have truthmakers while propositions like the second do not.  (A declarative sentence enclosed in asterisks names the Fregean proposition expressed by the sentence.  I will assume that the primary truthbearers are Fregean propositions.  By definition, a truth is a true truthbearer.) 

2. Intuitively, the first truth is in need of something external to it that 'makes' it true or determines it to be true, or serves as the ontological ground of its truth.  By 'external to it,' I don't just mean that the truthmaker of a truth must be distinct from it:  this condition is satisfied by a distinct proposition that entails it.  What I mean is that the truthmaker must be both distinct from the truthbearer and not, like the truthbearer, a 'representational entity' where the latter term covers such items as sentences, contents of judgments, and Fregean propositions (the senses of context-free sentences in the indicative mood.)  In other words, a truthmaker of a first-order truth such as *Peter is tired* must be outside the sphere of representations: it must be extralinguistic, extramental, and extra-propositional.  Truthmakers, then, are 'in the world' in one sense of 'world.'  They are ontological grounds of truth.  Thus the truthmakers of propositions like *Peter is tired* cannot belong to the category of propositions.  The ontological ground of such a proposition cannot be an entity within the sphere of propositions.

3.  The truthmaker of *Peter is tired* cannot be a proposition; but it also cannot be utterly unlike a proposition.  Consider Peter himself, that very concrete individual.  It is clear that he could not be the truthmaker of *Peter is tired.*  Granted, if Peter were not to exist, then the proposition in question could not be true.  There are no truths about nonexistent objects.  Truthmaker theory, as I understand and defend it, is anti-Meinongian.  But although Peter's existence is a necessary condition of the truth of  propositions about him, it is not the case that Peter's existence is a sufficient condition of the truth of contingent propositions about him.  That Peter by himself cannot be the truthmaker of contingent propositions about him can be proven as follows. 

Argument from Necessitation.  Assume for reductio that Peter by himself can serve as truthmaker.  Now, by Truthmaker Necessitarianism,  whatever truthmakers are, they broadly logically  necessitate the truth of their corresponding truthbearers.  So if X is the truthmaker of *Peter is tired at t,* then there is no possible world in which X exists and *Peter is tired at t* is not true.  But there are plenty of worlds in which Peter exists but *Peter is tired at t* is not true.  So Peter by himself cannot be the truthmaker of *Peter is tired at t.*

Selection Argument.  Consider any two true affirmative atomic contingent monadic propositions about Peter such as *Peter is tired at t* and *Peter is hungry at t.*  If Peter by himself can serve as the truthmaker of one, then he can serve as the truthmaker of the other.  But they obviously require numerically different truthmakers.  So Peter is the truthmaker of neither of them.  Although different truths can have the same truthmaker, this is not the case when both truths are atomic, even if both are about the same individual.  The truthmakers of such atomic propositions as Peter is a philosopher and Peter is a violinist must be distinct and they must match up with, or select, their truthbearers.  To do this, the truthmakers must have an internal structure isomorphic to the structure of the truthbearers.  In other words, the truthmakers must be proposition-like despite their not being propositions.  It follows that Peter by himself cannot be the truthmaker of atomic contingent propositions about him.

4.  If Peter by himself cannot serve as truthmaker of the accidental predication  *Peter is F*, then neither can F-ness by itself.  The same goes for the set {Peter, F-ness}, the mereological sum (Peter + F-ness) and the ordered pair [Peter, F-ness].  For what is needed in addition to Peter and F-ness is a link in the truthmaker that corresponds to the copulative link in the proposition.  After all, not every possible world in which both Peter and F-ness exists is a world in which Peter is F.  There could be a world in which Peter exists and F-ness exists (by being instantiated by Paul) but in which Peter does not instantiate F-ness.  I am assuming that F-ness is a universal, but not that F-ness is a transcendent universal (one that can exist uninstantiated).  This is why concrete states of affairs are plausible candidates for the office of truthmaker.

5.  But even if one balks at the admission of concrete states of affairs or facts, one will have to admit that Peter himself -- assuming that this concrete individual is not assayed as a state of affairs! -- cannot be the truthmaker of contingent propositions of the form *Peter is F.*  Some will say that tropes can serve as truth makers.  Fine, but they too have a proposition-like structure.  If the trope Peter's-tiredness-at-t is the truthmaker of *Peter is tired at t,* then it is made true by an entity that has a proposition-like structure, a structure isomorphic to, and mirroring, the structure of the truthbearer.

6.  It seems to me that I have just definitively established that the truthmakers of accidental  atomic predications like 'Peter is a philosopher' cannot be concrete individuals lacking a proposition-like structure.  I have also made it clear that we should not confuse the principle that there are no truths about nonexistent objects with the truthmaker principle.

7.  We now turn to *Every concrete object is self-identical.*  On Truthmaker Maximalism, every truth has a truthmaker.  The proposition just cited is true, indeed necessarily true, but what could be its truthmaker?  Consider a possible world W in which only abstract objects exist.  The proposition cited, being true in all worlds, is true in W.  But there are no concrete objects in W, and a fortiori no facts having them as constituents.  The proposition cited would seem to be a truth that cannot have a truthmaker in every world in which it exists and is nonetheless true.

8.  Consider the analytic proposition *Every cygnet is a swan.*  As analytic, it is true solely in virtue of the meanings of 'cygnet' and 'swan.'  The concept cygnet includes the concept swan, so that, by sheer analysis of the subject concept, one can arrive at the truth in question.  That's why we call it 'analytic.'  Clearly, nothing external to an analytic proposition is required to make it true.  It follows that it cannot have a truthmaker.  For we saw in #2 above that a truthmaker of a first-order truthbearer is an entity that is external to the truthbearer and resident in the realm of reality beyond the sphere of representations broadly construed.

Does this not decisively refute maximalism?  There are plenty of analytic truths, but none of them has or can have a truthmaker.  For if you say that an analytic truth needs a truthmaker, then you are saying that it needs something external to it to 'synthesize,' to bring together, subject and predicate concepts. But analytic truths are precisely not synthetic in that sense.  But I hear an objection coming.

"*Every cygnet is a swan* does have a truthmaker, namely, the fact that cygnet includes swan."  This is a confused response.  There would not be a analytic truthbearer at all if cygnet did not include swan.  The very existence of the proposition *Every cygnet is a swan* requires that the first concept include the second.  So there is no need of an ontological ground of the truth of this proposition. One could say that in the analytic case the truthbearer is its own truthmaker.  But it is better to say that in the analytic case there cannot be a truthmaker as 'truthmaker' was defined in #2 above.

Here is a second argument.  *Every cygnet is a swan* is necessarily true, true in all possible worlds.  So it it is true in those worlds in which there are no material objects.  Let W be one of those worlds.  Now if the proposition in question had a truthmaker, it would have to be some chunk or chunks of material reality.  This is because the proposition is about material objects, and cygnets and swans are material objects.  Since there are no material objects in W, and since the proposition is true in W (because it it true in every world), the proposition does not have a truthmaker in W.  Not having a truthmaker in one world, it doesn't have a truthmaker in any world.

9.  What about *Peter is self-identical*?  Although this is a contingent truth, because not true in all worlds, it  is an essential predication, true in every world in which Peter exists.  Peter exists in some but not all worlds, but in the worlds in which he exists he is self-identical.  It is therefore very tempting to say that Peter by himself is the truthmaker of *Peter is self-identical.*  Generalizing the temptation, we can say that for every essential property F-ness of Peter, the truthmaker of *Peter is F* is just Peter himself.  For by the definition of 'essential property,' Peter cannot fail to instantiate each of his essential properties in every world in which he exists.  If there are n distinct essential properties of Peter, then there are n disinct propositions about him, but all have the same truthmaker, Peter himself.

10.  If concrete individuals are allowed as truthmakers of some propositions, then, given that concrete individuals cannot be the truthmakers of some other propositions, the ones expressed by accidental predications, we have to ask whether 'truthmaking' picks out the same relation in both types of case.

Some writers seem to think that the mere existence of the truthmaker logically suffices to make the corresponding truthbearer true.  Thus:

TMP1:  Necessarily, if *T exists,* then *p* is true.

(Note that 'Necessarily, if T, then *p* is true' makes no sense:  a nonproposition cannot stand in an entailment relation.)

TMP1 clearly works for the 'essential' cases.  But it does not fit the 'accidental' cases very well.  It makes sense to say that the mere existence of Peter makes true *Peter is human.*  But how could the mere existence of the fact of Peter's being tired make true the corresponding proposition?  It is not the mere existence of this fact (concrete state of affairs) that functions as truthmaker, but its existence PLUS its proposition-like structure.  Otherwise, the fact in question could not 'select' *Peter is tired* as opposed to *Peter is hungry.*

The truthmakers of these two propositions do not differ in point of existence, nor do they differ in point of their individual constituent, Peter.  So if truthmaking is a matter of the mere existence of the truthmaker, then either truthmaker could make true either proposition.  And that can't be right.  So we try:

TMP2:  Necessarily, if *T exists* and *T is structurally isomorphic to *p**, then *p* is true.

The trouble with this latter principle is that it cannot accommodate the 'essential' cases for the simple reason that concrete individuals lack proposition-like structure.

The upshot is that 'truthmaking' has no one univocal sense: it is being used to pick our two very different relations.  Is that a problem?  We will have to pursue this in a separate post.

Comments

[Vlastimil Vohánka]

Bill,

An Aristotelian, like Lukas Novak, would comment to (8) as follows:

(i) There are some propositions true solely in virtue of their concepts, yet not discoverable to be true by sheer definitional analysis of their concepts. Cf. Lukas's http://www.skaut.org/ln/docs/aporiageneris.pdf In the abstract, he says that thanks to a "distinction between two different kinds of conceptual containment ... the primitive concepts do not contain the transcendentals formally, that is, as constituents that can be revealed by means of definitional analysis, but they nevertheless do contain them virtually, that is, they strictly imply them."

(ii) Concepts are abstracted from reality (cf. Lukas's explication http://www.skaut.org/ln/docs/univocity.pdf ). So, even analytically true propositions are true in virtue of reality.

I leave it to you how much this is in/consistent with the main points of your post.

[William Woking]

So, trying to summarise this. Let p = "Peter is tired". You say that p needs something external to it (X) that 'makes' it true, such that

1. X 'determines' p to be true
2. X is not merely a proposition distinct from p that entails it
3. X is not a 'representational entity' such as a sentence, judgment content, Fregean proposition &c
4. X is extramental, and extra-propositional.
5. Thus X 'in the world'
6. X is the 'ontological ground of truth' of p.

In one sense I can't disagree with any of this. I mean, if it is a fact that Peter is tired, then it is indeed a fact. If I think that Peter is not tired, that belief makes no difference to the fact that Peter is tired. Even if no one believed that he was tired, that would make no difference to the fact. In that sense (i.e. for any p, whether p is true is logically independent of whether any S thinks p is true). So in that sense X is 'in the world' i.e. not a statement about anyone's thought or belief, is extramental, is not a proposition but a fact (for a proposition can be true or false, a fact is something that is strictly neither true nor false). X is not a representational entity.

What about propositions like 'roses smell sweet', which is true even in the winter, or 'thunder is a loud noise in the sky', which is true even when there is no thunder? What is the truthmaker for these sorts of proposition?

[William Woking]

You also say "Peter's existence is a necessary condition of the truth of propositions about him". The truth of the proposition 'Caesar is dead' necessarily requires the existence of Caesar? Who does not exist any more?

[Account Deleted]

William,

The two propositions you consider: i.e., 'roses smell sweet' and 'thunder is a loud noise in the sky' are universal propositions. They are equivalent, respectively, to 'for every time t, roses smell sweet at t' and 'for every time t, thunder is a loud noise in the sky at t'. I think Bill focuses here primarily on singular propositions and in the case of contingent propositions, on singular monadic propositions. Perhaps you think that the two general propositions you consider are equivalent to a conjunction of singular propositions. Bill also does not consider here complex propositions formed by logical operators. Since Bill rejects Truthmaker Maximalism, it is open to him to maintain that general propositions do not have truthmakers or he can say that their truthmakers mirror the structure of the general proposition of which they are truthmakers.

[William Woking]

Looking at the point about 'a cygnet is a swan' I wonder if this answers the point about 'roses smell sweet'? I'm not sure. First, is even the proposition 'a cygnet is a swan' about concepts of cygnets and swans, as opposed to cygnets and swans? Second, is 'roses smell sweet' analytic? Third, 'Caesar is dead' is clearly a contingent fact, but is true, even when Caesar does not exist.

Summarising all the points I am making here:

1. Perhaps even analytic statements are true because they 'correspond with facts'. I.e. 'cygnets are swans' is about cygnets and swans, not about concepts or meanings.

2. Some universal non-analytic statements like 'roses smell sweet' can be true even though there are no roses, e.g. in winter.

3. Some singular contingent statements can be true even though nothing existing corresponds to them, e.g. 'Caesar is dead'.

But all the statements above are facts: it is a fact that cygnets are swans, that roses smell sweet, and that Caesar is dead. If facts are truthmakers, and if these points are correct, then that removes some of the objections to the 'maximalist' theory.

I am not sure understand the maximalist theory though.

[Account Deleted]

Vlastimil,

1) So far as I understand Bill, he does not think that there is a realm of propositions and also a separate realm of concepts such that facts about the later can serve as truthmakers for the former. This is unlike the case of the realm of propositions and the realm of physical facts so that states of affairs that occur in the later realm serve as truthmakers for the propositions. Thus, for Bill, there is nothing external to an analytic proposition that makes the analytic proposition true. Therefore, analytic propositions cannot have truthmakers.

2) As for your (ii), it is difficult to see what point is made here. Suppose we accept that "concepts are abstracted from reality" (whatever that means) and so the concepts of 'bachelor', married', and 'happy' are all "abstracted from reality". Nevertheless, we still acknowledge a difference between the propositions "bachelors are married" vs. "bachelors are happy". The former proposition is true only in virtue of the relationship between its concept constituents, whereas the later is not true only in virtue of its constituent concepts.

The confusion here seems to be between how concepts are obtained (answer: "abstracted from reality") vs. what makes a given proposition true, if anything. So even if we accept that concepts are abstracted from reality, it does not follow that the reality from which we abstract concepts is always involved in what makes the propositions in which the concepts occur true.

3) As for (i), I am unsure what Lukas could mean when he says that primitive concepts "strictly imply" the "transcedentals" (concepts?)? Implication is a relation between propositions (sentences, statements, claims, etc.,). So while concepts may (or may not) contain other concepts as constituents, only propositions (and other truthbearers) imply other propositions. So Lukas might have in mind some other notion of implication that I am not familiar with.

Unless this notion of "concept implication" is made clear, the distinction between "formal containment" vs. "virtual containment" is unclear.

[Bill Vallicella]

Vlastimil,

It would take us too far afield to pursue your first point, but I should say something about the second. When I wrote #8 I was aware that I was ignoring a distinction one could make between propositions true in virtue of meaning and conceptual truths. Set aside conceptual truths for the moment. If by an analytic truth we mean a truth true solely in virtue of the meanings of its constituent terms, then it seems my point is unassailable, especially if we avoid natural kind terms such as 'cygnet' and 'swan.' I used that example just to avoid the trite 'All bachelors are male.' But the latter is actually a clearer example. 'Bachelor' has meaning, but a meaning that is conventional and not derivative from nature. *All bachelors are male* is true but there is nothing external to it that makes it true.

[Bill Vallicella]

William W. writes >> I mean, if it is a fact that Peter is tired, then it is indeed a fact.<< Right, but this trivializes the truthmaker idea. A FACT THAT is just a true proposition. But truthmakers are FACTS OF. It is the fact of Peter's being tired that makes true *Peter is tired.* This fact is a not a proposition or a sentence or a belief or anything like that.

[Bill Vallicella]

William writes, >>You also say "Peter's existence is a necessary condition of the truth of propositions about him". The truth of the proposition 'Caesar is dead' necessarily requires the existence of Caesar? Who does not exist any more?<<

I used Peter as my example, and not Socrates or Caesar, precisely becaue Peter presently exists, and to avoid the time problematic. Truthmaking can be discussed without bringing time into the picture. But one way to answer your question would be by saying that Caesar exists in a tenseless sense of 'exists.' We can say that everything that did exist, does exist, and will exist exists tenselessly. Accordingly, Caesar both exists (tenselessly) and does not exist (tensed use). That is not a contradiction. (A further wrinkle emerges if you think that Caesar has an immortal soul, which I am not now assuming.)

[Bill Vallicella]

William of Woking aka 'Ocham,'

You fooled me again, for a moment. It is very interesting that how I interpret a comment depends on my preconceptions regarding its author. So do you live in Woking? (You don't have to answer that). It's near London, I see. Very interesting place names around there, e.g., 'Dorking' and 'Maidenhead.' I will resist the temptation to compose a limerick about the lads of Dorking, the birds of Maidenhead, and their rendezvous in Woking of a Saturday night.

[Account Deleted]

William,

"Perhaps even analytic statements are true because they 'correspond with facts'. I.e. 'cygnets are swans' is about cygnets and swans, not about concepts or meanings."

There is a difference between what a proposition is about and in virtue of what it is true. While one can legitimately say that the proposition 'cygnets are swans' is "about" cygnets and swans, the question of what makes it true may have nothing to do with cygnets and swans and have everything to do with the relationship between the concept of a cygnet and a swan.

[Account Deleted]

Bill,

You seem to claim (or agree) that if F-ness is an essential property of T (=an individual), then TMP1 works, where *p* is the proposition *T is F*.

"TMP1: Necessarily, if *T exists,* then *p* is true.

(Note that 'Necessarily, if T, then *p* is true' makes no sense: a nonproposition cannot stand in an entailment relation.)

TMP1 clearly works for the 'essential' cases."

However, this means that in the essential cases the mere existence of the individual is a sufficient condition for the truth of the proposition which ascribes an essential property to the individual. But this is not so. Consider the property of 'being a human' and the property of 'being rational'.

So we have the following two true propositions:

(i) Peter is human.
(ii) Peter is rational.

So now let us apply TPM1 to each proposition:

(i)* Nec (If *Peter exists*, then *Peter is human* is true);
(ii)* Nec (If *Peter exists*, then *Peter is rational*).

While both (i)* and (ii)* are true, the mere existence of Peter cannot distinguish between what is involved in the truth of the two respective propositions. And surely there is a difference between them, even if in every possible world in which Peter exists, he is both a human as well as rational.

In order to see this, consider the fact that the following propositions also hold:

(iii) Nec (If *Peter is human* is true, then *Peter exists*).
(iv) Nec (If *Peter is rational* is true, then *Peter exists*).

But, now the following propositions all follow:

(v) Nec (*Peter exists* iff *Peter is human* is true);
(vi) Nec (*Peter exists* iff Peter is rational* is true);

and also

(vii) Nec (*Peter is human* is true iff *Peter is rational* is true).
(viii) Nec (*there exists an x such that x is human* is true iff *there exists a y such that y is rational* is true).

But surely (viii) is false, for there could be rational beings (e.g., God or some other non-human but rational aliens), without there being any humans.

The above results in the collapse of all essential properties. How do we distinguish then between different essential properties? The general point is this. A concrete object may have several essential properties. According to TPM1, the existence of the object is a sufficient condition for the truth of two propositions each stating that the object has a certain essential property. But the mere existence of the object cannot be sufficient for the two respective truths because such truths also involve having the property essentially.

[William Woking]

>>A FACT THAT is just a true proposition. But truthmakers are FACTS OF.

I would say that 'it is a fact that snow is white' is just another way of saying 'it is true that snow is white' and the latter is moreover just another way of saying 'snow is white'. "Do not multiply things according to the multiplicity of terms. " But I think you know this. Similar comments apply to your other remarks, which probably take us off topic. Only to say that, as you know, I am deeply unclear about the nature of a 'truthmaker'. That in virtue of which snow is white is the physical or chemical composition of snow. But you do not mean that. That in virtue of which roses smell sweet is a certain relation between the chemical composition of roses, and the nervous system. But you do not mean that. That in virtue of which 'nothing exists' would be true, if it were true, is also problematic.

>>You fooled me again, for a moment. It is very interesting that how I interpret a comment depends on my preconceptions regarding its author. So do you live in Woking? (You don't have to answer that).

No I don't live in Woking, which is horrible, I was alluding to a theory that Ockham actually came from Woking (whose name also means 'oak ham' or something like that. Despising the suburbs, I have always lived in London itself. Although most of London is really a collection of places used to be suburbs, until they were swallowed up the urban monster.

Re 'dorking', does this (used as a verb) have the same connotations in the US as it does here? Presumably yes, given your remark about 'maidenhead'!

[Bill Vallicella]

Peter,

Good response to William three comments up.

[aresh v.]

Peter,
Are you sure that you can imply (Viii) from (Vii)?
I'm not sure, but I think that the correct implication from (vii) is either:

(viii)' Nec (*there exists an x such that x is human* is true iff *there exists a y such that y is rational* is true AND x=y).

or
(viii)'' Nec (*there exists an x such that x is human* is true iff *there exists a x such that x is rational* is true).

Because the value you are going to substitute to the variable should be the same, which is something your implication doesn't seem to require

[Bill Vallicella]

Peter,

We are headed in the same direction, toward the thesis that individuals without proposition-like structure cannot be T-makers of either essential or accidental predications. But you may have found a more direct route.

Your argument is impressive and if sound is an important result. I agree that (viii) is false, but I am not clear how (viii) follows from (vii). It seems to follow. But what rules of inference are you using?

[Bill Vallicella]

Peter,

You are apparently trying to move from (vii) to (viii) by Existential Generalization. But you may be misapplying E.G. Suppose we are given
1. Peter is H iff Peter is R.
From this, by E.G., we can infer
2. (Ex)(Hx <--> Rx).

But that is not the same as
3. (Ex)Hx <--> (Ex)Rx.

(3) -- or rather its necessitation -- is false for the reason you gave. But (3) doesn't follow from (1).

It would have be nice to deliver a quick knockout to a dozen brilliant philosophers, but I don't think your argument works.

[Bill Vallicella]

Peter,

I just noticed Aresh's comment after writing my two last ones. He is alluding to the same problem.

[Account Deleted]

Aresh, Bill,

You may be right about the inference from (vii) to (viii) (I am not yet sure; will check this out more carefully). However, even if the inference from (vii) to (viii) does not go through, the inference to (vii) is problematical, in my opinion. It means that all essential properties of an individual collapse. I think this already is problematical.

[Bill Vallicella]

William of Woking,

You are a drive-down-the-road-to-the-bitter-end nominalist, and so it is no surprise that you are no friend of truthmakers. They are doubly or perhaps trebly offensive to you. First, the T-maker of *Peter is tired* must involve both a concrete individual and a realistically construed property (whether a universal or a trope) and presumably you have no truck with either sort of property. Second, the T-maker cannot be a mathematical set or an ordered pair since you eschew these abstract entities. Third, a concrete state of affairs is a non-mereological composite of individual and property and hence a 'queer entity' and an unnecessary posit on your view of things.

Since I couldn't (a couple years ago) get you to accept mathematical sets, despite the pellucidity of my arguments, I am surely not going to get you to accept truthmakers. Hell, we won't even be able to agree as to what the primary truthBEARERs are.

And to top it off, you will recall that we disagree about the very nature of logical validity!

[Bill Vallicella]

>>Re 'dorking', does this (used as a verb) have the same connotations in the US as it does here? Presumably yes, given your remark about 'maidenhead'!<<

'Dork' is used in American English to mean a dull stupid fatuous socially 'lame' person. Related to 'dick,' 'dickhead' and the Yiddish 'schmuck.' So there is a penile reference. But to my knowledge 'dorking' is never used here to refer to the sex act. 'Dork' and 'doofus' are probably interchangeable. 'Tool' seems to be Gen-X slang for roughly the same sort of person. Again the penile suggestion. 'Nerd' and 'geek' are in the same linguistic vicinity except that nerds and geeks, though socially inept, are not stupid.

Is 'bird' still used in England as it was in the 60s to refer to girls?

[Account Deleted]

Bill,

You mean William is an Ockhamist? Wow! How can one live with that?

[Bill Vallicella]

Peter,

I've never understood nominalism. 'Red' applies to this pen but not that one. In virtue of what does 'red' apply to this one rather than that one? Nominalist: In virtue of nothing! It just does. So, with respect to truths, he will say: they are just true. What the hell else do you want? They are not true in virtue of something.

But I like William; he is a conservative!

[Bill Vallicella]

>> That in virtue of which snow is white is the physical or chemical composition of snow. But you do not mean that.<<

Right, I don't mean that. I am not seeking an empirical explanation (in terms of empirical causes) of snow's being white; I am seeking a philosophical explanation of what makes any contingently true truthbearer true.

To you this project is senseless. To me and Peter it makes sense. How can we adjudicate our differences? Why dowe differ? Can we find common ground? It is not as if I am making some easily correctable mistake or am ignorant of some plain fact.

[aresh v.]

Bill,
You said: "the truthmakers of accidental atomic predications like 'Peter is a philosopher' cannot be concrete individuals lacking a proposition-like structure"
1) "concrete individual" do you mean a bare particular? Is that all what you wanted to say?
2) TMP1 can be trivially applied to bare particulars too. Consider the proposition:" *Peter exists*

[William Woking]

>>In virtue of what does 'red' apply to this one rather than that one? Nominalist: In virtue of nothing!

That is a gross misrepresentation of nominalism! What do these red things have in common? Nominalist: they are all red.

>>They are doubly or perhaps trebly offensive to you.

Indeed heinous.

>>I am surely not going to get you to accept truthmakers.

We nominalists are always open to careful argumentation. "The gateway to wisdom
is accessible to no one without education in logic".

>>How can we adjudicate our differences? Why do we differ? Can we find common ground? It is not as if I am making some easily correctable mistake or am ignorant of some plain fact.

The first step is to throw daylight upon the difference. Perhaps it concerns the idea of facts as 'things'. If facts are things, and if propositions are things, then we can legitimately talk about a relation between these things.

A nominalist would raise the worry multiplying things (facts) according to the multiplicity of terms (the word 'fact'). Perhaps the word 'fact' is merely an expression used to confirm the truth or falsity of statements.

>>you will recall that we disagree about the very nature of logical validity!

Our disagreement, if I remember, was about the coherence of the idea of 'logical form'.

>>But I like William; he is a conservative!

Actually an ex-liberal, this is something quite different.

>>Is 'bird' still used in England as it was in the 60s to refer to girls?

Only ironically. Or sometimes to refer to a FEMLO (female employed for looks only). Putting them on or in front of cars is a time-honoured way of doing this. See the 'fit bird' in the picture below.

http://img.wallpaperstock.net:81/girl-and-yellow-car-wallpapers_10487_1280x960.jpg

Note 'fit' does not mean in fine physical shape but, rather, 'sexually attractive'. A term only used by the lower orders or occasionally by my teenage children for the purpose of making me irate.

[aresh v.]

William,
Take these 2 statements:
1) "A is red", "B is red" and "C is red" because "A,B,C are red"
2) "A,B,C are red" because "A is red", "B is red" and "C is red"
Do you endorse (1) or (2)? If neither, what else?
thanks

[William Woking]

Aresh: I take "A is red", "B is red" and "C is red" as equivalent to "A,B,C are red". Similarly "Peter and Paul preached in Galilee and Jerusalem" is equivalent to

Peter preached in Galilee
Peter preached in Jerusalem
Paul preached in Galilee
Paul preached in Jerusalem

Given the logical equivalence, there is therefore no real sense in your 'because'.

[aresh v.]

...And therefore "A,B,C are red" can't be analyzed away as "A is red", "B is red" and "C is red".
That is: "A,B,C are red" is an atomic statement and the equivalence should hold between the atomic statement "A,B,C are red" and the molecular statement "(A is red) and (B is red) and (C is red)", right?

thanks

[aresh v.]

...And the atomic statement "A,B,C are red" implies the atomic statement "A is red", right?

[William Woking]

>>And therefore "A,B,C are red" can't be analyzed away as "A is red", "B is red" and "C is red".

No, the very opposite. "A,B,C are red" is not an atomic, but a composite statement. Read what I say about "Peter and Paul ..." which is a similar composite (i.e. conjunctive) statement.

[aresh v.]

Then I've lost you.
IF:
1) "A,B,C are red" is not an atomic sentence
2) "A,B,C are red" is equivalent to "(A is red) and (B is red) and (C is red)"
3) "(A is red) and (B is red) and (C is red)" is true in function of the atomic sentences "A is red", "B is red" and "C is red"
THEN:
4) "A,B,C are red" is true in function of the atomic sentences "A is red", "B is red" and "C is red"

But (4) is exactly what I meant by: "A,B,C are red" because "A is red", "B is red" and "C is red", which is what you seemed to deny

[William Woking]

>>Then I've lost you.

You have indeed lost me.

>>But (4) is exactly what I meant by: "A,B,C are red" because "A is red", "B is red" and "C is red", which is what you seemed to deny

I said there wsa no real sense to 'because', meaning that when p and q are equivalent, 'p because q' makes no real sense. Well I suppose you could say 'Peter is a bachelor because Peter is a married man'. But that is not the 'because' that Peter and Bill are talking about. At least I think not.

[aresh v.]

Actually I was trying to targeting at your comment
"What do these red things have in common? Nominalist: they are all red."
So I thought maybe your point is that "they are all red" is function of "A is red", "B is red", "C is red"...etc. And then that "A is red", "B is red", "C is red" are true in virtue of A, B and C respectively (if not, what else? nothing?).
I guess Bill was asking you about what necessitates the truth of "A is red", and that can't be the sentence "they are all red"

[Account Deleted]

William,

You say: "I take "A is red", "B is red" and "C is red" as equivalent to "A,B,C are red"."

Why are these equivalent? I suppose because the predicate '...is red' occurs in all four statements. But, oops, this is just what you cannot say. For each occurrence of the predicate '...is red' is an individual occurrence, a token. And since a nominalist such as yourself cannot accept types, since these are universals, you cannot say that the four tokens are tokens of the same predicate-type. But, how can you maintain the equivalence between "A is red", "B is red" and "C is red", on the one hand, and "A,B,C are red", on the other, without being able to say that the four occurrences of '...is red' are tokens of the same predicate-type?

[William Woking]

>> oops, this is just what you cannot say.

Difficult. But I think I can talk about all words similarly-shaped to the one below.

RED

No? Also, there are degrees of Ockhamism. Ockhamism (see my comment to Bill in his more recent post) is caution about multiplying entities according to terms. So, when asked about what all Londoners have in common, an Ockhamist may be perfectly happy to admit the existence of the entity 'London' (other Ockhamists may not). However, London is not enough. The relation of 'living in London' is also required. And if asked to admit to an entity corresponding to 'living in London' to which all Londoners are related (and a possible further entity of relation to that entity, ad infinitum), any respectable Ockhamist would just say no.

[Account Deleted]

William,

1)"Ockhamism (see my comment to Bill in his more recent post) is caution about multiplying entities according to terms."

(Read your comment.)

The Ockhamist commandment "Thou shall not multiply entities beyond necessity" is predicated upon a conception of what is necessary and for what explanatory purposes. Take the interpretation of this dictum that you have just given above; namely, it is not necessary to posit an entity for every type of term: e.g., it is not necessary to posit universals just because there are predicates in our language.

But this is viewing things backwards. I may very well agree with the general dictum, but disagree with the particular case of predicates. Why? Well, unlike the Ockhamist who thinks that the realist about universals wily-nilly posits universals because predicates exist in our language, I think that predicates exist in our language because universals exist in the world.

Why do we have singular terms in our language? I suppose you will correctly respond: because individuals exist in the world; we believe that individuals exist in the world; and so a language that contains singular terms will have the resources to state truths about the world (and communicate them).

The same goes regarding universals. Which conveniently takes me to my second comment.

2)"But I think I can talk about all words similarly-shaped to the one below.

RED"

"all words...similarly-shaped"? In what respect? Take the last token-word in the quoted sentence above. Does the "similarly-shaped to THAT one" include the black ink? the font? capitalization; e.g., does 'red' is similarly shaped to that one? the absence of other letters in between: e.g., 'REminD' contains the letters 'r', 'e', and 'd'. Are we to say that since the letters 'r', 'e', and 'd' appear in 'REminD', a similarly shape word to *that one* appears in 'REminD? and so on.

The problem of universal appears with full force at the level of language. If you admit that there are letter-types, word-types, sentence-types because positing such types is necessary in order to make sense of the use of language, then all of the above questions disappear. But then you already accept some universals? And wouldn't you say that the same considerations apply with at least the same force to the world?

Just like numerically different word-tokens exhibit similarities because they belong to the same word-type, similarly numerically different individuals exhibit similarities in shape, color, size, etc., because they feature the same properties. '...lives in ___' relates many ordered pairs of individuals: e.g., , , etc. You refuse to accept that there is an entity corresponding to the relation term, but cheerfully accept that there are entities corresponding to the singular terms. But simply saying "No!" is not an argument.

You admit that the above two pairs alone cannot tell us the relevant similarity between William and Brown in relation to London. You also admit that this relevant similarity is a feature of the world itself. For otherwise, why do we need it? So you seem to agree that we also need the relation '...lives in __'. But you think that we do not need to posit any entity to correspond to this relation. But then why do you need it? And what is the *it*? Presumably a predicate such as '...living in ___'.

But, now, wait? We need the predicate because we need to express something that is part of the world, something that cannot be captured by merely giving the pairs above. So we bring in the predicate in order to do the job, but at the same time we refuse to admit that the predicate so introduced describes any additional features of the world beyond the one's already expressed by the pairs noted above. I don't get it?

You might respond: All we need is to see that the predicate applies to both pairs and that is all that is needed over and above the mere existence of the pairs. We do not need also to assume that the predicate applies to both pairs in virtue of something in the world that they both share.

But this can't be right. You don't mean to say that the predicate '...lives in___' applies to both pairs for reasons that have nothing to do with their actual circumstance in the world of their living conditions; i.e., by some sort of arbitrary stipulation like when I stipulate that the word 'Gara' shall apply to William as a tag when and only when he talks about nominalism, but at no other time. If the pairs themselves do not suffice because they fail to express something that is part of the world and this is the reason we need the predicate, then the account you give that the predicate applies in virtue of nothing in the world cannot satisfy this antecedent need.

"Thous shall multiply entities only when the world makes it necessary". Contra nominalism, the world, it seems to me, does make universals necessary.

[Account Deleted]

Well, my ordered pairs disappeared from the above post. Hmmm...wonder whether there is some sort of a message here?

Whenever I refer to ordered pairs I mean {William, London}; {Brown, London}. Fill in the rest as needed.