Existence, Elimination,and Changing the Subject

This is the fourth in a series on the metaphilosophical problem of sorting out the differences and similarities of analysis, identification, reduction, elimination, and cognate notions.  Parts I, II, III.  This post features existence, a topic I find endlessly fascinating and inexhaustibly rich.

Consider the position of a philosopher I will call Gottbert Fressell.  (A little known fact about him is that in his spare time he writes pro-capitalist novels under the pseudonym 'Randlob Ruge.') Fressell intends a reductionist line about existence.   He maintains that

1. There is (the property of) existence, but what this property is is the property of being instantiated.

This is a reductionist line because our philosopher admits that while there is existence, it can be reductively identified with something better understood, namely, the second-level property of being instantiated.  But I say that despite Fressell's intentions, his position is in truth an eliminativist one.  Thus I maintain that (1) collapses willy-nilly into

2.  There is no (property of) existence.

So if Fressell understood the implications of what he is saying, he would come out of the closet and forthrightly declare himself an existence denier, a denier that there is any such 'property' as existence.  And if he understood his position he would plead 'guilty' to the charge of having changed the subject.

The subject is existence, that in virtue of which me, you, and the moon exist, are, have Being, are not nothing -- however you want to put it.  Existence is what Russell has (speaking tenselessly) but his celestial teapot lacks.  The subject is singular existence, the existence of non-instantiable items, the existence of that which I prove when I enact the Cogito.   But what Fressell does is change the subject to what could be called general existence, which is just the being-instantiated of first-level properties.

Note the difference between 'Mungojerrie exists' and 'Cats exist.'  The latter, but not the former, can be reasonably understood as predicating a second-level property (the property of beng instantiated) of a first-level property, the property of being a cat.  Thus 'Cats exist' is analyzable as 'The property of being a cat has instances.'  But 'Mungojerrie exists' cannot be analyzed as 'The property of being identical to Mungojerrie is instantiated' because there is no such haecceity property.  But even if there were, the analysis would fail due to circularity.  If you want to explain what it is for individual a to exist, you move in an explanatory circle of embarrassingly short diameter if you say that the existence of a is a's instantiation of a-ness: a's existence is logically prior to its instantiation of any property. 

If you say that general existence is instantiation, then I have no quarrel with you.  But 'general existence' is a misleading expression with which we can easily dispense by using in its stead 'the property of being instantiated.'  General existence, if you  insist on the phrase, presupposes singular existence.  And because 'general existence' is dispensable, we don't need the qualifier 'singular': existence just is singular existence. If, having understood all of this, you insist that existence is instantiation, then I say you are an eliminativist about existence who has changed the subject from existence to instantiation.

Exercise for the reader:  find more examples of changing the subject in philosophy.  Replacing truth with warranted assertibility would be an example, as would replacing knowledge by what passes for knowledge in a given society (a move some sociologists of knowledge make).

 

Comments

[William]

We made much progress in agreeing what the E/R distinction is. E: 'there no existence, there is only instantiation'. R: 'there is existence, but existence is only instantiation'. The 'but' and the 'only' of the reductivist pragmatically imply that there may be something more to existence, and it is this 'something more' that the eliminativist denies.

But here we disagree:

>> 'The property of being identical to Mungojerrie is instantiated' because there is no such haecceity property. But even if there were, the analysis would fail due to circularity. If you want to explain what it is for individual a to exist, you move in an explanatory circle of embarrassingly short diameter if you say that the existence of a is a's instantiation of a-ness: a's existence is logically prior to its instantiation of any property.

But at least we are clear on where we disagree. I say there is a haecceity property (or rather a haecceity predicate, a Cambridge predicate to which no real property corresponds). And I say that the concept embedded in this predicate is as it were logically prior to our concept of existence. So I think we are clear where we disagree. And I agree on your analysis above. If there is no haecceity property/predicate, the analysis would be circular. If there were, but existence were logically prior, then it would be circular. But we do not agree on the fundamental premisses of your argument. Your reasoning is valid, but it is not sound.

[Bill Vallicella]

We have made some progress. We are agreed on the utility of the E/R distinction in general, though we may disagree when we get down to cases.

What exactly are the fundamental premises with which you disagree?

[William]

Namely

1. Whether there are haecceity properties

2. Whether existence is logically prior to haecceity.

Your (2) is a 'failover' premiss, i.e. you say there are no haecceity properties. But in that case fails, you can fall back on 2, the 'priority' argument. I disagree with both.

[Paul]

I have a question about existence within a formal system. Can we construct it so that a theorem t implies "there exists" theorem t itself?

Thanks,

Paul

[Bill Vallicella]

Paul,

You will have to say a bit more for me to understand what you are asking.