On Smiting One's Political Enemies

Tony Hanson e-mails from the once-great state of California whose governor-elect is once again Governor Moonbeam:

I see you had Berlin's essay in your library and reread it. I just wanted to say I don't think that we are in quite the bind you describe since there still seems to be a lot of room for some good rationally justified smiting, polemics and general political ass-kicking in spite of value pluralism. I'll make this very brief.

Defense of Polemics. I am sure you would agree that one's opponents may have all sorts of bad reasons for their positions, and (politely?) exposing them can make people more thoughtful, and may even enlighten them to the truth of value pluralism so much so that they may "flinch" too. Could this encourage comity?

That is a good point and I fully agree with it.  The pluralistic position, according to which no objective resolution satisfactory to all competent practioners is possible due to irresolvable value differences, is entirely consistent with the possibility of the fully objective exposure of bad arguments and empirical falsehoods on both sides.  Take abortion.  There are bad arguments on both sides of the debate, and almost everyone will agree that there are.   (I won't say what those bad arguments are lest I spark a meta-debate as to exactly which arguments on both sides are bad; but that there are bad arguments on both sides is uncontroversial.)   An argument can be objectively bad for a number of different reasons: it is logically invalid; rests on an empirically false premise; involves a weak analogy; commits an informal fallacy; is so murky and indistinct as to be insusceptible of evaluation, etc.  The essence of the pluralistic position is that once all the bad arguments on both sides are set aside, one arrives at a set of 'good' arguments which, however, do not resolve the issue for an  impartial observer.

I would quibble, though, with your use of 'polemics.'  From the Greek polemos, it means strife, struggle, war.  So we can define polemics as verbal warfare, warfare at the level of ideas.  There needn't be anything polemical about pointing out to an opponent that one of his arguments falls short of an objective standard such as the one represented by formal logic.  Here there is the possibility of convincing the opponent (assuming he is sincere, intelligent, etc.) because the cognitive values that come into play (truth, clarity, logical coherence, etc.) are agreed upon.

Defense of War and Smiting.  You said, "Suppose further ... that this value difference that divides them cannot be objectively resolved to the satisfaction of both parties by appeal to any empirical fact or by any reasoning or by any combination of the two." Say you are arguing with a Fascist or radical libertarian (who thinks property rights are absolute), and no empirical fact or reasoning satisfies them In other words, they are unreasonable.

But if you say that the radical libertarian is unreasonable, what are your criteria of reasonability or rationality?  I reject the radical libertarian position on property rights and I get the impression that you do as well.  But from his point of view, his stance is reasonable in that it is rationally derivable from certain axioms he accepts.  Is there some plain empirical fact that he fails to take cognizance of, or some rule of logic that he flouts?  When you  say that the radical libertarian is unreasonable, aren't you just rejecting his scheme of values? He places an absolute, inviolable, value on the individual and his property and refuses to admit that there are any competing values that would tend to have a relativizing effect.  Consider an eminent domain dispute.  Farmer Jones has worked hard all his life and owns 100 acres.  The Feds want to buy from him a strip of land for a much-needed road that cannot be placed anywhere else. Jones refuses to sell.  Even if he agrees that there is such a thing as the common good, he refuses to concede that it has the power to limit the absoluteness of his property right.

When you say that Jones is unreasonable, what you are doing is pitting your value-based conception of reasonableness against his.  But then my point goes through, which was that disputes like this are objectively irresolvable because rooted in value disputes which are objectively irresolvable.

Seems like its time for the Converse Clausewitz Principle [Politics is war conducted by other means]. Well, you can of course work to defeat libertarians in the political arena (though they do a pretty good job of this themselves, which is why I follow Medved in calling them 'losertarians.')  But the issue concerns your rational warrant for "unflinchingly" opposing them.  What makes you so cocksure that you are right and they are wrong?

Further, it seems a distinction needs to be made between the priority of a value, and the weight (or  height?) of the priority. Two people could prioritize security over liberty, but one would be prepared to sacrifice a lot more liberty for security than the other. The extremist gives his value too much weight, obviously; but it also seems one can be objectively wrong about the weight of the prioritized value, and not be an extremist. Invoking Aristotle might be helpful. Though one might not be a complete coward (or extremist), one might miss the mark with respect to courage and be a little cowardly, and so on with the various values. Moreover, it might not be possible to come to an agreement by using facts and reason, to what "hitting the mark" is, but you know it misses. Someone might have a different intuition on what hitting the mark is, or the target might be a large one allowing for disagreement, but it still might be worth trusting your sense of "tone," and fighting for it.

I agree that if value V1 takes priority over value V2, there remains the question of how much higher up in the axiological hierarchy V1 is.  Patrick Henry said, "Give me liberty or give me death."  He apparently valued his liberty over his very life.  Would you call him an extremist?  If yes, then what is wrong with being an extremist?  If he is placing an inordinate value on liberty, how do you show that?  Or take the Obama liberal who is willing to sacrifice his liberty for (the promise of) cradle-to-grave security and material comfort.  How do you show in an objective manner that the liberal places too much value on security and not enough on liberty?  You simply assert that "one can be objectively wrong about the weight of the prioritized value." Gratuitous assertions, however, elicit gratuitous counterassertions in response.

Tea Partiers object to the liberty-encroaching governmental overreach of the Obama gang.  (Case in point: the 'individual mandate' of Obamacare which forces citizens to buy health insurance.)  The political conflict is rooted in a deep value conflict.  How resolve it?

I don't see how Aristotle helps in this.  I would also point out that he was talking about virtues, not values, which are a different animal entirely and didn't come into philosophical currency until the 19th century.  A virtue is a habit (hexis, habitus), a dispositional feature of an agent; a value is . . . well what exactly is a value?  An abstract or ideal object of some sort?

The ComBox is open to give Hanson an opportunity to reply.  Others may chime in as well, but only if their comments are well-informed, intelligent, and stick precisely to the topic under discussion, what he says and what I say here and in the post that Hanson in replying to.  I simply delete comments I consider to be substandard. 

Comments

[T. Hanson]

Hi Bill,

Thanks for the comments. I knew you would agree with the first part, but not the second.

First, I think there are value claims that cannot be rationally or empirically defended but are still true: “It is wrong to molest infants,” would be an example.” Would you call this a gratuitous assertion on my part? I am cocksure I am right about it, though there is no objective way to resolve a possible dispute with a pervert who has contrary ethical axioms that prioritize the value of his own pleasure over everything else. Is being dogmatic about this “dangerous and immature” as Berlin says?

You seem to accept the existence of a priori truths when it come to metaphysics. Do you deny their existence when it comes to ethics? If so, why?

I would not take Libertarian Jones to be an extremist in thinking his property rights trump the common good in this case. That could be a hard case. I would have to know a lot more about the details. But if he based his a case on absolute property rights, I would call him an extremist. Say an Earth smashing meteorite is headed for us, and Libertarian Jones is a reclusive genius inventor who has constructed a laser that could destroy it. But he is also a misanthrope or apocalyptic type and will not let the laser be used to prevent Armageddon. I would find Jones to be an unreasonable extremist, and though he might not accept appeals to reason or fact, I am still sure he has the wrong priorities. What is the basis for this judgment? Perhaps, the same reason I think the pervert is wrong about his priorities.

Why is life more valuable than death? What reason or facts can resolve this? I would still think it right to unflinchingly defend life from terrorists, say, rather than repose in Pyrrhonism.

Regarding Aristotle, yes virtues and values are different, but virtues are parasitic on values. A virtue as you say is a habit, but it is a habit that internalizes into practice a value. But instead of arguing this connection, I’ll just put my thought into the form of an anology with virtues. Someone may not be a full blown coward (analogue to the extremist), but they may still show an excessive amount of fear in a situation. I know a person whose fear of bees is a little excessive, in my judgment. I doubt very much I could convince them with facts about bees, and rational argument that they are too fearful of bees, but I think I am still justified in my judgment. Similarly, why couldn’t I judge with some validity that some people support policies that seem to excessively prioritize security over liberty? On your picture it seems (and correct me if I am wrong), there is a world full of different values that people can prioritize and weigh differently and no configuration of priorities or weight is objectively better than any other since reason and empirical facts cannot decide the matter definitively. That picture seems wrong, since values have to be connected to human flourishing, and I am sure you would agree that some configurations contribute to this while others discourage and crush it. If that is so, and we are intelligent, informed, experienced (older?) reasonable people, why surrender to Pyrrhonism, rather than trust our judgments on what the better configurations are?

How do we know which configurations are better when reason and facts cannot resolve the matter? Sorry I can’t give an answer to that right now. Practical wisdom? A “good ear” for balance?

[T. Hanson]

This morning I looked at our discussion and found one more point that should be made. You said,

"The essence of the pluralistic position is that once all the bad arguments on both sides are set aside, one arrives at a set of 'good' arguments which, however, do not resolve the issue for an impartial observer."

I don't think that is the essence of the pluralistic position. Pluralists like W.D. Ross and even Berlin would agree with me that some prioritizations are objectively better even if reason cannot justify them. W.D.Ross prioritizes the pro tanto obligations of preserving human life over keeping promises, if you have to pull the proverbial drowning child out of the pond and miss a promised lunch date. In "Two Concepts of Liberty" Berlin argues there is a "frontier of freedom" that can never be crossed. These a priori or natural law principles include the prohibition of torture, of making children betray their parents in a political cause, of genocide for the greater good, etc. So a better definition of pluralism would be the view whereby the ethical universe contains a variety of values which sometimes conflict and in SOME of those conflicts it is not possible to give rationally warranted prioritizations. How large this latter set is, is open to debate, but as I argue in my prior reply I don't think that in close calls, we must always call it a wash.

[Bill Vallicella]

As for your second comment, you didn't read me very carefully. After using the term 'pluralistic position,' I then went on to explain what I meant by it. I was referring to my pluralistic metaphilosophical position; how others use the term is their business.

[Bill Vallicella]

Tony,

You choose as your example, "It is wrong to molest infants." But almost everyone agrees about that. The contentiousness and divisiveness of our politics concerns things like 'Same-sex marriage should not be allowed.'

Now if George Bush were to intone, in his second-grader sort of way, 'Marriage is between a man and a woman,' that would come close to a gratuitous assertion absent some rational justification which I doubt Bush would be capable of providing (without help from others). A well-meaning leftist could legitimately ask: Why not same-sex marriage? What justifies discriminating against same-sex couples?

The conservative has an answer that the leftist won't accept because of his different values. Therein lies the problem. You are of course free to be a dogmatist and insist you are right despite your inability to support your position.

My concern is with how we can lessen tensions and avoid unnecessary strife in our politics given that disagreement runs deep and cannot be objectively resolved in a manner satisfactory to all dfisputants given objectively irresolvable value differences.

One part of my solution is less government. The bigger the government the more to fight over. Another part is federalism. But of course these two issues are themselves deeply and hotly contested.

[T. Hanson]

Bill, I used the extreme molestation example because you said I cannot justify dimissing the libertarian extremist (whom almost everyone disagrees with, too) as unreasonable, since there is no empirical fact he fails to take account of, or rule of logic he flouts. I deny that your fork exhausts the criteria for reasonableness, and feel justified dismissing your libertarian extremist as unreasonable on the same a priori grounds I would dismiss the priorities of the child molestor. And I don't think this is being dogmatic.

You say about the issue of same sex marriage, etc.,"disagreement runs deep and cannot be objectively resolved in a manner satisfactory to all disputants given objectively irresolvable value differences."

Are you saying 1) there is no fact to the matter, or objective hierarchy, and therefore the issue is irresolvable? Or 2)there could be a fact to the matter, but there is no way for people to figure it out?

I would ask for evidence for either claim. Whether people should own slaves, or whether women should have political equality were hotly contested issues of wide disagreement that we seem to have resolved in a way that is objectively certain.

Three possibilities:

A. There seem to be easy cases where there is a clearly discernable objective hierarchy and solution. (My molestation example)

B. There might be hard cases where values objectively conflict and are therefore irresolvable with respect to how they are prioritized. (Federalism could be a solution to this, and perhaps we should flinch in how vigorously we cheer on our team.)

C. There also might be cases where there is an objective hierarchy, but it is a close call and difficult to discern, and takes careful moral thinking to come to an objectively correct solution - and for which there is a lot of disagreement, presently. Would federalism and flinching be the right solution here or should these battles be vigorously fought out until they are resolved for all of us? Are slavery and women's rights lik this?

How do you know in any given disagreement whether it is a case under B or C? Your version of pluralism seems to put all disagreements under B.

[Bill Vallicella]

Thanks for the discussion, Tony. You are asking the right questions.

>>Are you saying 1) there is no fact to the matter, or objective hierarchy, and therefore the issue is irresolvable? Or 2)there could be a fact to the matter, but there is no way for people to figure it out?<<

The latter. The interminability and intractability of the various debates is evidence, though not conclusive. *Justice demands forcible redistribution of wealth.* *It is not the case that justice demands forcible redistribution of wealth.* I am assuming that exactly one of these propositions is true, and indeed objectively true. The problem, however, is not merely to rationally justify one's choice, but to do this in a way that convinces all competent interlocutors. If I cannot do this then I have very good reason to doubt my commitment to one or the other of the propositions.

More tommorrow.

[T. Hanson]

Just a brief preemptive comment.

What about "whether women should have the right to vote?"

A lot of competent people opposed suffrage for women and were not convinced by the arguments. Should the supporters of suffrage have doubted their committment to suffrage, perhaps prolonging the injustice against women?

I am convinced that certain instances of partial birth abortion for certain reasons is immoral. I am pretty sure there are competent people who would disagree with me given they think a fetus at any stage is not a person. Of course, I have a bit of a general skepticism about the judgments I make based on my status as an imperfect being with imperfect faculties, but I am not going to additionaly question my judgment based on the fact they disagree, though I would be happy if they questioned their judgment.

In truly hard cases, I would hedge my certainty. But your example is a little vague or "murky." Do you mean whether it is just to redistribute any wealth? I have already said I am certain that absolutists in property rights are extreme and should be rejected outright and I am not hedging on that. I might think it is more just to redistribute wealth for certain causes than others, but I am not going to agree that I have to be skeptical about my judgment on a case unless I hear the details.

Okay, time for sleep.