Spencer Case e-mails:
I am as big an enemy of relativism in all its manifestations as you are. However, I think you were a bit too quick in your recent post on the supposed difficulties of standing resolutely for things you value only relatively. For instance, consider the following passage:
Now here's the question. Given that the two [the conservative and the libertarian]maintain contradictory value-prioritization theses [with respect to the prioritizaqtion of liberty and security] , how can either "stand unflinchingly" for his thesis given that each recognizes that each thesis is true only from his orientation, an orientation which rests crucially on his value-prioritization, a value-prioritization that he has no objective reason to prefer over that of his opponent?
You seem here and throughout your piece, to be operating on the assumption that there is a foundation of absolute values upon which our relative values are grounded, so that we should be troubled to find our deepest, sincerest values are not "any better than" contradictory values in ultimate terms. Maybe that's fine in the context of a discussion of Berlin's thought (with which I am not familiar). However, if the discussion is supposed to be a general discussion about absolute versus relative values, than it betrays the fact that you have insufficiently internalized the mindset of a truly radical subjectivist like Simon Blackburn.
Suppose, like Blackburn, you hold that all values are relative, that values simply are non-cognitive expressions of subjective yays! and boos! In that case, what's wrong with standing unflinchingly for what is only subjectively valued? What else could we possibly stand unflinchingly in favor of than those things to which we are most deeply committed, albeit with commitment understood in a non-cognitive way? Your mistake, Blackburn would say, is that you seem to think your deepest subjective commitments require absolute grounding, and in so doing sell your own commitments short. To misquote Wittgenstein, just as nothing holds up the world, nothing holds up your deepest subjective values.
On one point I think we are in agreement. If one adopts a noncognitivist theory according to which values are nothing more than purely subjective expressions of preferences and aversions, then there cannot be any reason of an axiological sort not to stand unflinchingly in favor of one's commitments. This is a point that is often not appreciated. If values are subjective and relative in this way, and it is one of the values of our group to dominate and subjugate other groups, then there cannot be any reason of an axiological sort to prevent us from doing so. So relativists fool themselves if they think that relativism necessarily breeds tolerance. It is a non sequitur to reason, "Because all values are relative, one must respect the values of other cultures." After all, if all values are relative, then the value of respecting the values of other cultures cannot be absolute but must itself be relative. A commitment to the relativity of values is logically consistent with obliterating other value-systems and their proponents.
So far, then, agreement!
But I am not assuming that values are relative; indeed I am presupposing that they are not. For example, I was in earlier posts presupposing that liberty, equality, and security are nonrelative values, and that the propositions which express their ordering (e.g., 'Liberty is a higher value than security') are objectively true if true.
The point I was making was about justification. Even if liberty and security are objective values, and it is objectively the case that one trumps the other, it can still be the case that one will not be able to show that one is right and one's opponent wrong. I claim that this is the predicament we are in with respect to some value conflicts. Now suppose that is the case. Then, contra Berlin-quoting-Schumpeter, I ought to be bothered by the fact that my opponent -- who, we are assuming, is a sincere truth-seeker, possessing all the moral and intellectual virtues, well-informed of all the relevant empirical facts, etc. -- disagrees with me. I ought to flinch! Otherwise I am privileging my own point of view simply because it is mine -- which is irrational.
Right now I'm Manas, Kyrgyzstan about to fly back to Fort Lewis, Washington for stateside outprocessing, so this will be the last email you get from me on this deployment (in a non-sinister way). Take care and thanks for all the correspondence over the months!
You're welcome. Have a safe trip back, and thank you for your service to our country.
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