Intentionality and Haecceity

Steven Nemes inquires:

Do you think that your stand on intentionality not requiring the existence of the intentional object is contradictory with your argument against haecceity properties (as non-qualitative thisnesses)? You say that an individual can have the property of searching after Atlantis, let's say, even if Atlantis doesn't exist. But your argument against haecceities is that identity-with-Socrates would be nonsense if Socrates didn't exist.

How would you solve the apparent contradiction?

Let's first note an ambiguity that infects 'intentional object.' Intentionality is object-directedness.  So there is a clear sense in which every intentional mental state 'takes an accusative,' 'is of or about an object.'  That object could be called the intentional object.  Accordingly, whether I want a three-headed dog or a one-headed dog, my wanting has an intentional object.  The nonexistence of three-headed dogs does not prejudice the object-directedness of my wanting a three-headed dog.  It is equally important to note that the existence of one-headed dogs plays no role in making my wanting a one-headed dog object-directed.  This is because object-directedness is an intrinsic feature of mental acts.  To see this more clearly, suppose I want a one-headed dog that is distinct from every one-headed dog that presently exists.  This mental state is object-directed, but its object-directedness does not derive from the present existence of any one-headed dog, or anything else.

But one could also use 'intentional object' to refer to the mind-independent entity, if there is one, that satisfies the description (definite or indefinite) that expresses the content of the intentional state.  If we use the term in this second way, then my wanting a three-headed dog does not have an intentional object.

It is only in this second sense that intentionality does not require the existence of the intentional object.  It is part of the very essence of wanting as an intentional mental state that it be a wanting of something (that is an objective genitive, by the way, not a subject genitive.)  But it doesn't follow that the something exists.  Similarly for perceiving, imagining, believing, etc.

As for the haecceity-property identity-with-Socrates, it is nothing at all at times and in worlds in which Socrates doesn't exist.  I stick to that self-evident point pace Plantinga. (See A Difficulty With Haecceity Properties)

It seems to me that my line on haecceities is entirely consistent with my line on intentionality.  Socrateity (identity-with-Socrates) essentially involves Socrates himself, that very individual, in a way in which seeking Atlantis (construed as a mental state, not as a physical action or actions) does not essentially involve Atlantis itself.  And this is a good thing since there is no such island.

You seem to think that an intentional mental state acquires its object-directedness from without in virtue of the mind-independent existence of an entity that the state is directed to.  It is this misconception that suggests to you that there is a contradiction in my affirming  both

1. An haecceity H of x is nothing if x does not exist
and
2. It is not the case that a wanting W of x is nothing if x does not exist.

But note that  'H of x' is a subjective genitive whereas 'W of x' is an objective genitive.  The haecceity or nonqualitative thisness of Atlantis is nothing at all because Atlantis does not exist. There is nothing for it to be the haecceity of.   But a wanting of Atlantis is what it is whether or not Atlantis exists. 

And similarly in other cases.  An ancient Greek can be a Zeus-worshipper whether or not Zeus exists.   But the same Greek cannot own a slave unless there exists some slave he owns.  The instance of of ownership requires for its individuation the existence of both relata.  But the instance of worshipping does not require the existence of both relata.

Comments

[Steven]

Hi BV,

Thanks for your response. Let me start by apologizing for the bad wording in parts of the email. I was 2:00 AM when I wrote it. Young and restless, you know.

In your argument against haecceities, both in that post you link to and in your Paradigm Theory of Existence, you said that Socrateity is understand as a compound, the identity relation and Socrates himself; that is how the property identity-with-Socrates is to be understood. But how is the property seeking after Atlantis to be understood? Why not also as a compound of the seeking after relation and the location Atlantis? (But there is no place.)

Perhaps my argument could be put this way, because I am having a hard time understanding your response. (This is probably because I did not clearly word it in my e-mail, so I have only myself to blame!)

(1) If someone is seeking after Atlantis, then they have the property seeking after Atlantis.
(2) But seeking after Atlantis seems to be a compound of seeking after and Atlantis, the second of which does not exist.
(3) So there is no such property and
(4) no one is in the intentional state of seeking after Atlantis.

I think this is pretty much a parallel of your argument against haecceities, but you want to deny the conclusion, so there needs to be some kind of relevant difference between the two.

[Bill Vallicella]

And I improved the wording a bit . . . .

Yes, I deny (4) and I deny (2). Seeking Atlantis is not a compound of Seeking and Atlantis. Atlantis doesn't exist, and there cannot be a compound of two things one of which does not exist. You are missing the point that one can seek what doesn't exist.

You also may be conflating intentional states and properties. Even if I grant (2), how did you get from (3) to (4)?

[Steven]

(4) follows from (3) and (1) by MT.

(1) is: if (there is an x such that x is seeking after Atlantis), then (there is an x such that x has P).
(3) is: it is not the case that (there is an x such that x has P).
Hence, etc.

I think seeking after Atlantis sure seems like a compound; I mean, seeking after George Bush and seeking after Atlantis seem to have the seeking after in common. But if you allow that there be a non-compound property like seeking after Atlantis, then you must allow that there be a non-compound identity with Socrates.

[Bill Vallicella]

You ignored the point that there cannot be a compound one of the components of which is nonexistent.

Suppose you are seeking Bush. Do you think Bush is literally a constituent of your seeking? Seems you would have to think that way if seeking is a compound of seeking + Bush.

[Steven]

"You ignored the point that there cannot be a compound one of the components of which is nonexistent."

I'm not ignoring it, but rather I am trying to use it in my favor. My argument is that seeking after Atlantis would be a compound if it is at all, but it can't be a compound, so it isn't at all.

Yeah, I think Bush would be a constituent of my seeking, because he is what I'm seeking. If he wasn't, then what I am a seeking?

[Bill Vallicella]

I don't think you understand intentionality. Suppose you are in the mental state of wanting X where X is some spatiotemporal particular like Bush. Obviously, your wanting X does not require that X be in your skull. But neither does it require that X be in your consciousness or in your mind. There is no way that Bush, all 180 lbs of him, cowboy boots and all, can be literally a part of a transient mental state.

[Edward Ockham]

You are walking a very tight tight-rope here. We can all agree

(*) Tom worships Zeus

is true. But which of the following do you think are true?

(1) Tom’s worship is object-directed
(2) Tom’s worship is directed towards an object
(2) Tom’s worship has an object
(3) There is an object of Tom’s worship
(4) There exists an object of Tom’s worship
(5) The object of Tom’s worship exists

[Edward Ockham]

I had a pretty hard time understanding the ambiguity you are talking about in the paragraphs that begin ‘Let's first note an ambiguity …’

The first sense seems to be such that
(1A) every intentional mental state 'takes an accusative,' 'is of or about an object.', or ‘has an intentional object’.
(1B) the non-existence of an F does not prejudice the object-directedness of my wanting an F
(1C) its being an object is an intrinsic feature of the intentional act of which it is an object.
(1D) the object-directedness of wanting an F does not derive from the present existence of any F, or anything else
The second sense seems to be such that
(2B) an intentional object is a mind-independent entity, if there is one, that satisfies the description (definite or indefinite) that expresses the content of the intentional state.
The difficulty of my understanding this distinction is related to my difficulty in seeing any difference between (1)-(6) immediately above. E.g. I can’t see any difference between ‘Tom’s mental state has an object’ and ‘there is an object of Tom’s mental state’. What is the difference?