Philosophy, Religion, Mysticism, and Wisdom

Dennis E. Bradford sent me three comments via e-mail on my recent Butchvarov post.  I omit the first and the third which are more technical in nature, and which I may address in later posts.    Bradford writes,

Second, and this separates me from Butch, Larry [Blackman], and you, I reject your assumption concerning the narrowness of philosophy.  You mention a conceptual impasse that is “insoluble on the plane of the discursive intellect, which of course is where philosophy must operate.”  I object to the “of course.”  To be a philosopher is to be a lover of wisdom and who says that our only access to wisdom is via the discursive intellect?   In fact, I deny that.  As far as I can tell, the Buddha was the greatest philosopher and the wisest human who ever lived, and his view was that limiting our examination only to the domain of the discursive intellect prevents one from becoming wise.

Actually, I don't disagree with this comment.  It is a matter of terminology, of how we should use the word 'philosophy.'  For me there are at least four ways to the Absolute, philosophy, religion, mysticism, and morality.  This post provides rough sketches of how I view the first three.  I end by suggesting that the pursuit of wisdom involves all three 'postures.'  (Compare the physical postures in the three pictures below.)

 

Philosophy

Philosophy is not fundamentally a set of views but an activity whereby a questing individual, driven by a need to know the truth, applies discursive reason to the data of life in an attempt to arrive at the ultimate truth about them. Discursive reason is reason insofar as it articulates itself in concepts, judgments, arguments, and systems of argument. As the etymology of the term suggests (L. currere, to run), discursive reason is roundabout rather than direct -- as intuitive reason would be if there is such a thing. Discursive reason gets at its object indirectly via concepts, judgments, and arguments. This feature of discursive reason makes for objectivity and communicability; but it exacts a price, and the price must be paid in the coin of loss of concreteness. Thus the oft-heard complaint about the abstractness of philosophy is not entirely without merit.

Note that I define philosophy in terms of the activity of discursive reason: any route to the truth that does not make use of this ‘faculty’ is simply not philosophy. You may take this as a stipulation if you like, but it is of course more than this, grounded as it is in historical facts. if you want to know what philosophy is, read Plato.  As Ralph Waldo Emerson says somewhere, "Philosophy is Plato, and Plato philosophy."  (I quote from memory!)  And there is this from  Keith's blog. 

The nearest thing to a safe definition of the word "philosophy", if we wish to include all that has been and will be correctly so called, is that it means the activity of Plato in his dialogues and every activity that has arisen or will arise out of that.

(Richard Robinson, "Is Psychical Research Relevant to Philosophy?" The Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume 24 [1950]: 189-206, at 192.)

This is in line with my masthead motto which alludes to the famous observation of Alfred North Whitehead:

The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.  I do not mean the systematic scheme of thought which scholars have doubtfully extracted from his writings.  I allude to the wealth of general ideas scattered through them.  [. . .] Thus in one sense by stating my belief that the train of thought in these lectures is Platonic, I am doing no more than expressing the hope that it falls within the European tradition. (Process and Reality, Corrected Edition, The Free Press, 1978, p. 39)

Discursivity, then, is essential to philosophy as a matter of definition, a definition that is not merely stipulative but grounded in a possibility of our nature that was best realized in Plato and what he gave rise to.

Thus Jesus of Nazareth was not a philosopher, pace George Bush. If you insist that he was, then I will challenge you to show me the arguments whereby he established such dicta as "I and the Father are one," etc. I will demand the premises whence he arrived at this ‘conclusion.’ Argument and counterargument before the tribunal of reason are the sine qua non of philosophy, its veritable lifeblood. The truth is that Jesus gave no arguments, made no conjectures, refuted no competing theories. There is no dialectic in the Gospels such as we find in the Platonic dialogues. This is not an objection to Jesus’ life and message, but simply an underscoring of the fact that he was not a  philosopher. (But I have a nagging sense that Dallas Willard says something to the contrary somewhere.)  Believing himself to be one with the Father, Jesus of course believed himself to be one with the ultimate truth. Clearly, no such person is a mere philo-sopher, etymologically, a lover of wisdom; he is rather (one who makes a claim to being) a possessor of it. The love of the philosopher, as Plato’s Symposium made clear, is erothetic love, a love predicated on lack; it is not agapic love, love predicated on plenitude. The philosopher is an indigent fellow, grubbing his way forward bit by bit as best he can, by applying discursive reason to the data of experience. God is no philosopher, thank God!

Agreeing with Bradford that a philosopher is a lover of wisdom, I yet insist that he is a lover and pursuer of wisdom by dialectical means, assuming we are going to use 'philosopher' strictly.  This use of terms does not rule out other routes to wisdom, routes that may prove more efficacious.

Indeed, since philosophy examines everything, including itself  (its goals, its methods, its claim to cognitivity), philosophy must also examine whether it is perhaps an inferior route to truth or no route to truth at all!

Religion

Religion (from L. religere, to bind) is not fundamentally a collection of rites, rituals, and dogmas, but an activity whereby a questing individual, driven by a need to live in the truth, as opposed to know it objectively in propositional guise, seeks to establish a personal bond with the Absolute. Whereas philosophy operates with concepts, judgments, arguments and theories, religion proceeds by way of faith, trust, devotion, and love. It is bhaktic rather than jnanic, devotional rather than discriminative.  The philosophical project, predicated on the autonomy of reason, is one of relentless and thus endless inquiry in which nothing is immune from examination before the reason’s bench. But the engine of inquiry is doubt, which sets philosophy at odds with religion with its appeal to revealed truth.  If the occupational hazard of the philospher is a life-inhibiting scepticism, the corresponding hazard for the religionist is a dogmatic certainty that can easily turn murderous. For a relatively recent example, consider the Ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa against Salman Rushdie. (This is why such zealots of the New Atheism as Dennett, Dawkins, Hitchens, Grayling, et al. are not completely mistaken.)

The philosopher objects to the religionist: "You believe things for which you have no proof!" The religionist replies to the philosopher: "You sew without a knot in your thread!" I am not engaging in Zen mondo, but alluding to Kierkegaard’s point that to philosophize without dogma is like sewing without a knot in one’s thread. The philosopher will of course reply that to philosophize with dogma is not to philosophize at all. Here we glimpse one form of the conflict beween philosophy and religion as routes to the Absolute. If the philosopher fails to attain the Absolute because discursive reason dissolves in scepticism, the religionist often attains what can only be called a pseudo-Absolute, an idol.

The reader must of course take these schematic  remarks cum grano salis. It would be simple-minded to think that cold impersonal reason (philosophy) stands in simple and stark confrontation to warm personal love (religion). For philosophy is itself a form of love –- erothetic love -- of the Absolute, and without the inspiring fervor of this longing love, the philosopher would not submit himself to the rigorous logical discipline, the mental asceticism, without which serious philosophy is impossible. (I speak of real philosophers, of course, and not mere paid professors of it.) Good philosophy is necessarily technical, often mind-numbingly so. (The reader may verify that the converse of this proposition does not hold.) Only a lover of truth will put up with what Hegel called die Anstrengung des Begriffs, the exertion of the concept. On the other hand, religious sentiments and practices occur in a context of beliefs that are formulated and defended in rational terms, including those beliefs that cannot be known by unaided reason but are vouchsafed to us by revelation. So in pursuit of taxonomy we must not fall into crude compartmentalization. The philosopher has his devotions and the religionist has his reasonings.

Mysticism

Turning now to mysticism, we may define it as the activity whereby a questing individual, driven by a need for direct contact with the Absolute, disgusted with verbiage and abstraction as well as with mere belief and empty rites and rituals, seeks to know the Absolute immediately, which is to say, neither philosophically through the mediation of concepts, judgments and arguments, nor religiously through the mediation of faith, trust, devotion, and adherence to tradition. The mystic does not want to know about the Absolute, that it exists, what its properties are, how it is related to the relative plane, etc.; nor does he want merely to believe or trust in it. He does not want knowledge by description, but knowledge by acquaintance. Nor is he willing, like the religionist, to postpone his enjoyment of it. He wants it, he wants it whole, and he wants it now. He wants to verify its existence for himself here and now in the most direct way possible: by intuiting it. ‘Intuition’ is a terminus technicus: it refers to direct cognitive access to an object or state of affairs. You should think of the the Latin intuitus as used by Descartes, and the German Anschauung as used by Kant. The intuition in question is of course not sensible but intellectual. Thus the mystical ‘faculty’ is that of intellectual intuition. The possibility of intellektuelle Anschauung was of course famously denied by Kant.

 Wisdom

The ultimate goal for a human being is wisdom which could be characterized as knowledge of, and participation in, the saving truth.  One who attains this goal is a sage.  No philosopher is a sage, by definition.  For a philosopher, as a lover (seeker) of wisdom, is not a possessor of it.  One does not seek what one possesses.  The philosopher's love is eros, love predicated on lack.    At most, the philosopher is a would-be sage, one for whom philosophy (as characterized above) is a means to the end of becoming a sage.  If a philosopher attains the Goal, then he ceases to be a philosopher.  If a philosopher gets a Glimpse of the Goal, in that moment he ceases to be a philosopher, but then, after having lost the Glimpse (which is what usually happens) he is back to being as philosopher again.

At this point a difficult question arises.  Is philosophy a means to sagehood, or a distraction from it?  I grant that the ultimate Goal cannot be located on the discursive plane.  What one ultimately wants is not an empty conceptual knowledge but a fulfilled knowledge.  Some say that when a philosopher seeks God, he attains only a 'God of the philosophers,' an abstraction.  (See my Pascal and Buber on the God of the Philosophers.)  The kernel of truth in this is that discursive operations typically do not bring one beyond the plane of discursivity.  One thought leads to another, and another, and another . . . and never to the Thinker 'behind' them or the divine Other. 

And so one might decide that philosophy is useless -- "not worth an hour's trouble" as Pascal once said -- and that one ought  either to follow the path of religion or that of mysticism.  That is not my view, for reasons I will need a separate post to explain.

For now I will say only this.  Philosophy is not enough.  It needs supplementation by the other paths mentioned.    Analogy.  You go to a restaurant to eat, not to study the menu.  But reading the menu is a means to the end of ordering and enjoying the meal.  Philosophy is like reading the menu; eating is like attaining the Goal. 

But it is also the case that religion and mysticism require the discipline of philosophy.  There is a lot to be said on these topics, and it will be the philosopher who will do the saying.  The integration of the faculties falls to philosophy, and an integrated life is what we aspire to, is it not?  We seek to avoid the onesidedness of the philosopher, but also the onesidedness of the mystic, of the religionist, of the moralist, not to mention the onesidedness of  the moneygrubber, the physical fitness fanatic, etc.

Comments

[Alfred Centauri]

I greatly enjoyed reading your post Bill.

I do wonder though to what extent those that call themselves philosophers are lovers of the seeking of wisdom rather than lovers of wisdom itself. That is, I wonder to what extent philosophy, to actual philosophers, is the end rather than the means.

Perhaps sagehood is the realization that one's quest is the end in itself?

[Bill Vallicella]

Thank you, Alfred.

>>That is, I wonder to what extent philosophy, to actual philosophers, is the end rather than the means.<<

Well, for most paid teachers/professors of philosophy philosophy is a means to filling their bellies such that, were they not able to fill their bellies from it, they would do something else.

It goes without saying that one can be a paid professor of philosophy and be a real philosopher, e.g. Santayana before he quit teaching and Cambridge, Mass and headed for Rome. Kant. And many others.

A real philosopher (as opposed to a belly-filler) could pursue philosophy as an end in itself and not as a means to something beyond philosophy such as what religionists and mystics aim at. His goal may be purely theoretical, "to understand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term." (Wilfrid Sellars, "Philosophy and the Scientific Image iof Man," first sentence.

Nothing wrong with that, and far, far above the belly-filler. But not enough for me.

[Alfred Centauri]

Thanks for the reply Bill.

Yes, by actual philosopher, I do mean real philosopher as opposed to belly-filler.

You wrote: His goal may be purely theoretical, "to understand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term."

I'm still thinking of something different I believe. Consider the plight of a theoretical physicist that loves the challenge of his work - that loves *doing* physics - finding at long last, the true (physical) theory of "everything". I believe that such a man would think "dang, is that all there is?". What would a physicist - the man that loves doing physics - do?

Do you love *doing* philosophy? Do you enjoy reading the menu, anticipating the meal to come with the occasional bite of appetizer? If you could, by pressing a magic button, possess the saving truth, would you press it?

[bob koepp]

Hi Bill -
Nice post. Your rough and ready taxonomy serves to indicate the limitations of each sort of pursuit. I think that the proverbial well-rounded person needs some of each -- feet on the ground, head in the clouds, and a clear sense that these are (somehow) part of a whole.

[Bill Vallicella]

Thanks, Bob. Nice comment!

[Shannon Nason]

Hi Bill, I've been reading your blog for quite some time now with much interest. I just wanted to say that I thoroughly enjoyed this entry. It so succinctly explains what I try to explain to my intro to philosophy students about the different ways to connect to the Absolute. While I spend most of my time developing various philosophical ways this can be done, I always end with Kierkegaard who, philosophically, argues, as you point out, for faith, hope, devotion, and love.

I should say, though, to echo Bob's lines, that faith, hope, devotion, and love are not incompatible with the rigidity of discursive reason. Of course, nothing you say here implies this, but it's worth emphasizing, I think. I'm tempted to believe that to understand what one loves, hopes for, devotes oneself to, and has faith in, requires the discursivity of reason. But, it also may turn out that Kierkegaard is right: discursive reason does not nor can it not begin without presuppositions. Do I have myself caught in a circle, vicious or otherwise?

[Shannon Nason]

Whoops! I guess I didn't read what you wrote carefully enough. You clearly emphasize the compatibility between philosophy and religion at the end of your post. So, I guess, I'd like to read more about how you understand this compatibility.

[Bill Vallicella]

Hi Shannon,

Thanks for the comment and thanks for reading my blog. I see that you teach at my old undergraduate alma mater and that you are a Kierkegaard scholar. Let me ask you your opinion of the Joakim Garff biography (Kimmse trans. Princeton 2005). I recently finished reading this monstrous tome (almost 900 pages) and was favorably impressed. In terms of sheer detail, it may never be surpassed. The author definitely avoids hagiography, which is good, but in places his tone is too breezy and post-modern for my taste. I wonder whether he has any really deep sympathy with S.K.'s point of view. Any thoughts?

I've been fascinated with Kierkegaard all my philosophical life. But I read him as an irrationalist, and that puts me off. I lump him in with Lev Shestov and Tertullian, rightly or wrongly.

I tend to think of philosophy, religion, and mysticism as different routes up the same mountain. If there are three routes to the summit of K2, it doesn't follow that there are three summits. I read S. K. as at once both anti-rational and anti-mystical.

Perhaps I'll dig up some of my Kierkegaard posts and we can discuss this in more detail. Thanks again for writing.

[Richard E. Hennessey]

On the one hand, philosopher x tell us that:

Philosophy is not enough. It needs supplementation by the other paths mentioned. Analogy. You go to a restaurant to eat, not to study the menu. But reading the menu is a means to the end of ordering and enjoying the meal. Philosophy is like reading the menu; eating is like attaining the Goal.

On the other hand, philosopher y tell us that:

Jesus of Nazareth was not a philosopher, pace George Bush. If you insist that he was, then I will challenge you to show me the arguments whereby he established such dicta as "I and the Father are one," etc. I will demand the premises whence he arrived at this ‘conclusion.’

I wonder whether philosopher x and philosopher y are identical, for I can imagine philosopher y demanding that philosopher x provide the premises whence he arrived at the “conclusion” that “Philosophy is not enough.”

Would philosopher x offer the statement, “The philosopher fails to attain the Absolute because discursive reason dissolves in skepticism,” here shorn of the hypotheticality which it bore in the original, as the or as a premise for the conclusion, “Philosophy is not enough”? But that too stands in need of argumentation.

[Bill Vallicella]

You are not getting my point. I suggest you re-read my post, carefully this time.

[Shannon Nason]

Hi Bill,

It took me close to two years to get through Garff's biography. I enjoyed every minute of it. You are right, the amount of detail of SK's life that Garff divulges is incredible. Indeed, it's a momentous book. Because I'm not an intellectual historian of SK, I can't speak to the accuracy of the book. I am aware, though, that some items in the book caused controversy. For example, one criticism of the book had to do with the lack of scholarly primary and secondary references.

Also, there was some anger about Garff's representation of SK as a kind of dandy. You might be interested in Peter Tudvad's take on the book. He wrote an article called "SAK: An Unscholarly Biography about Soren Kierkegaard."

It's funny, I started reading Kierkegaard because I was attracted to fideism. But in my relatively short philosophical career, fideism has significantly fallen out of favor with me. As I have found it less attractive of a position, I began to find ways to excuse Kierkegaard of the charge of irrationalism. I now read (controversially, to be sure) Kierkegaard as broadly situated within the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, possibly bridging it with the Platonic-Augustinian tradition -- we come to know God, first, through temporal, contingent particulars, and then as we begin to reflect on what makes these particulars possible, we come to see that God is the ontological pre-condition of them. I see this kind of reasoning throughout both the Climicean and religious works.

Of course, I think the charge of irrationalism is tempting to make. And to a certain degree it is correct. However, I take it that whatever irrationalism Kierkegaard endorses is set against what he saw as the hyper-rationalism of Hegelianism. So, his "irrationalism" is specific to his critique of that tradition. C. Stephen Evans argues, convincingly, that Kierkegaard's beef with reason is strictly to do with what he terms "concrete" reason (Cf. Faith Beyond Reason, pp. 94-95). This is the reason of the Enlightenment, culminating in Hegel. According to concrete reason, faith is irrational. But, Kierkegaard calls such reason a "blockhead and dunce" (p. 95).

However, nowhere to my knowledge does Kierkegaard abandon the normative use of reason as truth aiming. He does believe, though, that faith is also truth aiming, and to tell the whole truth, so help me God, will require the correcting influence of faith on reason.

So, I'm very wary about grouping Kierkegaard with the likes of Shestov, who doesn't seem to have any use for reason, concrete or otherwise.

[Bill Vallicella]

Shannon,

Thanks for the reference to the Tudvad review, which is damning, especially with its accusations of plagiarism. Here it is: http://www.faklen.dk/english/eng-tudvad07-01.php

I am far from being an SK scholar, but having read Garff's book, Tudvad's review is very credible. Glancing through my marginalia, I find on p. 116 bottom of the English translation the annotation, "Is this biography or historical fiction?" The impression I got from this and many other passages was that Garff was making up a story based on S. K.'s life. Tudvad has confirmed me in this suspicion.

[Bill Vallicella]

Shannon,

I'm glad you have moved away from fideism. But I would not have thought to situate SK within the A-T tradition or to take him as a bridge between the A-T and the P-A traditions. It sounds unlikely to me, but then perhaps you have impressive arguments.

SK definitely thinks like a Platonist, but I think it is also clear that he is averse to the notion that the existence of God can be rendered credible by any considerations *a contingentia mundi,* though I can't explain why at the moment.

>>However, nowhere to my knowledge does Kierkegaard abandon the normative use of reason as truth aiming.<<

Speaking of immortality on p. 154 of CUP (Swenson and Lowrie tr.), Johannes Climacus says that objectively the question cannot be answered. The same goes for God I should think.. But more importantly, the passages where JC holds that the Incarnation is logically absurd yet believable anyway seem to speak against your position. But no doubt you have an answer to this.

[Shannon Nason]

Hi Bill,

Indeed, I do have an answer (in the form of an objection) to the reading of Climacus (and Kierkegaard) as believing that the Incarnation is logically absurd. But I want to spend some time developing it for you as it (1) is an important issue and (2) requires a lot of contextualizing. In short, I wouldn't be doing justice to the problem by offering a simple explanation. It just isn't simple.

So, will you take a rain check?

[Richard E. Hennessey]

I could reply to your reply with a "You are not getting my point. I suggest you re-read my comment, carefully this time." But that would be non-productive and even churlish.

Perhaps then another approach would be better. I agree fully with your point about the discursiveness of human intellectual activity, including philosophical activity. I wonder, however, whether you and Plato are right in restricting human intellectual and philosophical activity to the dialectical. There is, after all, the Aristotelian perspective according to which human intelligence is capable, not only of dialexis, but also of apodeixis, of demonstrative knowledge, and this not only in mathematics but also in philosophy. If such a perspective can stand up to scrutiny, then we need not face the unhappy prospect that “discursive reason dissolves in[to] skepticism.”

[Alex Leibowitz]

And because I am vane enough I will leave you this postscript which thanks you first for your site and for the opportunity which you still sometimes provide your readers to comment upon it (if you do insist we remove our hats) also apologizing because I know I am quite a fool even if I do not believe it -- and asks, second, why science is not included in the list above.

Or do you think that philosophers never ask questions to which scientists do or better yet could know the answer? Because if the truth does not divulge the general nature of the particulars of this world, and if it contains nothing relating to numbers and number-like things, I am afraid as a mortal man it would bore me -- or the mystical vision would have never to end (as the visions of living mystics, so I think and by the testimony of history, do).

But if we can endeavor to be philosophers, religious, mystics, should we also endeavor to be scientists?

[Bill Vallicella]

Shannon,

I would be very interested in hearing how you object to the reading of Climacus/Kierkegaard as holding that the Incarnation is logically absurd. Rain check accepted.

Can we assume that what SK puts in the mouth of J. Climacus are SK's own words? I found it very interesting from Garff's book how widespread was the use of pseudonyms in the Copenhagen literary scene in the 1840s and '50s.

Is Blystone still teaching?

[Bill Vallicella]

Alex,

You are a strange bird. You don't have to remove your hat, but you do have to make a serious attempt to talk sense. Not detecting much sense in the comment to which your latest is a postscript, I deleted it.

If you know that you a fool, how can you not believe it? Doesn't *S knows that p* entail *S believes that p?*

>>why science is not included in the list above.<<

That's a reasonable question. There is no way to give a quick answer that will not appear tendentious.

[Bill Vallicella]

Richard,

You bring up an important question, one concerning the different senses of 'dialectic' and 'dialectical.' A fuller treatment would have to sort out the main senses that have surfaced in the history of philosophy. For example, in Kant and Hegel, 'dialectic' means different things. Very roughly, in Kant it has a negative sense while in Hegel it has a positive sense. The Transcendenal Dialectic of the CPR is concerned to exhibit the noncognitivity of rational psychology, philosophical cosmology, and natural theology.

I was using the word broadly above to include apodeixis. So I was using 'dialectical' as roughly equivalent to 'discursive.' The contrast term would then not be 'demonstrative' since demonstration is a discursive procedure. The contrast would be with 'phenomenological' (as in the usage of G. Bergmann and his Iowa School).

Must (pure) reason issue in skepticism? I didnt take a stand on this question above. I merely mentioned this as an "occupational hazard" of the philosopher. So I don'tr rule out the possibility of strict demonstrations in philosophy. But when it comes to the really important questions, such God and the soul, I am not aware of any strict demonstrations either for or against.

Do you have anrgument for me that strictly proves the existence of God or the immortality of the soul?

[Richard E. Hennessey]

Bill,

While I hope that there is a God and that I possess an immortal soul, I, like you, am not aware of any genuine proof that either is the case. On the other hand, while I fear that there is no God and that I do not possess an immortal soul, I equally unaware of any genuine proof that either of the latter two propositions is the case.

This is not a matter of skepticism. It may be that our not having such knowledge is a contingent matter of fact, not one of necessary principle.

Your clarification re "dialectical, "discursive," and "demonstrative" is just fine. But I want to add a comment re Whitehead's Plato and footnote remark: Aristotle deserves at least an appendix.