An Argument for Direct Reference

Edward Ockham uses  ‘Direct Reference’ to refer to "the theory that part or all of the meaning of a proper name requires the existence of a named object."  This implies that a proper name cannot have a meaning unless there exists an object it names.  He then gives the following argument:

A term signifies either a property or an object.  But properties are repeatable.  A property like being white, or running, or being bald can be instantiated by many individuals.  Even a property that can only be had by one individual at a time (being the tallest living philosopher) can be instantiated by different individuals at successive times, or could be instantiated by a different individual than the one that possesses it now.  If a proper name like 'Socrates' signified a property, even a unique property, it would make sense to say that this individual is Socrates on Tuesday, but that someone else is Socrates on Wednesday.  Or that this individual is Socrates today, but might not have been Socrates.  But that makes no sense.  A proper name does [NOT] signify something that is repeatable, therefore does not signify a property.  Therefore it signifies an object.  Therefore an object is part or all of the meaning of a proper name, and the theory of Direct Reference, as defined above, is true.

As it stands, this argument is not compelling.  To be compelling, it would have to close off the 'haecceity escape route.'  Haecceitas is Latin for 'thisness.'  Let us say that H is an haecceity property, an haecceity for short, if and only if H is a first-level property which, if instantiated, is instantiated by the same individual ('object' in Edward's terminology) at every time and in every possible world in which it is instantiated.  Accordingly, 'the tallest living philosopher' does not express an haecceity property:  it has different instances at different times and at different possible worlds, even though at a given time in a given world it has only one instance.  If there are haecceity properties, then they are not repeatable, i.e., multiply instantiable, whether at different times or in different worlds.

Consider the property of being identical to Socrates. If there is such a property, it can serve as the sense of 'Socrates,' or, to use Edward's word, that which 'Socrates' "signifies."  In the case of a vacuous proper name such as 'Vulcan,' the property of being identical to Vulcan  could serve as its sense.  If this is tenable, then 'Vulcan' is a genuine proper name despite it having no referent, and the Direct Reference theory as defined above is false.

Haecceities can either be nonqualitattive or qualitative.  Identity-with-Socrates is an example of a nonqualitative haecceity.  But one can imagine an haecceity property that is compounded out of qualitative properties where the latter are not tied to specific individuals in the way in which identity-with-Socrates is tied to the individual Socrates.  The logical construction goes like this.  We first form the huge conjunction K1 of all the qualitative properties that Socrates instantiates in the actual world.  K has as conjuncts being snubnosed, being married, being a plebeian, being poor, etc.  We do the same for every possible world in which Socrates exists.  This yields a series of conjunctive properties, K1, K2, K3, etc.  We then make a monstrous disjunctive property each disjunct of which is one of the Ks.  This property is Socrates' qualitative haecceity.  It is a property but it is clearly not repeatable (multiply instantiable).  If there are such properties, they defeat Edward's argument above.

I myself do not believe in haecceity properties, nonqualitative or qualitative.  See A Difficulty With Haecceity Properties.  My point is that Edward's argument above is not compelling unless he can persuasively exclude them.

Now, given that I reject haecceity properties, I ought to find the above argument compelling.  But this lands me in a quandry.  For I hesitate to say that 'Vulcan' or 'Pegasus' are not proper names.  They seem to be perfectly good proper names albeit vacuous.  If so, then no part of their meaning involves the existence of a referent, and the DR theory is false.

Or consider 'Moses.'  Was there some one man who received, or claimed to receive, the Torah from YHWH on Mount Sinai?  Aren't we strongly tempted to say that the meaning of 'Moses' is what it is whether or not Moses existed?  If we say that, then it can be no part of the name's meaning that it have an existing referent.  Nor can it be any part of the name's meaning that there be a causal chain leading back to an initial baptism.  If Moses never existed, then there was nothing to baptize. 

Comments

[Edward the Ockhamist]

I broadly agree with your assessment (please note these arguments are straw men). However

(a) I am not sure your description of the ‘qualitative haecceity’ makes sense. Given that Socrates could be any of the things that Plato could be, how does this property distinguish Socrates from Plato? Let’s suppose there is a possible world in which Socrates is not a philosopher but is a farmer, is not snub-nosed but flat-nosed etc., for as many properties as you like. Then equally there could be a possible world in which Plato is exactly those things. It follows that the massive disjunct does not distinguish the one from the other. We could form a massive 1-1 correspondence between the possible worlds in which Socrates in one world had all the properties of Plato in some other world.

(b) You say reject any kind of haecceity property, and you say this lands you in a quandary. But you don’t point to any way out of the quandary.

[Account Deleted]

I have tried to point out in previous posts about this subject that as long as we respect the Freagean distinction between sense (i.e., meaning) and reference, and we are careful not to conflate them, the traditional theory of direct reference is distinguished from other theories by denying that proper names (and perhaps other expressions as well) have a meaning.

I have also noted that in these discussions it is important to respect the distinction between the role of a definite description to give the meaning of an expression vs. fixing its reference. Regardless of whether or not you think that such a distinction makes sense on theoretical grounds, you must respect it and characterize direct reference in a manner their adherents do. O/w you are not talking about the theory of direct reference discussed in the literature, but only pretend to do so.

Edward introduces a term 'direct reference' (EDR) for a certain theory of reference which he then defines as follows:

EDR=df "the theory that part or all of the meaning of a proper name requires the existence of a named object."

EDR so defined is not the same theory as the theory of direct reference (DR) so-called in the traditional literature about reference. The reason EDR is not identical to DR is because while the former attributes a meaning to proper names, the later denies that proper names (and perhaps other expressions) have a meaning at all, whether or not they have a reference. As long as we respect the distinction between meaning and reference, and we should, EDR is not identical to DR. Therefore, whatever objections one has against EDR, they are not ipso facto objections against DR.

[Bill Vallicella]

Ed,

Who in the literature gives an argument like the one I quote above? Why call it 'straw man'? I think it is a good argument against what you define as DR.

We don't need to discuss (a) because we both reject haecceity properties. As for (b), I suspect there is no good theory.

[Bill Vallicella]

Peter, Ed,

We will never make any progress until we agree on how to use 'meaning.' Peter, meaning is not sense! Ed, meaning is not reference! Meaning is neutral as regards that distinction.

Start with the plain fact that ordinary proper names have meaning. Then we can ask: Is the meaning of a name exhausted by its reference? Does the meaning of a name consist of both sense and reference? Does a name have meaning whether or not it has a reference? And so on.

Those questions cannot even be formulated if you assume that meaning = reference or that meaning = sense.

[Edward from Ockham]

>>EDR=df "the theory that part or all of the meaning of a proper name requires the existence of a named object." EDR so defined is not the same theory as the theory of direct reference (DR) so-called in the traditional literature about reference.

I concede that some theorists do not use the term 'direct reference' in this way. But the majority do See http://www.reading.ac.uk/AcaDepts/ld/Philos/borg/Reference%20Without%20Referents_1.doc p.3.

Kaplan talks about a theory, which he attributes to Russell, that the proposition expressed by "John is tall" provides it with two components: "the property expressed by the predicate is tall and the individual John. That's right, John himself, trapped in a proposition" (my emphasis).

There is another family of theories, sometimes called 'externalism', that certain types of terms have an object-dependent semantic value. The thesis of object-dependence is defended by, , Gareth Evans and John McDowell among others.

David Braun defends a theory which he and others call 'Millianism'. In “Empty names, fictional names, mythical names” http://www.ling.rochester.edu/~braun/Papers/empficmyth.htm he says "We hold that the semantic content of a proper name is simply its referent. We also think that the semantic content of a declarative sentence is a Russellian structured proposition whose constituents are the semantic contents of the sentence's constituents. he also says that "If Millianism is true, then the names ‘Vulcan’ and ‘Sherlock Holmes’ have no semantic content."

If you really have a problem, can we call it 'Millianism' or 'The object-dependence theory'?

>>The reason EDR is not identical to DR is because while the former attributes a meaning to proper names, the later denies that proper names (and perhaps other expressions) have a meaning at all

But DR theorists hold that sentences express propositions, and that propositions are partly mind-dependent entities, more or less equivalent to thoughts. If you hold that the thought expressed by 'Peter is tall' is composed of elements, and that one of these elements corresponds to 'Peter', you can't escape object-dependence.

[Edward from Ockham]

Bill >> Who in the literature gives an argument like the one I quote above? Why call it 'straw man'?

No, I meant MY argument was a straw man :) I don't believe in DR, but I am considering plausible arguments in support of DR.

Bill >>We will never make any progress until we agree on how to use 'meaning.'

I think the disagreement is about the meaning of the expression "direct reference". As I understand it, and as many authors define it, direct reference is the view that the entire semantic content (or 'meaning', if you like) of a singular term is its referent. So, the content of the term "Peter" in "Peter is a philosopher" simply is the man Peter himself. Trapped in a proposition.

[Edward from Ockham]

>>As for (b), I suspect there is no good theory.

But then you are in a pickle.

1. You agree that a proper name either signifies a property or an object.

2.You agree that a proper name does not signify a repeatable property.

3. You agree that a proper name does not signify an unrepeatable property, because you don't believe in such things.

4. You disagree that a proper name signifies an object.

These positions are inconsistent. Philosophers are not allowed to do this.

[Bill Vallicella]

We are in a common aporetic pickle.

[Edward from Ockham]

>>We are in a common aporetic pickle.

Well not quite, because I disagree with proposition (1). Why is there no third possibility? Why does a proper name have to signify either a property or an object? Why can't it have a different sort of meaning entirely? Thus:

(A) A proper name signifies (pace Peter)
(A) A proper name does not signify a repeatable property.
(C) A proper name does not signify an unrepeatable property.
(D) A proper name does not signify an object.

These four logically imply

(E) A proper name signifies something which is neither an object or a property.