More Mail on Prager, Osama, Judaism, and Pacifism

Hi Bill,

I was a bit surprised to read that in response to your post about tempering
one's joy at Osama's demise, "Prager pointed out that the Jews rejoiced when the Red Sea closed around the Egyptians, and that this rejoicing was  pleasing to God."

First, I was surprised because a quick look at Exodus 15 does not say that the Israelites' rejoicing was pleasing to God. Maybe this was "lost in translation," but I very much doubt that, since the Bible is the most carefully translated book in the world.

You are right: Exodus 15 does not explicitly say that the Israelites' rejoicing was pleasing to God.  But one can infer from verse 25 that God was pleased, or at least not displeased, since God shows Moses a tree with which he sweetens and makes potable the bitter waters of Marah after they make it through the Red (Reed?) Sea and are mighty thirsty (Ex 15: 23-25). I should add that "this rejoicing was pleasing to God" was Dennis Prager's addition, as I understood him.

Second, I was surprised because I imagine that Prager was at some point exposed to a Talmudic story which is often recounted at the Passover Seder. A version that I was able to locate fairly quickly on the Web follows. As evil as Pharoah and the Egyptians were, when it came to their destruction at the hands of God through the plagues (particularly the death of the first born)and at the Sea of Reeds, the rabbis went to great lengths to temper our joy. A famous midrash in the Talmud makes the point:

When the Egyptians were drowning in the Sea of Reeds, the ministering angels began to sing God's praises. But God silenced them, saying: How can you sing while my children perish? We may rejoice in our liberation but we may not celebrate the death of our foes. To underscore the point, and re-enforce the value, the rabbis instructed that ten drops of wine be spilled from our cups [at the seder] diminishing the joy of our celebration, as a reminder of those who peished in the course of our liberation. It is said that this is also the reason why a portion of the Hallel (the great songs of praise) is omitted on the last six days of Passover.

By the way, I would like to question your agreement with Prager that pacifism is "immoral." Is it really immoral, or just not morally obligatory? Or perhaps it should be approached as part of an aspirational ethics. While I'm not a pacifist, I think it's something to which I ought to aspire. Perhaps one is less guilty for aspiring to, but not realizing pacifism, than for not aspiring to pacifism at all.

We agree that being a pacifist is not morally obligatory.  So the question is whether it is morally permissible.  The answer will depend on what exactly we mean by 'pacifism.'  Suppose we mean by it the doctrine that there are no actual or possible circumstances in which the intentional taking of human life is morally justified.  Someone who holds this presumably does so because he thinks that human life as such has absolute value.  Now if that is what we mean by pacifism, then I think it is morally impermissible to be a pacifist. Here is an argument off the top of my head:

1. We ought to (it is morally obligatory that we) work for peace and justice and oppose violence and killing.  "Blessed are the peacemakers."
2. It is sometimes necessary to kill human beings in order to maximize peace and justice  and minimize violence and killing. 
3. To will the end is to will the means.
Therefore
4. It is morally obligatory that we sometimes kill human beings to minimize violence and killing.
Therefore
5. It is morally impermissible that we never kill human beings to minimize violence and killing.

(1) is a deliverance of sound moral sense.  The NT verse is a mere ornament.  It is not the justification for (1).  Examples of (2) are plentiful.  (3) is an unexceptionable Kantian principle.  (4) follows from the first three premises.  (5) follows from (4).

  

Should we aspire to be pacifists?  In some senses of that term, sure. But not in the sense I defined.  It's a large topic.

Faithfully,
Bob Koepp

Comments

[Leo Carton Mollica]

Thanks for the post, Dr. Vallicella, and for the email, Mr. Koepp.

Mr. Koepp, your claim that "[w]hile [you're] not a pacifist, [you] think it's something to which [you] ought to aspire" caught my eye. How can you aspire to a doctrine? Does belief take effort? If you want to be a pacifist and think aspiring to it noble why not just adhere to the position and be done with it? Please explain if and where I'm getting you wrong.

For those interested, G. E. M. Anscombe has some very interesting critical remarks on such aspirational-but-not-committed sentiments as you seem to express in this essay.

Cheers!

[bob koepp]

Leo -
What I aspire to is pacifism in my behavior. Perhaps I lack commitment, or am merely a hypocrite, but I haven't found a solution to the problem of my own weakness of will. Also, and perhaps as a symptom of that weakness, my belief that pacifism is something to which one should aspire is itself tempered and tentative. I'm more inclined to think I should be pacific in the face of threats to myself than that I should be pacific when others are threatened. I don't think that we should only aspire to things that we are able to achieve. Trying, and failing to be perfect is better than not trying at all.

[Bill Vallicella]

Leo,

I clicked on your link and found the high praise. I am deeply grateful. But now I have to live up to it!

Bob,

"I don't think that we should only aspire to things that we are able to achieve." I agree if you are referring to abilities that we now possess. Some of these abilities can be extended and new abilities can be developed. But I cannot see how we ought to aspire to what will not ever be able to do, or cannot ever be able to do.

[bob koepp]

I agree with Kant that ethics is for creatures constructed of crooked timber. Such creatures cannot, by their natures, be "perfectly straight," yet they are capable of conceiving of the perfectly straight and, having formed this conception, aspiring to it in their actions. In their hearts, if they are self-aware, they must know that they cannot do more than "approximate" the straight, but it is the necessary standard relative to which approximation is judged. While ethics is about a kind of practical reason, concerned with the choice of ends and the means to those ends, it also involves (I think necessarily) idealizations which cannot, in this crooked world, be realizations.

[Leo Carton Mollica]

Dr. Vallicella,

I'm gratified that you would deign to visit my humble weblog! Unless you were planning on some significant change in your blogging style, I don't think you'll have to worry about living up to anything I mentioned.

With regard to the issue here at hand, I must express my agreement with Mr. Koepp: it is rational to suppose that we should aspire to some things that are impossible, for...

1. We ought always to fully pay our debts.
2. Some of our debts cannot be repaid fully (using "cannot" to exclude both first and second potencies).
3. We ought to aspire to doing what we ought to do.
4. Therefore, some debts are such that we cannot repay them and ought to aspire to paying them.
5. Therefore, not everything we ought to do are we able to do.

I know that you'll dispute (2), or perhaps (1), but my point is that it is not mysterious or indefensible to suppose that some acts or habits should be aspired to without admitting of possible attainment. After all, my three premises look plausible, even if they are not certainly true.