Does Classical Theism Require Haecceitism?

Haecceitism is the doctrine that there are haecceities. But what is an haecceity? 

Suppose we take on board for the space of this post the assumptions that (i) properties are abstract objects, that (ii) they can exist unexemplified, and that (iii) they are necessary beings. We may then define the subclass of haecceity properties as follows.

A haecceity is a property H of x such that: (i) H is essential to x; (ii) nothing distinct from x exemplifies H in the actual world; (iii) nothing distinct from x exemplifies H in any metaphysically possible world.

So if there is a property of Socrates that is his haecceity, then there is a property that individuates him, and indeed individuates him across all times and worlds at which he exists: it is a property that he must have, that nothing distinct from him has, and that nothing distinct from him could have. Call this property Socrateity. Being abstract and necessary, Socrateity is obviously distinct from Socrates, who is concrete and contingent. Socrateity exists in every world, but is exemplified (instantiated) in only some worlds. What's more, Socrateity exists at every time in every world that is temporally qualified, whereas Socrates exist in only some worlds and only at some times in the worlds in which he exists.

Now suppose you are a classical theist.  Must you accept haecceitism (as defined above) in virtue of being a classical thesist?  I answer in the negative.  Franklin Mason answers in the affirmative.  In a comment on an earlier post, Mason gives this intriguing argument into which I have interpolated numerals for ease of reference.

[1] When God created the world, he knew precisely which individuals he would get.  Thus [2] he didn't need to have those very individuals in front of him to know which ones they were.  Thus [3] there must be a way to individuate all possible individuals that in no way depends upon their actual existence. [4] Such a thing is by definition a haecceity. Thus [5] there are haecceities.

I don't anticipate any disagreement with Mason as to what an haecceity is.  We are both operating with the Plantingian notion.  We disagree, however, on (i) whether there are any haecceities and (ii) whether classical theism is committed to them. In this post I focus on (ii).  In particular, I will explain why I do not find Mason's argument compelling.

My reservations concern premise [1].  There is a sense in which it is true that when God created Socrates, he knew which individual he would get.  But there is also a sense in which it is not true.  So we need to make a distinction.  We may suppose, given the divine omniscience, that before God created Socrates he had before his mind a completely determinate description, down to the very last detail, of the individual he was about to bring into existence.  In this sense, God knew precisely which individual he would get before bringing said individual into existence.  Now either this description is pure or it is impure.

A pure description is one that includes no proper names, demonstratives or other indexicals, or references to singular properties.  Otherwise the description is impure.  Thus 'snubnosed, rationalist philosopher married to Xanthippe' is an impure description because it includes the proper name 'Xanthippe.'  'Snubnosed, rationalist, married  philosopher,' by contrast, is pure.  (And this despite the fact that 'married' is a relational predicate.)  Pure descriptions are qualitative in that they include no references to specific individuals.  Impure descriptions are nonqualitative in that they do include references to specific individuals.

Now if God has before his mind a complete pure description of the individual he wills to create then it could apply to precisely one individual after creation without being restricted to any precise one.  (Cf. Barry Miller, "Future Individuals and Haecceitism," Review of Metaphysics 45, September 1991, p. 14)  This is a subtle distinction but an important one.  It is possible that Socrates have an indiscernible twin.  So the complete description 'snubnosed, rationalist philosopher, etc.' could apply to precisely one individual without applying to Socrates.  This is because his indiscernible twin would satisfy it just as well as he does.  The description would then apply to precisely one individual without being restricted to any precise one.  So there is a clear sense, pace Mason, in which  God, prior to creation, would not know which individual he would get.  Prior to creation, God knows that there will be an individual satisfying a complete description.  But until the individual comes into existence, he won't know which individual this will be.

Creation is not the bestowal of existence upon a a pre-existent, fully-formed, wholly determinate essence.  It is not the actualization of a wholly determinate mere possible.  There is no individual essence or haecceity prior to creation.  Creation is the creation ex nihilo of a a new individual.  God creates out of nothing, not out of pre-existent individual essences or pre-existent mere possibles.  Thus the very individuality of the individual first comes into being in the creative act.  Socrates' individuality and haecceity do not antedate (whether temporally or logically) his actual existence.

Mason would have to be able rationally to exclude this view of creation, and this view of the relation of existence and individuality, for his argument to be compelling.  As it is, he seems merely to assume that they are false.

Could God, before creation, have before his mind a complete impure description, one that made reference to the specific individual that was to result from the creative act?  No, and this for the simple reason that before the creative act that individual would not exist.  And therein lies the absurdity of Plantingian haecceities.  The property of identity-with-Socrates  is a nonqualitative haecceity that make essential reference to Socrates.  Surely it is absurd to suppose that that this 'property' exists at times and in possible worlds at which Socrates does not exist.  To put it another way, it is absurd to suppose that this 'property' could antedate (whether temporally or logically) the existence of Socrates.

We are now in a position to see why Mason's argument is not compelling.  If [1] is true, then [2] doesn't follow from it.  And if [2] follows from [1], then [1] is false.  Thus [1] conflates two distinct propositions:

1a.  When God created the world, he knew precisely which pure complete descriptions would be satisfied.

1b.  When God created the world, he knew precisely which individuals would exist.

(1a) is true, but it does not entail

2.  God didn't need to have those very individuals in front of him to know which ones they were.

(1b) entails (2), but (1b) is false.

I conclude that classical theism does not entail haecceitism.  One can be such a theist without accepting haecceities.

Comments

[Franklin Mason]

The disagreement between us, I take it, is that I accept and you deny [1]. (When I asserted [1], I did of course mean [1b].) I found no argument for the denial of [1] that does not beg the question. But I wasn't owed an argument, for I offered none for [1]'s truth.

At this point, we are at a stand-off.

When I asserted [1], I did have an argument in mind. I'll give it, and then give the inevitable objection.

God is omniscient. This means that He knows all things His knowledge of which entails no impossibility. (I would not say that it means that He knows all things. God doesn't know what it's like to suffer just retribution, for if He did know that He must have suffered just retribution.)
Before God created the world, there was a fact of the matter about which individuals it would contain. Moreover, there is no impossibility entailed by God's knowledge of this.
Thus before God created the world, He knew which individuals it would contain.

Here's the inevitable objection. There simply was no fact of the matter about which individuals the world would contain before it was created. Thus God didn't know which individuals it would contain. The objector is likely to add that this does not impugn God's omniscience. (He'd be right about that, if nothing else.)

(One might wonder here about God's sovereignty. If God can't know which individuals He will get, He can't control which individuals He will get. I often find that theists worry most about God and His sovereignty. This was my impression of Plantinga.)

Let me up the ante. I'll actually give an argument for [1]. Here it is.

Individuals have identities, and this isn't something that can be reduced to the applicability of a pure description. (I take it that you accept this.)
Assume that, before some individual, call it V, came to be, there was no fact of the matter of precisely which individual it would be, though, let us say, there was a fact of the matter of which "pure" properties and relations that it instantiate.
It follows that V's identity does not supervene upon the "pure" properties and relations that it instantiates, and from this it follows that W might have come to be instead of V, though W and V are exactly similar.
Indeed it seems that, instead of V, there are an infinity of possible individuals that might have come to be instead, each exactly similar to V.
This is absurd. There just can't be this infinite realm of facts about identity that, as it were, floats free. It would be better to banish identity altogether than to embrace this.

Here's a second argument.

Before Socrates came to be, it was possible that he come to be.
But consider the proposition: it is possible for Socrates to come to be.
Quite clearly it is about Socrates. Let us ask how this is possible given that it was true before there was the man Socrates.
It must be able to latch onto one particular possible individual, and it can do this only if there are particular possible individuals.
But particular possible individuals are haecceities, etc.

[Bill Vallicella]

Franklin,

I am grateful for your excellent comments.

I take it you concede that I successfully showed that your argument is not compelling. That was all I was attempting above with respect to your argument. (Whether I can give a compelling positive argument for my position is a separate question.) But my deeper concerns are with the nature of existence (whether it can be adequately treated in a Fregean manner, and the exact relation between existence and individuality/individuation) and with the nature of creation (whether creation is the actualization of pre-existent merely possible individuals, or whether individuality itself is created).

It is worth noting that the underlying general-metaphysical questions about existence and individuality are logically prior to any special-metaphysical questions about God and creation. The former questions arise for atheists as well as for theists.

[Bill Vallicella]

I'll consider your second argument first. It begs the question in the way your original argument does. >>Before Socrates came to be, it was possible that he come to be.<< That is not obviously true. What's obviously true is that it is possible that someone come to be who satisfies the pure complete description which has as its components: philosopher, snubnosed, etc.

You are simply assuming haecceitism and therefore begging the question. I say that before a concrete individual comes to be, one cannot refer to IT or conceive of IT.

>>But consider the proposition: it is possible for Socrates to come to be.<<

But before S. came to be there were no propositions about him. But I concede that there is a proposition if you substitute for 'Socrates' a complete pure description.

[Bill Vallicella]

As for your first argument, everything is just fine until you say: >>there are an infinity of possible individuals that might have come to be instead, each exactly similar to V.<< Here again you beg the question inasmuch as you assume that there are merely possible individuals. Since there are no merely possible individuals, there is no infinity of facts which you find absurd.

On my way of thinking there are no merely possible INDIVIDUALS. A bunch of pure properties becomes an individual only when it comes to exist.

And so I persist in my conviction that haecceities are 'creatures of darkness.' In plain English, there are no such properties. The nonqualitative thisness of an individual cannot exist prior to the existence of the individual of which it is the nonqualitative thisness.

Is it not self-evidently absurd to suppose that the property identity-with-Socrates can exist at times and in worlds at which S. does not exist? What content could that property have at those times and in those worlds?

[Edward Ockham]

>But until the individual comes into existence, he won't know which individual this will be.

What is the sense of 'know which', in which God 'knows which' individual has come into existence after it has come into existence, but doesn't know before? This seems crucial to the argument, but I have read through your post very carefully, and it is not clearly explained.

[Bill Vallicella]

Suppose a prophet informs me that a baby will be born next year with such-and-such properties. And lo and behold the baby does appear next year with all and only the properties listed. Now would it be an intelligible question were I to ask the prophet: 'Was THIS -- and no other -- the baby you prophesied?'

This example is adapted from A. N. Prior, Papers on Time and Tense, p. 74. I'm sure you have it in your library.

[Edward the nominalist]

>>Now would it be an intelligible question were I to ask the prophet: 'Was THIS -- and no other -- the baby you prophesied?'

Would an appropriate answer be "Yes, for this baby indeed has such and such properties"? If not, why not? Is your 'and no other' significant?

(This week I became a 'Socratist' and will in future only be asking questions, and making no statements, apart from this statement).

[Franklin Mason]

I have a question for you, Bill. You seem to believe that the identity of a thing, Socrates' identity say, is non-qualitative. If this is so, then on one side we have the pure properties and relations exemplified by Socrates and on the other we have his identity.

But what is a non-qualitative identity if not a haecceity? Even if we grant that it only comes to be with Socrates and so does not precede him, isn't it still a haecceity?

I suggest then that if, as you say, a haecceity is a creature of darkness, then we must reject non-qualitative identity. The issue here isn't really about when they come to be. Instead it is whether there could ever be such a thing, and it seems that you should say that there couldn't.

At this point, we seem to have two options. (1) We could embrace a Leibnizian account of identity on which the pure properties of a thing together constitute its identity. (In my view not a bad thing at all. On some days, I think that he was the greatest philosopher ever to put pen to paper.) To be Socrates, for instance, is to be human, male, snub-nosed, . . .. (Include all and only those pure properties that he exemplified.) Essential to this account is the Identity of Indiscernibles. (My pugilist professor used to scold me about this name. He'd tell me that if we have identity, we have only one thing and thus don't have indiscernibles (plural). He'd tell me to call it the Non-Identity of Discernibles. Imagine my annoyance.) (2) We could also seek to eliminate all talk of identity from philosophy. (Let non-philosophers do as they please, but we the enlightened ones know better.)It would take a true philosophical hero to take on such a task. Isn't it just obvious that Socrates is identical to Socrates but not to Plato?

Here's a second thought. If there is no such thing as Socrates' identity before he came to be, it would seem that there's no such thing as his identity after he ceases to be. If we need the man Socrates if we are to speak about him, then we can't do so either before or after he exists. But clearly we can now speak of Socrates though he is long since dead. Thus we don't need the man to speak of the man, and so whatever reason we had to deny the existence of haecceities that predate the things to which they attach collapses.

[Bill Vallicella]

Franklin,

Bear in mind that what we were discussing was whether or not there are any Plantingian haecceities. I gave a careful definition at the top of my post. My thesis is that there are no Plantingian haecceities. For that reason one cannot provide an adequate Fregean analysis of 'Socrates exists' using such haecceity properties.

But of course from the fact, if it is a fact, that there are no Plantingian haecceities, it does not follow that existing individuals do not have haecceity (thisness). I say they do! And I say that that haecceity is nonqualitative, i.e., not constructible by logical operations from pure properties and relations.

What I find absurd is the notion that the nonqualitative haecceity of an individual can exist at times and in worlds in which the individual does not exist.

Are we on the same page now?

[Bill Vallicella]

That pugilist was one hell of a pedant. (I won't ask who he is.) Now I understand better your sensitivity. I once pointed out to you that 'conceivability' is not the right term when what you intend is 'conceivability without contradiction.' You seemed slightly annoyed.

Reverting to standard usage, my position entails the rejection of the Identity of Indiscernibles.

[Franklin Mason]

Gotcha. But I have to admit that I've lost the intuition that would lead one to embrace non-qualitative haecceities but claim that they cannot preexist those things of which they are the haecceities. Upon reflection, I think that this is what I was (clumsily) after.

But however that turns out, my second thought still seems relevant.

Here's a question: are there worlds qualitatively indistinguishable from one another (worlds with precisely the same distribution of pure properties and relations)that yet contain different individuals? I wonder whether the existence of non-qualitative haecceities would imply that there are such sets of worlds. (I find the existence of such sets of worlds bizarre. Arguments that I've already offered attempt to get at this implication of the existence of non-qualitative haecceities.)

[Bill Vallicella]

Your second thought is an interesting objection that needs a separate post.

[Bill Vallicella]

Edward,

The appropriate answer is 'No.' It makes no sense to ask the prophet whether THIS baby is the one he prophesied since what he prophesied was the coming of some baby -- albeit only one -- that instantiates the relevant properties. If there is a baby that instantiates the property then that's got to be the one.

[Edward Ockham]

>>The appropriate answer is 'No.' It makes no sense to ask the prophet whether THIS baby is the one he prophesied since what he prophesied was the coming of some baby -- albeit only one -- that instantiates the relevant properties. If there is a baby that instantiates the property then that's got to be the one.

So what is it that the prophet would have to have prophesied in order that the question make sense, and the answer be appropriate? Is it perhaps that the prophet would have had to have made some "identifying reference"? So that, if the baby were not the subjct of the identifying reference, the appropriate answer is 'no', otherwise 'yes'?

[Edward Ockham]

A thought: if we can make an identifying reference for items that exist now ('this baby here'), and items that existed in the past ('Caesar'), why can't we make identifying references in the future? Isn't the 'he' below such a future identifying reference? Does it require a haecceity existing when Isaiah made the prophesy? Why? Why can't the reference reach over the future centuries in order to identify the yet-to-be-born Jesus?

For to us a child is born,
to us a son is given,
and the government will be on his shoulders.
And he will be called
Wonderful Counselor, 
Mighty God,
Everlasting Father,
Prince of Peace.

[Bill Vallicella]

The short answer is that only what exists and what did exist has identity, individuality, thisness.