Comments on Richard Hennessey's Neo-Aristotelian Theory of Predication

Richard Hennessey of Gnosis and Noesis sketches a neo-Aristotelian theory of predication in Another Aristotelian Basis for a Neo-Aristotelian Anti-Realism in the Theory of Universals.  Drawing as he does upon my discussion in Scholastic Realism and Predication, he has asked me to comment on his post.  I will do so with pleasure.

I first want to agree partially with something he says at the close of his post: 

. . . we have in the so-called problem of universals not a genuine problem, but merely a pseudo-problem. That is, we have a problem of universals only if we posit their existence. If we do not posit them, there is no genuine problem.

I would put the point somewhat differently.  The phrase 'problem of universals' is a misnomer. For what is in dispute in the so-called problem of universals is the nature of properties.  Not their existence, but their nature.  That there are properties is a given, a datum.  What alone can be reasonably questioned is their nature.  If you deny that sugar is sweet, then I show you the door.  But if you deny that sweetness is a universal, then I listen to your arguments.  For it is not at all obvious that the sweetness of a sugar cube is a universal. (Nor is it obvious that it isn't) That it is a universal is a theoretical claim that goes beyond the data.  It is consistent with the data that the sweetness be a particular, an unrepeatable item, such as a trope (as in the theories of D. C. Williams and Keith Campbell, et al.) or some other sort of particular. 

The correct phrase, then, is 'problem of properties,' not 'problem of universals.'  But that is not to say that there is no legitimate use for 'problem of universals.'  If one posits universals, then one will face various problems such as the problem of how they connect to particulars.  Those problems are genuine, not pseudo, given that there are universals.

In any case, Richard sees no need to posit universals, whether Platonic or Aristotelian, to explain either essential or accidental predication.  Here is the gist of Richard's theory:

Let us take the proposition “Socrates is sitting” or the strictly equivalent “Socrates is a sitting being.” The referent of the subject term here is the sitting Socrates and that of the predicate term is one and the same sitting Socrates. Similarly, the referent of the subject term of “Plato is sitting” is the sitting Plato and that of its predicate term is one and the same sitting Plato. Here, once again, only if the referent of the “Socrates” and that of the “sitting” of “Socrates is sitting” are identical can it be true that Socrates is actually the one sitting. And, only if the referent of the “Plato” and that of the “sitting” of “Plato is sitting” are identical can it be true that Plato is actually the one sitting.

What we have here could be called an identity theory of predication: if 'Socrates is a sitting being' is true, then the referent of the subject term 'Socrates' and the referent of the predicate term 'sitting being' are numerically identical.  Accordingly, the 'is' is the 'is' of identity.  ONLY on this analysis, says Richard, can the sentence be true. I rather doubt that, but first we need to consider whether Richard's theory is not open to serious objection.

If x and y are identical, then this is necessarily so. Call this the Necessity of Identity.  More precisely: for any x, y, if x = y, then necessarily, x = y.   Equivalent contrapositive: if possibly ~(x = y), then ~(x = y).  It follows that if Socrates is identical to some sitting being, then necessarily he is identical to that sitting being.  But in that case it would not be possible for Socrates not to be a sitting being.  This, however, is possible.  Sometimes he is on his feet walking around, other times he is flat on his back, and he has even been observed standing on his head.  And please note that even if, contrary to fact, Socrates was always seated, it would still be possible for him not to be seated.  The mere possibility of his not being seated shows that he cannot be identical to some sitting being.

This is an objection that Richard needs to address if his theory is to be tenable.  Note that my objection can be met without invoking universals.  One could say that 'Socrates' in our sample sentence refers to Socrates, that 'sitting' refers to a particularized property (a trope), and that the 'is' is the 'is' of predication, not identity.  Accordingly, there is not an identity between Socrates and a sitting being; the particularized property being-seated inheres in Socrates, where inherence, unlike identity, is asymmetrical.

The other claim that Richard makes is that ONLY on his theory can the truth of 'Socrates is sitting' be accommodated.  That strikes me as false.  I just gave an analysis on which the truth of the predication is preserved.  And of course there are others. 

 

Comments

[arash]

Bill,

Sorry I don't get this "the Necessity of Identity" principle. Take this example:
"Obama is the president of the US"
Is this an identity? If so, is this a necessary identity?

[Bill Vallicella]

Good comment, arash. The principle holds when proper names flank the identity sign. 'The president of the US,' however, is not a proper name but a definite description. When read attributively as opposed to referentially it allows for possible worlds in which Obama is not the present president of the US.

There may be a line of defense for Hennessey here. He wants to read the predication 'Socrates is seated' as the identity sentence, 'Socrates is identical to a seated being.' Now what exactly is the logical status of 'a seated being'? It is not a logically proper name. It is an indefinite description.

[arash]

Bill,
'Socrates is identical to a seated being' does not sound right. Because if:
1. 'X is seated' means 'X is identical to a seated being'
2. 'Socrates is seated' and 'Obama is seated' are both true
3. Identity is transitive
Then:
4. 'Socrates is identical to a seated being' and 'Obama is identical to a seated being' are both true (for 1 and 2)
5. 'Obama is identical to Socrates' is true (for 4 and 3)

[Bill Vallicella]

Hennessey would probably say that 'a seated being' means 'some seated being or other' in which case the inference to (5) fails.