An Infinite Regress Argument Against Truth-Makers?

Edward, the proprietor of Beyond Necessity,  presents an infinite regress argument against truth-makers.  Here it is:

. . . I reject the idea of a truthmaker altogether. If there is such a truthmaker, let it be A, it comes into existence when Socrates sits down, and ceases to exist when he stands up. If it were something real – let’s say a candle flame, which comes into existence when we light the candle, and ceases to exist when we blow it out – then there would have to be a further truthmaker for A existing. I.e. the sentence “A exists” can be true or false, and so requires a further truthmaker B, that makes it true when B exists. But then “B exists” requires yet another truthmaker, and so on ad infinitum. That is absurd. Therefore, there are no truthmakers.

I am not sure Ed understands what a truth-maker is.  Here is a Philosophy 101 explanation.  Suppose we have some true contingent declarative sentence such as 'Tom is tired.' The truth-maker theorist maintains that for contingent true sentences, there is more to the sentence than its being true.  There  must be something external to the sentence, something that is not a sentence, that 'makes it true.'  If you deny this, then you are saying that the sentence is just true and that there is no explanation of its being true in terms of anything  extralinguistic.  And surely that is absurd, assuming you are not some sort of linguistic idealist.  'Tom is tired' cannot just be true; it is true because there exists a man to whom 'Tom' refers and this man is in a certain state.

Could Tom by himself be the truth-maker of 'Tom is tired'?  No.  For if he were, then he would also be the truth-maker of 'Tom is manic' -- which is absurd.  This is why truth-maker theorists (not all but most) introduce facts or states of affairs as truth-makers.  David Armstrong is a prominent contemporary example.

Now what are we to make of Edward's argument?  The argument seems to be that if sentence s has a truthmaker t, then the sentence 't exists' must also have a truth-maker, call it t*.  But then the sentence 't* exists' must itself have a truth-maker, t**, and so on ad infinitum.

Now this is a terrible, a thoroughly and breath-takingly rotten, argument which is why no one in the literature (to the best of my knowledge) has ever made it.  Suppose that 'Tom is tired' is made-true by the fact of Tom's being tired.  Call this fact F.  If  'Tom is tired' is true, then F exists, whence it follows that 'F exists' is true.  (This of course assumes that there is the sentence 'F exists,' an assumption I will grant  arguendo.)  Since 'F exists' is contingent, we can apply the truth-maker principle and ask for its truth-maker.  But surely its truth-maker is just F.  So there is no regress at all, let alone an infinite regress, let alone a vicious infinite regress.  (Please note that only vicious infinite regresses have the force of refutations.)  'Tom is tired' has F as its truth-maker, and 'F exists' has the very same F as its truth-maker.  Tom's being tired makes true both 'Tom is tired' and 'Tom's being tired exists.'  No regress.

So Ed's argument is a complete non-starter.  There are, however, plausible arguments against facts as truth-makers.  See my Facts category. 

Comments

[Account Deleted]

Bill,

I certainly agree with you that Ed's argument is a non-starter and for the reasons you state. However, I do have a concern about one point in your argument above.

On the one hand, you argue convincingly that Tom alone cannot be the truth maker for the sentence 'Tom is tired' because then Tom would also be the truth maker for an indefinite number of sentences that are true of Tom alone. I think this is correct. Hence, truth makers cannot be individual entities but structured entities such as state-of-affairs or facts.

On the other hand, you maintain that the truth-maker for the sentence 'F exists', where 'F' is the name of the state of affairs of Tom's being tired, is just F itself. But why in the case of 'Tom is tired' Tom alone is insufficient as truth maker whereas in the case of 'F exists' F alone is sufficient?

Consider the sentence 'F is improbable/impossible (etc.,)' (i.e., Tom being tired is an improbable state of affairs). You are now committed to saying that the truth maker of this sentence is also F alone. But then F is going to be the truth maker of both 'F exists' and 'F is improbable'. Would this be as absurd as the case of Tom alone being the truth maker of both 'Tom is tired' and 'Tom is manic'?

[Bill Vallicella]

Thanks for the excellent comment, Peter.

>>But why in the case of 'Tom is tired' is Tom alone insufficient as truth maker whereas in the case of 'F exists' F alone is sufficient?<<

Because 'Tom is tired' is a predication whereas 'F exists' is not a predication but an existential sentence.

Consider 'Tom exists.' In this case the truth-maker is arguably just Tom. For Tom is nothing if he doesn't exist, and so if you have Tom then you have all you need for 'Tom exists' to be true. Just as Tom suffices as T-maker for 'Tom exists,' F suffices as T-maker for 'F exists.'

[Bill Vallicella]

Consider now 'Tom's being tired is improbable.' This is a predicative sentence: it predicates improbability of a state of affairs or fact. The truth-maker of this is not Tom's being tired butt he fact of Tom's being tired's being improbable.

So F is not the T-maker of both 'F exists' and 'F is improbable.'

Have I convinced you?

[Bill Vallicella]

At this point Ed may smell an infinite regress. He might say, OK, F is a fact and F's being improbable is a distinct fact. But there is also the fact of F's being improbable's being a fact, and the further fact of F's being improbable's being fact's being a fact, etc.

But I say no truth-maker regress arises becuase the TM principle applies only to contingent sentences. 'F's being improbable's being a fact' is not a contingent sentence.'

[Edward Ockham]

I had exactly the same objection as Peter. Why is 'Tom exists' different from 'Tom sits'?

Your reply to Peter is:

>>Consider 'Tom exists.' In this case the truth-maker is arguably just Tom. For Tom is nothing if he doesn't exist, and so if you have Tom then you have all you need for 'Tom exists' to be true. Just as Tom suffices as T-maker for 'Tom exists,' F suffices as T-maker for 'F exists.'
<<

I would have to think about that. Meanwhile, my blog has been overrun by cyberpunks, calling each other 'troll'.

[Bill Vallicella]

Ed,

That's not the same objection as Peter's. Peter grants that Tom cannot be the truth-maker of 'Tom sits' and the like.

[Bill Vallicella]

Ed,

Your toleration of cyberpunks has come back to bite you . . . Doesn't Blogger have comment moderation?

[Edward Ockhamist]

I thought Peter's argument was also an appeal to equal reasoning. He says "why in the case of 'Tom is tired' Tom alone is insufficient as truth maker whereas in the case of 'F exists' F alone is sufficient?"

[Bill Vallicella]

The difference between you and Peter is that you assume that if there is such a truth-making fact as Tom's being tired, then the truth-maker of 'Tom exists' must also be a fact, the fact of Tom's existing. Peter is not assuming that. He grants that Tom himself suffices as truth-maker for 'Tom exists.'

Meanwhile I have put up two more posts on these topics. Do I suffer from graphomania? Cacoethes scribendi?

And what about you? Did you lose your job? You are learning how to blog and keep up the flow.