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Sunday, April 01, 2012

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If I am remembering that text correctly, did he not conclude that the identity of an individual cannot be its essence, because that is not singular for that individual? The consequence being that the individual would not have a (singular) soul, which is absurd. I mention this because if I recall he went quite a ways with the present argument, and I wonder where your analysis would go if you continued.

Bill,

Would 'expressible' work?

Seems so, Peter. The concept *expressible* both falls under itself and falls within itself. Same with the concept *concept.* It includes itself and is an instance of itself.

Jason,

Not sure what you are getting at . . .

Let me put it this way. What is the place of this part of the argument within the larger work, and does that say something more about your present analysis? My faded memory says that answering this would be informative.

It might be. But in this post I am concerned only with these
questions:

1. What exactly is the argument in the text in question?
2. Is it sound? Ought one be convinced by it?
3. Does the Fregean critque defeat it?
4. Is there an adequate Thomist response to the critique?

I think the response a Thomist would be based upon the distinction between the one convertible with being and that which is the principle of number (see the Summa I q. 11 a. 1 ad 1). Since the nature exists in a multitude of individuals, it cannot be one in number nor many in number. Considered as one nature, this is the one which is convertible with being.

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