Maverick Philosopher

Must We Stop Asking Why There's Anything?

1. A Pseudo-Question:  How Many Things are There?

A while back, in response to a reader's question, I argued that one cannot count things as things.  I can count the cats in my house, the tiles on my roof, and 'in principle' the subterranean termites within two feet of my foundation.  What I cannot do is count things (entities, beings, existents, items, objects, etc.) as things. The reason, briefly, is that 'thing,' unlike 'cat,' is not a sortal.  It is a dummy sortal.  It is a term that functions grammatically like a sortal, and can serve as a placeholder for a sortal, but is logically unlike a sortal in that it supplies no criteria of identification and re-identification for the things to which it applies.  I can count the cats in my house because I know what it is to be a cat; I know what 'counts' as a cat and what does not 'count' as a cat: the lifespan of a cat is not a cat; the location of a cat is not a cat; the posture of a cat is not a cat; the parts of a cat are not cats; the properties and relations of a cat are not cats, etc.

But I can't count the things in my house because I don't know what all counts as a thing, and what all doesn't.  Are only middle-sized specimens of dry goods things?  Or are persons also things?  Are my cats things?  Is their blackness a thing? Everything black is colored.  So do I count the cat as one thing, its blackness as a second thing, the being colored of the cat as a third thing?  If I have a cat on my lap, do I have at least three things on my lap, or only one, or perhaps a countable or (heaven forbid) an uncountable infinity of things on my lap?  And what about the parts of the cat, and the parts of the parts, and how far do we go with that?  To the molecular level. the atomic level. the quark level?

I trust the point is clear: one cannot count things (entities, etc.) as things.  It seems to follow that the question 'How many things are there?' is a pseudo-question.  It is a pseudo-question because it is unanswerable in principle.  'Many' and 'more than one' are not answers.  A Parmenidean monist might insist that there is exactly one thing, and a nihilist that there are none.

2. Why is There Anything at All?  A Pseudo-Question?

But now a vexing question arises:  does the fact that 'thing' is a dummy sortal, hence not a sortal, constitute a reason for holding that the question 'Why is there anything (any thing) at all?' is also a pseudo-question?  Stephen Maitzen answers in the affirmative in his paper, Stop Asking Why There's Anything. (Thanks to Vlastimil Vohanka for alerting me to the article.)

Maitzen seems to be reasoning along the following lines.  We can sensibly ask why there are apples, trees, plants, living things, and sensibly expect a natural-scientific answer.  But we cannot sensibly ask why there are things (existents, beings, etc.).  The same goes for the restricted question why there are any contingent beings.  This is because 'contingent being' is just as much a dummy sortal as 'being.'   Dummy sortals are referentially indeterminate unless replaced by a genuine sortal such as 'penguin.' 

Maitzen's point could be put as follows.  There are various sorts of thing, and of each sort we can sensibly ask: why are there things of this sort?  But we cannot sensibly ask: why are there things at all, or contingent things at all?  Things that are are not a sort of thing. And the same goes for things that are contingently.

So perhaps the point is simply this.  'Why is there anything at all?' is a pseudo-question because (a)  things that are are not a sort of thing, and (b) we can sensibly ask the 'why' question only about sorts of things.

3. Tentative Evaluation

Well, I think it is perfectly clear that things that are are not a sort of thing.  Aristotle said essentially that long ago when he said that being is not a genus (Metaph. 998b22, Anal Prior. 92b10).  We could put the point in formal mode by saying that 'being,' ens, das Seiende, are not sortal expressions.  (I am thinking of Heidegger's question, Warum ist das Seiende und nicht vielmehr nichts? )  But who ever said they were?

Maitzen's explanation of why people fall for the pseudo-question 'Why is there anything at all?' is because they confuse dummy sortals with genuine sortals.  But it seems to me that we can avoid the confusion and still sensibly ask the question.

Consider the question, 'Does anything exist?'  The question makes sense and has an obvious answer: 'Yes, things exist.'  Both the question and the answer make sense despite the presence in them of the dummy sortal 'thing.'  So why shouldn't it also make sense to ask why things exist?

Maitzen mistakenly assimilates the question 'Why does anything exist?' to the obviously senseless question 'How many things exist?'  This is the central weakness of his paper.  He never adequately explains the connection between the 'how many?' question and the 'why?' question.  The former is senseless and precisely for the reason that 'thing' is not a sortal.  But from the fact that 'thing' is not a sortal, how is it supposed to follow that the 'Why?' question is also senseless? 

The Thin Theory is Circular!

London Ed demands that I reduce my circularity objection to a sound bite.  No can do.  But at least I can combat this travesty he ascribes to me:

The thin conception of 'exists' is that 'An F exists' means the same as 'The concept *F* is instantiated'
But if *F* is instantiated, then it is instantiated by an individual that exists
Therefore the thin conception of 'exists' is circular.

So let me try once more.  I will try to be succinct.  But there is no way I can get my point across in just a few sentences.  Philosophy cannot be reduced to sound bites!

1. On the thin theory, 'An F exists' means the same as 'The concept *F* is instantiated.'
2. If a first-level concept such as *F* is instantiated, then it is instantiated by an individual.
3. Let the arbitrary constant 'a' denote an individual that instantiates *F.*

We now ask whether a exists, does not exist, both, or neither.  These are the only options.

4. By LNC, a cannot both exist and not exist.
5. By LEM, a must either exist or not exist.
6. If a does not exist, i.e., if a is a Meinongian nonexistent object, then the link expressed in (1) between existence and instantiation is broken.
Therefore
7. If  *F* is instantiated, then *F* is instantiated by an individual that exists.
Therefore
8. On the thin theory, 'An F exists' means the same as 'The concept *F* is instantiated by an individual that exists.'
9. A definition (analysis, account, theory, explanation ) is circular iff the term to be defined occurs in the defining term.
10. 'Exists' occurs both in (8)'s definiendum and its definiens.
Therefore
11. The thin theory is circular.

Summary:  Our question is: What is existence?  The thin theory maintains that existence reduces to instantiation.  The whole point of the theory is that existence is in no sense a property of individuals; what it is is a property of concepts, the property of having an instance.  But if a first-level concept is instantiated, it is instantiated by an individual that exists. Therefore, the attempt to reduce existence to instantiation ends up presupposing what was to be reduced, namely existence, and is a failed theory for this reason.

Objection.  (5) is false. Individual a neither exists nor does not exist.  To exist = to be instantiatiated, and no individual is either instantiated or not instantiated. 

Reply.  This objection begs the question.  The question is whether existence can be reduced to instantiation.  One cannot just assume that it can be so reduced.  Furthermore,it is a plain fact that individuals exist.  I exist. This cat exists.  And of course the existence of this cat is not its being instantiated.  Since I exist, and my existence is not my being instantiated, existence cannot be reduced to instantiation.

The point could be put as follows.  The thin theory tries to reduce singular existence to general existence.  But general existence presupposes singular existence: there cannot exist cats in general unless this or that individual is a cat and exists.  Therefore, singular existence cannot be reduced to general existence.

It may  that what London Ed is doing is simply stipulating that 'exist(s)' shall mean 'is instantiated.'  But an arbitrary stipulation gratuitously made can be gratuitously rejected.  That individuals exist is a plain fact, innocent until proven guilty.  The question about existence cannot be answered by any mere stipulative definition.

Robert Paul Wolff: "The Left Has Had All the Good Songs"

Anarchist philosopher Robert Paul Wolff, over at The Philosopher's Stone, writes,

While I was making dinner, Susie put on a CD of Pete Seegar [sic] songs. I was struck once again by the oft-remarked fact that for half a century, the left has had all the good songs. That cannot be irrelevant.

By the way, the old commie's name is 'Seeger' not 'Seegar.'  In the ComBox, some guy confuses him with Bob Seger! The Left has had all the good songs over the last 50 years?  Nonsense.  Here are 50 counterexamples.

The really interesting case is Bob Dylan.  The Left can of course claim the early topical songs such as Only a Pawn in Their Game and The Lonesome Death of Hattie Carroll.  (Not that we contemporary conservatives don't take on board all that was good in these critiques of racism and Jim Crow.)  But it wasn't long before Dylan distanced himself from politics and leftist ideology, a distancing documented in My Back Pages.  And then came the absurdist-existentialist-surrealist phase represented by the three mid-'sixties albums, Bring It All Back Home, Highway 61 Revisited, and Blonde on Blonde.  After that, the motorcycle accident and another attitude adjustment culminating in a couple of masterful albums, John Wesley Harding and New Morning, in which religious and conservative themes come to the fore.

I'll give just one example, Sign on a Window, from the October 1970 album, New Morning.  The song concludes:

Build me a cabin in Utah
Marry me a wife, catch  rainbow trout
Have a bunch of kids who call me 'Pa'
That must be what it's all about
That must be what it's all about.

To appreciate the full conservative flavor of this song, listen to it in the context of  "Masters of War" from the protest period and It's Alright Ma (I'm Only Bleeding) from the absurdist-existentialist-surrealist period.

Voter Identification and Voter Suppression

The controversy over voter ID is a fascinating  one because it highlights the deep divide between contemporary conservatives and contemporary liberals.  That this non-issue is debated at all shows that the Left is bereft of common sense.

Anyone with common sense ought to be able to appreciate that voting must be conducted in an orderly manner, and that only citizens who have registered to vote and have satisfied the minimal requirements of age, etc., are to be allowed into the voting booth. Given the possibility of fraud, it is therefore necessary to verify the identities of those who present themselves at the polling place. To do this, voters must be required to present a government-issued photo ID card, a driver's license being only one example of such. It is a reasonable requirement and any reasonable person should be able to see it as one.

Too many liberals, however, see these common-sense requirements as acts of voter suppression, as witness this astonishing outburst from Jennifer Granholm, former governor of Michigan:

In November, five million eligible voters will find it harder to exercise their rights in America -- 150 voter suppression laws have been introduced in 30 state legislatures across the country.

The most common tactics: requiring photo ID, restricting registration drives, limiting early voting and imposing onerous residency requirements. Who do these laws most directly affect? The poor, the elderly, minorities and the young. And how do those groups typically vote? Democratic.

Let's consider photo ID.  For Granholm, requiring such ID is a form of voter suppression.  How's that for hyperbole?  Does she call it bank withdrawal suppression when check cashers are required to produce ID?  The other day I withdrew a sum of money from a checking account in excess of what is obtainable from an ATM machine.  I was asked to show my driver's license.  Was that an infringement of my right to access my own funds?  Of course not.  The demand was eminently reasonable even though I am known at the bank in question.  Similarly with the photo ID requirement at the polling place.  Examples like this can be multiplied indefinitely.  See the above graphic.

Some liberals say that voter fraud is rare.  Maybe, maybe not.  In any case, irrelevant.  There is a principle at stake.  Besides, how many people lack ID?  Without ID one simply cannot function in society.  To exploit and adapt a slogan of the Harvard logician, Willard Quine, "No [social] entity without [social] identity."  You're a nonentity without  ID.  So when a liberal says that voter fraud is rare, reply, "So is lack of ID.  Since almost everyone has it, almost no one is excluded from voting by the ID requirement."

Since liberals don't have even one cogent argument against photo ID, we are justified in psychologizing their opposition to common-sense requirements.  Their opposition is rooted in a desire to win by any means, including fraud.  As lefties, they believe the end justifies the means.  They see themselves as the noble standard-bearers of equality against their disgusting, evil, SIXHRB opponents.  (SIXHRB: sexist, intolerant, xenophobic, homophobic, racist, bigoted. HT: Dennis Prager.)

By the way, Governor Granholm is now on the faculty at University of California, Berkeley.  Surprise! 

Companion post:  I Was Forced to Show My Papers!

Does My Front Page Take Too Long to Load?

A reader complains that my front page takes too long to load, on one of his machines, as long as five minutes.  That must be one Jurassic machine running some superannuated browser.  I am wondering if others are experiencing similar difficulties.  A while back I made some additions, including a Facebook button, and I am wondering if these add-ons are slowing things down.  The Facebook button, though, is a nifty utility: when conditions are right, the thing 'goes viral'  and I get an avalanche of page views.

I am open for comments regarding technical aspects of this site.  If, on the other hand, you have a beef about the content of these pages, then I invite you to fill out the following:

Bob Dylan Awarded Presidential Medal of Freedom

He deserves it for the hundreds of unforgettable songs ineliminable from the soundtrack of so many of our lives over the past 50 years: 1962-2012.

"Blowin' in the Wind" is the most famous of his anthems.  You may be surprised to learn that London Ed uploaded this outstanding rendition by Alanis Morissette.  Another of Dylan's great anthems is "Chimes of Freedom" here sung by the Byrds, and here by Dylan and Baez, or is it Dylan and Osbourne? (I say it's Baez)

And speaking of Baez, here she is singing Daddy, You've Been on My Mind. 

The man himself, She Belongs to Me.  I Want You.  I could go on, and on, and on.

More on C. J. F. Williams on Existence

I have been arguing with London Ed, a.k.a. 'Ockham,' about existence for years.  Here is part of  a post from the old blog dated 25 January 2006.  Ed has never said anything to budge me from my position.  So why continue?  One reason is to clarify and deepen one's understanding of one's own position.  I am also fascinated by the problem of disagreement in general.  Why do intelligent and sincere people disagree?  What can be done about it?  What does protracted disagreement say about us and our condition?

..............
     
I reject nonexistent objects in Meinong's sense. (But note well: to reject Meinongian possibilia and
impossibilia is not to reject non-epistemic possibilities and impossibilities. One can be a modal realist without being a possibilist; one can be an actualist. I am an actualist.) Given my rejection of Meinongian nonexistent objects, I cannot take negative existentials at face value.

'Frictionless planes do not exist,' for example, cannot be interpreted to be about nonexistent frictionless planes; it must be interpreted in some other way. In the language of Bertrand Russell circa 1918, one might say this: The propositional function 'x is a frictionless plane' is never true. Or one could say that the concept frictionless plane has no instances. Or: the property of being a frictionless plane is not instantiated. The point here is that the property does exist, and so is there to have a property predicated of it, the second-level property of being uninstantiated.

So I agree with Williams and 'Ockham' that there are no nonexistent objects and that apparent reference to them must be paraphrased away. There is no individual of which  we can say: it does not  exist, is not actual, is not real. But why should it follow that there  is no individual of which we can say: it exists, is actual, is real?

In my book, this is a non sequitur.

Williams assumes a sort of symmetry thesis: if there are no individuals that do not exist, then there are no individuals that exist. But my A Paradigm Theory of Existence rejects this symmetry thesis (pp. 114-116). Here is the way I put it in my book:

     If an individual exists, then no doubt it instantiates properties,
     satisfies descriptions and saturates concepts. But its existence
     cannot consist in, be identical with, its doing any of those
     things. However, if a putative individual does not exist, then its
     nonexistence can easily consist in a property's being
     uninstantiated. For a nonexistent individual is not a genuine
     individual, contra Meinong, but the mere absence of something of a
     more or less complete description. Thus there is no individual
     Pegasus to lack existence or to have nonexistence. [ . . .]

     Nonexistence is therefore always general nonexistence as opposed to
     singular nonexistence. But existence is primarily singular
     existence, the existence of individuals. Thus the asymmetry of
     existence and nonexistence. There is singular existence (the
     existence of individuals) and general existence (the
     being-instantiated of concepts) which latter presupposes singular
     existence: a first-level concept cannot be instantiated unless
     there exists an individual that instantiates it. But there is no
     such thing as singular nonexistence, e.g., the nonexistence of
     Cerberus. Thereis only general nonexistence, which is a
     second-level property.

So to Williams and 'Ockham' I say: You are right that there are no nonexistent objects. But you are wrong to infer that existence cannot  belong to individuals. It is well-nigh self-evident that existence belongs to individuals and can be predicated of them, as I do when, enacting the Cartesian cogito, I conclude, sum, 'I exist.'It is therefore a mistake to think that 'exist(s)' can only be used as a second-level predicate.

'Exist(s)' has both legitimate second-level and legitimate first-level uses.  Suppose I spy a mountain lion in my back yard.  I exclaim, 'There are mountain lions around here.'  That is a general existential sentence.  I could just as well have said, 'Mountain lions exist around here.'  The latter sentence sports a second-level use of 'exist.'  The sentence is not about any particular mountain lion even though based on the observation of a particular such critter.  Suppose I dub the distinctive cat, 'Monty.'  I can then say 'Monty exists,' and if he dies, 'Monty no longer exists.'  These latter two sentences feature first-level uses of 'exists.'

The attempt to reduce all first-level uses to second-level uses is throughly wrongheaded and impossible to carry out.  For details, see C. J. F. Williams' Analysis of 'I Might Not Have Existed.'

Existence and Quantification: Does London Ed Beg the Question?

In his latest installment, London Ed writes:

Maverick argues:

Ed thinks that the assumption that the domain of quantification is a domain of existing individuals is a contingent assumption. But I didn't say that, and it is not. It is a necessary assumption if (1) [namely that ‘Island volcanos exist’ is logically equivalent to ‘Some volcano is an island.’] and sentences of the same form are to hold. [My emphasis]

But he then says that there is nothing in the nature of logic to stop us from quantifying over nonexistent individuals, which I don't follow at all. We start with the initial logical or definition[al] assumption about the meaning of the verb 'exists'.

 (1) 'A golden mountain exists' = 'Some mountain is golden.'

[. . . ]

I suppose I need to explain why there is nothing in the nature of logic to stop us from quantifying over nonexistent individuals.  There would be something to stop us if the notion of a nonexistent object were logically self-contradictory.  But I see no contradiction in it.  So let me put the question to Ed:  Do you think that the very idea of a nonexistent object is logically self-contradictory?  If you do think this, then I refer you to my November 2009 post, Is Meinong's Theory of Objects 'Obviously Self-Contradictory'? Van Inwagen Says 'Yes.'

There is also the issue of question-begging.  Ed needs to justify the slide from

a. 'A golden mountain exists' is logically equivalent to 'Some mountain is golden'

to

1. 'A golden mountain exists' = 'Some mountain is golden.'

Equivalence is not identity!  Not even logical equivalence is identity. Propositions p, q are logically equivalent iff there is no logically possible world in which p is true and q false, or vice versa.  Now Ed and I agree about (a).  But the inference from (a) to (1) is invalid.  Consider triangularity and trilaterality.  There is no logically possible world in which it is true that something is triangular but not true that something is trilateral.  So 'Something is triangular' and 'Something is trilateral' are logically equivalent.  But it doesn't follow that they express the same proposition or that the triangularity = trilaterality.

Likewise, it does not follow from (a) that existence = someness.  Every world in which cats exist is a world in which something is a cat.  No doubt.  But how is it supposed to follow that the 'property' of existence is identical to the syntactical 'property' expressed by *Some ___ is a ---*?

Ed begs the question against me by simply stipulating that the meaning of the verb 'exists' shall be identical to the meaning of 'Some ___ is a --.'   That is what I deny.

Are You a Racist?

Find out here.

'A Pair of Pants' and Other Quirks of English

We speak of a pair of shoes, a pair of socks, a pair of gloves. But why a pair of pants? 'He bought a new pair of pants.' 'Why, does he have four legs?' A pair of socks is two things, a pair of pants one. Raising to reflective awareness these little quirks of the mother tongue is a source of pleasure to some of us.

These are pronounced similarly: cowl, fowl, howl, jowl, owl, yowl. But 'bowl' is an exception. And note that each of the following is pronounced differently: blood, food, good. Blood is good food!

These are pronounced similarly: dour, hour, our, sour; but unlike 'four' and 'pour.' And 'tour' is pronounced differently still.

Addendum 5/28:   A reader sends us here, where we read:

According to Michael Quinoin at World Wide Words, pants are a pair because, "before the days of modern tailoring, such garments, whether underwear or outerwear, were indeed made in two parts, one for each leg. The pieces were put on each leg separately and then wrapped and tied or belted at the waist (just like cowboys’ chaps). The plural usage persisted out of habit even after the garments had become physically one piece.

With a little stretching, the explanation can be made to fit 'pair of panties' despite their not having legs.

And that reminds me of the weighty question put to Bill Clinton: boxers or briefs?   Instead of replying , as he should have, that that is not a question one asks the President of the United States, Bubba answered the question in a display of what could be called anti-gravitas.  And of course thoughts of Clinton lead on quite naturally to thoughts of  Monica Lewinksy and her thongs.  'Thong' and 'G-string' are two of the species of the genus 'panties.'  Does one speak of a pair of thongs or a pair of G-strings?  Do the English speak of a pair of knickers?  If I am not mistaken knickers are what we call panties.

House and Home

You can buy a house but not a home, the blather of realtors notwithstanding.

The Cerebretonic Ectomorph

He has a lot of body surface. His 'exposure' is greater than that of the other body types. So he is more sensitive. His skin is also literally thinner, which is connected with his being psychologically 'thin-skinned.'

Misplaced Religious Enthusiasm

In our day the asceticism of old has vanished to be replaced by athletic and dietary 'asceticism' hitched to the cart of vanity.

Saturday Night at the Oldies Deferred: 50 Years of Dylan

This year we celebrate 50 years of Dylan's music.  1962-2012.  Here is a sampler.  The kid who put together this video  is to be commended for his excellent selections.  A good intro to Dylan, but it only scratches the surface of  his many-sided genius.

Teaching Versus Conducting Classes

At a gathering of Boston academicians some years back, by way of a conversational opener, I said to Professor X, "I understand you teach at the University of L." The good professor replied, "I conduct   classes at the University of L." I found that to be a very good distinction, one borne out by my own experience.

Related post: Can Philosophy be Taught?

Another Round on the Circularity of the Thin Conception of Existence

London Ed quotes me, then responds.  I counterrespond in blue.

1. ‘Island volcanos exist’ is logically equivalent to ‘Some volcano is an island.’

Agree, of course.

2. This equivalence, however, rests on the assumption that the domain of quantification is a domain of existing individuals.

Disagree profoundly. The equivalence, being logical, cannot depend on any contingent assumption. From the logical equivalence of (1), it follows that ‘the domain of quantification is a domain of existing individuals’ is equivalent to ‘some individuals are in the domain’. But the equivalence is true whether or not any individuals are in the domain. E.g. suppose that no islands are volcanoes. Then ‘Some volcano is an island’ is false. And so is ‘island volcanos exist’, by reason of the equivalence. But the equivalence stands, because it is a definition. Thus the move from (1) to (2) is a blatant non sequitur.

Ed says that the move from (1) to (2) is a non sequitur.  But the move cannot be a non sequitur since (2) is not a conclusion from (1); it is  a separate premise.  In any case, Ed thinks that (2) is false while I think it is true.  (2) is the bone of contention.  To mix metaphors in a manner most atrocious, (2) is the nervus probandi of my circularity objection.

Ed thinks that the  assumption that the domain of quantification is a domain of existing individuals is a contingent assumption.  But I didn't say that, and it is not.  It is a necessary assumption if (1) and sentences of the same form are to hold.  Let me explain.

On the thin theory, 'exist(s)' has no extra-logical content.  It disappears into the machinery of quantification.  It is just a bit of logical syntax: it means exactly what *Some ___ is a ---* means.  But quantifiers range over a domain.  In first-order logic the domain is a domain of individuals.  That is not to say that the domain cannot be empty.  It is to say that the domain, whether empty or non-empty is a domain having or lacking individuals as opposed to properties or items of some other category.

Now there is nothing in the nature of logic to stop us from quantifying over nonexistent individuals.  So suppose we have a domain populated by nonexistent individuals only.  Supppose a golden mountain is one of these individuals.  We can then say, relative to this domain, that some mountain is golden.  But surely 'Some mountain is golden' does not entail 'A golden mountain exists.'  The second sentence entails the first, but the first does not entail the second.  Therefore, they are not logically equivalent.

To enforce equivalence you must stipulate that the domain is a domain of existing individuals only.  If 'some' ranges over existing individuals, then 'Some mountain is golden' does entail 'A golden mountain exists.'   In other words, you must stipulate that the domain be such that, if there are any individuals in it, then they be existent individuals, as opposed to (Meinongian) nonexistent individuals.  The stipulation allows for empty domains; what it rules out, however, are domains the occupants of which are nonexistent individuals in Meinong's sense.

I hope it is now clear that a necessary presupposition of the truth of equivalences like (1) is that the domain of quantification be a domain of existing individuals only.  Again, such a domain may be empty.  But if it is, it is empty of existent individuals -- which is not the same as its harboring nonexistent individuals.

In other words, we can eliminate 'exist(s)' in favor of the particular quantifier 'some,' but only at a price, the price being the stipulation that quantification is over a domain of existing individuals.  But then it should be clear that the thin theory is circular.  We replace 'exist(s)' with 'some,' but then realize that the particular quantifier must range over a domain of existing individuals.  The attempt to eliminate first-level existence backfires.  For we end up presupposing the very thing that we set out to eliminate, namely, first-level existence.  The circularity is blatant.

Ed's argument against all this is incorrect.  We agree that (1), expressing as it does a logical equivalence, is necessarily true.  As such, its truth cannot be contingent upon the actual existence of any individuals.  If existence reduces to someness, then this is the case whether or not any individuals actually exist.  My point, however, was not that (1) presupposes the existence of individuals, but that it presupposes that any individuals in the the domain of quantification be existent individuals as opposed to (Meinongian) nonexistent individuals.

(1) presupposes, not that there are individuals, but that any individuals that there are be existent individuals.  If you appreciate this distinction, then you appreciate why Ed's argument fails.

Propinquity and Social Distance

Familiarity and social proximity have their positive aspects, but they also breed contempt. No man a hero to his valet. Nemo propheta acceptus est in patria sua:  No prophet is accepted in his own country. (Luke 4:24) Few bloggers are read by their relatives. Social distance, too, has positive and negative sides.  One negative is that people are more ready  to demonize and abuse the  distant than the near-by.  Internet exchanges make that abundantly evident.  On the positive side, distance breeds respect  and idealization which can taper off into idolization.

What is almost impossible to achieve is justice in our relations with others, near and far, falling into neither favoritism nor contempt, demonization nor idolization.  Four extremes to avoid if you would be just.

A. Inordinately favoring one's own; being partial; overlooking or downplaying their wrong-doing.  Tribalism. Nepotism.  Clanishness.  Chauvinism.  Racism.  Class-identification.  Blut und Boden mentality.  Example: John Gotti's children thought him a good man despite the fact that his good qualities were overshadowed by his murderous thuggishness. 

The conservative is more likely to make this mistake than the liberal.

B. Contempt for one's own; being impartial in violation of duties to kith and kin; treating them exactly as one would treat an outsider, if not better.  A vacuousness internationalism that ignores real differences.

The liberal is more likely to make this mistake than the conservative.

C. Demonization of the other, the foreigner, the stranger.  Xenophobia.  Irrational hatred of the other just because he is other.

Some conservatives are prone to this.

D. Excessive admiration of the other. Idolization of the far away. Idolatry.  Romanticization of foreign lands and cultures.

Many liberals make this mistake.

The Argument From Circularity and Singular Existential Statements: A Response

This is a response to a post of the same name by London Ed.  I am much in his debt for his copious and relentless commentary.  My responses are in blue.

After reading some of Maverick’s other posts on the subject, and reading some material he sent me, it  is clear I have misrepresented his argument. Although I am still some way from understanding it, I think it is this.

Suppose there is only one American philosopher, and suppose that it is Vallicella. Then the sentence ‘an American philosopher exists’ is true because Vallicella (qua American philosopher) exists. Now we can translate ‘an American philosopher exists’ into ‘some philosopher is American’, which reduces the verb ‘exists’ to the copula ‘is’. But we can’t translate ‘Vallicella exists’ in the same way. Thus general existential statements presuppose the truth of singular existential statements (or a disjunction or conjunction of singular existential statements). But we cannot analyse away ‘exists’ from singular existential statements. Therefore there is circularity: the same word appears on the right and left hand side of the definition. An American philosopher exists if and only if Vallicella exists.

That is not quite what I say, but it is a fair approximation.

But there is an obvious route out of this problem. What actually makes ‘some philosopher is American’ true is ‘Vallicella is an American philosopher’, which does not use the word ‘exist’. Vallicella may object that ‘Vallicella exists’ has to be true for that to work. Certainly, but we can reply in two ways. We could suppose that empty proper names are meaningless, and that ‘Vallicella’ is only meaningful because it names something. I.e. if it names something, it must name an existing something. ‘Vallicella exists’ is therefore true in virtue of the meaning of the proper name ‘Vallicella’. Or we could allow that empty proper names are meaningful, and that they have a sense but not a reference. Then we can appeal to the idea of instantiation, as with general concepts. ‘Vallicella exists’ means that the sense of ‘Vallicella’ has a referent or instance. ‘An American philosopher exists’ means that the sense of ‘American philosopher’ has an instance.

That is, either common names and proper names fall into different logical categories, in which case we don’t need to use the word ‘exists’ in singular sentences at all. Or they fall into the same category, in which case we can analyse singular existential statements exactly as we analyse general existential statements. In neither case is the definition of ‘exists’ circular.

The second alternative is available only if there are haecceity properties to serve as the Fregean senses of proper names.  Now I have argued many times in these pages and in print against such properties.  It follows that we cannot analyze 'Vallicella exists' in the same as as 'American philosophers exist.'  This leaves the first alternative, according to which the meaning of 'Vallicella' is its referent, an existing individual.  Ed claims that on this alternative "‘Vallicella exists’ is therefore true in virtue of the meaning of the proper name ‘Vallicella’."

I would say that Ed has it precisely backwards.  What he should say is that 'Vallicella' has meaning in virtue of the truth of 'Vallicella exists.'  What Ed says illustrates the linguistic idealism that I have more than once criticized him for.  V.'s existence does not depend on his name or on its meaning.  The point is clearer in terms of a non-human example.  So consider Stromboli, the island volcano.  Presumably Stromboli existed long before the emergence of language.  So what we should say is that 'Strromboli' has meaning in virtue of the fact that Stromboli extralinguistically and extramentally exists, and not vice versa.

Ed and I agree that 'Island volcanos exist' is logically equivalent to 'Some volcano is an island.'  This equivalence, however, rests on the assumption that the domain of quantification is a domain of existing individuals.  (If the domain were populated by Meinongian nonexistent objects, then the equivalence would fail.)   The attempted reduction of existence to someness is therefore circular.  For when we think it through we come to realize that the general existence expressed by sentences like 'Some volcano is an island' presupposes the  singular existence of the individuals in the domain of quantification.  This singular existence, obviously enough, precisely because it is singular, cannot be understood in terms of the logical quantity, someness.  So we move in a circle: from existence to someness and then back to existence.

The same argument can be couched in terms of instantiation.  'Island volcanos exist' is logically equivalent to the second-level predication  'The concept island volcano is instantiated.'  But if a first-level concept is instantiated, it is instaniated by at least one individual.  Obviously, this individual must exist.  (If it were a nonexistent individual, the link between existence and instantiation would be broken.)  So again we move in an explanatory circle,from existence to instantiation and back to existence again.  It follows that existence cannot be reduced to instantiation.

Pace Quine, existence is NOT what 'existential' (i.e., particular) quantification expresses.  What the particular quantifier expresses is instantiation, and instantiation is not existence. 

Elizabeth Warren's Identity Politics

A great column  by George F. Will.

Cat Blogging Friday: Alekhine and his Cat, Chess

Reuben Fine, The Psychology of the Chess Player (Dover 1967), p. 53:

In 1935, an international team tournament was held in Warsaw.  Alekhine played top board for France, of which he was a naturalized citizen.  However, on this trip he arrived at the Polish border without a passport.  When the officials asked him for his papers he replied: "I am Alekhine, chess champion of the world.  I have a cat called Chess.  I do not need papers." The matter had to be straightened out by the highest authorities.

Richard Swinburne's Obituary of C. J. F. Williams

I wasn't aware of this until now.  Williams was London Ed's teacher.  I  battle the former via the latter. 

It came as news to me that Williams spent most of his life in a wheelchair.  It testifies to the possibilities of the human spirit that great adversity for some is no impediment to achievement.  I think also of Stephen Hawking, Charles Krauthammer, and FDR.

So stop whining and be grateful for what you have. You could be in a bloody wheelchair!

The Blogger Slacker Award

I hereby present the coveted MavPhil Blogger Slacker Award to Harriet Baber of The Enlightenment Project.  So far this year, she has uploaded a grand total of two posts.  In 2011 she managed to scribble only eleven.  That averages to less than one a month.  It's a pity: her cantankerous and idiosyncratic entries  make for enjoyable reading.

Other good blogs infrequently updated: Jim Ryan's Philosoblog and Franklin Mason's The Philosophical Midwife.

 

The Circularity of the Fressellian Account of Existence: Objections and Replies

Being in receipt of the following detailed comments on a central argument in a forthcoming paper, "Existence: Two Dogmas of Analysis," I am now deeply in London Ed's debt. In each numbered item, Ed more or less quotes me and then comments.  My responses are in blue.

 1. On the thin theory existence is a property of concepts only and cannot be sensibly predicated of individuals. The theory says that existence is the property of being instantiated, the property of having one or more instances.

This leaves out other versions of the thin theory, which do not mention concepts.

I thought I had made it  clear that 'concepts' is short for 'concepts, properties, propositional functions, and cognate items,' a phrase I used earlier in the paper.  To save words, I did not use the longer phrase.

2. An affirmative general existential such as '‘Horses exist'’ does not predicate existence of individual horses; it predicates instantiation of the concept horse.

Other versions would translate 'horses exist' as 'some things are horses'.

It does not make any difference for my purpose, which is to present a 'master argument' against every version of the Fressellian theory.  If the concept horse is instantiated, then of course something is a horse. And if something is a horse, then either the concept horse is instantiated, or the property of being a horse is exemplified, or the propositional function 'x is a horse is "sometimes true" (in Russell's phrase), or the word 'horse' applies to something, and so on for every cognate item you can think of.

Left-Wing Racial McCarthyism

Contemporary liberals hunt for racists the way McCarthyites in the '50s and early '60s hunted for commies, and they use their terms of opprobrium with the same sort of  irresponsible semantic latitude. You could say that they are extreme semantic latitudinarians when it comes to their verbal bludgeons of choice.  But a witch hunt by any other name is still a witch hunt.

Can an Irreligious Person Really be a Conservative?

John Derbyshire asks and answers his  question.

Q. Can an irreligious person really be a conservative?

A. Of course he can. The essence of modern conservatism is the belief in limited government power, respect for traditional values, patriotism, and strong national defense. The only one of those that gets snagged on religion is the second. But while traditional Western society has had a religious background, it has usually made room, at all points of the political spectrum, for unbelievers. Plenty of great names in the Western cultural tradition have been irreligious. Mark Twain, America's greatest writer, was a complete atheist; and one has one's doubts about Shakespeare. In any case, as Bill Buckley has pointed out somewhere, the key word is respect. Respect for traditional values implies respect for religious belief, even if you don't share it. The really interesting question is not "Can an irreligious person be a conservative," but "Can a militant God-hater be a conservative?"

I'd go a bit further than that. Conservatism, including (including especially, I think) religious conservatism, has at its core an acceptance of, a respect for, human nature. We conservatives are the people who see humanity plain, or strive to, and who wish to keep our society in harmony with what we see. Paul Johnson has noted how leftists always used to talk about building socialism. Capitalism doesn't require building. It's just what happens if you leave people alone. It arises, in short, from human nature, and only needs harmonizing under some mild, reasonable, laws and customary restraints. You don't have to build it by forging a New Capitalist Man, or anything like that.

Leaving people alone, I like. Capitalism, I like. Social harmony, I like. Human nature . . . Well, it has its unappealing side. I don't count religious feeling as necessarily on that side, though; and I do count religious feeling — stronger in some individuals, weaker in others, altogether absent in a few — a key component of the human personality at large. To be respected ipso facto.

Exactly right.

Praise and Supererogation

Here is a little argument in support of the category of supererogatory actions:

1. Some good actions are praiseworthy.
2. No obligatory actions are praiseworthy.
---
3. Some good actions are not obligatory.

Since by definition a supererogatory action is one that is good but not obligatory, the above amounts to an argument for supererogatory actions. The argument is valid and the first premise self-evident. So the soundness of the argument rides on the second premise. Here, I suppose, an appeal to intuition is unavoidable.

So I will simply state that it is morally obtuse to praise someone for doing what he is obligated (whether legally or morally) to do. You don't praise a person for driving in accordance with the traffic laws, you blame him for failing to do so. It is a sign of moral confusion and moral decline to praise people for doing what they ought to do.

Praise and blame attach to the supererogatory and the prohibited, respectively. Neither attach to the obligatory.

While I'm on the topic of moral confusion, I saw an official sign on a pedestrian traffic signal in Tempe, Arizona. It read: Please do not cross against the light. The pertinent code was cited. Now what moral idiot formulated this sign? 'Please' is a word used in making a request, not in issuing a command. Am I being requested to not cross against the signal? If it is a request, then it is permissible for me to decline. "No thank you, I prefer to do as I please regardless of public safety and order." And if it is a request, why cite the traffic code? Or am I being commanded to not cross against the signal? But then 'please' is out of place.

Can Theistic Arguments Deliver More Than Plausibility?

James N. Anderson writes,

. . . a good theistic argument doesn’t have to be irrefutable, but surely we should expect the conclusions of our arguments to rise above the level of mere plausibility. If indeed the heavens declare the glory of God (Ps. 19:1), and God’s existence can be “clearly perceived” from the creation (Rom. 1:20), it would appear that God has given humans something stronger than “clues” about his existence.

I tend to differ with Professor Anderson on this point.  I don't believe theistic arguments can deliver more than plausibility. Here below we are pretty much in the dark.  Just as our wills are weak and our hearts divided by disordered and inordinate loves, our minds are clouded.  The existence of God is not a plain fact, but the infirmity of reason is.  The believer hopes that light will dawn, fitfully and partially in  this life, and more fully if not completely in the next.  But he doesn't know this, nor can he prove it.  That there is Divine Light remains a matter of faith, hope, and yearning.  There is light enough in this life to render rational our faith, hope, and yearning.  But there is also darkness enough to render rational doubt and perhaps despair.  The individual must decide what he will believe and how he will live.  He remains free and at risk of being wrong.  There are no compelling arguments one way or the other when it comes to God and the soul. 

If a black cat jumps on my lap in a well-lit room, I have no doxastic 'wiggle room' as to whether a cat is on my lap.  It's not the same with God.  I don't believe God's existence can be "clearly perceived" from the existence or order of the natural world.  What is "clearly perceived" leaves me quite a lot of doxastic wiggle room.

I develop this thought in Is There Any Excuse for Unbelief?  Romans 1: 18-20.

"I Have Nothing to Hide"

This is an entry from the old blog, first posted 28 December 2005.  It makes an important point worth repeating. 

.............. 

In an age of terrorism, enhanced security measures are reasonable (See Liberty and Security) But in response to increased government surveillance and the civil-libertarian objections thereto, far too many people are repeating the stock phrase, "I have nothing to hide."

What they mean is that, since they are innocent of any crime, they have nothing to hide and nothing to fear, and so there cannot be any reasonable objection to removing standard protections. But these   people are making a false assumption. They are assuming that the agents of the state will always behave properly, an assumption that is spectacularly false.

Most of the state's agents will behave properly most of  the time, but there are plenty of rogue agents who will abuse their authority for all sorts of reasons. The O'Reilly Factor has been following a case in which an elderly black gentleman sauntering down a street in New Orlean's French Quarter was set upon by cops who proceeded to use his head as a punching bag. The video clip showed the poor guy's head bouncing off a brick wall from the blows. It looked as if the thuggish cops had found an opportunity to brutalize a fellow human being under cover of law, and were taking it. And that is just one minor incident.

We conservatives are law-and-order types.  One of the reasons we loathe contemporary liberals is because of their casual attitude toward criminal behavior.  But our support for law and order is tempered by a healthy skepticism about the state and its agents.  This is one of the reasons why we advocate limited government and Second Amendment rights. 

As conservatives know, power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. We have no illusions about human nature such as are cherished by liberals in their Rousseauean innocence.  Give a man a badge and a gun and the power will go to his head. And mutatis mutandis for anyone with any kind of authority over anyone. This is the main reason why checks on government power are essential.

The trick is to avoid the absurdities of the ACLU-extremists while also avoiding the extremism of the "I have nothing to hide" types who are willing to sell their birthright for a mess of secure pottage.

Companion post: Cops: A Necessary Evil

Elizabeth Warren: Undocumented Injun

Elizabeth 'Fauxcahontas' Warren, Cherokee maiden, diversity queen of the Harvard Lore Law School, and author of the cookbook Pow Wow Chow, is being deservedly and diversely raked over the coals.  Howie Carr, White and Wrong.  NRO, Paleface.  Michael Barone, Racial Preferences: Unfair and Ridiculous. Excerpt:

Let's assume the 1894 document is accurate. That makes Warren one-thirty-second Native American. George Zimmerman, the Florida accused murderer, had a black grandmother. That makes him a quarter black, four times as black as Warren is Indian, though The New York Times describes him as a "white Hispanic."

In the upside-down world of the liberal, the 'white Hispanic' George Zimmerman is transmogrified into a redneck and the lily-white Elizabeth Warren into a redskin.

The Left's diversity fetishism is so preternaturally boneheaded that one has to wonder whether calm critique has any place at all in responses to it.  But being somewhat naive, I have been known to try rational persuasion.  See Diversity and the Quota Mentality for one example.

The Problems of Order and Unity and Their Difference

Last Thursday, Steven N. and I had a very enjoyable three-hour conversation with ASU philosophy emeritus Ted Guleserian on Tempe's Mill Avenue.  We covered a lot of ground, but the most focused part of the discussion concerned the subject matter of this post.  If I understood Guleserian correctly, he was questioning whether there is any such problem as the problem of the unity of a fact.  I maintained that there is such a problem and that it is distinct from the problem of order.

................

The problem of order arises for relational facts and relational propositions in which there is a relation R that is either asymmetrical or nonsymmetrical. If dyadic R is asymmetrical, and x stands in R to y, then it follows that y does not stand in R to x. For example, greater than and taller than are asymmetrical relations. If I am taller than you, then you are not taller than me. If dyadic R is nonsymmetrical, and x stands in R to y, then it does not follow, though it may be the case, that y stands in R to x. For example, loves and hates are nonsymmetrical relations. If I love you, it does not follow that you love me, nor does it follow that you do not love me. But if I weigh the same as you, then you weigh the same as me: 'weigh the same as' picks out a symmetrical relation.

Well, suppose R is either asymmetrical or nonsymmetrical. Then the relational facts Rab and Rba will be distinct. For example, Al's loving Bill, and Bill's loving Al are distinct facts. A fact is a complex. Now the following principle seems well-nigh self-evident:

   P. If two complexes, K1 and K2, differ numerically, then there exists
   a constituent C such that C is an element of K1 but not of K2, or vice
   versa.

In other words, if two complexes differ, then they differ in a constituent. 'Complex' is intended quite broadly. Mathematical sets are complexes and it is clear that they satisfy the principle. There cannot be two sets that have all the same members.  Ditto for mereological sums.

Now if Rab and Rba are distinct, then, by principle (P), they must differ in a constituent. But they seem to have all the same constituents. Both consist of a, b, and R, and if you think there must also be a triadic nexus of exemplification present in the fact, then that item too is common to both. And if you think there is a benign infinite regress of exemplification nexuses in the fact, then those items too are common to both. Since both facts have all the same constituents, what is the ontological ground of the numerical difference of the two facts?  What makes them different?  The question is not whether they differ; it is obvious that they do.  The question concerns the ground of their difference.  What explains their difference?  Of course, I am not asking for an explanation in terms of empirical causes.  Consider {1, 2} and {1, 2, 3}.  What is the ontological ground of the difference of these two sets?  It would be a poor answer to say that they just differ, that their difference is a factum brutum.  The thing to say is that they differ in virtue of one set's having a member the other doesn't have.  When I say that 3 makes the difference between the two sets I am obviously not giving a causal explanation.  I am specifying a factor in reality that 'makes' the two entities numerically different.

So what, if anything, is the ontological ground of the difference between aRb and bRa when R is either asymmetrical or nonsymmetrical?  This, I take it,  the problem of order, or, in the jargon of Gustav Bergmann, the problem of providing an 'assay' of order.  It may be that no assay is possible.  It may be that the difference is a brute difference.  But that cannot be assumed at the outset.

It seems to me that the problem of unity is different although related.  What is the difference between the fact aRb and the set or sum of its constituents?  If a contingently stands in R to b, then it is possible that a, R, and b all exist without forming a relational fact.  So what is the difference between aRb and {a, R, b}?  Here we have two complexes that share all their constituents,  but they are clearly different complexes: one is a fact while the other is not.  What is the ground of fact-unity, that peculiar form of unity found in facts but not it other types of complex?

Suppose you deny that they share all constituents.  Suppose you maintain that the fact includes a triadic exemplification nexus that is not present in the set.  I will then re-formulate the problem as follows.  What is the difference between aRb and {a, R, NEX, }?

The problem of order is different from the problem of unity. The latter is the problem of accounting for the peculiar unity of those complexes that attract such properties as truth, falsity, and obtaining. For some of these complexes, no problem of order arises. For example, a monadic fact of the form, a's being F, precisely because it is nonrelational does not give rise to any problem of order. Since the problem of unity can arise in cases where the problem of order does not arise, the two problems are distinct.

The unity problem is the more fundamental of the two. The question as to the ground of the difference of a fact and the mere collection of its consituents is more fundamental than the question as to the ground of the difference between two already constituted facts which appear to share all their constituents.

Related:  Is the Difference Between a Fact and its Constituents a Brute Difference?

Saturday Night at the Oldies: Performers Who Ditched Their Italian Surnames, Part I

Before Bobby Darin became Bobby Darin he rejoiced under the name, Walden Robert Cassotto.  Dream Lover.  18 Yellow Roses. You're the Reason I'm Living.

Bobby Rydell started out Robert Ridarelli.  Forget Him.  Volare. "Letsa fly . . . ."

No, his name wasn't Dino Martino, it was Dino Paul Crocetti.  Schmaltzy as it is, That's Amore captures the Nagelian what-it's-like of being in love.  Houston.

Concetta Rosa Maria Franconero, better known as Connie Francis. Never on Sunday.  I prefer the understated Melina Mercouri version.

Timoteo Aurro = Timi Yuro.  When I first heard her back in the day, I thought she was black.  What a voice!  What's the Matter, Baby?  Her signature number: Hurt.

Laura traded in 'Nigro' for Nyro.'  Wedding Bell Blues. And When I Die.

Asserting and Arguing: Analysis of an Example and Response to Novak

In my earlier posts on this topic here and here I did not analyze an example.  I make good that deficit now. 

Suppose a person asserts that abortion is morally wrong.  Insofar forth, a bare assertion which is likely  to elicit the bare counter-assertion, 'Abortion is not morally wrong.'  What can be gratuitously asserted may be gratuitously denied without breach of logical propriety, a maxim long enshrined in the Latin tag Quod gratis asseritur, gratis negatur.  So one reasonably demands arguments from those who make assertions.  Here is one:

Infanticide is morally wrong
There is no morally relevant difference between abortion and infanticide
Ergo
Abortion is morally wrong.

Someone who forwards this argument in a concrete dialectical  situation in which he is attempting to persuade himself or another asserts the premises and in so doing provides reasons for accepting the conclusion. This goes some distance toward removing the gratuitousness of the conclusion.  But what about the premises?  If they are mere assertions, then the conclusion, though proximately non-gratuitous (because supported by reasons), is not ultimately non-gratuitous (because no support has been provided for the premises).

Of course, it is better to give the above argument than merely to assert its conclusion.  The point of the original post, however, is that one has not escaped from the realm of assertion by giving an argument.  And this for the simple reason that (a) arguments have premises, and (b) arguments that do dialectical work must have one or more asserted premises, the assertions being made by the person forwarding the argument with the intention of rationally persuading himself or another of something.

Our old friend Lukas Novak proposes a counterexample to (b): the reductio ad absurdum (RAA)argument.  If I understand him, what Novak is proposing is that some such arguments can be used to rationally justify the assertion of the conclusion without any of the premises being asserted by the producer of the argument.  Suppose argument A with conclusion C has premises P1, P2, P3.  Suppose further that the premise set entails a contradiction. We may then validly conclude and indeed assert that either P1 is not true or P2 is not true or P3 is not true.  We may in other words make a disjunctive assertion, an assertion the content of which is a disjunctive proposition. And this without having asserted P1 or P2 or P3. What we have, then, is an argument with an asserted conclusion but no asserted promises.

I think Professor Novak is technically correct except that the sort of RAA argument he describes is not very interesting. Suppose the asserted conclusion is this: Either the null set is not empty, or the null set is not a set, or the Axiom of Extensionality does not hold, or the null set is not unique.  Who would want to assert that disjunctive monstrosity?  An interesting RAA argument with this subject matter would establish the uniqueness of the null set on the basis of several asserted premises and one unasserted premise, namely, The null set is not unique, the premise assumed for reductio.

So I stick to my guns: 'real life' arguments that do dialectical work must have one or more asserted premises. Novak's comment did, however, give me the insight that not every premise of a 'real life' dialectically efficacious argument must be asserted.

Now back to the abortion argument.  My point, again, is that providing even a sound argument for a conclusion -- and I would say that the above argument is sound, i.e., valid in point of logical form and having true premises -- does not free one from the need to  make assertions.  For example, one has to assert that infanticide is morally wrong.  But if no ground or grounds can be given for this assertion, then the assertion is gratuitous.  To remove the gratuitousness one can give a further argument:  The killing of innocent human beings is morally wrong; (human) infants are innocent human beings; ergo, etc.  The first premise in this second argument is again an assertion,  and so on.

Eventually we come to assertions that cannot be argued. That is not to say that these assertions lack support.  They are perhaps grounded in objective self-evidence.

Note that I am not endorsing what is sometimes called the Münchhausen trilemma, also and perhaps better known as  Agrippa's Trilemma, according to which a putative justification either

   a. Begets an infinite regress, or
   b. Moves in a circle, or
   c. Ends in dogmatism, e.g., in an appeal to self-evidence that can only be subjective, or in an appeal to authority.

All I am maintaining -- and to some this may sound trivial -- is that every real-life argument that does dialectical work must have one or more asserted premises.   And so while argument is in general superior to bare assertion, argument does not free us of the need to make assertions.  I insist on this so that we do not make the mistake of overvaluing argumentation.

To put it aphoristically, the mind's discursivity needs for its nourishment intuitive inputs that must be affirmed but cannot be discursively justified. 

Catblogging Friday

As you know, Friday is official catblogging day here in the blogosphere, a tradition started in aught-four by Kevin Drum. So, in lieu of a substantial post, I present you with:

Adapted from Teilhard de Chardin

We are not human beings on a spiritual journey; we are spiritual beings on a human journey.

A Review of Barry Miller's From Existence to God

I have reviewed two of Barry Miller's books. My review of A Most Unlikely God appeared in Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review (vol. XXXVIII, no. 3, Summer 1999, pp. 614-617). My review of From Existence to God appeared in American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly (Summer 1993), pp. 390-394, I post a version of the latter here.

Barry Miller, From Existence to God: A Contemporary Philosophical Argument (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. x + 206. $42.50.

I

Arguments for the existence of God a contingentia mundi usually proceed by way of some version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), where this embraces principles of intelligibility and causality. Professor Miller's book is a bold but rigorous defense of a contingency argument that makes no use of any of these controversial principles. He thus evades the standard objections to PSR-based arguments. The engine driving Miller's argument is Non- Contradiction, a principle he deploys at various stages of his treatment. (cf. pp. 172-174) Accordingly, his central thesis is that there is "a hidden contradiction in claiming both that, say, Fido exists and that God does not." (p. ix)

If so, the existence of God should follow by dint of sheer analysis of what it is for a concrete individual to exist, in the presence of the uncontroversial premise that concrete individuals do in fact exist. By 'God' Miller understands the god of classical theism, a being that is the uncaused sustaining cause of the universe, where "The Universe is everything existing which either is a concrete individual or is individuated by individuals." (p. 131) This uncaused cause is unique, identical with its existence (and thus subsistent existence), metaphysically (not logically) necessary, and an individual only in an analogical sense of this term. (p. 137) Thus the above definition of 'universe' does not imply that God is in the universe. God cannot be an individual in the strict sense since He is not distinct from his existence; but He is nevertheless a concrete entity since capable of causal activity. (p. 126) The 'omni-properties' (omniscience, etc.) are not discussed. Thus Miller starts here below with existing concrete individuals, works his way up to the uncaused cause of their existence, and only then embarks on a discussion of those of the divine attributes relevant to the analysis of existence. This in marked contrast to the usual procedure of beginning with a definition of 'God' and then considering whether anything satisfies the definition.

A central challenge Miller faces is to show that the existence of concrete individuals is not a brute fact, where "a brute fact is by definition one for which any explanation is simply unnecessary." (p. 79) He meets this challenge by arguing that the existence of concrete individuals would harbor a contradiction if taken to be a brute fact. Given this putative contradiction, an inquiry into how it is possible that any such individual exist becomes logically inescapable. It turns out that the contradiction can only be removed if the existence of concrete individuals is not a brute fact but is dependent on something
external to them. (p. 84)

Wherein lies the contradiction? Consider Fido's existing. On Miller's preferred analysis, Fido's existing has two constituents, Fido and Fido's existence. Whereas Fido is a complete entity, one capable of independent existence, Fido's existence is a property-instance and therefore incomplete: incapable of independent existence, it requires a complete entity for its "individuation." (p. 38, n. 22) As constituents, Fido and his existence are ontologically, not chronologically, prior to Fido's existing in the sense that "...Fido's existing must be constructible conceptually from Fido and his existence." (p. 10) But such a construction would make no sense if Fido could not be conceived prior to Fido's existing. Yet chapter 3 ("The Inconceivability of Future Individuals") issues in precisely this conclusion: "Fido could neither be referred to nor conceived of before he existed." (p. 11)

Thus a contradiction emerges at the heart of concrete individuals: Fido's existing is a complex whose ontological constituents are such that one of them (Fido) must be and cannot be conceived prior to Fido's existing. Fido must be independently conceivable if he is to be available for the conceptual construction; but he cannot be so conceivable since "prior to its existing no concrete individual could be conceived of by anyone or in any way." (p. 42)

To establish that there is this contradiction, Miller must first of all develop a constituent ontology of individuals. This he does in chapter 2, "Sense Structure and Ontology." The analysis is pushed further in chapter 4, "Existence is a Real Property." Here he argues (convincingly to my mind) against the dominant Frege-Russell line that 'exists' and cognates are never legitimately predicable of individuals. The upshot is that existence is a first-level property.

Further argument is to the effect that it is a real (as opposed to a 'Cambridge') first-level property. Miller is now in a position to think of Fido's existing as built up from two constituents, Fido and Fido's existence. But what is Fido in distinction from his existence? One way to think of this is in terms of the question, What was Fido before he came to exist? Was he conceivable or referrable-to before he existed?

Chapter 3 defends the thesis that concrete individuals can neither be conceived of nor referred to prior to their existence, not even by God. This implies that, prior to Socrates' coming to exist, there was no de re possibility of his coming to exist. Thus there are no singular propositions about future individuals; all such propositions are general. (p. 42) Further implications are that the coming into existence of an individual is not the actualization of a merely possible individual, or the exemplification of any such exotic property as a Plantingian haecceity.

Now if Fido is inconceivable before he existed, then, "he cannot be conceived of except as existing or as having existed..." (p. 62) If so, how can Fido be a constituent of his existing? The result of chapters 2 and 4 thus contradicts that of chapter 3.

Given the obvious fact that Fido does exist, the contradiction in Fido's existing must be merely apparent. But if the analyses in chapters 2, 3 and 4 are correct, Fido's existing can neither be a brute fact needing no explanation, nor a fact explainable in terms of its constituents. So Fido's existing must be "dependent upon something other than either it or its constituents." (p. 84) This is the thesis of chapter 5, "Why existence? The penultimate answer."

The ultimate answer is provided in chapter 6, where it is argued that nothing is amiss in the idea of a causal regress that terminates necessarily in an uncaused cause. A causal series terminates necessarily if its members are intrinsically such that the series must terminate. (pp. 98-99) I take it that the series of causes that reaches back some 13-15 billion years ago to the Big Bang (assuming the truth of current cosmology) is a contingently terminating series: there is nothing in the nature of an ordinary physical event-cause that necessitates that a series of such causes should terminate, or should not terminate. So if there are no necessarily terminating causal series, there is no hope for a contingency argument that does not apply some version of PSR to an initial event like the Big Bang.

The main challenge Miller faces in showing the possibility of necessarily terminating causal series derives from Hume's contention that in an infinite series of causes each member is wholly explained
by the preceding member without any member being uncaused. If so, there is no a priori reason why a causal regress must terminate. To the objection that this would leave the series itself unexplained, the Humean rejoinder is that the explanation of each member by the preceding member suffices to explain the series as a whole. Miller responds to Hume's challenge by distinguishing five types of causal series. The justice of Hume's remarks is admitted with respect to types I-III. But types IV and V are argued to escape Humean censure.

It is impossible in the short space allotted to summarize Miller's intricate and carefully argued discussion of causal series. But perhaps the gist of it can be rendered as follows.

Miller needs a causal series that is both explanatory and necessarily terminating. But if a series is such that each of its members is caused by that which precedes it and causes that which succeeds it, then that series cannot be necessarily terminating. "Series IV and V, however, are cases of causal series in which each part neither is caused by that which precedes it, nor causes that which succeeds it . . ." (p. 111) How? Let a be the cause of Fido's existing, and suppose (to put it roughly) a is caused to exist by b, b by c, c by d, and d by m. Miller's idea is that when properly formulated, what causes a to exist is not b, but b inasmuch as it is caused to exist by c inasmuch as it is caused to exist by d inasmuch as it is caused to exist by m. (p. 112) Now m must be an uncaused cause, says Miller, on pain of the series' no longer being able to cause anything. (p. 112)

Having thus arrived at the uncaused cause, the remaining chapters consolidate and elaborate this result. Chapter 7, "The Uncaused Cause," argues that the ground of the uncaused cause's status as uncaused is in the lack of "any distinction between itself and its existence" (p. 117) and defends this consequence of the doctrine of divine simplicity against charges of incoherence. Miller also addresses the question whether the universe might be the uncaused cause, and concludes that it cannot since it is distinct from its existence, and what is so distinct can exist only if caused to exist. (p. 135)

Chapter 8 ("Necessary Existence") explains the sense in which God's existence is necessary "in terms of the more basic notion of something's lacking any distinction from its existence." (p. 148)

Chapters 9 and 10 treat, respectively, "Objections to the Contingency Argument" and "The Contingency Argument Misconceived." The book concludes with three appendices in support of chapters 2, 3 and 4 respectively, and a useful index.

The production job is reasonably good, although the quality of the paper inspires little confidence in its ability to resist the onset of yellowing. I note only four typographical errors: p. 1 has 'prologomena' instead of 'prolegomena.' P. 35, line 16 sports 'Fido's existing' in place of 'Fido's blackness.' P. 38, n. 22, line 6 shows 'predicate' where it should have 'property.' And a spot check of the index revealed on p. 202, col. I, line 7 a reference to p. 74 when it should be to p. 76.

II

Miller's book is a significant contribution not only to philosophical theology, but also to metaphysics and the philosophy of language. He engages a fundamental question ("How ever can it be that the Universe does exist?" (p. 1)) and he does so in a clear and rigorous manner. Equally important, he develops a line of reasoning which has been largely ignored in the theistic renaissance of recent decades. Along the way, a number of dogmas come under fire, among them the dogma held by atheists and theists alike that the doctrine of divine simplicity is incoherent. Miller leaves no doubt that he is historically informed, but does not allow himself to be led down exegetical sidetracks. All in all, an exciting and important work.

I conclude with a couple of critical comments, offered in the spirit of a request for clarification.

Miller's contingency argument is motivated by "the recognition that to accept Fido's existing as a brute fact would be to accept that Fido and his existence were simultaneously both constituents and non-constituents of Fido's existing."(p. 116) Suppose we take a closer look at this putative contradiction. Given that they are constituents, Fido and his existence are ontologically, not chronologically, prior to Fido's existing. (p. 10) But if Fido is ontologically prior to Fido's existing, how is this priority contradicted by the fact, if it is one, that Fido is inconceivable until he exists? Fido's being nothing, not even a possible entity, chronologically prior to his existing seems logically compatible with his being ontologically prior to his existing, and therefore a constituent of his existing. The fact that "...Fido's existing should be conceptually constructible from Fido and his existence" (p. 83) seems consistent with Fido's being "disqualified [from being the starting point of the construction] by being inconceivable until he has completed his existence." (p. 83) A conceptual construction is presumably not a temporal process, despite Miller's talk of "beginning" the construction, moving through its "steps" and "stages," (p. 81) and "finishing" it. (p. 82) This talk is surely to be taken nontemporally. If so, it is not clear why Fido cannot be both ontologically prior and chronologically simultaneous with his existing. Surely Miller is not equivocating on 'prior'?

A second point concern's Miller's oft-made admission that Fido's existing admits of more than one legitimate analysis. (p. 37, n. 18, p. 81) Miller's analysis generates a contradiction; but if there is a legitimate analysis that does not generate a contradiction, would this not undercut Miller's argument? He would not think so, since "The nub of the argument is that a legitimate analysis cannot generate an insoluble paradox." (p. 81) But isn't the fact, assuming it is a fact, that Miller's analysis issues in a contradiction, together with the fact that alternative legitimate analyses are available, prima facie evidence that his analysis is illegitimate? It seems that for Miller's argument to work he must show, or at least render credible, the view that his analysis is the only legitimate analysis.

W. F. Vallicella

Abbreviations, Place-Holders, and Logical Form

It is one thing to abbreviate an argument, another to depict its logical form. Let us consider the following argument composed in what might be called 'canonical English':

1. If God created some contingent beings, then he created all contingent beings.
2. God created all contingent beings.
-----
3. God created some contingent beings.

The above  is an argument, not an argument-form. The following abbreviation of the argument is also an argument, not an argument-form: 

1. P --> Q
2. Q
---
3. P

Both are arguments; it is just that the second is an abbreviation of the first in which sentences are replaced with upper-case letters and the logical words with symbols from the propositional calculus. But it is easy to confuse the second argument with the following argument-form:

1. p --> q
2. q
---
3. p

An argument-form is a one-over-many: many arguments can have the same form. And the same goes for its constituent propositional forms: each is a one-over-many. 'p --> q' is the form of indefinitely many conditional statements. But an argument, whether spelled out or abbreviated, is a particular, and as such uninstantiable. One cannot substitute different statements for the upper-case 'P' and 'Q' above.

Some of you will call this hair-splitting. But I prefer to think of it as a distinction essential to clear thinking in logic. For suppose you confuse the second two schemata. Then you might think that the original argument, the one in 'canonical English,' is an instance of the formal fallacy of Affirming the Consequent. But the second schema, though it is an instance of the third, is also an instance of a valid argument-form:

(x)(Cgx)
---
(Ex)(Cgx).

In sum, the confusion of abbreviations with place-holders aids and abets the mistake of thinking that an argument that instantiates an invalid form is invalid. Validity and invalidity are asymmetrical: if an argument instantiates a valid form, then it is valid; but if it instantiates an invalid form, then it may or may not be invalid.

'The Wrong Side of History'

I once heard a prominent conservative tell an ideological opponent that he was 'on the wrong side of history.' But surely this is a phrase that no self-aware and self-consistent conservative should use. The phrase suggests that history is moving in a certain direction, toward various outcomes, and that this direction and these outcomes are somehow justified by the actual tendency of events. But how can the mere fact of a certain drift justify that drift? For example, we are moving in the United States, and not just here, towards more and more intrusive government, more and more socialism, less and less individual liberty. This has certainly been the trend from FDR on regardless of which party has been in power. Would a self-aware conservative want to say that the fact of this drift justifies it?  I think not.

'Everyone today believes that such-and-such.' It doesn't follow that such-and-such is true. 'Everyone now does such-and-such.' It doesn't follow that such-and-such ought to be done. 'The direction of events is towards such-and-such.' It doesn't follow that such-and-such is a good or valuable outcome. In each of these cases there is a logical mistake. One cannot validly infer truth from belief, ought from is, or values from facts.

One who opposes the drift toward socialism, a drift that is accelerating under President Obama, is on the wrong side of history. But that is no objection unless one assumes that history's direction is the right direction. Now an Hegelian might believe that, one for whom all the real is rational and all the rational real. Marxists and 'progressives' might believe it. But no conservative who understands conservatism can believe it.

The other night a conservative talk show host told a guest that she was on the wrong side of history in her support for same-sex marriage.    My guess is that in a generation the same-sex marriage issue will be moot,  the liberals having won.  The liberals will have been on the right side of history.  The right side of history, but wrong nonetheless. 

As I have said more than once, if you are a conservative don't talk like a liberal. Don't validate, by adopting, their question-begging phrases.

Singular Concepts and Singular Negative Existentials

London Ed seems to be suggesting that we need irreducibly singular concepts (properties, propositional functions) if we are properly to analyze grammatically singular negative existence statements such as

1. Vulcan does not exist.

But why do we need to take 'Vulcan' to express a singular concept or haecceity property?  Why isn't the following an adequate analysis:

1A. The concept Small, intra-Mercurial planet whose existence explains the peculiarities of Mercury's orbit is not instantiated.

Note that the concept picked out by the italicized phrase is general not singular.  It is general even though only one individual instantiates it if any does.  The fact that different individuals instantiate it at different possible worlds suffices to make the concept general, not irreducibly singular.

Profiling

Moral Failure

Repeated moral failure has at least this salutary effect: it teaches us to be humble.  Moral success can have the opposite effect of conducing toward spiritual pride -- which undermines the very success of which it is the upshot.  So, while regretting one's failures, one can derive a little consolation from the realization that they are contributing to one's humility.

Down With Evil Corporations!

Down with greed!
Down with human nature!
Power to the rabble!

More on Translating 'Something Exists' and a Response to Brightly

I issued the following challenge: translate 'Something exists' into standard first-order predicate logic with identity. This is the logic whose sources are Frege and Russell. So I call it Frege-Russell logic, or, to be cute, 'Fressellian' logic.  My esteemed commenters don''t see much of a problem here.  So let me first try to explain why I see a problem.  I then  consider David Brightly's proposal.

1. First of all, 'Something exists' cannot be rendered as 'For some x, x exists.'  This is because 'exist(s)' is not an admissible first-level predicate in Frege-Russell logic.  The whole point of the Fressellian approach is to make 'exist(s)' disappear into the machinery of quantification. There is no such propositional function as 'x exists.'  'For some x, x exists' is gibberish, syntactic nonsense in Frege-Russell logic. 

2. But the following is not gibberish: 'For some x, x = x.'  So one will be tempted to say that 'Something exists' can be rendered as 'For some x, x = x,' ('Something is self-identical') and 'Everything exists' as 'For all x, x = x' ('Everything is self-identical'). 

But this won't work either.  It is true that everything that exists is self-identical, and vice versa.  But it doesn't follow, nor is it true, that existence is self-identity. Here is one consideration.  When I say of Tom that he exists, I am not saying that he is self-identical. Suppose I hear a false rumour to the effect that Tom is no more.  But then I encounter him in the flesh.  I exclaim, "You still exist!"  Clearly, "You are still self-identical" does not mean the same.  If I said that, Tom might retort, "What the hell, man, were you worried that I had become legion?"  In some circumstances, that a man should continue in existence is surprising.  But we are never surprised by a man's continuing in self-identity.

Furthermore, when Tom ceases to exist, he does not become self-diverse.  Loss of existence is not loss of self-identity.  To put the point in formal mode, after his demise 'Tom' continues to refer to one and the same individual, Tom.  The bearer of the name is gone, but not the reference. Otherwise it could not be true that Tom is gone.  There is also a modal consideration.  Tom is a contingent being: he exists but he might not have existed.  If existence is self-identity, then Tom's possible nonexistence is Tom's possible self-diversity -- which is absurd.  It makes prima facie sense to say of an individual that it might not have existed or that it no longer exists; but it make no sense at all to say of an individual that it might not have been self-identical or that it is no longer self-identical.  If Tom might not have existed, then it is Tom who might not have existed.  But if Tom might not have been self-identical, then it is not Tom who might not have been self-identical.

So, even if everything that exists is self-identical and conversely, existence is not self-identity.  When we say that something exists we are not saying that something is self-identical, and when we say that everything exists we are not saying that everything is self-identical.  I conclude that 'Something exists' is not expressible in the terms of the Frege-Russell system.  As for 'Everything exists,' it is surely a presupposition of the whole Frege-Russell approach: the approach presupposes that Meinong was wrong to speak of nonexistent objects.  But this presupposition cannot be expressed, cannot be 'said,' in Fressellian terms.

We are in the following curious predicament.  Something that must be true if if the Fresselian system is to be tenable -- that everything exists, that there are no nonexistent objects -- is not expressible within the system.

3. David Brightly accepts my challenge to give a Frege-Russell translation of 'Something exists.'  He writes:

And as a Fressellian I accept the challenge. That property is Individual aka Object, the concept at the root of the Porphyrean tree. We can say 'Something exists' with ∃x.Object(x), ie, there is at least one object. Likewise ∀x.Object(x) (which is always true, even when the box is empty) says 'Everything exists' and its negation (which is always false) says 'Some thing is not an object'. But both these last are unenlightening---because always true and always false, respectively, they convey no information, make no distinction, are powerless to change us.

I asked: which property  is it whose instantiation is the existence of something?  David's answer is that it is the property or concept Individual or Object.  And so I take David to be saying something like the following. "Just as the existence of cats is the being-instantiated of the concept cat, the existence of something is the being-instantiated of the concept Object."

David mentions the tree of Porphyry:

David speaks of the 'root' of the tree where I speak of its apex. No matter.  However we visualize it, upside down or right side up, David's suggestion is that Object or Substance (as above) is a summum genus, a supreme genus. It is a concept superordinate to every concept, a concept under which everything falls.

Operating with a scheme like this, we can, in the spirit of Frege's dialogue with the illustrious Puenjer, reduce every existential proposition (or at least every general existential proposition) to a predication by climbing Porphyry's tree.  Thus:

Cats exist --> Some mammal is a cat
Mammals exist --> Some animal is a mammal
Animals exist --> Some  living thing is an animal
Living things exist --> Some  body is a living thing
Bodies exist --> Some  substance is a body
Substances exist --> Some Objects are substances.

The point of these translations is to dispense with 'existst(s)' by showing how propositions of the form Fs exist can be replaced salva veritate with propositions of the form Some G is a F, where G is superordinate to F.  This amounts to the elimination of existence in favor of the logical quantity, someness.

We have now climbed to the tippy-top of the tree of Porphyry. We have ascended to a concept superordinate to every concept (except itself) a genus generalissimum, a most general genus.  And what concept might that be? Such a concept must have maximal extension and so will have minimal intension. It will be devoid of all content, abstracting as it does from all differences. Frege in his dialog with Puenjer suggests something identical with itself as the maximally superordinate concept. 'There are men' and 'Men exist' thus get rendered as 'Something identical with itself is a man.' (63)  Something identical with itself is equivalent to Brightly's Object.

4. Now why can't I accept the Frege-Brightly view? Well, I've already shown that 'Everything exists' cannot be translated as 'Everything is self-identical.'  But this is tantamount to having established that the concept whose instantiation is the existence of everything cannot be the concept self-identical something or the concept Object.

Another way to see this is by considering two individuals at the very bottom of the Porphyrean tree.  So consider my cats, Max and Manny.  In respect of being cats, mammals, beasts, animals, living things, material substances, and self-identical somethings, they do not differ.  They do not differ quidditatively.  But they do differ: they differ in their very existence.  Each has his own existence.  Max is not Manny, and Manny is not Max.  That is not a mere numerical difference; it is a numerical-existential difference.  Since each cat has its own existence, the existence of either cannot be the being-instantiated of any quidditative concept. All such concepts abstract from existence.  The same goes for all individuals.  Individuals exist.  But the existence of individuals is not the being-instantiated of any concept. If you want, you can think of existent (self-identical something) as a highest genus, but Existence -- that in virtue of which things  exist and are not nothing -- is not a highest genus.  And it is Existence that is the topic.  There are no instances of Existence.  Existing things are not a kind of thing.

The Frege-Russell theory fails utterly as a theory of Existence.

As sure as I am sitting here, I am sure that I will not convince the Londonistas.  That fact is more grist for the (meta)philosophical mill.

First John Derbyshire, then Naomi Riley

John Fund in Censoring Naomi Riley comments on the latter's dismissal by the The Chronicle of Higher Education:

Earlier this week, the Chronicle of Higher Education, the trade paper for faculty members and administrators in universities, fired Naomi Schaefer Riley, a paid blogger for its website. Her crime? She had the courage to respond to a Chronicle story called “Black Studies: ‘Swaggering Into the Future,’” which stated that “young black-studies scholars . . . are less consumed than their predecessors with the need to validate the field or explain why they are pursuing doctorates in their discipline.” The article used five Ph.D. candidates as examples of those “rewriting the history of race.” Riley looked at the subject areas of the five proposed dissertations and concluded that they were “obscure at best . . . a collection of left-wing victimization claptrap at worst.”

John Fund goes on to make a number of obvious points in protest of the illiberalism of contemporary liberals.

But Fund neglects to comment on the irony of publishing his piece in National Review Online, which recently defenestrated John Derbyshire.  (My posts on Derbyshire are in the Race category.)  What makes it worse is that NRO is supposedly a conservative publication.  We have a supposedly conservative publication publishing a piece that criticizes The Chronicle for dumping a blogger who bravely  spoke her mind and expressed some unpleasant truths that many acknowledge but few have the courage to express.  But this same publication did exactly the same thing to John Derbyshire.  We expect craven acquiescence to race-baiters from politically correct liberals, but not from so-called conservatives such as Rich Lowry and Andrew McCarthy.

Why doesn't Fund stick up for Derbyshire? (Perhaps he has in some other venue.)  I could be wrong, but Derbyshire is a more substantial commentator on the passing scene than the blogger Riley.

Saturday Night at the Oldies: Travel, Travail, Transition

Johnny Cash, I've Been Everywhere, man, crossed the deserts bare, man/I've breathed the mountain air, man/Of travel I've had my share, man/I've been everywhere.
Pete Seeger, Passing Through.  "Yankee, Russian, white or tan, Lord a man is just a man/We're all brothers and we're only passing through."
Soggy Mountain Boys, I am a Man of Constant Sorrow
Peter, Paul, and Mary, 500 Miles
EmmyLou Harris, Wayfaring Stranger
Ralph Stanley, Will the Circle be Unbroken
Karla Bonoff, The Water is Wide.  Is there a better treatment?
Tom Waits, Shiver Me Timbers.  If you've read Jack London's Martin Eden, you will figure out what this song is about.

More on Asserting and Arguing

James Anderson comments astutely via e-mail:

I have a worry about your post Asserting and Arguing.

You seem to affirm all of the following:

(1) An assertion is a mere assertion unless argued.
(2) Mere assertions are gratuitous.
(3) The premises of arguments are assertions.
(4) One cannot argue for every premise of every argument.

This is an accurate summary except for (3).  I did not say that the premises of arguments are assertions since I allow that the premises of an argument may be unasserted propositions.  The constituent propositions of arguments considered in abstracto, as they are considered in formal logic, as opposed to arguments used in concrete dialectical situations to convince oneself or someone else of something, are typically unasserted.

Since the conclusion of an argument cannot be any stronger (or less gratuitous) than its premises, doesn't it follow from these claims that the conclusion of every argument is gratuitous?

Well, if the conclusion follows from the premises, then it has the support of those premises, and is insofar forth less gratuitous than they are.  Your point is better put by saying that, if the premises are gratuitious, then the conclusion canot be ultimately non-gratuitous, but only proximately non-gratuitous.

You distinguish between 'making' arguments and 'entertaining' arguments, but that doesn't offer a way out here because the kind of argument required in (1) and (3) is a 'made' argument rather than an 'entertained' argument.

Isn't the answer here to reject (1) and to grant that some assertions (e.g., the assertion that your cats are on the desk) can be neither mere assertions nor argued assertions?  We need a category like 'justified' assertions:  no justified assertion is a mere assertion and not every justified assertion is an argued assertion.

Professor Anderson has put his finger on a real problem with the post, and I accept his criticism.  I began the post with the sentence, "Mere assertions remain gratuitous until supported by arguments."  But that is not quite right.  I should have written:  "Mere assertions remain gratuitous until supported, either by argument, or in some other way."  Thus my assertion that two black cats are lounging on my writing table  is not a mere assertion although it is and must be unargued; it is an assertion justified by sense perception.

Expressed more clearly, the main point of the post was that ultimate justification via argument alone cannot be had.  Sooner or late one must have recourse to propositions unsupportable by argument.  Argument does not free us of the need to make assertions.  (I am assuming that there is no such thing as infinitely regressive support or circular support.  Not perfectly obvious, I grant: but very plausible.)

 

Keezer on Kats

Bill Keezer writes,

I had a cat once like which there will never be another. He supposedly was my wife’s cat. He decided I was his human. He considered it his divine right to walk up in my lap when I was studying statistical mechanics and lie down on the book. I would walk up the street to cross the highway to the convenience store and he would come up to me, let me carry him across and then once down, go hunt in the field until it was time to come back. At such time he would come up to me, let me pick him up and carry him back across the highway. Once down on the other side, he would disappear until we reached home. He was a phenomenal hunter. He grew up on a farm and until was sent to us would produce several mouse heads a day. A mouse got in the house once and hid behind the refrigerator. I pulled the fridge out, dropped the cat in, and came back a bit later. Problem solved. When we lived in San Francisco, we had a stair with right angles to a glass front outside door. He would scare all the callers because he was pure panther-black and moved like a much bigger cat. The pumas in the zoo remind me of his walk. He died of infectious feline anemia and rather broke my heart. 

So I envy you your cats. We now have my son’s dog and very expensive living room furniture. I don’t think cats are in our future. But that is OK. We had cats afterwards and it wasn’t the same.

 Enjoy them.

Asserting and Arguing

Mere assertions remain gratuitous until supported by arguments. Quod gratis asseritur, gratis negatur.  That which is gratuitously assertible is gratuitously deniable.  Thus one is right to demand arguments from those who make assertions.  It is worth pointing out, however, that  the difference between making an assertion and giving an argument is not absolute. Since no argument  can prove its own premises, they must remain mere assertions from within the context of the argument. No doubt they too can be supported by further arguments, but eventually one comes to ultimate premises that can only be asserted, not argued.

Argument cannot free us of assertion since every argument has premises and they must be asserted if one is making an argument as opposed to merely entertaining one.  One who makes an argument is not merely asserting its conclusion; he is asserting its conclusion on the basis of premises that function as reasons for the assertion; and yet the premises  themselves are merely asserted.  There is no escaping the need to make assertions.

If you refuse to accept ultimate premisses, then you are bound for a vicious infinite regress or a vicious circle, between which there is  nothing to choose.    (The viciousness of a logical circle is not mitigated by increasing its 'diameter.') This shows the limited value of argument and discursive rationality. One cannot avoid the immediate taking of something for true.  For example, I immediately take it to be true, on the basis of sense perception, that a couple of  black cats are lounging on my desk:

 

A Wittgenstein Paradox

Ludwig Wittgenstein had no respect for academic philosophy and steered his students away from academic careers.  For example, he advised Norman Malcolm to become a rancher, a piece of advice Malcolm wisely ignored.  And yet it stung his vanity to find his ideas recycled and discussed in the philosophy journals.  Wittgenstein felt that when the academic hacks weren't plagiarizing his ideas they were misrepresenting them.

The paradox is that his writing can speak only to professional philosophers, the very people he despised.  Ordinary folk, even educated ordinary folk, find the stuff gibberish. When people ask me what of Wittgenstein they should read, I tell them to read first a good biography like that of Ray Monk, and then, if they are still interested, read the aphorisms and observations contained in Culture and Value (Vermischte Bemerkungen).

Only professional philosophers take seriously the puzzles that Wittgenstein was concerned to dissolve.  And only a professional philosopher will be exercised by the meta-problem of the origin and status of philosophical problems.  So we have the paradox of a man who wrote for an audience he despised.

"There is less of a paradox that you think.  Wittgenstein was writing mainly for himself; his was a therapeutic conception of philosophy.  His writing was a form of self-therapy.  He was tormented by the problems.  His writing was mainly in exorcism of his demons." 

This connects with the fly and fly bottle remark in the Philosophical Investigations.

Why does the bug need to be shown the way out? Pop the cork and he's gone.

Why did Wittgenstein feel the need to philosophize his way out of philosophy? He should have known that metaphilosophy and anti-philosophy are just more philosophy with all that that entails: inconclusiveness, endlessness . . . . He should have just walked away from it.

If the room is too smoky, there is no necessity that you remain in it. You are free to go, the door is unlocked. This figure's from Epictetus and he had the quitting of life in view. But the same holds for the quitting of philosophy. Just do it, if that's what you want. It can be done.

What cannot be done, however, is to justify one's exit. (That would be like copulating your way to chastity.) For any justification proffered, perforce and willy-nilly, will be just more philosophy. You cannot have it both ways. You either walk away or stay.

Adapted from Pascal

There is light enough for those who wish to see, and darkness enough for those who don't.

On Translating 'Some Individual Exists' Fressellianly

An astute reader comments:

You write:

2. But can this presupposition be expressed (said) in this logic? Here is a little challenge for you Fressellians: translate 'Something exists' into standard logical notion. You will discover that it cannot be done. Briefly, if existence is instantiation, which property is it whose instantiation is the existence of something? Same problem with 'Nothing exists.' If existence is instantiation, which property is it whose non-instantiation is the nonexistence of anything? Similarly with 'Everthing exists' and 'Something does not exist.'

But couldn't we translate those expressions this way (assuming  we have only two properties: a, b)?
1. "something exists" -> "there is an x that instantiates either a or b or ab"
2. "everything exists" -> "there is an x that instantiates a and there is a y that instantiates b and there is a z that instantiates ab"
3. "nothing exists" -> 1 is false
4. "something doesn't exist" -> 2 is false

I am afraid that doesn't work.   We need focus only on on 'Some individual exists.'  The reader's proposal could be put as follows.  Given the properties F-ness and G-ness,

What 'Some individual exists' says is exactly what 'Either F-ness is instantiated or G-ness is instantiated' says.

I would insist however that they do not say the same thing, i.e., do not have the same meaning.  The expression on the left says that some individual or other, nature unspecified, exists.  The expression on the right, however, makes specific reference to the 'natures' F-ness and G-ness.  Surely, 'Some individual exists' could be true even if there are are no individuals that are either Fs or Gs. 

Note that it is not a matter of logic what properties there are.  This is an extralogical question.

On the Frege-Russell treatment of existence, 'exist(s)' is a second-level predicate, a predicate of concepts, properties, propositional functions and cognate items.  It is never an admissible  predicate of individuals.  Thus in this logic every affirmation of existence must say of some specified concept or property that it is instantiated, and every denial of existence must say of some specified concept or property that it fails of instantiation.

This approach runs into trouble when it comes to the perfectly meaningful and true 'Something exists' and 'Some individual exists.'  For in these instances  no concept or property can be specified whose instantiation is the existence of things or the existence of individuals.  To head off an objection: self-identity won't work.

That there are individuals is a necessary presupposition of the Frege-Russell logic in that without it one cannot validly move from 'F-ness is instantiated' to 'Fs exist.'  But it is a necessary presupposition that cannot be stated in the terms of the system.  This fact, I believe, is one of the motivations for Wittgenstein's distinction between the sayable and the showable.  What cannot be said, e.g., that there are individuals, is shown by the use of such individual variables as 'x.'

The paradox, I take it, is obvious.  One cannot say  that 'There are individuals' is inexpressible without saying 'There are individuals.'  When Wittgenstein assures us that there is the Inexpressible, das Unaussprechliche,  he leaves himself open to the retort: What is inexpressible? If he replies, 'That there are individuals,' then he is hoist by his own petard.

Surely it is true that there are individuals and therefore expressible, because just now expressed.

"The suicide of a thesis," says Peter Geach (Logic Matters, p. 265), "might be called Ludwig's self-mate . . . . "  Here we may have an instance of it.