Maverick Philosopher

Deterrence Will Not Work Against Iran

Charles Krauthammer gives three reasons:

(1) The nature of the regime.

Did the Soviet Union in its 70 years ever deploy a suicide bomber? For Iran, as for other jihadists, suicide bombing is routine. Hence the trail of self-immolation, from the 1983 Marine barracks attack in Beirut to the Bulgaria bombing of July 2012.  Iran’s clerical regime rules in the name of a fundamentalist religion for whom the hereafter offers the ultimate rewards. For Soviet communists — thoroughly, militantly atheistic — such thinking was an opiate-laced fairy tale.

For all its global aspirations, the Soviet Union was intensely nationalist. The Islamic Republic sees itself as an instrument of its own brand of Shiite millenarianism — the messianic return of the “hidden Imam.”

It’s one thing to live in a state of mutual assured destruction with Stalin or Brezhnev, leaders of a philosophically materialist, historically grounded, deeply here-and-now regime. It’s quite another to be in a situation of mutual destruction with apocalyptic clerics who believe in the imminent advent of the Mahdi, the supremacy of the afterlife and holy war as the ultimate avenue to achieving it.

The classic formulation comes from Tehran’s fellow (and rival Sunni) jihadist al-Qaeda: “You love life and we love death.” Try deterring that.

(2) The nature of the grievance.

The Soviet quarrel with America was ideological. Iran’s quarrel with Israel is existential. The Soviets never proclaimed a desire to annihilate the American people. For Iran, the very existence of a Jewish state on Muslim land is a crime, an abomination, a cancer with which no negotiation, no coexistence, no accommodation is possible.

(3) The nature of the target.

America is a nation of 300 million; Israel, 8 million. America is a continental nation; Israel, a speck on the map, at one point eight miles wide. Israel is a “one-bomb country.” Its territory is so tiny, its population so concentrated that, as Iran’s former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani has famously said, “Application of an atomic bomb would not leave anything in Israel but the same thing would just produce damages in the Muslim world.” A tiny nuclear arsenal would do the job.

In U.S.-Soviet deterrence, both sides knew that a nuclear war would destroy them mutually. The mullahs have thought the unthinkable to a different conclusion. They know about the Israeli arsenal. They also know, as Rafsanjani said, that in any exchange Israel would be destroyed instantly and forever, whereas the ummah — the Muslim world of 1.8 billion people whose redemption is the ultimate purpose of the Iranian revolution — would survive damaged but almost entirely intact.

Political Anagram

Malcontent liberal:  abnormal intellect.

Montaigne on Why Language Matters

Allan J. writes,

You often speak of the importance of using language responsibly, i.e. not like a librul. So I thought you would enjoy this:

“Our understanding is conducted solely by means of the word: anyone who falsifies it betrays public society. It is the only tool by which we communicate our wishes and our thoughts; it is our soul’s interpreter: if we lack that, we can no longer hold together; we can no longer know each other. When words deceive us, it breaks all intercourse and loosens the bonds of our polity.” – Montaigne

Montaigne's point is mine.  Language matters.  It deserves respect as the vehicle and enabler of our thoughts and -- to change the metaphor -- the common currency for the exchange of ideas.  To tamper with the accepted meanings of words in order  to secure argumentative or political advantage is a form of cheating.  Wittgenstein likened languages to games.  But games have rules, and we cannot tolerate those who change the rules mid-game.  We must demand of our opponents that they use language responsibly, and engage us on the common terrain of accepted usage.

The violation of accepted usage is a common ploy of contemporary liberals.  Some examples: 

Minimal ID requirements are said to disenfranchise certain classes of voters.  The common sense requirements amount to voter suppression.  They are described absurdly as an onerous barrier to voting." Onerous?  Barrier?  In Pennsylvania a photo ID can be had free of charge.  In Arizona it costs a paltry $12 and is good for 12 years.  If you are 65 or older, or on SS disability, it is free.

People who insist on the rule of law with respect to immigation are called xenophobic.  And then there are the cheaply-fabricated  neologistic  '-phobe' compounds.  One who rationally articulates a principled position against same-sex marriage is dismissed as homophobic.  One who draws attention to the threat of radical Islam is denounced as Islamophobic.

The sheer stupidity of these mendacious coinages ought to disgust anyone who can think straight.  A phobia is an irrational fear.  But the proponents of traditional marriage have no fear of homosexuals or their practices, let alone an irrational fear of them.  And those alive to the threat of radical Islam may be said to fear it, but the fear is rational.

Liberals can't seem to distinguish dissent from hate.  So they think that if you dissent from liberal positions, then you hate liberals.  How stupid can a liberal be?  "You disagree with liberal ideas, therefore you are a hater!"   Even worse: "You differ with a black liberal's ideas, therefore you are a hater and a racist!"

'Unilateral.'  John Nichols of the The Nation appeared on the hard-Left show, "Democracy Now," on the morning of 2 September 2004. Like many libs and lefties, he misused 'unilateral' to mean 'without United Nations   support.' In this sense, coalition operations against Saddam Hussein's regime were 'unilateral' despite the the fact that said operations were precisely those of a coalition of some thirty countries.  The same willful mistake was made by his boss Victor Navasky on 17 July 2005 while being
interviewed by David Frum on C-Span 2.

There are plenty more examples, e.g., 'white Hispanic.'   When Republicans had control of the presidency and both houses of Congress, Dems whined about a 'one-party system.'  Exercise for the reader: find more examples of liberal misuse of language.

Ron Radosh on Woody Guthrie at 100

A very good piece that ends like this:

Poor Woody Guthrie. He never expected to see the day when the newsmen, the photographers, the media as a whole would proclaim singers like Bruce Springsteen, Tom Morello, and Ry Cooder geniuses because they are leftists, and although like all good millionaires and billionaires, they use their money as Bruce Springsteen does — to buy homes all over the world and race horses for his daughter to compete with. If Woody was alive, he at least would be honest, and would have squandered his money and given it to the CPUSA.

So go and honor Woody — he was in so many ways a bard of those who were dispossessed and down under in the years of the Great Depression and the Dust Bowl, and in his best works, he echoed their concerns and their lives. In his worst, he became a prisoner of the Communist movement he joined, who forced him to adopt political correctness on behalf of evil causes, and to write songs on their behalf better forgotten.

Remember this if you’re attending any of the concerts coming up. And if Tom Morello sings and I’m there, I’ll remain sitting, won’t applaud, and if you hear someone booing, it might just be me.

Self-Deprecation

There is usually more of self than of deprecation in self-deprecation.

Beating the Dead Horse of the Thin Theory Some More

It is obviously true that something exists.  This is not only true, but known with certainty to be true:  I think, therefore I exist, therefore something exists.  That is my Grand Datum, my datanic starting point.  Things exist! 

Now it seems perfectly clear to me that 'Something exists' cannot be translated adequately as 'Something is self-identical' employing just the resources of modern predicate logic (MPL), i.e., first-order predicate logic  with identity.    But it seems perfectly clear to van Inwagen that it can.  See my preceding post on this topic. So one of us is wrong, and if it is me, I'd like to know exactly why.  Let me add that 'Something is self-identical' is the prime candidate for such a thin translation.  If there is a thin translation, this is it.  Van Inwagen comes into the discussion only as a representative of the thin theory, albeit as the 'dean' of the thin theorists.

Consider the following formula in first-order predicate logic with identity that van Inwagen thinks adequately translates 'There are objects' and 'Something exists':

1. (∃x) (x = x).

It seems to me that there is nothing in this formula but syntax: there are no nonlogical expressions, no content expressions, no expressions like 'Socrates' or 'cat' or placeholders for such expressions such as  'a' and 'C.'  The parentheses can be dropped, and van Inwagen writes the formula without them. This leaves us with '∃,' three bound occurrences of the variable 'x,' and the identity sign '=.' 

Now here is my main question:  How can the extralogical and extrasyntactical fact that something exists be a matter of pure logical syntax?  How can this fact be expressed by a string of merely syntactical symbols: '∃,' 'x,' '='?

It is not a logical truth that something exists; it is a matter of extralogical fact.  There's this bloody world out there and it certainly wasn't sired by the laws of logic.  Logically, there might not have been anything at all.  It is true, but logically contingent, that something exists.  Compare (1) with the universal quantification

2. (x)(x =x).

If (1) translates 'Something exists,' then (2) translates 'Everything exists.'  But (2) is a logical truth, and its negation a contradiction.  Since (1) follows from (2), (1) is a logical truth as well.  But (1) is not a logical truth as we have just seen.  We face an aporetic triad:

a. '(x)(x =x)' is logically true.
b. '(∃x) (x = x)' follows from '(x)(x = x).'
c. '(∃x) (x = x)' adequately translates 'Something exists.'

Each limb is plausible, but they cannot all be true.   The truth of any two linbs entails the falsehood of the remaining one. For example, the first two entail that '(∃x) (x = x)' is logically true. But then (c) is false:  One sentence cannot be an adequate translation of a second if the first fails to preserve the modal status of the second.  To repeat myself: 'Something exists' is logically contingent whereas the canonical  translation is logically necessary.

Now which of the limbs shall we reject?  It is obvious to me that the third limb must be rejected, pace van Inwagen.

Now consider 'Everything exists.'  Can it be translated adequately as '(x)(x = x)'?  Obviously not.  The latter is a formal-logical truth. and its negation is a formal-logical contradiction.  But the negation of 'Everything exists' -- 'Something does not exist' -- is not a formal logical contradiction.  Therefore, 'Everything exists' is not a formal-logical truth.  And because it is not, it cannot be given the canonical translation.

Finally, consider 'Nothing exists.'  This is false, but logically contingent: there is no formal-logical necessity that something exist.  One cannot infer the existence of anything (or at least anything concrete) from the principles of formal logic alone.  The canonical translation of 'Nothing exists,' however -- (x)~(x = x)' -  is not contingently false, but logically false.  Therefore, 'Nothing exists' cannot be translated adequately as 'Everything is not self-identical.'

Van Inwagen and his master Quine are simply mistaken when they maintain that existence is what 'existential' quantification expresses. 

I Run, Therefore I Think

The atavism and simplicity and cleansing quality of a good hard run are particularly beneficial for Luftmenschen.  Paradoxically, the animality of running releases lofty (lüftig) thoughts.  Running along the ground one ascends into the aether.   Curro, ergo cogito.

Overheard at the Chess Club

"Analyze long, analyze wrong."  To which the kibitzing philosopher added, "In life as in chess."

The 'You Didn't Build That' Speech Revisited: Wieseltier Says Romney and Ryan are Lying

In His Grief and Ours: Paul Ryan's Nasty Ideal of Self-Reliance, Leon Wieseltier taxes Ryan and Mitt Romney with a simple lie (emphasis added):

It is no wonder that Ryan, and of course Romney, set out immediately to distort the president’s “you didn’t build that speech” in Roanoke, because in complicating the causes of economic achievement, and in giving a more correct picture of the conditions of entrepreneurial activity, Obama punctured the radical individualist mythology, the wild self-worship, at the heart of the conservative idea of capitalism. An honest reading of the speech shows that Romney and Ryan and their apologists are simply lying about it. The businessman builds his business, but he does not build the bridge without which he could not build his business. That is all. Is it everything? Surely it takes nothing away from the businessman, who retains his reason for his pride in his business. But it is not capitalist pride that Romney and Ryan are defending, it is capitalist pridefulness.

Here is the key passage from Obama's speech (emphasis added):

If you were successful, somebody along the line gave you some help. There was a great teacher somewhere in your life. Somebody helped to create this unbelievable American system that we have that allowed you to thrive. Somebody invested in roads and bridges. If you've got a business, you didn't build that. Somebody else made that happen. The Internet didn't get invented on its own. Government research created the Internet so that all the companies could make money off the Internet. The point is, is that when we succeed, we succeed because of our individual initiative, but also because we do things together.

What is the antecedent of the pronoun 'that' in the fifth sentence?  The general rule, one admitting of exceptions, is that the antecedent of a pronoun is the noun or noun phrase immediately preceding it in the context in question.  By that rule 'business' is the antecedent of 'that'  and Obama is saying that business owners did not build their businesses.  But since the rule allows exceptions, the context permits a   charitable reading: 'If you've got a business, you didn't build the roads and bridges and other infrastructuire without which your business would have been impossible.'

So there are two readings of Obama's words.  Both are permitted by the words themselves, but one is uncharitable and the other charitable.  On the first what he is saying is plainly false: no business person built his business.  On the second, what he is saying is trivially true and disputed by no one, namely, that no business could be built without various infrastructure already being in place. 

On either reading, there is a serious problem for Obama and his apologists.  Either Obama is is saying something that everyone, including Obama, knows is false, in which case he is lying, or he is saying something that goes without saying, something disputed by no one.  On the second reading Obama is commiting a straw man fallacy: he is portraying his opponents as holding a position that none of them holds. 

So if we are going to be charitable, then we ought to tax the president with a straw man fallacy.  But there is worse to come.  Behind the latter fallacy is a fallacy of false alternative.  Obama assumes, without justification, that if you didn't build the infrastructure without which your business could not exist, then government built it.  Or, to put it in the form of a disjunction: Either you as an individual built the the roads and bridges and tools or government built them for you.  But that is a false alternative.  Not everything that arises collectively is brought about by the government.  Obama confuses government with society.  Only some of what we achieve collectively is achieved by government agency.

Uncharitably read, Obama is lying.  Charitably read, his claim is doubly fallacious and doubly false.  It is false that conservatives maintain a rugged individualism according to which each of us creates himself ex nihilo.  And it is false that what is achieved collectively is achieved by government agency.

Now did Romney and Ryan lie about Obama's message?  No.  They interpreted his words in a way that the English language permits.  Their interpretation, of course, is uncharitable in the extreme.  After all, no one really believes that business people pull themselves up out of nothing by their own bootstraps. 

Is Wieseltier lying about Romney and Ryan? No, he is is just being stupid by failing to make an elementary distinction between sentence meaning and speaker's meaning.

Obama's gaffe will be and ought to be exploited to the hilt by the Republicans.  Politics is not dispassionate inquiry but war conducted by other means. 

Obama must be defeated.  Four more years of his collectivism  may harm the country irreparably.

Lanzetta Responds re: Kerouac

This is Danny Lanzetta. I saw your blog posting in response to my piece in the Huffington Post last week, "In Defense of Jack Kerouac..." Thanks for reading.

 

In your reaction, you wrote of my link to that famous OTR passage: "Lanzetta seems to be suggesting that this is a particularly bad specimen of  Kerouac's scrivening."

 

I went back and looked at the passage in question. Your reading of it could not be more correct. That is absolutely what I wrote. However, it is not what I meant. My point was supposed to be that Kerouac's "madness" sometimes led to the most beautiful and ecstatic writing one could ever read (thus, the link), while at other times it led to the mess that became his personal life (such as his terrible treatment of his daughter, Jan). After countless proofreadings and going through my piece with a fine-toothed comb, I simply missed the way that sentence read. A simple adjective, appropriately placed, could've saved me. Alas, I missed it. I apologize for the confusion.

 

I'd be grateful if you could pass along my apologies to your readers. Luckily, it was only a case of bad writing (my own) and not what would be an egregious denouncement of one of the most beautiful sentences ever put to paper.

 

Thanks again.

 

Well, Danny, there is certainly no need to apologize.  If you had meant that the famous OTR passage was the sort of purple prose an over-excited sophomore might write, that would have been a defensible claim.  But I am glad that is not what you meant.  In any case, it is very easy for a writer to fail to say what he means.

 

I must say I was very impressed at your willingness to accept criticism. 

Alypius and the Gladiators

The 28th of August is the Feast of St. Augustine in the Roman Catholic liturgy.  The following post from three years ago bears up well:

At the time of the Nicholas Berg beheading by al-Qaeda terrorists, a correspondent wrote to say that he watched the video only up to the point where the knife was applied to the neck, but refused to view the severing. He did right, for reasons given in Book Six, Chapter Eight of Augustine’s Confessions.

Alypius was a student of Augustine, first in their hometown of Thagaste, and later in Carthage. In the previous chapter, Augustine writes that in “the maelstrom of Carthaginian customs” Alypius was “sucked down into a madness for the circus.” Later, when Alypius preceded Augustine to Rome to study law, some friends persuaded him against his will to attend a gladiatorial show. Alypius thought he could observe the scene calmly and resist the temptation to blood lust. But he was wrong. When a gladiator fell in combat, and a mighty roar went up from the crowd, Alypius, overcome by curiosity, opened his eyes, drank in the sight, “...and was wounded more deeply in his soul than the man whom he desired to look at was wounded in his body.” Augustine continues:

As he saw that blood, he drank in savageness at the same time. He did not turn away, but fixed his sight on it, and drank in madness without knowing it. He took delight in that evil struggle, and became drunk on blood and pleasure. He was no longer the man who entered
there, but only one of the crowd that he had joined, and a true comrade of those who had brought him there. (Tr. J. K. Ryan)

In our decadent culture, we are not yet at the nadir of Roman brutality. But we are at the point where vast numbers of people find entertainment in, and see nothing wrong with, blood lust by itself or in permutation with sexual lust. For such people, and the legal sophists who misuse the First Amendment, the story of Alypius and the Gladiators can mean nothing.

To borrow a line from a 1997 Dylan song, “It's not dark yet, but it’s gettin’ there.”

I Was Forced to Show My Papers!

Voting this morning in the AZ state primary I was put in mind of an old post from a couple of years ago that bears reposting and editing:

Things are really getting bad here in the fascist state of Arizona.  Why just this morning I was forced to show ID when I went to vote.  I strolled into the polling place looking a fright after several hours of hiking.  I introduced myself as 'King Blog' but that cut no ice with the  old ladies who 'manned' the place.  They asked to see my driver's license! What chutzpah!  What bigotry!  A bunch of damned Nazis, if you want my opinion.  What if I forgot it, or never had one? Then the Nazi bastards would have disenfranchised me!  The very act of requesting ID is an act of

 disenfrachisement and intimidation.  Besides, it prevents me from voting twice, which I have a right to do. 

I should have adapted a line from B. Traven's The Treasure of the Sierra Madre.  Papers?  I don't need no stinkin' papers!  I'm a human being.  You just hate me because I smell like I spent the night under a bridge.  I have the right to do whatever I want, wherever I want, and vote wherever I want and as many times as I want. You Anglo bastards are raaacists because my skin isn't lily-white like yours and because my name ends in a vowel.

I'm gettin' the hell out of this rattlesnake-infested inferno of gun-totin' yahoos, rednecked racists, and xenophobic immigrant-bashers.  I'm going where a man can be free.  I'm headed for Castro's island paradise.  "Live free or die," as I always say.

Epitaph for an Anthologist

mr u will not be missed
who as an anthologist
sold the many on the few
not excluding mr u

e e cummings (1884-1962) quoted in Epigrams and Epitaphs, ed. Grigson, Faber and Faber, 1977. p. 212.

 

My Epitaph

Here he lies old blogger Bill
Whose thoughts once did the ether fill
But permalinks proved no exception
To the gen'ral rule of imperfection.

2016: Obama's America is a Must-See

Even-handed and extremely well-produced, 2016 exposes the anti-colonialist ideology that animates Obama's policy decisions.

According to NPR, "so far, 2016 has made more than nine million dollars. It's already the sixth highest grossing political documentary of all time."  It is even doing well in liberal New York City.  I saw it at 1:30 PM today, Monday, in a Mesa, Arizona, theater that was almost full.  That give me hope that change will come.

Here is a review.

To Call it an Exaggeration Would be an Understatement

There are statements so extreme that to call them exaggerations would be an understatement.  There are plenty of examples to be found in liberal precincts.

"The photo ID requirement is voter suppression. It disenfranchises minorities, the poor, the elderly.  It is an onerous barrier to voting."

Onerous?  In Pennsylvania a photo ID can be had free of charge.  In Arizona it costs a paltry $12 and is good for 12 years.  If you are 65 or older, or on SS disability, it is free.

Are our liberal pals exaggerating?  Actually it is more like lying.  It is the willful misuse of language to win at all costs.  Linguistic hijacking.

Academic Philosophy (with an addendum on Human Corruption)

Academic philosophy too often degenerates into a sterile intellectual game whose sole function is to inflate and deflate the egos of the participants.  But this is no surprise: everything human is either degenerate or will become degenerate.

..........................

Addendum: 2:45 PM

Long-time blogger-buddy and supplier of high-quality links and comments, Bill Keezer, comments:

Academic anything eventually degenerates either into ego battles or battles for status as grant securers.  In addition to tuition inflation the big money-maker for universities is the administration overhead awarded within grants and the supplement to salaries in some cases that allow them to forego raises or to reduce their portion of the payroll.   

Government corrupts all that it touches.

I agree with Bill's first point, but not with his second.  The source of moral corruption is not government, but the human being, his ignorance, his inordinate and disordered desires, and his free but wayward will.  Everything human beings are involved in is either corrupt or corruptible, and government is no exception, not because government is the unique source of corruption, but because government is a human, all-too-human, enterprise.

On my view, government is practically necessary.  Anarchism is for adolescents.  Some of what government does is good, some bad.  Governments in the free world defeated the Nazis; communist governments murdered 100 million in the 20th century. (Source: Black Book of Communism.)  Some of what is bad are unintended consequences of programs that were set up with good intentions.  Federally-insured student loans made it possible (or at least easier) for many of us to finance our educations.  (It is of course a debatable point whether it is a legitimate function of government to insure student loans.)  But lack of oversight on the part of the Feds, and the greediness of university administrators coupled with the laziness and prodigality of too many students has led to the education bubble.

What has happened is truly disgusting.  The price of higher education has skyrocketed, increasing out of all proportion to general inflation, while the quality of the product delivered has plummeted in some fields and merely declined in others.   There are young people graduating from law schools today with $150 K in debt and little prospect of a job sufficiently remunerative to discharge the debt in a reasonable time.

Can we blame the federal government for the education bubble?  Of course, if there had been no federally-insured loan program the bubble would not have come about.  But there was no necessity that the program issue in a bubble.  So we are brought back to the real root of the problem, human beings, their ignorance, greed, prodigality, and general lack of moral and intellectual virtue.

Compare the housing bubble.  Government must bear some of the blame through its bad legislation.  But no bubble would have occurred if consumers weren't stupid and lazy and greedy.  What sort of fool signs up for a negative amortization loan?  Am I blaming the victim?  Of course.  Blaming the victim is, within limits and in some cases, a perfectly reasonable and indeed morally necessary thing to do.  If you are complicit in your own being ripped-off through your own self-induced intellectual and moral defectiveness, then you must hold yourself and be held by others partially responsible.  And then there are the morally corrupt lenders themselves who exploited the stupidity, laziness, greediness and general lack of moral and intellectual virtue of the consumers.  A fourth factor is the corruption of the rating agencies. 

So, contra my friend Keezer, we cannot assign all the blame to government.  We need government, limited government.

Saturday Night at the Oldies: Scott McKenzie, San Francisco, Summer of Love

Nostalgia time again.  Scott McKenzie, famous for the 1967 anthem "San Francisco" penned by John Phillips of The Mamas and the Papas, is dead at 73.  Gen-Xer Mick LaSalle gets it right in his commentary:

The thing about that song is that . . . however naive and even sanctimonious it might be, it is so clearly a true expression of a mindset, of a vision, of a moment in time, of a generation, of an aspiration that, even if it is singing about a San Francisco that never happened and a dream that never came true and never really had a chance of coming true, and that had only a scant relationship with reality . . . it’s a precious thing.  It’s a document of a moment, but more than that, a perfect poetic expression of that moment.

It was not MY youth, but I can recognize in that song and in the purity of McKenzie’s vocal something that is as unmistakably honest, in its way, as Gershwin playing the piano, or Fred Astaire dancing, or Artie Shaw playing the clarinet.  It is youth finding itself in the world and saying the most beautiful thing it can think of saying at that particular moment. You can’t laugh that away.  You have to treasure that.  Really, you have to love it.

Speaking of the Mamas and Papas, here are some of my favorites:  Dedicated to the One I Love (1967), a cover almost as good as the Shirelles original.  But it is hard to touch the Shirelles. 

Twelve Thirty.  Creeque Alley. California Dreamin'.

And then there's Eric Burdon and the Animals, San Franciscan Nights from '67.

The so-called Summer of Love transpired 45 years ago. (My reminiscences of the Monterey Pop Festival of that same summer of '67 are reported here.) Ted Nugent, the guru of kill and grill, and a rocker singularly without musical merit in my humble opinion,  offers some rather intemperate reflections in a WSJ piece, The Summer of Drugs. Excerpts:

The 1960s, a generation that wanted to hold hands, give peace a chance, smoke dope and change the world, changed it all right: for the worse. America is still suffering the horrible consequences of
hippies who thought utopia could be found in joints and intentional disconnect.

[. . .]

While I salute and commend the political and cultural activism of the 1960s that fueled the civil rights movement, other than that, the decade is barren of any positive cultural or social impact. Honest people will remember 1967 for what it truly was.

Although I am not inclined to disagree too strenuously with Nugent's indictment, especially when it comes to drug-fueled self-destruction, Nugent misses much that was positive in those days. For one thing, there was the amazing musical creativity of the period, as represented by Dylan and the Beatles above all. This in stark contrast to the vapidity of '50s popular music. Has there been anything before or since in popular music that has come up the level of the best of Dylan?

The '60s also offered welcome relief from the dreary materialism and social conformism of the '50s. My generation saw through the emptiness of a life devoted to social oneupsmanship, status-seeking, and the piling up of consumer goods. We were an idealistic generation. We wanted something more out of life than job security in suburbia. (Frank Zappa: "Do your job, do it right! Life's a ball, TV tonight!")

We were seekers and questers, though there is no denying that some of us were suckers for charlatans and pied pipers like Timothy Leary. We questioned the half-hearted pieties and platitudes and hypocrisies of our elders. Some of the questioning was puerile and dangerously utopian, but at least we were questioning. We wanted life and we wanted it in abundance in rebellion against the deadness we perceived around us. We experimented with psychedelics to open the doors of perception, not to get loaded.

We were a destructive generation as well, a fact documented in Peter Collier and David Horowitz, Destructive Generation: Second Thoughts About the '60s. But the picture Nugent paints is onesided. Here is Dylan's "Blowing in the Wind" which was one of the anthems of the Civil Rights movement. Or give a listen to the Youngblood's Let's Get Together.  This song captures the positive spirit of the '60s, a spirit not much in evidence nowadays.

My Argument That 'Exist(s)' is not Univocal Revisited: No 'Is' of Predication?

On August 11th I wrote:

Suppose we acquiesce for the space of this post in QuineSpeak. 

Then 'Horses exist' says no more and no less than that 'Something is a horse.'  And 'Harry exists' says no more and no less than that 'Something is Harry.'  But the 'is' does not have the same sense in both translations.  The first is the 'is' of predication while the second is the 'is' of identity.  The difference  is reflected in the standard notation.  The propositional function in the first case is Hx.  The propositional function in the second case is x = h.  Immediate juxtaposition of predicate constant and free variable [with the predicate constant coming first] is the sign for predication.  '=' is the sign for identity.  Different signs for different concepts.  Identity is irreducible to predication which is presumably why first-order predicate logic with identity is so-called.

Those heir to the 'Fressellian' position, such as Quine and his epigoni, dare not fudge the distinction between the two senses of 'is' lately noted. That, surely, is a cardinal tenet of their brand of analysis.

So even along Quinean lines, the strict univocity of 'exist(s)' across all its uses cannot [pace van Inwagen] be upheld.  It cannot be upheld across the divide that separates general from singular existentials.

But the next morning I had a doubt about what I had written.  Is there an 'is' of predication in MPL (modern predicate logic)? I argued (above) that 'exist(s)' is not univocal: it does not in MPL have the same sense in 'Fs exist' and 'a exists.' The former translates as 'Something is (predicatively) an F' while the latter translates as 'Something is (identically) a.'  Kicked out the front door, the equivocity returns through the back door disguised as  an equivocation on 'is' as between predication and identity.

But if the 'is' in 'Grass is green' or 'Something is green' is bundled into the predicate in the Fregean manner, then it could be argued that there is no 'is' of predication in MPL distinct from the 'is' of identity and the 'is' of existence.  If so, my equivocity argument above collapses, resting as it does on the unexpungeable distinction between the 'is' or identity and the 'is' of predication.

Yesterday a note from Spencer Case shows that he is on to the same (putative) difficulty with my argument:

Hey Bill, I have a professor whose pet peeve is the claim that there is an 'is' of identity and an 'is' of predication. I don't know his arguments for thinking so, but his view is that 'is' is univocal and what differs is the content of the copula. If he's right, that would be a problem for you here. Do you know more about this position than I do?           

To sort this out we need to distinguish several different questions:

Q1. Is there a predicative use of 'is' in English?  Yes, e.g., 'Al is fat.'  This use is distinct from the existential use and the identitative use (and others that I needn't mention).  So I hope Spencer's professor is not denying the plain linguistic fact that in English there is an 'is' of predication and an 'is' of identity and that they are distinct.

Q2. Must there be a separate sign for the predicative tie in a logically perspicuous artificial language such as MPL (modern predicate logic, i.e., first-order predicate logic with identity)?  No.  When we symbolize 'Al is fat' by Fa, there is no separate sign for the predicative tie.  But there is a sign for it, namely, the immediate juxtaposition of the predicate constant and the individual constant with the predicate constant to the left of the individual constant. So we shouldn't confuse a separate or stand-alone sign with a sign.  Other non-separate signs are conceivable exploiting different fonts and different colors, etc. 

Q3.  Must there be some sign or other for predication in a logically adequate language such as MPL? How could there fail to be?  If our logical language is adequate, then it has to be able to symbolize predications such as 'Al is fat.'  And note that existentials such as 'Fat cats exist' cannot be put into MPL without a sign for predication.  '(∃x)(Fx & Cx)' employs non-separate signs for predication.

Q4.  Is the predicative tie reducible or eliminable?  No.  For Frege, there is no need for a logical copula or connector to tie object a to concept F when a falls under F.  The concept is "unsaturated" (ungesaettigt).  Predicates and their referents (Bedeutungen) are inherently gappy or incomplete.   So the predicate 'wise' would be depicted as follows: '___ wise.'  What is thereby depicted is a sentential function or open sentence.  A (closed) sentence results when a name is placed in the gap. The concept to which this predicate or sentential function refers is gappy in an analogous sense. Hence there is no need for for an 'is' of predication in the logical language or for an instantiation relation. Object falls under concept without the need of a tertium quid to connect them.

I would imagine that Spencer Case's professor has some such scheme in mind.  One problem is that it is none too clear what could be meant by a gappy or incomplete or unsaturated entity.  That a predicate should be gappy is tolerably clear, but how could the referent of a predicate be gappy given that the referent of a predicate is a single item and not the manifold of things to which the predicate applies?  The idea is not that concepts exist only when instantiated, but that  their instantiation does not require the services of a nexus of predication: the concept has as it were a slot in it that accepts the object without the need of a connector to hold them together.  (Think of a plug and a socket: there is no need for a third thing to connect the plug to the socket: the 'female' receptacle just accepts the 'male' plug.)

There are other problems as well.

But here is the main point.  Frege cannot avoid speaking of objects falling under concepts, of a's falling under F but not under G.  If the notion of the unsaturatedness of concepts is defensible, then Frege can avoid speaking of a separate predicative tie that connects objects and concepts.  But he cannot get on without predication and without a sign for predication.

I conclude that my original argument is sound.  There is is and must be a sign for predication in any adequate logic, but it needn't be a stand-alone sign.  (Nor need its referent be a stand-alone entity.)   Compare '(∃x)Hx' to '(∃x)(x = h)' as translations of 'Horses exist' and 'Harry exists,' respectively.  The identity sign occurs in only one of the translations, the second.  And the sign for predication occurs only in the first.  There is no univocity of 'exist(s)' because there is no univocity of 'is' in the translations. 

Life is for Living

Life is for living. And risks are for taking.  But Henry David Thoreau says it best: "A man sits as many risks as he runs."  The other side of the coin is that the risks must be proportional to the rewards.

No living well without risks.  No living long without circumspection. 

Why Do Jews Do So Well and Arabs So Poorly?

I don't think much of Richard Cohen as a commentator on the passing scene, but his A Difference Beyond Question is right on target in his defense of Mitt Romney for pointing out the obvious:

The cultural difference between Israel and its Arab neighbors is so striking that you would think it beyond question. But when Mitt Romney attributed the gap between Israel's economic performance and the Palestinians' -- "Culture makes all the difference," he said in Israel -- the roof came down on him. PC police the world over raised a red card, giving him demerits for having the temerity to notice the obvious. Predictably, Saeb Erekat, chief Palestinian negotiator and a member of the executive committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, denounced the statement as "racist." It was, of course, just the opposite.

But I want to take issue with the following sentence:  "I do know, though, that if you eliminate what would certainly be condemned as a racist explanation -- Jews as inherently smarter than non-Jews -- then you are left with culture . . . ."  What I object to is Cohen's apparent acquiescence in the false notion that a racial explanation must be a racist explanation.  I take no position on whether Jewish superiority is best explained racially or culturally.  I am objecting to the conflation of the racial with the racist.

There are two distinctions operative here and they ought not be conflated.  There is a distinction between the racial and the cultural, and a distinction between the racial and the racist.  The distinctions cut perpendicular to one another.  If some phenomenon has a racial explanation, as opposed to a cultural explantion, it doesn't follow that the explanation is racist or that the people advancing it are racist.

Suppose that Jews as a group are smarter than non-Jews.  If that is true, then it is true. (And what I just wrote is a tautology, hence logically true: it doesn't get any better than that.)  Now if a statement is true, how can it be racist?  This is what I don't understand.  Truth is truth. Facts are facts.  There are racial facts, facts about race, but no racist facts.  If blacks are 12-14% of the U. S. population, then that is a racial fact.  But it is not a racist fact.  Nor is someone who states it, just in virtue of his stating it, a racist.  A person who states it may be, accidentally, a racist; but he is not, just in virtue of stating it, a racist.  Similaarly, there are facts about sex, but such facts are not sexist facts, and there are the sorts of facts that gerontologists study, but they are not ageist facts.

There are racial explanations, explanations in terms of race, but a racial explanation is not a racist explanation.  Facts, propositions, explanations -- these are not the sorts of item that could be racist or nonracist.  To think otherwise would appear to be a Rylean category mistake.  People are racist or not.

The Obama Movie, 2016

I'll be seeing  it soon.  Here are some remarks on the movie by Thomas Sowell. Excerpts:

It was refreshing to see how addressing adults as adults could be effective, in an age when so many parts of the media address the public as if they were children who need a constant whirlwind of sounds and movements to keep them interested.

That is one of my main objections to the destructive HollyWeird libruls who produce the mindless crap that fill our screens.  I continue in this vein, in only slightly more measured terms, in What I Look For in a Movie: A Rant.

The story of Barack Obama, however, is not just the story of how one man came to be the way he is. It is a much larger story about how millions of Americans came to vote for, and some to idolize, a man whose fundamental beliefs and values are so different from their own.

For every person who sees Obama as somehow foreign there are many others who see him as a mainstream American political figure -- and an inspiring one.

This D'Souza attributes to Barack Obama's great talents in rhetoric, and his ability to project an image that resonates with most Americans, however much that image may differ from, or even flatly contradict, the reality of Obama's own ideological view of the world.

What is that ideological view?

The Third World, or anti-colonial, view is that the rich nations have gotten rich by taking wealth from the poor nations. It is part of a much larger vision, in which the rich in general have gotten rich by taking from the poor, whether in their own country or elsewhere.

Whatever its factual weaknesses, it is an emotionally powerful vision, to which many people have dedicated their lives, and for which some have even risked their lives. Some of these people appear in this documentary movie, as they have appeared throughout the formative phases of Barack Obama's life.

The Reverend Jeremiah Wright is just the most visible and vocal of a long line of such people who played crucial roles in Obama's evolution. When Jeremiah Wright thundered about how "white folks' greed runs a world in need," he captured the essence of the Third World or anti-colonial vision.

But many of the other mentors, allies, family and friends of Barack Obama over the years were of the same mindset, as this documentary demonstrates.

More important, the movie "2016" demonstrates how so many of Obama's actions as President of the United States, which D'Souza had predicted on the basis of his study of Obama's background, are perfectly consistent with that ideology, however inconsistent it is with the rhetoric that gained him the highest office in the land.

 

Existentials and Their Equivalents: Aid and Comfort for the Thin Theory?

I grant that logical equivalents not containing 'exist(s)' or cognates can be supplied for all singular and general existentials.  Thus, 'Socrates exists' can be translated, salva veritate, as 'Something is identical to Socrates,' or, in canonical notation,  '(∃x)(x = Socrates).'  Accordingly,

Socrates exists =_df (∃x)(x = Socrates).

But if the definiens preserves the truth of the definiendum, then the definiendum must be true, hence must be meaningful, in which case first-level uses of 'exist(s)' must be meaningful.  Pace Russell, 'Socrates exists' is nothing like 'Socrates is numerous.'

What's more, the definiendum is prior in the order of understanding to the definiens.  If I didn't already understand 'Socrates exists,' then I would not  be able to understand '(∃x)(x = Socrates).'  You couldn't teach me the Quinean translation if I didn't already understand the sentence to be translated.

One conclusion we can draw from this is that if 'exist(s)' is univocal across general and singular existentials, then  existence cannot be instantiation.  For the left-hand side of the definition does not make an instantiation claim.  It is simply nonsense to say of an individual that it is instantiated.  And if the right-hand side makes an instantiation claim, then we need those creatures of darkness, haecceity-properties.

But we don't have to give the RHS a Fressellian reading; we can give it a Quinean-Inwagenian reading.  (We could call this the 'Van' reading.)  Accordingly: There exists an x such that x = Socrates. On the Van reading, in stark contrast to the Fressellian reading,  'exist(s)' can be construed as a first-level predicate, as synonymous to the predicate 'is identical to something.'  Accordingly:

y exists =_df(∃x)(x = y).

On the reasonable assumptions that (i) 'exist(s)' is an admissible first-level predicate and that (ii) there are no nonexistent objects, this last definition is unobjectionable.  If Tom exists, then there exists an object to which he is identical.  And if there exists an object to which Tom is identical, then Tom exists.  No doubt!

The interesting  question, however, is whether any of this affords aid and comfort to the thin theory.  Well, what exactly is the thin theory?  It is the theory that existence is exhaustively understandable in purely logical, indeed purely syntactical, terms.  The thin theory is a deflationary theory that aims  to eliminate existence as a metaphysical topic.  It aims to supplant the metaphysics of existence (of whatever stripe: Thomist, Heideggerian, etc.) with the sober logic of 'exist(s).'  The aim of the thin theory is to show that there is no sense in which existence is a non-logical property of individuals.  The aim is to be able to consign all those tomes of metaphysical rubbish to the flames with a good conscience.

Now glance back at the definition.  Every mark on the RHS  is a bit of logical syntax.  Ignoring the parentheses which in this instance can be dropped, we have the backwards-E, two bound occurrences of the variable 'x,' a free occurrence of the variable 'y,' and the sign for identity.  There are no non-logical expressions such as 'Socrates' or 'philosopher.'  On the LHS, however, we find 'exists' which is not obviously a logical expression.  Indeed,  I claim that it is not a logical expression like 'some' or 'all' or 'not.'  It is a 'content' expression.  What could be more important and contentful than a thing's existing?  If it didn't exist it would be nothing and couldn't have properties or stand in relations.

Surely my sheer be-ing is my most impressive 'feature.'  "To be or not to be, that is the question."

Since there is content on the LHS there has to be content on the RHS.  But how did it get there, given that every expression on the RHS is just a bit of syntax? In only one way: the domain of the bound variables is a domain of existents.  But now it should be clear that the definition gives us no deflationary account of existence.  What it does is presuppose existence by presupposing that the domain of quantification is a domain of existents.  Existence is that which existents have in common and in virtue of which they exist.

In short, I have no objection to the definition read in the 'Van' as opposed to the  'Fressellian' way.  It is perfectly trivial!  My point, however, is that it gives no aid and comfort to the thin theory.  A decent thin theory would have to show how we can dispence with existence entirely by eliminating it  in favor of purely logical concepts.  But that is precisely what we cannot do given that the domain of quantification is a domain of existents.  (Of course, if the domain were populated by Meinongian nonexistent objects, then the definition would be false). 

Friday Cat Blogging

“The weakest link in a chain is the strongest because it can break it.”
- Stanislaw Lec

Some Aphorisms of Stanislaw Jerzy Lec

I have discovered the aphorisms of Stanislaw Jerzy Lec via a reference in a book by Josef Pieper.  Here are a few that  impressed me from More Unkempt Thoughts (Curtis Publishing, 1968, tr. Jacek Galazka), the only book of Lec's I could easily lay hands on.

No snowflake in an avalanche ever feels responsible. (9)

Why can't you believe in paradise on earth when you know there is hell on earth? (10)

When they blow the horn of plenty this loud, it must be empty. (15)

In him there is a void filled to the brim with erudition. (18)

Do not greet people with open arms.  Why make yourself easier to crucify? (19)

Take good care of yourself: Property of the State. (22)

Cannibals prefer men who have no spines. (28)

To keep fit fame needs the massage of applause. (31)

Ladies, do not complain about men:  their aims are as transparent as your clothes. (36)

The strongest brakes fail on the path of least resistance. (37)

Percussion wins every discussion. (38)

You cannot rely on people to remember, or, alas, to forget. (42).

In some countries life is so open you can spot the Secret Police everywhere. (42)

Not every shi- can age gracefully and become valuable guano. (48)

America! We gave you Kosciuszko and Pulaski; please send us some used clothes. (48)

Woe to those who have more hate than enemies. (49)

Who created the world? So far only God admits to it. (52)

When reasons are weak, attitudes stiffen. (52)

He had a clear conscience. Never used it. (53)

Bread opens all mouths. (56)

You may give a barbarian a knife or a gun, but never a pen.  He will turn you into barbarians as well. (56)

How did they get a permit to create the world? (57) 

The Sound of One Hand Slapping

To hear the sound of one hand slapping twice, turn the other cheek.

To Doctor Empiric

When men a dangerous disease did 'scape
    Of old they gave a cock to Aesculape
Let me give two, that doubly am got free
    From my disease's danger, and from thee.

Ben Jonson (1753?-1637) from Epigrams and Epitaphs (London: Faber and Faber, 1977), p. 27.

At the very end of the Phaedo, having drunk the hemlock, Socrates is reported by Plato as saying to Crito, "I owe a cock to Asclepius; do not forget to pay it." (tr. F. J. Church) Asclepius is the Greek god of healing.  Presumably, Socrates wanted to thank the god for his recovery from the sickness of life itself.

Nietzsche comments at the the beginning of "The Problem of Socrates" in The Twilight of the Idols:

Concerning life, the wisest men of all ages have judged alike: it is no good.  Always and everywhere one has heard the same sound from their mouths -- a sound full of doubt, full of melancholy, full of weariness of life, full of resistance to life.  Even Socrates said, as he died: "To live -- that means to be sick a long time: I owe Asclepius the Savior a rooster." (tr. W. Kaufmann)

Coyne versus Vallicella Vapaista Valinnoista

I can't read it, but maybe you can.  It is a response to my Jerry Coyne on Why You Really Don't Have Free Will.

Update (22 August):  Ilari Malkki writes:

I noticed that you posted a link to my blog post "Coyne versus Vallicella Vapaista Valinnoista" (Coyne vs Vallicella on Free Will).  Thanks for the link! The main language is Finnish, so I´m not too  surprised that you can´t read it.

One correction, though. It is not a "response" to you, but to Jerry  Coyne. I just lay out your arguments on that post and defend them  against Coyne.

Trotsky's Faith

Leon Trotsky died on this date in 1940.  Here is something I posted about two and a half years ago:

The last days of Lev Davidovich Bronstein, better known as Leon Trotsky, prime mover of the October 1917 Russian Revolution, are the subject of Bertrand M. Patenaude's Trotsky: The Downfall of a Revolutionary (HarperCollins, 2009).  It held my interest from the first page to the last, skillfully telling the story of Trotsky's Mexican exile, those who guarded him, and their failure ultimately to protect him from an agent of the GPU/NKVD sent by Stalin to murder him.  Contrary to some accounts, it was not an ice pick that Ramon Mercader drove into Trotsky's skull, but an ice axe.  Here is how Trotsky ends his last testament, written in 1940, the year of his death:

For forty-three years of my conscious life I have been a revolutionary; and for forty-two I have fought under the banner of Marxism . . . I will die a proletarian revolutionary, a Marxist, a dialectical materialist and, consequently, an irreconcilable atheist.  My faith in the communist future of mankind is no less ardent, indeed it is even stronger now than it was in the days of my youth. [. . .] Natasha has just come up to the window from the courtyard and opened it wider so that the air might enter more freely into my room.  I can see the bright green strip of grass beneath the wall, and the clear blue sky above the wall, and sunlight is everywhere.  Life is beautiful.  Let the future generations cleanse it of evil,
oppression, and violence, and enjoy it to the full. (Patenaude, pp. 234-235)

No pie-in-the-sky for old Trotsky, but pie-in-the-future.  Those of us who take religion seriously needn't deny that it can serve as opium for some.  But if one can see that, then one should also be able to see that secular substitutes for religion can be just as narcotic.   Why is utopian opium less narcotic than the religious variety?  Why is a faith in Man and his future more worthy of credence than faith in God?

I should think that it is less credible.  Note first that there is no Man, only men.  And we human beings are a cussedly diverse and polyglot lot, a motley assortment of ornery sons-of-bitches riven by tribalisms and untold other factors of division.  The notion that we are all going to work together to create a workers' paradise or any sort of earthly paradise is a notion too absurd to swallow given what we know about human nature, and in particular, what we know of the crimes of communism.  In the 20th century, communists  murdered 100 million to achieve their utopia without achieving it.  That is a lot of eggs to waste for a nonexistent omelet.

We know Man does not exist, but we do not know that God does not exist. Religious faith, therefore, has a bit more to recommend it than secular faith.  You say God does not exist? That may be so. But the present question is not whether God exists or not, but whether belief in Man makes any sense and can substitute for belief in God. I say it doesn't and can’t, that it is a sorry substitute if not outright delusional. We need help that we cannot provide for ourselves, either individually or collectively. The failure to grasp this is of the essence of the delusional Left, which, refusing the tutelage of tradition and experience, and having thrown overboard every moral standard,  is ever ready to spill oceans of blood in pursuit of their utopian fantasies.

There may be no source of the help we need. Then the conclusion to draw is that we should get by as best we can until Night falls, rather than making things worse by drinking the Left's utopian Kool-Aid.

Trotsky, as you can see from the quotation, believed in a redemptive future.  Life in this world is beautiful and will be cleansed by future generations of evil, oppression, and violence.  But even if this fantasy future were achieved, it could not possibly redeem the countless millions who have suffered and died in the most horrible ways since time beyond memory.  Marxist redemption-in-the-future would be a pseudo-redemption even if it were possible, which it isn't. 

There is also the moral and practical absurdity of a social programme that employs present evil, oppression, and violence in order to extirpate future evil, oppression, and violence.  Once the totalitarian State is empowered to do absolutely anything in furtherance of its means-justifying ends it will turn on its own creators as it did on Trotsky.  Because there is no such thing as The People, 'power to the people' is an empty and dangerous phrase and a cover for the tyranny of the vanguard or the dictator.  The same goes for 'dictatorship of the proletariat.'  What it comes to in practice is the dictatorship of the dictator.

The tragedy of Trotsky is that of a man of great theoretical and practical gifts who squandered his life pursuing a fata morgana. It is interesting to compare Edith Stein and Lev Davidovich Bronstein.  Each renounced the present world and both set out in quest of a Not-Yet, one via contemplation, the other via  revolution.  Which chose the path of truth, which that of illusion?  it is of course possible that both quests were illusory.

How strange the stage of this life and the characters that pass upon it, their words and gestures resounding for a time before fading away.

Obama: One Cool Dude

But cool is all that remains. 

A Razor's Edge

One must both strive and submit, doubt and believe, question and trust.

Degradation

We degrade ourselves and yet expect the source of all elevation to visit and guide us?

Ambiguity

'She was determined to succeed.'

'Not So Much'

Do I like the increasing usage of this phrase?  Not so much.

Literarily Pleasing, but Incoherent

I found the folllowing quotation here:

But now I have come to believe that the whole world is an enigma, a harmless enigma that is made terrible by our own mad attempt to interpret it as though it had an underlying truth. 

— Umberto Eco

The world is a play of phenomena, an enigmatic play of appearances beneath which there is no reality.  Harmless in itself, the world is made terrible by us when we make the mad attempt to lay bare an underlying truth it fails to possess.  Part of Eco's thought, I take it, is that those who seek the world's underlying truth fool themselves into thinking that they have found it, and having convinced themselves that they are now in possession of it, feel entitled and perhaps even obligated to impose it on others for their own good.  But these others, naturally, resist the imposition and react violently.  Hence the pursuit of the truth leads to contention and bloodshed. Better to live and let live and admit that there is a variety of perspectives, a diversity of interpretations, but no God's Eye perspective and no final interpretation, let alone an uninterpreted reality in itself, a true world hidden by the world of appearances.   The world is interpretation all the way down.  Being has no bottom.

 

The line of thought is seductive but incoherent.  If the world is an enigma, then it is true that it is an enigma.  If it is harmless, then it is true that it harmless.  If it is made terrible by our attempt to interpret it, then it is true that it is made terrible by our attempt to interpret it.  If our attempt is mad, then it is true that our attempt is mad.  And if it has no underlying truth, then it is true that it has no underlying truth.

 

If that is the truth, then there is after all an underlying truth and the world cannot be a play of relativities, of  shifting perspectives, of mere interpretations.  If the world is such-and-such, then it is, and doesn't merely seem.

Some Recent Writing on Kerouac

October is Kerouac month hereabouts and she is still a good six weeks off.  But Danny Lanzetta's In Defense of Kerouac and Other Flawed Literature should be noted before it scrolls into cyber-oblivion.  Excerpt:

Kerouac's work is undoubtedly sophomoric at times. He is hopelessly naïve about people, which sometimes leads to this and other times just comes off as laziness, a selfish desire to write the way he wanted to write and live the way he wanted to live, collateral damage be damned.

The first link is to this OTR passage:

The only people for me are the mad ones, the ones mad to live, mad to talk, mad to be saved, desirous of everything at the same time, the ones who never yawn or say a commonplace thing but burn, burn, burn like fabulous roman candles exploding like spiders across the stars and in the middle you see the blue centerlight pop and everybody goes 'Awww!"

Lanzetta seems to be suggesting that this is a particularly bad specimen of  Kerouac's scrivening.  But although too often quoted, it is passages like this that grabbed my attention and gave me shivers back in the '60s  and that still do now in my 60s.  My 'beatitude' is considerably more measured these days, and it's a good thing too: too much 'madness' leads to an early grave.  Jack's prodigious quaffing of the joy juice caught up with him in '69 at the tender age of 47, and his hero Neal Cassady (the Dean Moriarty of On the Road) was found dead on the railroad tracks near San Miguel Allende, Mexico the year before a few days shy of his 42nd birthday.

But it is for the hyper-romanticism and the heartfelt gush & rush that some of us read Kerouac still despite his many literary flaws, not to mention the mess he made of his life and the lives of others.  He was no cool beatnik.  He was mad to live, to talk, to feel, to know, to be saved.  He was a restless dreamer, a lonesome traveler, a dharma seeker, a desolation angel passing through this vale of tears & mist, a pilgrim on the via dolorosa of this dolorous life, a drifter on the river of samsara hoping one day to cross to the Far Shore.

More in the Kerouac category.

The Last Words of Leon Trotsky

On this date in 1940 in Mexico City Ramon Mercader drove an ice axe (not an ice pick as some accounts have it) into the skull of Leon Trotsky.  He died the next day.  Here we read:

Mercader later testified at his trial:

I laid my raincoat on the table  in such a way as to be able to remove the ice axe which was in the pocket. I  decided not to miss the wonderful opportunity that presented itself. The moment  Trotsky began reading the article, he gave me my chance; I took out the ice axe  from the raincoat, gripped it in my hand and, with my eyes closed, dealt him a  terrible blow on the head.

According to Joseph Cannon, the secretary of the Socialist Workers Party  (USA), Trotsky's last words were "I will not survive this attack. Stalin  has finally accomplished the task he attempted unsuccessfully before."

Trotsky, who didn't shrink from murder and brutality in pursuit of his utopian fata morgana, met his end brutally. Live by the sword, die by the sword.

Gratitude

Every day find something to be grateful for. 

It might be the regularity of nature.  Without it, how would you make coffee?  And then there is coffee itself and its wonderful taste.  What a marvellous, yet harmless, drug!  And then there are the  thoughts that percolate up under its agency.  There are so many of them swarming and demanding attention.   Some are even worth writing down. Your notebooks lay ready: they weren't destroyed during the night.  And the pens too.  Your fingers are supple and free of arthritis.  And there is your library of  books, thousands of them, to supply you with thought- and blog-fodder . . . .

But if you want to be miserable you should be able to find something to kvetch about.

Difficulties

Many difficulties are to be subdued where alone they reside: in your own head. 

Doubt, the Engine of Inquiry

Paul Brunton, Notebooks, vol. 13, part II, p. 10, #48:

It is the first operation of  philosophical training to instill doubt, to free the mind of all those numerous suggestions and distortions imposed on it by others since childhood and maintained by its own slavish acceptance, total unawareness, or natural incapacity.

Or as I have put it more than once in these pages: Doubt is the engine of inquiry, the motor of mental development. Of course, doubting  and questioning are not ends in themselves, but means to the attainment of such insight as it is possible for us to attain.

Ron Radosh on a Useful Idiot Who Thinks Castro's Island a Paradise

Required reading

Saturday Night at the Oldies: Midnight and Moonlight

Eric Clapton, After Midnight

Thelonious Monk, 'Round Midnight

Jack Kerouac, Old Angel Midnight

Allman Bros., Midnight Rider

Rolling Stones, Midnight Rambler

B. B. King, et al., Midnight Hour

Maria Muldaur, Midnight at the Oasis  (This one goes out to Mary Korzen)

Patsy Cline, Walkin' After Midnight

Joey Powers, Midnight Mary.  A one-hit wonder.

Kenny Ball, Midnight in Moscow  One of many memorable instrumentals from the early '60s.

Rolling Stones, Moonlight Mile

Doors, Moonlight Drive

Anne Murray, Shadows in the Moonlight (This one goes out to K. P.)

Ludwig van Beethoven, Moonlight Sonata.  A part of it anyway with scenes from the great Coen Bros. film, "The Man Who Wasn't There."

Van Inwagen on Quine on Existence

From Peter van Inwagen, "McGinn on Existence" in Modes of Existence: Papers in Ontology and Philosophical Logic, eds. Bottani et al., Ontos Verlag, 2006, p. 106:

There is the theory of Quine, according to which the two oppositions [that between being and non-being and that between existence and non-existence] are not two but one.  Existence and being are the same.  Existence or being is what is expressed by phrases like 'there is,' 'there are,' and 'something is.'  And, similarly, non-existence is what is expressed by phrases like 'there is no, 'there are,' and 'nothing is.'  Thus, 'Universals exist' means neither more nor less than 'There are universals,'  and the same goes for the pairs 'Carnivorous cows do not exist'/'Nothing is both carnivorous and a cow' and 'The planet Venus exists'/'Something is the planet Venus.'  This outline constitutes the essence of Quine's philosophy of being and existence.

And an accurate and succinct outline it is.  But it just reinforces me in my conviction of the wrongheadedness of Quine's version of the thin theory of existence.

I grant that existence and being are the same.  My objections begin with the assimilation of 'exists' to 'something.'  The following are logically equivalent:

Cats exist
There are cats
Something is a cat.

and the same goes for:

Mermaids do not exist
There are no mermaids
Nothing is a mermaid.

But the thin theorist goes beyond the relatively uncontroversial claim of logical equivalence to the eminently dubious claim that the meaning (van Inwagen uses this word above) of 'exist(s)' is exhausted by the meaning of 'something' and the meaning of 'not exist' is exhausted by the meaning of 'nothing.'

To sort this out, we first note that 'something' splits into 'some' and 'thing.'  To appreciate this, observe that the following are nonsensical

Some is a cat
Thing is a cat.

Equally nonsensical are their canonical counterparts:

(∃ )(x is a cat)
( x) (x is cat).

So both  'some' and 'thing' are needed for  'Something is a cat' -- '(∃x)(x is a cat)' -- to make sense. 

Now it is obvious that existence is not expressed by 'some' or '∃' since these are merely signs for particular (as opposed to universal) logical quantity.  Existence is not someness.  Existence is not expressed by '∃.'  And it is obvious that existence is not expressed by the variable 'x,' which is merely the canonical stand-in for the third-person singular pronoun, 'it.'  It is obvious, I hope, that one  cannot express the thought that cats exist by saying 'It is a cat.'  Existence is not 'itness.'  Existence is not expressed by 'x' any more than it is expressed by '∃.'

So existence cannot be expressed by the quantifier part of 'something' or the variable part.  Is existence expressed by both together?  No.  Putting together two pieces of mere logical syntax just gves you more logical syntax.  If existence is to come into the picture, we have to get off the plane of mere logical syntax: there has to be some reference to the real world. Suppose we write 'Something is a cat' as

Some thing is a cat.

But now the cat is out of the bag.  For surely these things one is quantifying over are existing things: 'thing' is a variable having existing values.  So to be perfectly clear, one must write:

Some existing thing is a cat.

And now the explanatory circularity of the Quinean account is obvious.  We were promised an account of existence in terms of the so-called existential quantifier.  But the account on offer presupposes the very 'thing' we want an account of, namely, existence.  Clearly, one must presuppose that the objects in the domain of quantification are existing objects if the logical equivalences above mentioned are to hold. 

The Quietist on the Delights of Escapism

There are the undeniable and readily accessible delights of escapism into scholarship, and science, and research and inquiry of all sorts.  When 'reality' becomes too much to bear, what is wrong with retreating into an ivory tower?  Who can rightfully begrude us our right to peace and quiet and happiness?

You say that there are more pressing concerns than the nature and extent of the influence of Avicenna on Aquinas' De Ente et Essentia?  No doubt.  But do you really believe that your becoming hot and bothered over these 'pressing concerns' will lead to any improvement?  Are you sure about that?  And isn't your political activism your mode of escape from something or other?  I like peace and quiet; you like 'drama' and contention.  To each his own.

Thus spoke the quietist.

Looking Beyond for Meaning

We look beyond the moments of this life for meaning.  And we must look beyond the 'moment' of this life as a whole if this life is to have meaning.

Death and Time

Death is as certain as the passage of time -- and as real.  But how real is that?

Relatives

Some want to stay in touch, not on the basis of what one actually and presently is, but on the basis of what one was or was imagined by them to be.  And so I rarely visit the homes of my relatives.  For, as Emerson brilliantly quips in a related connection, "I do not want to be alone."

Identity and Diversity

It is curious that the partisans of the politics of identity should make such a fuss about diversity.

The Philosopher and the Conservative

One cannot be a philosopher without believing in the power of reason.  But one cannot be a conservative without doubting its power to order our affairs and ameliorate our condition.

Equally, one cannot be a philosopher without doubting -- doubt being the engine of inquiry -- and one cannot be a conservative without believing, that is, without accepting as true much that one cannot prove.

To live well we must somehow tread a razor's edge between unexamined belief and beliefless examination.

I Married an Animal!

You are and you marry both a person and a member of a zoological species.  And so you must be concerned not only with person-to-person compatibility but with  animal-to-animal as well.  Can she stand your smell, and you hers?