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Thursday, January 03, 2013


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One may argue that even simple modes have at least two constituents--one, they are simple and two, they are not constituents of objects, and two point five, they might or might not have constituents. A third might be that they are unlike complex or other modes, fourth might be that they can be perceived or intuited by men, fifth might be that some people don't know or care about them, sixth might be that they fit into someone's ontological scheme, seventh might be that I am thinking of them on this date, eigth might be that a mode is itself an object. etc., etc.
Seems no necessity not to proceed thus.

Identity dependent on the objects they characterize? How very odd -- what the heck kind of object is it? Seems to me that if you strip away all character, you have no object whatsoever to characterize. There is nothing left and so to say that modes characterize an object is inaccurate. More accurate would be to say that
an object simply is a collection of modes--- and avoid positing
the phantom "object" that modes are supposed to characterize. I invoke Ockham.
No identity apart from objects? But then if these are modes they must have something in common with all other modes---even modes that make up different objects. They must have some commonality or how could they all be modes? So, to some degree mode's identity does not depend upon any particualr object in so far as they are modes and have mode-ness.

And one may argue alternately, that one is free to say that the modes that make up collectively the object are unique and unconnected with any other modes--by virtue that they make up a unique particular apart from all others. But again, of course, how, one may ask, can they be put into the category of mode at all, since all modes share some sameness, some commonality, and so cannot be entirely unique. But if a mode shares its mode-ness with all other modes, what part then is unique? Seems to me you can't identify tell me which part exactly, of the mode is unique and which is common---
This exemplifies to me the difficulty of the issue you deal with, which boils down to the question: what is same and different? ---Identity, in other words. And oh what a slippery thing that is.

Thanks for the comments, Susan.

1. If different predicates are true of a mode, it doesn't follow that the mode has constituents.

2. Lowe's idea is that the particular whiteness of Socrates is dependent on the object (individual substance) Socrates to be what it is. That does not imply that the object is a bare particular. Necessarily, S. instaniates the kind *human.* And necessarily, S. has some modes or other. It is just that there is no necessity that he be white or sweaty or sunburned. A mode, however, is necessarily tied to the object of which it is the mode.

Your second thought in the second para. has merit. Not too clear what you are saying in the third para.

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