Bill reveals in his post, Could the Meaning of Life Be the Quest for the Meaning of Life, that he “toyed with the notion that the meaning of life just is the search for its meaning.” He concludes that if the meaning of life were merely the searching for it, then there would be no meaning, strictly speaking. Why? In Part A I outline Bill’s reasoning in the form of a reductio where (*) sentences are assumptions and (1*) is the assumption Bill entertains. In Part B I outline Bill’s argument that he gives elsewhere that supports the crucial premises of his Reductio Argument. In Part C I will show that his argument outlined in Part B is not sound and briefly describe a theory that is not subject to his argument.
A. Bill’s Reductio Argument
Suppose for the sake of the argument that
1*. The meaning of life is identical to the search for meaning;
2. If the meaning of life is the search for it, then the meaning of life is subjective;
3. If the meaning of life is subjective, then life has no meaning;
4. If the meaning of life is the search for it, then life has no meaning; (from 2 and 3)
Therefore,
5. If life has meaning, then it cannot be identical to the search for meaning; (from 4)
Suppose one holds that
6*. Life has meaning.
It follows that
7. Necessarily, the meaning of life is not identical to the search for meaning.
Therefore,
7. (1*) is false.
BV responds: So far, so good, except that there is no call for the importation of the modal operator 'necessarily' in (7). (7) follows from the conjunction of (5) and (6), but from the necessity of the consequence one cannot validly infer the necessity of the consequent. The modal fallacy is explained here. I am not denying that (7) is necessarily true; I think it is. My point is that its necessity is not supported by the premises Peter adduces.
Bill wholeheartedly endorses the view that the search for meaning is necessary in order to enjoy a meaningful life. He rejects, however, (1*) (his (1)), I suspect due to something like the argument I outlined above. However, I do not think that Bill’s short post and my outline of his argument tells the most important part of the story; far from it.
B. Bill’s Sling-Shot Argument
Bill’s reductio argument heavily depends upon premises (2) and (3). Both are in dire need of justification. Bill offers no such justification in this post, but he does in some others. What justifies premises (2) and (3)? I will outline what I take to be Bill’s argument for (2) and (3) and call it “Bill’s Sling-Shot Argument”.
I think Bill has in mind an argument he gave in a previous post titled “We Cannot Be the Source of Our Own Existential Meaning” (Saturday, September 22, 2012 at 12:49 pm; henceforth, ‘EM’). We are assuming throughout that by ‘meaning’ we do not mean linguistic meaning, but rather what Bill calls existential meaning.
Bill thinks that any theory of meaning that identifies meaning with a source internal to the individual will ultimately collapse into an eliminativist theory: i.e., a theory that denies that there is any meaning to life. Premises (2) and (3) together summarize this view. It follows, then, that if there is going to be any meaning to life, then its source must be external to the individual.
Why should one think that any internalist theory of meaning collapses into an eliminativist theory? Bill offers what I have called the “Sling-Shot-Argument” in order to establish this claim. Bill thinks that all internalist theories are subject to the Sling-Shot Argument. Below is Bill’s Sling-Shot-Argument:
(SI) All internalist theories are committed to the view that the source of meaning is some action (typically mental) of individuals.
(SII) If the source of meaning is some action(s) of individuals, then meaning itself is a consequence of such actions.
(SIII) If meaning is a consequence of actions of individuals, then there cannot be any meaning prior to, and independently from, the resulting consequences of such actions.
(SIV) But “logically and temporally” (EM) individuals must exist prior to undertaking any meaning-bestowal actions and actions must exist prior to their consequences.
The above entails that:
(SV) “…the acts of meaning-bestowal and the subject whose acts they are, exist meaninglessly.” (EM) 4th paragraph)
Therefore:
(SVI) “…my existence and my acts of meaning-bestowal are meaningless.” (ibid)
The “Sling-Shot-Argument”purports to show that any internalist theory must collapse into an eliminativist theory. Is the Sling-Shot-Argument sound? I don’t think so.
C. The Sling-Shot Criticized
I deny premise (SI) of Bill’s Sling-Shot-Argument: i.e., I deny that all internalist theories must hold that the source of meaning is some action of individuals and that, therefore, meaning is a consequence of such actions. I deny this premise because I think that it is compatible with an internalist theory to hold that the source of meaning (or its ground) is a certain kind of property that all individual agents possess; namely, the potential of self-reflection. Actions (mental or otherwise) enter the picture only as the means to realize this potential. The picture is this. The meaning of life is the potential to self-reflect. All agents have the potential to self-reflect in virtue of being agents. Therefore, all agents have meaning to their life essentially and not merely as a result of the consequences of undertaking certain actions. The more one self-reflects (i.e., performs suitable mental actions), the more one realizes this potential and, therefore, the more one fulfills the meaning of his life. So far as I can see, this version of an internalist account, which we may call The Potentiality Account of Meaning (PAM) is not vulnerable to Bill’s Sling-Shot-Argument. Therefore, such an internalist theory does not collapse into an eliminativist theory. Hence, Bill’s Sling-Shot-Argument is not sound. I view Thomas Nagel’s theory of the meaning of life as a good example of an internalist theory which is at heart a PAM.
BV asks: reference?
Nevertheless, I agree with Bill that (1*) is too strong. The meaning of life is not identical to the search for meaning, if by ‘search’ we mean undertaking certain actions the consequences of which result in a meaningful life. On the other hand, if we think of searching for meaning as essentially a self-reflective activity, then searching for meaning is essential in order to realize the meaning of our life; namely, the potential we already posses. Therefore, viewed in this light, searching for meaning just is part of having meaning.
Response
Peter tells us that we have a certain power or potential, the potential to reflect upon our lives. I of course agree. Peter then goes on to say, rather more controversially, that "The meaning of life is the potential to self-reflect." His thought is that our lives have meaning in virtue of their possession of a certain dispositional property (the property of being disposed to self-reflect). This is a property that we all have, and indeed essentially as opposed to accidentally. Since we have the property essentially, it is not in our power to either possess it or not, which implies that our possessing it is not a consequence of anything we say or do. The possession of theproperty is thus not a consequence of acts of meaning bestowal. So if the meaning of life consists in the possession of this dispositional property, then the meaning of life is objective as opposed to subjective. And yet on Peter's theory, meaning is endogenic rather than exogenic: it has its source in us, not in something outside of us such as God. Peter's theory, then, is a theory on which the meaning of life is both objective and internal.
If Peter is right, then I am wrong. For what I maintain is that internalist theories of existential meaning, according to which meaning is conferred upon one's life by acts of meaning-bestowal, are unable to confer meaning upon the objective presupposition of meaning-bestowal, namely, the acts themselves and their subjects, which acts and subjects must be logically and temporally prior to the meanings bestowed. In consequence, internalist theories deliver only subjective meaning. But if the meaning of life can only be subjective, then there is no such thing as THE meaning of life.
Do I have a good reason to reject Peter's theory? He tells us that "The meaning of life is the potential to self-reflect." But surely the actual meaning of my life -- if it has one -- cannot be identified with a power I possess, a power that is what it is whether or not it is ever exercised. A man who lives the unexamined life, who goes through life unreflectively, never pondering the why or the wherefore, arguably lives a meaningless life despite his power to reflect. I am assuming that one cannot live meaningfully without choosing and appropriating meanings -- which acts require reflection. But now suppose our man begins to actualize his reflection potential. Now his life begins to acquire actual meaning by his choices and decisions. But now the problem I raised arises again. The decisions and choices whereby a person's life acquires actual and concrete meaning are, in themselves, meaningless, as is their subject.
Peter is telling us that there is a property objective and essential possession of which by individuals confers existential meaning upon them. But of course they cannot have this or any property unless they exist. Since their existence cannot be accounted for by their possession of this or any property, the meaning (purpose) of their existence cannot be accounted for by possession of this or any property.
I go to Peter. I ask him, "What is the purpose of my existence?" He tells me, "The purpose of your existence and of every agent's is to reflect on its existence." That seems no better than saying: You exist for no purpose except to reflect on your purposeless existence.
This is a topic that interests me greatly, thank you for posting this Bill. The centre piece of the argument here is the statement: "The meaning of life is the potential to self-reflect". Let me call this statement: S1. It seems to me that we can create an opposite statement: "The meaning of life is the actual act of reflection itself"; let me call this statement: S2. Peter advocates S1; it seems to me Bill that you advocate something closer to S2, but not entirely. The reason I say "not entirely" is that BOTH S1 & S2 are still subjective claims of meaning and it seems to me that you (Bill) are seeking an objective meaning. You seek a meaning not provided by man for man (i.e. subjective), but by "something other than man" (God for example) for man.
S1 is shown to be subjective by the simple example of still-births where the "potential of self-reflection" never even "got off the ground" so to speak. Even just one instance of a still-birth shows that S1 cannot be objective for it is contradicted by clearly observable objective natural examples. Simply put: the potential for self-reflection cannot be divorced from the conditions giving rise to that potential in the first place and those conditions (which are born from nature) are not subjective. S2 is subjective due to the simple fact that there is more than one reflecting entity in existence and that these entities are not equivalent. This assumes three conditions: 1: that nature (or if you prefer: existence) is objective; 2: that there is a category difference between "meaning" and "existence" & 3: that difference (any difference) is real.
I surmise that you (Bill) seek this: an objective meaning realized subjectively. In plain English: you seek that there is a specific objective meaning that God (who is the source of said objective meaning) has for nature (and by extension: us) being here, but that we also somehow facilitate via our own individual/subjective meanings said objective meaning born from God.
Is my surmisal correct Bill or do you in fact seek exclusively objective meaning without any reference to subjective meaning. I think seeking solely objective meaning without acknowledging that subjective meaning really exists is foolish; likewise at the same time concluding that solely subjective meaning exists is foolish (this to me is what Peter is doing). Something (call it a philosophical intuition) tells me...that both must exist and do so in a very intricate manner as of yet not explicated by man.
Before I go any further with my argument I would appreciate it if you could just indicate to me whether my surmisal of your stance in this is correct; I also would appreciate any questions and counter-arguments you can provide to me. I am interested in taking this discussion a bit further (if you and even Peter feel so inclined). Make no mistake: I am very sympathetic to your search for universal objectively justified meaning (i.e. God) Bill, but for me the individual subjectively justified meaning is equally important and must be considered. Perhaps one can express it as such: I seek both myself, my true self (my “soul”, i.e. subjective meaning), and also God (i.e. objective meaning) and I do not consider that the search for the one is at the complete exclusion of existence of the search for the other; that the subjective and objective are far more intimately connected...but that in the end they both MUST BE. I am aware that one can construe this as a simple contradiction or extreme relativism or a “divine paradox” of sorts, but I believe it is justified. If you show interest and confirm to me whether my surmisal of your position is correct (and if not please elaborate), we can further discuss this argument and its justification.
Thank you again for this post and everything you for the project of philosophy.
- Phil
Posted by: Phil | Monday, April 15, 2013 at 07:05 AM
Response to Bill on Existential Meaning
First, two editorial comments. The last sentence that appears in the first batch of comments by Bill in blue is my sentence, not Bill’s. Second, the essay by Nagel I had in mind is The Absurd, in his collection Mortal Questions, (1979), Cambridge University Press.
1. The centerpiece of Bill’s objection is that internalist theories of existential meaning cannot confer meaning on meaning bestowal-acts as well as the actor because the later are “logically and temporally prior to the meanings bestowed.”
2. The first point to make is that this argument presupposes that meaning cannot be conferred retroactively: i.e., that existential meaning is time-sensitive insofar as it cannot be imparted to times prior to its bestowal. While this assumption may make sense initially, upon further reflection it does not seem to be as obvious as Bill makes it out to be. In any case, it needs to be justified. I will assume for now that existential meaning is not retroactive.
3. It is the second point, however, that I wish to focus upon. Bill’s objection against internalist accounts of existential meaning points towards an important distinction which Bill seems to misidentify. I will now identify the proper target of Bill’s argument.
4. Bill’s argument properly applies to any theory which identifies existential meaning with some feature of the *consequences* of actions (mental or behavioral). Assuming Bill is right about the impossibility of retroactive existential meaning, this will inevitably leave the person and the actions that cause these consequences barren of any meaning due to the logical and temporal priority of the former.
5. I wish now to distinguish between *Consequentialist* vs. *Constitutive* theories of existential meaning. Consequentialist theories of meaning maintain that meaning is conferred only by the consequences of actions performed by an agent. Hence, prior to such acts and the ensuing consequences (and given non-retroactivity) the meaning bestowal acts and the agents that perform such acts lack meaning. Constitutive theories, on the other hand, hold that meaning is imminent in the acts of meaning bestowal and this is made possible because existential meaning already exists, in some form, within the agent who acts.
6. Note that the internalist vs. externalist distinction is not the same as the consequentialist vs. constitutive distinction, since both internalist as well as externalist theories may be of the consequentialist variety.
7. Bill’s argument outlined in (1) is effective only against consequentialist theories, whether these are internalist or externalist. It leaves constitutive theories untouched. The reason for this is very simple. Since constitutive theories do not maintain that meaning is conferred by the consequences of acts, they are free to hold that existential meaning exists prior to any acts, in whatever form, and is imparted by means of the acts. Thus, according to constitutive theories, existential meaning is constitutive of suitable acts of the agent. Thus, devotion, for instance, is not a consequence of devotional acts, but it is a constitutive element of devotional acts.
8. My original proposal that existential meaning is the potential of autonomous agents to self-reflect is not a consequentialist theory but rather it is a constitutive theory. Therefore, Bill’s objection fails against such a theory. Yet it is by all accounts n internalist theory, as far as the internalist vs. externalist distinction is concerned.
9. Acts of reflection realize a man’s potential to self reflect and thus realize a man’s existential meaning. The more one self-reflects, the more one has a meaningful life. A man who fails to self-reflect (if that is even possible) still has existential meaning as a potential, albeit he fails to realize it and, thus, lacks a meaningful life. Therefore, Bill’s imagined unreflective man still has existential meaning, but fails to realize it.
Posted by: Peter Lupu | Monday, April 15, 2013 at 08:12 AM