The Aporetics of Existential Meaning

For present purposes, an aporia is a set of propositions each member of which has a strong claim on our acceptance, but whose members are collectively inconsistent.  Like many a philosophical problem, the philosophical problem of the meaning of life is usefully approached from an aporetic angle.  So consider the following aporetic tetrad:

A. If life has a meaning, then it cannot be subjective.

B. The meaning of life must be subjectively appropriable by all.

C. There is no meaning that is both nonsubjective and subjectively appropriable by all.

D. Life has a meaning.

Good  though not absolutely compelling reasons have been given for both (A) and (B).  But they are in tension with one another, a tension recorded in (C), the third limb of our aporetic tetrad. One who inclines towards compatibilism with respect to existential meaning inclines toward  the rejection of  (C).  Unfortunately, (C) is not easily rejected, as I will try to show in this post.  The main difficulty concerns the subjective appropriability of an objective purpose by all even if it is granted that there is an objective purpose applicable to all. 

First of all, one cannot appropriate an objective purpose unless one knows or at least has good reasons for believing that there is one.  More importantly, one must know what the purpose is and what one must do to live in accordance with it.  Three different questions: Is there an objective purpose? What is it?  How do I live in accordance with it?  Countless millions of people, however, have lived who lacked the abilities or the opportunities to form reasonable beliefs about these matters, let alone to come to have knowledge about them. It is not enough that the objective purpose be knowable by some; it must be knowable by all.  This was argued earlier.  But for the countless millions just mentioned there was no real possibility of appropriating the objective purpose.  By ‘real possibility’ is meant something far stronger than a mere logical possibility or even a nomological possibility.  It is logically and nomologically possible for a human being to run a four-minute mile.  But it is not possible for me and plenty of others to run that fast.  So even if it is logically and nomologically possible for all human beings to know the objective purpose of life, it does not follow that all have any serious possibility of knowing it.  It is as impossible for the countless millions just mentioned to know the objective purpose of life, supposing there is one, as it is for people like me to run a four-minute mile.  It follows that the objective purpose of life, supposing there is one, is not subjectively appropriable by all, which is to say that it is not subjectively appropriable in the way it would have to be for life to be objectively meaningful.  Again, if life has a meaning, it has a purpose, and the purpose must be the same for all and appropriable by all.  Redemption from absurdity must be possible for all if it is be possible for any.  If the world is so arranged that you are barred from redemption through no fault of your own, then my redemption is not a redemption from absurdity.

Those with the abilities and opportunities to investigate the three questions just mentioned are not in a much better position.  For they are confronted with a welter of conflicting doctrines. The fortunate have the leisure to inquire and the intellect with which to inquire, but our intellects are weak and the problems stare us down with a face of seeming intractability.  If all we have to rely on are ourselves and the resources of this world, then the conclusion to draw is that human life has no meaning that is both nonsubjective and subjectively appropriable.

Some will reply that what we cannot supply has been supplied by divine revelation.  But this is no real solution.  Even if God has revealed the purpose of human existence to us, together with the means of achieving that purpose, and in a way that respects our freedom and dignity, this will not do us any good  if  we do not know the purpose and how to achieve it.  That, however, is precisely what we do not know as is clear from the conflicting accounts of the content of revelation, not to mention conflict over whether revelation is actual or even possible.  All of these are ‘up for grabs’: the existence of God, the possibility of divine revelation, the actuality of divine revelation, not to mention its content and interpretation. If I merely believe in the content of a particular (putative) revelation, the Christian revelation for example, as interpreted in a certain way by a certain ecclesiastical authority such as the Roman Catholic magisterium, that is not good enough for it leaves me with reasonable doubts.  But as long as I doubt the meaning of life and must continue to inquire, I have not yet subjectively appropriated the objective meaning of life.  The subjective certainty of faith is not enough.  What is needed  is the objective certainty of knowledge.  And it must be available to all – which is not the case for those who lived before the time of the historical revelation.

D. Life Has a Meaning  

A case has been made for each of the first three limbs.  Should we therefore conclude that life has no meaning?  That would be hasty.  It is arguable, though not compellingly arguable, that the living of a life presupposes the objective meaningfulness of life.  E. M Adams writes,

Just as belief in the intelligibility of the world is presupposed by our quest for understanding, the meaningfulness of life is presupposed in living a life.  We have to believe that life is not absurd, that it is not a tale told by an idiot, that it makes sense, in order to keep on with the struggles of life. (“The Meaning of Life,” International Journal of the Philosophy of Religion 51, 2002, pp. 71-81.)

I take Adams’ point to be that we cannot live without presupposing that our lives have meaning, objective meaning, a meaning whose source is external to us.  One who believes, not just in his study, but throughout the activities of his life, that his life and its activities have only the meaning that he gives them must suffer a loss of motivation.  If he does not, he is simply fooling himself about what he really believes and lives in a state of self-deception, or else he conveniently forgets his theoretical conviction when it comes time to act.  He maintains at the level of theory that his life has only the meaning he confers upon it, but he ‘contradicts’ this theoretical belief by the energy and passion with which he pursues his projects and perhaps also by the passion with which he tries to convince the rest of us that nothing matters except what we make matter.  For if he fully appreciated what his subjectivism amounts to he would see that his acts of meaning-bestowal are as meaningless as everything else in his life. You could say that such a person has not subjectively appropriated his subjectivism.  This is true whether the subjectivism is extreme or moderate.

Living our lives with zest and vigor and passion and commitment, we presuppose that they are objectively meaningful.  One who denies this I would suspect of self-deception or a lack of intelligence or spiritual superficiality.  One who responds, “I live a rich and full life despite my conviction that life has no objective meaning applicable to all” simply does not appreciate the existential implications of what he believes.  This is a bold assertion, many will disagree with it, some will be offended by it, and I cannot prove it; but it is reasonable to maintain it. It must also be conceded that, even if we cannot live full lives without the presupposition of objective meaningfulness, it does not follow that there is an objective meaning.  It is not easy to exclude the possibility that what we must presuppose does not hold in fact.  We must presuppose the intelligibility of the world if we are to embark seriously upon the arduous quest for understanding, but it is logically and epistemically possible that the world is unintelligible in itself.  Likewise, we must presuppose the objective meaningfulness of life if we are to live rich and full and committed lives, but it is logically and epistemically possible that our lives are objectively meaningless nonetheless. 

But if these possibilities are actual, then all the more are our lives meaningless, for then the way things are thwarts us: there is a ‘disconnect’ between what we need and must presuppose and what is true.  Given that we cannot know that this is the case, we are entitled to believe that it is not the case.  It may be that the ultimate nature of the world is such as to frustrate our purposes.  But we cannot know this and there is no point in believing it, while there is every point in believing that the presupposition of meaning is true.  Our very lives are the ‘proof’ of it. When it comes to life and its living it is reasonable to hold that the ‘proofs’ will be vital and pragmatic rather than theoretical.  We are participants first and spectators second.  We are parts of the world-whole and we are beings of meaning; it is reasonable to extrapolate that the world-whole of which we are parts is also a world of meaning and intelligibility.  If we are wrong and the truth thwarts us, then why should we value truth?  With this I conclude my case that life has meaning, whatever that meaning might be.  It has some objective meaning or other and part of what contributes to the zest and passion and subjective meaningfulness of a life is the quest for that objective meaning.

Impasse

The limbs of the aporetic tetrad are all of them defensible, yet they cannot all be true.  I leave it to the reader to find his way forward if he can.  If nothing else, I have elucidated  the philosophical problem of the meaning of human existence and have blocked some facile (non)solutions.

Comments

[Peter Lupu]

Bill,

One minor correction regarding your reference to Adam's paper (for those interested to search it). The Journal is "International Journal for Philosophy of Religion" 51: Issue 2, pp. 71-81.

If you search by "International Journal of the Philosophy of Religion" you won't find it easily or not at all.

[Phil]

Thank you Bill for your insights on this incredibly important philosophical problem/question. Your series of posts on this has facilitated me with a great deal to think upon and hopefully in the near future I can post the conclusions of my thoughts on this in this comments section.

[Elliott]

Bill,

I agree with much of your post. However, according to my understanding of the term ‘subjectively appropriable’, I am not presently convinced by limb C. I offer a working definition of the term below.

Here is how I would begin to navigate the impasse. Please forgive the long post - I wish I could make it shorter. It seems to me that the following three statements are true:

1) The process of subjectively appropriating a non-subjective meaning of life is gradual and by degree. 2) The process ranges from a general degree of awareness, intention and appropriation to a specific degree thereof. 3) A general degree of awareness, intention and appropriation of a non-subjective meaning of human life is available to all.

1) The process of subjectively appropriating a non-subjective meaning of life is gradual and by degree.

A working definition of the term ‘subjectively appropriable’: To subjectively appropriate a meaning is to take that meaning into one’s mind, reflect upon it, form intentions about it, and put it into action in one’s life. This happens in three steps: a) mental, b) volitional, and c) practical. The mental step is a matter of awareness, the volitional step of forming intentions based on awareness, and the practical step of applying the product of awareness and intention to life. Each step happens gradually.

In short, awareness, intention, and application happen gradually and by degree. The process of subjectively appropriating a non-subjective meaning of life is a matter of awareness, intention, and application. As such, the process is gradual and by degree.

2) The process ranges from a general degree of awareness, intention and appropriation to a specific degree thereof.

First, one recognizes that there is an objective meaning. This first step gets one in range, so to speak. Once in range, one starts with a general degree of awareness, intention and appropriation of the meaning of life and moves toward an increasingly specific degree thereof. This movement happens by continued reflection, intention, and application.

3) A general degree of understanding, intention and appropriation of a non-subjective meaning of human life is available to all.

Virtually everyone can and does recognize that there is an objective meaning of human life. We do this in a “vital and pragmatic way”, as you wrote. But what is the meaning? The general meaning might be stated as ‘living in conformity with truth and reality’. Everyone understands and practices a basic conformity to reality, though not with the same level of awareness, clarity, and consistent application. I am not claiming that understanding reality is an easy matter (quite to the contrary!), but only that everyone understands and practices a basic conformity to reality.

With the above in mind, I think that ‘living in conformity with reality’ is a non-subjective meaning that is subjectively appropriable by all. This meaning is general but not vacuous. Though lacking specific content, the meaning is worthy of human beings as such, and it is recognizable by all as being the same for all. Moreover, it is such that no rational being is excluded from partaking in it; the awareness and application of it contributes to human flourishing; and recognizing it enables one to begin thinking carefully about specific meaning. Perhaps those with sufficient leisure, education, and ability progress further toward specificity, but everyone can and does subjectively appropriate - at a fundamental level - that life in conformity to reality is the foundation of human meaning.

I’d be interested in your thoughts.

[Awais Aftab]

Your discussion of limb C seems to have the underlying assumption that the search for meaning terminates at death. If everyone has just one shot at this earthly existence, then indeed it is hard to reject C. However, if some variant of reincarnation is the case, then the search for meaning is no longer restricted to one particular individual life, and will carry on even afterwards by means of another life. If such a possibility is entertained, then one may hope (cosmic optimism!) that over the course of many lives, an objective meaning will eventually be subjectively appropriable by all.

[Bill Vallicella]

Awais,

That is a good suggestion and may be a way of solving the problem. My very stringent knowability condition on the appropriability of meaning makes it impossible for most of us to appropriate the meaning of life in one lifetime. But if there are multiple lifetimes then one can hope that mere belief that there is an objective meaning might transform itself into knowledge that there is one.

Or if God exists, then one hope that after death one will come to know what we can only believe in this life. It may be -- and this is what I really think -- that the only way to subjectively appropriate the objective meaning of life in this life is by faith and hope. Just as we cannot live well (or at all) in this life without hope, we must hope beyond this life, and indeed to live well in this life.

[Elliott]

Bill and Awais,

I agree with you about faith and hope. Does the “ought implies can” principle obtain here?

An objective and universal meaning/purpose of human life seems to imply that all human beings ought to subjectively appropriate the meaning/purpose. But to say that all ought to subjectively appropriate the meaning/purpose seems to imply that all can do so. Perhaps hope and faith in God and immortality is the key whereby we can begin to do what we ought.

[Bill Vallicella]

Elliot,

Your comments are very good. I apologize for not responding, but I am busy with other things. Maybe later. All the best to you.