Or dissolved? Logically prior to the title question is this: What would it be to solve a philosophical problem? Four approaches to the logically prior question come to mind. I'll call them Pluralism, Dogmatism, Skepticism, and Optimism.
A. Pluralism. Solutions and dissolutions are relative to theories and background assumptions such that there is a plurality of solutions and no one absolute and definitive solution or dissolution per problem. If we take this tack, then many problems have been solved and dissolved. The problem of universals, for example has been solved: in one way by Platonists, in another way by Thomists, in a third way by nominalists, and in a fourth way by Kantians. Different schools of thought, different solutions. It is the same with the problem of the meaning of life. Some solve it one way, others another way, and some dismiss it as a pseudo-problem.
On the first approach, then, philosophical problems have solutions but they are theory-relative.
B. Dogmatism. The second approach rejects the relativism of the first by maintaining that philosophical problems have solutions only if the solutions are not relative to theories or background assumptions or schools of thought but are instead absolute and definitive. The second approach also maintains that some problems have been definitively solved, and this despite a lack of consensus among competent practioners as to whether or not definitive solutions have been achieved. Thus a Thomist might insist that Thomism has definitely solved the problem of universals despite the fact that the Thomist solution is rejected by many competent practitioners.
This second approach includes the following claims:
1. There are perennial problems that are essentially time- and system-invariant. Thus there is something called the problem of universals that different thinkers in different epochs and lands wrestled with. This is not obvious inasmuch as one could argue that, for example, the mind-body problem in Descartes is merely an artifact of his system and not identical to any problem addressed by thinkers before or since. (It also goes without saying that 'mind-body problem' is an umbrella term covering a number of distinct but interrelated subproblems.)
2. Some of the perennial problems have solutions. (They are not insoluble by us.)
3. Only a non-relative solution counts as a solution.
4. Some of the problems have been solved.
5. The dissent of competent practitioners is not evidence that a claimed solution is not a solution. Thus dissensus does not give our Thomist a good reason to doubt that his solution to the problem of universals is correct. He can say to the dissenters: "We have solved the problem and if you disdagree, then you are wrong. What's more, our solution is logically incompatible with yours, whence it follows that your solutions are all mistaken."
C. Skepticism. The third approach agrees with the second on points (1) and (3), but diasagrees on the remaining points. Thus on the third approach there are perennial problems and they are soluble only if absolutely soluble. But none of the central classical problems have been solved and it is reasonable to hold that they are insoluble by us. (As a matter of fact, they have not been solved to the satisfaction of all competent practitioners, and the best explanation of this fact is that they are insoluble by us. Why they should be insoluble by us is a further question.) The dissent of competent practioners is very good evidence that a claimed solution is not a solution. A competent practioner is one who is logically astute, apprised of all relevant empirical facts and theories, thoroughly understands the problems, their history, their interrelation to surrounding problems, including all of the relevant arguments and counterarguments, and exemplifies the full range of intellectual virtues, e.g., is intellectually honest, a sincere truth-seeker, etc.
D. Optimism. Optimism is Dogmatism minus (4), the claim that some problems have been solved. The optimist appreciates the force of the skeptic's argument, but refuses to take the fact of intractable philosophical disagreement as warranting an inference to the insolubility (by us) of philosophical propblems. He pins his hopes on future philosophy. And so the optimist replaces (4) with the claim that some problems are soluble in the fullness of time.
None of these approaches is wholly satisfactory. Pluralism seems a cheap way out of the difficulty. If among our background assumptions is the assumption that all meaning is linguistic, then we can dissolve the problem of the meaning of life straightaway by simply pointing out that a life is not something linguistic and so cannot have or lack meaning. But why accept the background assumption?
The problem with Dogmatism is, of course, that it is dogmatic. One can always insist that one is right and the other guy wrong, but claiming such epistemic privilege for oneself ought to bother one's intellectual conscience assuming that the other guy is as competent a practioner as oneself.
In LIFE, one must insist, stand one's ground, not back down, because in life "there ain't no easy way out." But in THOUGHT, insistence is churlish since the impersonal truth is the goal, truth which is not mine or yours, but everyman's. In life egoism and self-privileging has its place, assuming you want to continue in existence; you shoot the thug who is doing the 'pound and ground' on your sorry head, leaving the philosophizing for later. But egoism has no place in the pursuit of the truth, nor does the 'pound and ground.'
If A and B are competent practioners by my definition and B dissents from A, it does not follow that A is wrong . But B's dissent ought to cause A to question whether he is right. For if he is right, what explains B's dissent? And if A has good reason to doubt that he has indeed solved the problem of universals, say, then he has not solved the problem. For a solution, to be one, must reveal itself as indubitably a solution. To solve a philosophical problem is to know that one has solved it, not merely believe that one has solved it. (I admit that this thesis needs defense.)
The weakness of skepticism is that the inference from the fact of protracted diasagreement to insolubuility is inductive and hence shaky. But is it less reasonable than the hope that future philosophy will solve some of philosophy's problems? For that hope seems to rest on nothing more than the mere possibility that problems hitherto unsolved will someday be solved.
How about the wittegenstein's view according to which philosophical problems are not genuine problems but arise from an unrecognized linguistic mystification, so that the only valuable philosophical practice that should be cultivated is the liberation from those mystifactions ?
Posted by: arash | Monday, July 15, 2013 at 03:35 AM
Bill,
Your post reminds me of Pascal’s Pensees 82 and 83. He suggested that human knowledge has two extremes. The first is our state of knowledge at birth. The second is the state of one who has run the range of human knowledge and realized that he knows very little. The one in the second state has a humble, Socratic wisdom, a valuable self-knowledge, and a cultivated ability to distinguish pseudo-wisdom from the real thing.
I think this is a profound reflection. But I also tend to think that, at least in principle, genuine problems have genuine answers. This seems to be true by definition. So I wonder, is the Socratic-Pascalian insight consistent with the idea that genuine problems have genuine answers? Or are these contradictory positions?
Posted by: Elliott Crozat | Monday, July 15, 2013 at 10:03 AM