Is Natural Causation Existence-Conferring?

When I reported to Peter Lupu over Sunday breakfast that Hugh McCann denies that natural causation is existence-conferring, he demanded to know McCann's reasons.  He has three. I'll discuss one of them in this post, the third one McCann mentions. (Creation and the Sovereignty of God, p. 18)

The reason is essentially Humean.  Rather than quote McCann, I'll put the matter in my own rather more detailed way.

But first I should limn the broader context.    McCann's God is not a mere cosmic starter-upper.  He keeps the universe in existence moment to moment after its beginning to exist -- assuming it has a beginning --  such that, were God to cease his creative sustenance, the universe would vanish.  On such a scheme, God is needed  to explain the universe and its continuance in existence even if it always existed.  But now suppose natural causation is existence-conferring and the universe always existed.  Then the naturalist might argue as follows:  (i) the universe is just the sum-total of its states; (ii) each state is caused to exist by earlier states; (iii) there is no first state; ergo (iv) every state has an immanent causal explanation in terms of earlier states; (v) if every state has an explanation of its existence in terms of earlier states, then the universe has an immanent, naturalistic explanation of its existence; ergo, (vi) there is no need for a God to explain why the universe exists, and (vii) if there were a God of McCann's stripe, then the existence of the universe would be causally overdetermined.

The above reasoning rests on the assumption that natural causation is existence-conferring.  This is why McCann needs to show that natural causation is not existence-conferring.  Here is one reason, a Humean reason.

One monsoon season I observed a lightning bolt hit a palm tree which then exploded into flame.  A paradigm case of event causation.  Call the one event token Strike and the other Ignition.  One would naturally say that Strike caused Ignition.  To say such a thing is to refer to the salient cause without denyng the  contribution of such necessary causal conditions as the presence of atmospheric oxygen. 

But what exactly did I observe?  Did I observe, literally observe, an instance of causation?  Not clear!  What is clear is that that I observed two spatiotemporally contiguous events.  I also observed that Strike occurred slightly earlier than Ignition.  Thus I observed the temporal precedence of the cause over the effect.  But I did not observe the production (the bringing-into-existence) of the effect by the cause.  Thus I did not observe the cause conferring existence on the effect.  Strike and Ignition were nearby in space and time and Ignition followed Strike.  That I literally saw.  But I did not literally see any producing or causing-to-exist.  What I actually saw was consistent with there being no causal production of the effect by the cause.  Admittedly, it was also consistent with there being unobservable causal production.

The point is that conferral of existence by natural  causation is not empirically detectable.  One cannot see it, or hear it, etc.  Nor is there any such instrument as a causation-detector that one could use to detect what one's gross outer senses cannot detect.

Nothing changes if we add the third Humean condition, constant conjunction.  Some event sequences are causal and some are not.  How do we distinguish the causal from the noncausal?  Since we cannot empirically detect existence-conferral, we cannot say that causal event sequences are those that involve existence-conferral.  So the Humean invokes constant conjunction: in terms of our example, whenever an event of the Strike-type occurs it is spatiotemporally contiguously followed by an event of the Ignition type.  Accordingly, there is nothing more to causation on this empiricist approach than regular succession.  A causal event sequence is one that instantiates a regularity.  What makes a causal sequence causal is just its instantiation of a regularity.  But then, causation is not the bringing into existence of one event by another.  The two events are what Hume calls "distinct existences."  The events are out there in the world.  But the causal link is not out there in the world, or rather, it is not empirically detectable. 

I hope my friend Peter will agree to at least the following:  if we adopt a regularity theory of causation, then natural causation is not existence-conferring.  The regularity theory can be stated as follows:

RT. x (directly) causes y =df (i) x and y are spatiotemporally contiguous; (ii) x
occurs earlier than y; (iii) x and y are subsumed under event types X and Y that
are related by the de facto empirical generalization that all events of type X are followed by events of type Y.

If this is what causation is, it is is not existentially productive: the cause does not produce, bring about, bring into existence the effect.  On the contrary, the holding of the causal relation presupposes the existence of the cause-event and the effect-event.  It follows that causation as understood on (RT) merely orders already existent events and cannot account for the very existence of these events.  Since Peter is a B-theorist about time, he should be comfortable with the notion that the universe is a four-dimensional space-time manifold the states or events of which are all tenselessly existent logically in advance of any ordering by whatever the exact relation is that is the causal relation.

Peter should tell me whether he accepts this much.

Of course, the naturalist needn't be a Humean about causation.  But then the naturalist ought to tell us what theory of causation he accepts and how it can be pressed into service to explain the very existence of events.  My challenge to Peter: describe a theory of natural causation on which the cause event confers existence on the effect event, as opposed to merely ordering already existent events.  Nomological and counterfactual theories won't fill the bill (or satisfy the Bill.)

Here is another little puzzle for Peter to ruminate over.  Causation is presumably a relation.  But a relation cannot obtain unless all its relata exist.  So if x directly causes y, and causation is a relation, then both x and y exist.  But then x in causing y does not confer existence on y.  To the contrary, the obtaining of the causal relation presupposes the logically antecedent existence of y.

This little conundrum works with any theory of causation (regularity, nomological, counterfactual, etc.) so long as it is assumed that causation is a relation and that no relation can hold or obtain unless all its relata exist.  For example, suppose you say that x causes y iff had x not occurred, then y would not have occurred.  That presupposes the existence of both relata, ergo, etc.

For details and a much more rigorous development, see my article "The Hume-Edwards Objection to the Cosmological Argument," Journal of Philosophical Research, vol. XXII, 1997, pp. 425-443, and the second article below.

Related articles

Causation, Existence, and the Modified Leibniz Question

Could the Universe Cause Itself to Exist?

Comments

[Peter Lupu]

Bill extends a friendly gesture to me as follows: “if we adopt a regularity theory of causation, then natural causation is not existence-conferring.” I agree pending the following modification of the consequent: “…, then nothing is existence-conferring.” (emphasis on ‘nothing’) Such a modification is necessary, in my opinion, since we are talking here about a Humean account of causation according to which causation is not an objective aspect of the world. All we got objectively in the world are regularities in the form of constant conjunctions. Beyond that causation is a mental disposition projected upon events in the world.

Now, Bill attempts to set up the following dilemma for me: either I accept a Humean account of causation or I offer an alternative. Since he knows that I do not have such a worked out alternative account, he concludes that I must accept a Humean account of causation. Bill thinks that by so doing I am forced to accept McCann’s denial that “natural causation is existence-conferring.”

I object to the last step in Bill’s reasoning. If I am forced to accept anything at all, then I am forced to accept Hume’s own conclusion that causation is not an objective feature of the world, whether natural or divine. If so, then McCann cannot have it both ways. He cannot rely on Hume’s argument for natural causation, but demur regarding divine causation. If McCann wants to solicit Hume on his behalf against objective causation, then he is welcome. But he cannot later on retain God as the only causal agent, without showing why the Humean argument against objective causation (which Bill elegantly summarized in his post) fails to apply to the case of God. So far as I can see, the Humean argument either applies to both natural as well as divine causation or to neither.

[Mika L.]

I think Peter is on to something here. Existence-conferral is supposedly a relation, but a relation cannot hold if its relata don't exist. But if both relata already exist, then what sense is there in saying existence is being conferred here?

Perhaps the solution here is to say that existence-conferral is the conferral of objective existence, and that, prior to a creature being given objective existence, it exists subjectively in the mind of God. In this case, both relata exist, with the qualification that the creature exists subjectively before existence-conferral.

[Peter Lupu]

For good measure, Bill adds the following “little puzzle” on my plate: “if x directly causes y, and causation is a relation, then both x and y exist. But then x in causing y does not confer existence on y.”

I agree that if causality is a relation, then both relata exist. Thus, if x causes y, then both x and y exist. Let us call this conditional the “causal principle”. Whence is Bill’s “little puzzle”? I suppose the idea is this.

In order for causality to confer existence, the effect cannot exist at the same time as the cause; it must come into existence at a later time. But this seems to be impossible if causality is a relation, so argues Bill, since then both x and y must exist, according to the causal principle that causality entails the existence of both cause and effect.

I think the puzzle arises due to two different temporal frameworks. The causal principle is conceived regarding a static four-dimensional universe in which all events are already present. Thus, the phrases “x causes y” and “x and y exist” are taken to be tenseless. On the other hand, when we speak about causality conferring existence, we think about an evolving universe in which the cause temporally precedes the effect. What we mean here is that at a time t event x exists, and y does not yet exist, whereas at a later time t*, y came into existence because of x.

What Bill’s “little puzzle” shows is that we need both temporal frames in order to reconcile our causal talk.

Let me add that Bill’s “little puzzle” applies equally to God conferring existence. For if God created the universe; i.e., God caused the universe to exist, then by the causal principle both God and the universe must have already existed. But this puts to shame the very idea of divine creation.

[Bill V.]

Peter,

You are changing the subject. We are not talking about Hume but about (RT), which I think I stated rather clearly. The views of the historical Hume are not under discussion. And note that there is no reference to "mental dispositions" in (RT). A regularity theorist need not (indeed does not) bring in the mind to supply the causal nexus.

You also didn't give me a straight answer to my question. I asked, in effect, whether you think that (RT) entails that natural causation is not existence-conferring. I need a straight 'yes or no' answer to gauge whether you understand the issue. If you answer 'yes,' then we can proceed. But if you equivocate, then we cannot.

You also change the subject when you ask, in effect, whether everything is existence-conferring. We are not talking about everything, but about natural causation, a clear example of which I gave.

You also muddy the waters by bringing in God. We are not talking about God's relation to the world. We are talking only about natural causation and whether it is existence-conferring. I mentioned God only to supply context.

So I repeat my first question to you and add a second: On what theory of causation would natural causation be existence-conferring? This has nothing to do with getting you to accept McCann's worldview.

Let's assume that God does not exist. There remains the question whether the universe is causally self-explanatory. If it is, then the appeal to God would be otiose. And if it isn't then, the atheist can say that the universe exists as a matter of brute fact.

[Peter Lupu]

Bill,

1. I am puzzled by the charge that I changed the subject. After all you begin your post by summarizing McCann's view, the motivation for his claim that natural causation is not existence conferring, and then present a Humean argument to support the later claim. My comment is predicated on this presentation.

2. Let us suppose that I accept RT as an account of one concept of causation. Have I completely abdicated the idea that (natural) causation is existence conferring. Not at all.

What exactly is the problem raised by RT to causation being existence conferring? The argument you give here is essentially the "little puzzle" presented more explicitly later in the post. At this stage you state the argument as follows: If RT expresses what causality is, you say, then "...the cause does not produce, bring about, bring into existence the effect" because "the holding of the causal relation presupposes the existence of the cause-event and the effect-event."

As stated in my response to the "little puzzle" in my second post, this argument is based on confusing two temporal frames. RT defines causation over a four-dimensional static universe. In this sense, causation is timeless. "x causes y" in the sense of RT is to be interpreted timelessly. We cannot express the sense in which causation is existence conferring within a static four-dimensional framework because we are looking at the causal nexus, as if it were, from the outside, once all existence conferring processes have been completed.

But conceding this much is far from abdicating the idea that causation is existence conferring. This later idea, however, can find its natural home only when we speak in a dynamic temporal framework (see my second post on this matter). Confusing the two leads to your objection.

To summarize this portion of my position. I accept RT (for the sake of the present debate) as defining static-causation (in the sense outlined above). However, I deny that by so doing I abdicate causality as existence conferring. However, the later can only be upheld when stated within a dynamic framework. This makes complete sense because to say that causation confers existence is to state a dynamic process, whereas to say that causality is constant conjunction is to look at causality from the point of view of a uniformity that holds in the whole universe. But such a statement has a meaning only when applied to the whole universe.

3. So, now, as to the 'yes' or 'no' demand. The answer is: yes and no. Yes, because RT entails that ONE concept of causation, namely, static-causation, is not existence conferring. No, because this is not the only sense of causation in causal explanations. The other sense is dynamic-causation which is not captured by RT. This is not equivocation, but a time honored philosophical tool of making distinctions when doing so is warranted. And I think that the distinction I am proposing is warranted in general. In addition, it is required, so far as I can see, for the broader project that McCann seems to undertake. But, then, again, it is possible that this last claim stems from my lack of familiarity with the details of his project.

4. I never asked, or said, "whether everything is existence-conferring." I said that the Humean argument entails that "nothing", and I emphasized "nothing", is existence conferring. I thought this to be pivotal within the broader project within which McCann's argument against natural causation being existence-conferring is situated.

5. I am not sure whether I completely understand the connection you make between the question of whether there is a legitimate sense of causation that is existence conferring and the question of "whether the universe is causally self-explanatory" in the absence of a divine creator. I think that both sides to the later controversy generally assume that there is some notion of causality that is existence conferring. It seems to me that the theist needs such a concept of causality in order to express the tenet that God created the world (caused the world to come into existence) and the atheist might need such a notion for explanatory purposes within the physical world. I do not see how even granting an existence conferring concept of causation cuts either way regarding the other question of whether the existence of the universe can be explained without a divine creator.

[Peter Lupu]

Mika,

Your proposal may work to get around the problem, but the price is to give up on a univocal concept of 'existence'. For now we need one concept of existence when something exists only in the mind of God and another when it is realized in the world (i.e., outside God's mind). I do not know about McCann, but Bill might object to such a solution.

[David Brightly]

Bill,
Your definition RT gives us a causes relation over events. We could also define a brings about relation. I agree that without further premises x causes y does not entail that x brings about y. But can't the two relations have the same extension?

[BV]

Hi David,

Thanks for answering the question I put to Peter. It would be interesting to see how you would define 'x brings about y.'

I think the two definitions would have the same extension.

On RT causation is just regular succession. Now if the cause brings about (produce, causes-to-exist) the effect, that too would be an instance of regular succession.