Existence-Blindness or Double-Vision?

I had the pleasure of meeting London Ed, not in London, but  in Prague, in person, a few days ago.  Ed, a.k.a. 'Ockham,' and I have been arguing over existence for years.  So far he has said nothing to budge me from my position.  Perhaps some day he will.  The following entry, from the old Powerblogs site, whose archive is no more, was originally posted 25 May 2008.  Here it is again slightly redacted.

................

I am racking my brains over the question why commenter 'Ockham' cannot appreciate that standard quantificational accounts of existence presuppose rather than account for singular existence. It seems so obvious to me! Since I want to put off as long as possible the evil day when I will have to call him existence-blind, I will do my level best to try to understand what he might mean.

Consider the following renditions of a general and a singular existence statement respectively, where 'E' is the 'existential' or, not to beg any questions, the particular quantifier:

   1. Cats exist =_df (Ex)(x is a cat)

   2. Max (the cat) exists =_df (Ex)(x = Max).

Objectually as opposed to substitutionally interpreted, what the right-hand sides of (1) and (2) say in plain English is that something is a cat and that something is (identical to) Max, respectively. Let D be the domain of quantification. Now the right-hand side (RHS) of (1) is true iff at least one member of D is a cat. And the RHS of (2) is true iff exactly one member of D = Max. Now is it not perfectly obvious that the members of D must exist if (1) and (2) are to be true? To me that is obvious since if the members of D were Meinongian nonexistent items, then (1) and (2) would be false. (Bear in mind that there is no logical bar to quantifying over Meinongian objects, whatever metaphysical bar there might be. Meinongians, and there are quite a few of them, do it all the time with gusto.) 

Therefore, 'Something is a cat' is a truth-preserving translation of 'Cats exist' only if 'Something is a cat' is elliptical for 'Something that exists is a cat.' And similarly for 'Something is Max.' But here is where 'Ockham' balks. He sees no difference between 'something' and 'something that exists' where I do see a difference.

I am sorely tempted to call anyone who cannot understand this difference 'existence-blind' and cast him into the outer darkness, that place of fletus et stridor dentium, along with qualia-deniers, eliminative materialists, deniers of modal   distinctions, and the rest of the terminally benighted. But I will resist this temptation for the moment.  

And were I to label 'Ockham' existence-blind he might return the  'compliment' by saying that I am hallucinating, or suffering from double-vision. "You've drunk so much Thomist Kool-Aid that you see a distinction where there isn't one!" But then we get a stand-off in which we sling epithets at each other. Not good for those of us who would like to believe in the power and universality of reason. It should be possible for one of us to convince the other, or failing that, to prove that the issue is rationally undecidable.

The issue that divides us may be put as follows. (Of course, it may be that we have yet to locate the exact bone of contention, and in our dance around each other we have succeeded only in 'dislocating' it.)

BV: Because the items in the domain of quantification exist, there has to be more to existence than can be captured by the so-called 'existential' quantifier. Existence is not a merely logical topic. Pace Quine, it is not the case that "Existence is what existential quantification expresses." Existence is a 'thick' topic: there is room for a metaphysics of existence. One can legitimately ask: What is it for a concrete contingent individual to exist? and one can expect something better than the blatantly circular, 'To exist is to be identical to something.' To beat on this drum one more time, this is a circular explanation because D is a domain all of whose members exist.  One moves in a circle of embarrassingly short diameter if one maintains that to exist is to be identical to something that exists. Note that I wrote circular explanation, not circular definition.  Note also that I am assuming that there is such a thing as philosophical explanation, which is not obvious, and is denied by some.

O: Pace BV, the items in the domain of quantification admit of no existence/nonexistence contrast. Therefore, 'Something is a cat' is indistinguishable from 'Something that exists is a cat.' There is no difference at all between 'something' and 'something that exists,' and 'something' is all we need. Now 'something' is capturable without remainder using the resources of standard first-order predicate logic with identity. 'Exist(s)' drops out completely. There is no (singular) existence and there are no (singular) existents. There are just items, and one cannot distinguish an item from its existence.

Now if that is what O means, then I understand him, but only on the assumption that for individuals

    3. Existence = itemhood.

For if to exist = to be an item, if existence reduces to itemhood, then there cannot be an existence/nonexistence contrast at the level of items. It is a logical truth that every item is an item, and therefore an item that is not an item would be a contradiction: 'x is an item' has no significant denial. Therefore, on the assumption that existence = itemhood, there is no difference between 'Some item is a cat' and 'Some item that exists is a cat.' And if there is no such difference, then existence is fully capturable by the quantifier apparatus.

But now there is a steep price to pay. For now we are quantifying over items and not over existents, and sentences come out true that ought not come out true. 'Dragons exist,' for example, which is false, becomes 'Some item is a dragon' which is true. To block this result, O would have to recur to a first-level understanding of existence as contrasting with nonexistence. He would have to say that every item exists, that there are no nonexisting items. But then he can no longer maintain that 'something' and 'something that exists' are indistinguishable.

In defiance of Ed's teacher, C. J. F. Williams, I deny that the philosophy of existence must give way to the philosophy of someness. (Cf. the latter's What is Existence? Oxford, 1981, p. 215)  The metaphysics of existence cannot be supplanted by the logic of 'exist(s).'  Existence is not a merely logical topic.

Here is an obituary of Williams written by Richard Swinburne.

Related articles

Can a Thin Theorist Experience Wonder at Existence?

'Something is Self-Identical' Cannot Translate 'There are Objects': Another Argument Against the Thin Theory

More on C. J. F. Williams on Existence

Another Round on the Circularity of the Thin Conception of Existence

Existence, Circularity, and Metaphysical Grounding

Could God and the Universe be Equally Real?

The Circularity of the Fressellian Account of Existence: Objections and Replies

Existentials and Their Equivalents: Aid and Comfort for the Thin Theory?

Van Inwagen on Quine on Existence

Nausea at Existence: A Continental Thick Theory

Comments

[ed ockham]

My God have we been arguing about this for five years??

>>He sees no difference between 'something' and 'something that exists' where I do see a difference.<<

Correct.

>>Because the items in the domain of quantification exist, there has to be more to existence than can be captured by the so-called 'existential' quantifier.”<<

And I would say, because there are items in the domain of quantification, or (revertente in idem) because the domain of quantification contains some items, there is no more to being in the domain of quantification than is already captured by the ‘existential’ quantifier.

>> one can expect something better than the blatantly circular, 'To exist is to be identical to something.'

This is your formulation. I simply say that to exist is to be in the domain of quantification.

>> One moves in a circle of embarrassingly short diameter if one maintains that to exist is to be identical to something that exists. <<

Agreed, if ‘something that exists’ means more than just ‘something’, which I had already noted, I see.

>> 'Dragons exist,' for example, which is false, becomes 'Some item is a dragon' which is true. <<

No, ‘some item is a dragon’ is false.

[BV]

More than five years, Ed. We were discussing this before 2008.

You agree that everything exists. How would you express 'Everything exists'? Surely not like this: For all x, x exists. For that features a first-level use of 'exists.' So how?

[ed]

Actually I realise we have made a small amount of progress in that I now agree that some things no longer exist, and so don't exist. So it is not true that everything exists. Some things are (i.e. exist). Some things were, but aren't any more. And some things will be, but aren't yet.

There was a discussion on my blog somewhere about this. We discussed the apparent paradox that some things aren't things (although they were things).

[ed ockham]

Bill, there’s something else to say. You frequently mention my connection with Williams as though it were important, and as though I accepted his views on reference and meaning. I don’t. I broadly share his nominalism, as well as his views on the the european variety of philosophy. But I don’t share his view on the ‘second level’ predication of existence. In particular, I reject entirely his view on fictional and empty names which can be found in Chapter 10 of his book Existence, which he needs to bolster up the second-level theory, given his rejection of the hypothesis that names are disguised descriptions. His view is that fictional names are a sort of pretend name, and that their semantics are somehow different – radically different – from the semantics of ‘real’ names. I reject this. As you ought to know by now, I hold that names are singular descriptions.

IMO, a singular proposition with a proper-name subject both asserts the existence of its subject (or rather, asserts that it has a subject, since ‘X has a subject’ and ‘X has an existing subject’ are identical IMO), and asserts that the predicate is satisfied by the subject. I.e. ‘Pegasus flies’ asserts that something satisfies ‘Pegasus’ and that it also satisfies ‘flies’.

If you are looking for a reason why we have discussed the problem of existence for more than five years, you need to consider this aspect of our argument. Occasionally you venture into this remote corner, usually to discuss and reject ‘haecceity properties’, but then you retreat back to Williams and various straw men. ‘Haecceity properties’ is also a straw man, because I reject those too.

I accept the P->K4 line of your main attack, namely your attack on the idea of existence as a second-level predicate. You don’t need to prove that it isn’t, because I concede that it isn’t. You need to get to the middle game, from which we can proceed to the end game.

[BV]

Ed,

Thanks for the comments. Even if 'Everything exists' is false, how would you translate it?

I apologize for assimilating you to Williams. Your phil of lang concerns are not my main concerns, which may help explain why I have difficulty understanding you.

[ed]

>>Even if 'Everything exists' is false, how would you translate it?

Every thing is a thing. Which I believe is false, because some things (such as Socrates) although they were a thing, are things no longer.