The Grand Central Conundrum in the Philosophy of Fiction

As I see it, the central problem in the philosophy of fiction is to find a solution to the following aporetic dyad:

1. There are no purely fictional items.

2. There are some purely fictional items.

The problem is that while the limbs of the dyad cannot both be true, there is reason to think that each is true.

(1) looks to be an analytic truth: by definition, what is purely fictional is not, i.e., does not exist.  George Harvey Bone, the main character in Patrick Hamilton's 1941 booze novel Hangover Square, does not now and never did exist.  He is not a real alcoholic like his creator, Patrick Hamilton, who was a real alcoholic.  What is true is that

3. Bone is a purely fictional alcoholic.

That (3) is true is clear from the fact that if a student wrote on a test that Bone was a teetotaler, his answer  would be marked wrong.  But if (3) is true, then, given that nothing can satisfy a predicate unless it exists, it follows that

4. Bone exists

and, given the validity of Existential Generalization, it follows that

5. There is a purely fictional alcoholic.

But  if (5) is true, then so is (2).

It should now be spectacularly obvious what the problem is.  There are two propositions, each the logical contradictory of the other, which implies that they cannot both be true, and yet we have excellent reason to think that both are true.

Now what are all the possible ways of solving this problem?  I need a list.  London Ed et al. can help me construct it.  Right now all I want is a list, a complete list if possible, not arguments for or against any item on the list.  Not all of the following are serious contenders, but I am aiming at completeness.

A. Dialetheism.  Accept dialetheism, which amounts to the claim that there are true contradictions and that the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC) is false. 

B. Paraphrasticism.  Reject (2) by attempting to show that sentences such as (3) can be paraphrased in such a way that the apparent reference to ficta is eliminated.  For example, one might offer the following paraphrase of (3): 'Hamilton wrote a story implying that here is an alcoholic named Bone.'  The paraphrastic approach works only if every reference to a fictional item, whether it be a person or place or event or fiction, can be paraphrased away.  (As Kripke and others have noted, there are fictional fictions, fictional plays for example, such as a fictional play referenced within a play.)

C. Logic Reform.  Reject Existential Generalization (off load existence from the particular quantifier) and reject the anti-Meinongian principle that nothing can satisfy a predicate (or exemplify a property) unless it exists. One could then block the inference from (3) to (2).

D. Ontology Reform.  Reject (1) by arguing that fictional items, without prejudice to their being purely fictional, do exist.  Saul Kripke, for example, maintains that a fictional character is an abstract entity that "exists in virtue of more concrete activities of telling stories, writing plays, writing novels, and so on . . . the same way that a nation is an abstract entity which exists in virtue of concrete relations between people." (Reference and Existence: The John Locke Lectures, Oxford UP, 2013, p. 73.)  Or one might hold that fictional items are abstract items that exist necessarily like numbers.

E.  Dissolutionism.  Somehow argue that the problem as posed above is a pseudoproblem that doesn't need solving but dissolving.  One might perhaps argue that one or the other of the dyad's limbs has not even a prima facie claim on our acceptance.

F.  Neitherism.  Reject both limbs.  Strategy (A) rejects LNC.  This strategy rejects the Law of Excluded Middle. (Not promising, but I'm aiming for completeness.)

G. Mysterianism.  Accept both limbs but deny that they are mutually contradictory.  Maintain that our cognitive limitations make it either presently or permanently impossible for us to understand how the limbs can be both true and non-contradictory.  "They are both true; reality is non-contradictory; but it is a mystery how!"

H. Buddhism.  Reject the tetralemma: neither (1) nor (2), nor both, nor neither.

I. Hegelianism.  Propose a grand synthesis in which thesis (1) and antithesis (2) are aufgehoben, simultaneously cancelled and preserved.  (I have no idea what this would look like -- again, I want a complete list of options.)

First question:  Have I covered all the bases?  Or are there solution strategies that cannot be brought under one of the above heads?  If you think there are, tell me what you think they are.  But don't mention something that is subsumable under one of (A)-(I).

Second question (for London Ed):  under which head would you book your solution?  Do you favor the paraphrastic approach sketched in (B) or not? Or maybe Ed thinks that the problem as I have formulated it is a pseudoproblem (option (E)).

Be a good sport, Ed, play along and answer my questions.

Related articles

Another Round on Fictional Characters as Abstract Objects

Do Purely Fictional Items Exist? On Van Inwagen's Theory of Ficta

A Paraphrastic Approach to Fictional Sentences

London Paraphrastics Questioned

What Problem Does Literary Fiction Pose?

Comments

[london ed]

Obviously a version of (B), you correctly noted. The rest are all rubbish.

[BV]

Thanks for the forthright and pithy answer.

My work, at least with respect to you, is cut out for me: undermine your confidence in (B).

Are you really comfortable dismissing (C) and (D) as rubbish given that very distinguished philosophers have adopted these strategies?

Doesn't the fact that they oppose you -- or rather your sort of view -- give you pause?

[BV]

Please confirm that you do agree with me that the problem I have set forth is the central problem in the philosophy of fiction.

If we agree what the central problem is, and I know how you will attack it, then MAYBE we can make a bit of progress.

[london ed]

>>Are you really comfortable dismissing (C) and (D) as rubbish given that very distinguished philosophers have adopted these strategies?

(C) I understand as Meinongian, enough said. You have missed out free logic, by the way, which is genuinely 'Logic Reform', because it rejects the inference from Fa to ExFx. Meinongianism as I understand it is more a reinterpration of ordinary language. You introduce a new predicate !Ex for 'x exists', and then you can say that for some x, Fx and !Ex (x is existing F), and for some x ~!Ex, etc.

(D) Kripke is a distinguished philosopher, but a crowdpleaser, IMO.

[london ed]

And yes it's the main problem, but you have stated it at such a high level of generality that it would be hard to have missed anything. A large net catches many fish.

[BV]

That's a virtue, not a vice. But I'm glad we agree on what the main problem is.

(C) is Meinongian but it also covers free logic. Obviously, the doctrine of Aussersein implies that from 'a is F' one cannot validly infer 'An F exists' or 'An F is.'

I would also point out that 'Meinongian' is not a term of abuse, and that philosophers who rank higher than Kripke are Meinongians, e.g., Meinong himself.

'Meinongian' is no more a term of abuse than, say, 'nominalist' is.

[Ed]

>>'Meinongian' is no more a term of abuse than, say, 'nominalist' is.

I have probably told you the story about Edo Pivcevik (solitary 'continental' philosopher in a department of largely Oxford analytics types). He was being given a hard time by CJF Williams on some fine point of philosophy. "Ah but you are a nominalist", hissed Edo, in a way clearly not intended as complimentary.

"Oh you're calling me names now, are you?" smirked Christopher, rather wittily I thought.

[BV]

It's good story.

Name-calling and invective have their places in politics and other polemical precincts, but not in philosophy. Adhering to this principle is sometimes difficult . . . .

[Ed]

Meinong, who I have recently been reading, I have slightly more respect for than I did. His subject matter is that of Russell and Frege (which is no coincidence). He is almost an exact contemporary of Frege, and in his style of writing, even translated into English, reminds me a lot of Frege. But he meanders and there is no apparent thread, whereas Frege is sharp and to the point.

To me, there is no comparison. There is also that smart put down by Russell. Neo-Meinongians complain that Russell did not understand him, and that it wasn't a put down, but I have never read a convincing explanation of this.

[BV]

Which Russellian put-down do you have in mind?

[Ed]

>>Which Russellian put-down do you have in mind?

The one where he says "I must confess that I see no difference between existing and being existent; and beyond this I have no more to say". It is quoted in the Chisholm introduction.

[David Brightly]

Bill,
Isn't the simplest way of resolving 1. There are no Xs with 2. There is an X, certainly the way involving the least collateral damage compared to your other strategies, is to show that there is equivocation on X? The obvious equivocation in this context is between seeing a 'fictional item' as part of a representation (after van Inwagen, making (2) true), and as part of that which is represented (after Ed Ockham, making (1) true). Perhaps this falls under option (E), Dissolutionism.

[BV]

David,

So you are saying that 'fictional item' is being used in two senses.

Please give me two phrases that disambiguate 'fictional item.'

For example, 'financial institution' and 'natural boundary of a river' are two phrases that disambiguate 'bank.'

[David Brightly]

Bill,
May I offer the following resolution of the paradox? I say that 'purely fictional' does not function as a concept term. Instead, it is ambiguous between two interpretations. On the one hand, it behaves like the pseudo-concept 'inexistent'. To say that Bone is a purely fictional alcoholic is to deny that Bone exists. The same goes whatever name and concept term we substitute for 'Bone' and 'alcoholic'. This leads us to assert

1. There are no purely fictional items.

On the other hand, I say that 'fictional and 'purely fictional' appear to be concept terms because sentences like

Bone is a purely fictional alcoholic

arise via a surface transformation of

Purely fictionally, Bone is an alcoholic

and inherit their meaning and truth value. We can understand the latter as asserting that

Some work of fiction says that Bone is an alcoholic.

We take this as true, as evidenced by the work of Hamilton, and running the transformation in reverse gets us to

Bone is a purely fictional alcoholic.

Taking 'purely fictional alcoholic' as a predicate, which it superficially resembles, by Existential Generalisation we arrive at

There is some purely fictional alcoholic,

and hence to

2. There are some purely fictional items.

and apparent contradiction with (1).

The idea of a surface transformation may well appear controversial and ad hoc. But the phenomenon occurs with other pseudo-concept terms, notably 'possible'. We have

Bone is a possible alcoholic <---> Possibly, Bone is an alcoholic
Bone is a fictional alcoholic <---> Fictionally, Bone is an alcoholic.

On the left we have 'possible' and 'fictional' which look like concept terms but cannot be consistently interpreted as such. On the right we have sentential operators which introduce an element of semantic ascent which is not apparent on the left. It's precisely because 'possible' and 'fictional' involve hidden semantic ascent that they do not work as concept terms.

[David Brightly]

Our comments crossed, Bill. As I hope my immediately previous comment shows, I don't see 'fictional' as a concept term (except in the sense that Jane Austen's Emma is fictional, which is not relevant to the discussion) and I can't neatly disambiguate it in the way you ask.