For Dave Bagwill, who posed some questions in the near vicinity of the ones I will be addressing. This is a heavily revised version of a 2011 post. The MavPhil doctrine of abrogation is in effect. This is a hairy topic; expect a hard slog. If you prefer a 'leiter' read, a certain gossip site suggests itself.
..............
One morning an irate C-Span viewer called in to say that he prayed to the living God, not to the mythical being, Allah, to whom Muslims pray. The C-Span guest made a standard response, which is correct as far as it goes, namely, that Allah is Arabic for God, just as Gott is German for God. He suggested that adherents of the three Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam) worship the same God under different names. No doubt this is a politically correct thing to say, but is it true?
Our question, then, is precisely this: Does the normative Christian and the normative Muslim worship numerically the same God, or numerically different Gods? (By 'normative Christian/Muslim' I mean an orthodox adherent of his faith who understands its content, without subtraction of essential tenets, and without addition of private opinions.) Islam and Christianity are both monotheistic. So if Christian and Muslim worship different Gods, and a monotheistic God exists, then one is worshipping a nonexistent God, or, if you prefer, is failing to worship the true God.
1. Let's start with the obvious: 'Allah' is Arabic for God. So if an Arabic-speaking Coptic Christian refers to God, he uses 'Allah.' And if an Arabic-speaking Muslim refers to God, he too uses 'Allah.' From the fact that both Copt and Muslim use 'Allah' it does not follow that they are referring to the same God, but it also does not follow that they are referring to numerically different Gods. So we will not make any progress with our question if we remain at the level of words. We must advance to concepts.
2. We need to distinguish between our word for God, the concept (conception) of God, and God. God is not a concept, but there are concepts of God and, apart from mystical intuition and religious feelings such as the Kreatur-Gefuehl that Rudolf Otto speaks of, we have no access to God except via our concepts of God. Now it is undeniable that the Christian and Muslim conceptions of God partially overlap. The following is a partial list of what is common to both conceptions:
a. There is exactly one God.
b. God is the creator of everything distinct from himself.
c. God is transcendent: he is radically different from everything distinct from himself.
d. God is good.
Now if the Christian and Muslim conceptions of God were identical, then we would have no reason to think that Christian and Muslim worship different Gods. But of course the conceptions, despite partial overlap, are not identical. Christians believe in a triune God who became man in Jesus of Nazareth. Or to put it precisely, they believe in a triune God the second person of which became man in Jesus of Nazareth. This is the central and indeed crucial (from the Latin, crux, crucis, meaning cross) difference between the two faiths. The crux of the matter is the cross.
So while the God-concepts overlap, they are different concepts. (The overlap is partial, not complete.) And let's not forget that God is not, and cannot be, a concept (as I am using 'concept'). No concept is worship-worthy or anyone's highest good. No concept created the world. Whether or not God exists, it is a conceptual truth that God cannot be a concept. For the concept of God contains the subconcept, being that exists apart from any finite mind. It is built into the very concept of God that God cannot be a concept.
It is clear then, that what the Christian and the Muslim worship or purport to worship cannot be that which is common to their respective God-conceptions, for what is common its itself a concept.
We could say that if God exists, then God is the object of our God-concept or the referent of our God-concept, but also the referent of the word 'God.'
3. Now comes the hard part, which is to choose between two competing views:
V1: Christian and Muslim can worship the same God, even though one of them must have a false belief about God, whether it be the belief that God is unitarian or the belief that God is trinitarian.
V2: Christian and Muslim must worship different Gods precisely because they have different conceptions of God. So it is not that one of them has a false belief about the one God they both worship; it is rather that one of them does not worship the true God at all.
There is no easy way to decide rationally between these two views. We have to delve into the philosophy of language and ask how reference is achieved. How do linguistic expressions attach or apply to extralinguistic entities? How do words grab onto the (extralinguistic) world? In particular, how do nominal expressions work? What makes my utterance of 'Socrates' denote Socrates rather than someone or something else? What makes my use of 'God' (i) have a referent at all and (ii) have the precise referent it has?
4. It is reasonable to hold, with Frege, Russell, and many others, that reference is routed through, and determined by, sense: an expression picks out its object in virtue of the latter's unique satisfaction of a
description associated with the referring expression, a description that unpacks the expression's sense. If we think of reference in this way, then 'God' refers to whatever entity, if any, that satisfies the definite description encapsulated in 'God' as this term is used in a given linguistic community.
Given that God is not an actual or possible object of (sense) experience, this seems like a reasonable approach to take. The idea is that 'God' is a definite description in disguise so that 'God' refers to whichever entity satisfies the description associated with 'God.' The reference relation is one of satisfaction. A grammatically singular term t refers to x if and only if x exists and x satisfies the description associated with t. Now consider two candidate definite descriptions, the first corresponding to the Muslim conception, the second corresponding to the Christian.
D1: 'the unique x such that x is omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, created the world ex nihilo and is unitarian'
D2: 'the unique x such that x is omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, created the world ex nihilo, and is triune.'
Suppose that reference is not direct, but routed through sense, or mediated by a description, in the manner explained above. It is easy to see that no one entity can satisfy both (D1) and (D2). For while the descriptions overlap, nothing can be both unitarian and triune. So if reference is routed through sense, then Christian and Muslim cannot be referring to the same being. Indeed, one of them is not succeeding in referring at all. For if God is triune, nothing in reality answers to the Muslim's conception of God. And if God is unitarian, then nothing in reality answers to the Christian conception.
And so, contrary to what Miroslav Volf maintains, the four points of commonality in the Christian and Muslim conceptions listed above do NOT "establish the claim that in their worship of God, Muslims and Christians refer to the same object." (Allah: A Christian Response, HarperCollins 2011, p. 110.) For if reference to God is mediated by a conception which includes the subconcept triune or else the subconcept unitarian, then the reference cannot be to the same entity.
A mundane example (adapted from Kripke) will make this more clear. Sally sees a handsome man at a party standing in the corner drinking a clear bubbly liquid from a cocktail glass. She turns to her companion Nancy and says, "The man standing in the corner drinking champagne is handsome!" Suppose the man is not drinking champagne, but mineral water instead. Has Sally succeeded in referring to the man or not?
Argumentative Nancy, who knows that no alcohol is being served at the party, and who also finds the man handsome, says, "You are not referring to anything: there is no man in the corner drinking champagne. The man is drinking mineral water or some other bubbly clear beverage. Nothing satisfies your definite description. There is no one man we both admire. Your handsome man does not exist, but mine does."
Now in this example what we would intuitively say is that Sally did succeed in referring to someone using a definite description even though the object she succeeded in referring to does not satisfy the description. Intuitively, we would say that Sally simply has a false belief about the object to which she is successfully referring, and that Sally and Nancy are referring to and admiring the very same man.
But note how this case differs from the God case. Both women see the man in the corner. But God is not an object of possible (sense) experience. We don't see God in this life. Hence the reference of 'God' cannot be nailed down perceptually. A burning bush is an object of possible sense experience, and God may manifest himself in a burning bush; but God is not a burning bush, and the referent of 'God' cannot be a burning bush. The man in the corner that the women see and admire is not a manifestation of a man, but a man himself.
Given that God is not literally seen or otherwise sense-perceived in this life, then, apart from mystical experience, the only way to get at God is via concepts and descriptions. And so it seems that in the God case what we succeed in referring to is whatever satisfies the definite description that unpacks our conception of God.
5. My tentative conclusion, then, is that (i) if we accept a description theory of names, the Christian and Muslim do not refer to the same being when they use 'God' or 'Allah' and (ii) that a description theory of names is what we must invoke given the nonperceivability of God. Christian and Muslim do not refer to the same being because no one being can satisfy both (D1) and (D2) above: nothing can be both triune and not triune any more than one man can both be drinking champage and not drinking champagne at the same time.
If, on the other hand, 'God' is a logically proper name whose reference is direct and not routed through sense or mediated by a definite description, then what would make 'God' or a particular use of 'God' refer to God?
One might propose a causal theory of names.
The causal theory of names of Saul Kripke et al. requires that there be an initial baptism of the target of reference, a baptism at which the name is first introduced. This can come about by ostension: Pointing to a newly acquired kitten, I bestow upon it the moniker, 'Mungojerrie.' Or it can come about by the use of a reference-fixing definite description: Let 'Neptune' denote the celestial object responsible for the perturbation of the orbit of Uranus. In the second case, it may be that the object whose name is being introduced is not itself present at the baptismal ceremony. What is present, or observable, are certain effects of the object hypothesized. (See Saul Kripke Naming and Necessity, Harvard 1980 p. 79, n. 33 and p. 96, n. 42.)
As I understand it, a necessary condition for successful reference on the causal theory is that a
speaker's use of a name be causally connected (either directly or indirectly via a causal chain)) with the object referred to. We can refer to objects only if we stand in some causal relation to them (direct or indirect). So my use of 'God' refers to God not because there is something that satisfies the definite description or disjunction of definite descriptions that unpack the sense of 'God' as I use the term, but because my use of 'God' can be traced back though a long causal chain to an initial baptism, as it were, of God by, say, Moses on Mt. Sinai.
A particular use of a name is presumably caused by an earlier use. But eventually there must be an initial use. Imagine Moses on Mt. Sinai. He has a profound mystical experience of a being who conveys to his mind such locutions as "I am the Lord thy God; thou shalt not have false gods before me." Moses applies 'God' or 'YHWH' to the being he believes is addressing him in the experience. But what makes the name the name of the being? One may say: the being or an effect of the being is simply labelled or tagged with the name in an initial 'baptism.'
But a certain indeterminacy seems to creep in if we think of the semantic relation of referring as explicable in terms of tagging and causation (as opposed to in terms of the non-causal relation of satisfaction of a definite description encapsulated in a grammatically proper name). For is it the (mystical) experience of God that causes the use of 'God'? Or is it God himself who causes the use of 'God'? If the former, then 'God' refers to an experience had by Moses and not to God. Surely God is not an experience. But if God is the cause of Moses' use of 'God,' then the mystical experience must be veridical. (Cf. Richard M. Gale, On the Nature and Existence of God, Cambridge UP, 1991, p. 11.)
So if we set aside mystical experience and the question of its veridicality, it seems we ought to adopt a description theory of the divinenames with the consequences mentioned in (i) above. If, on the other hand, a causal theory of divine names names is tenable, and if the causal chain extends from Moses down to Christians and (later) to Muslims, then a case could be made that Jews, Christians, and Muslims are all referring to the same God when they use 'God' and such equivalents as 'Yahweh' and 'Allah.'
So it looks like there is no easy answer to the opening question. It depends on the resolution of intricate questions in the philosophy of language.
http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2015/02/the-god-of-christianity-and-the-god-of-islam-same-god-2015.html
reasons thus:
"Islam and Christianity are both monotheistic.
So if Christian and Muslim worship different Gods,
then one is worshipping a nonexistent God,
or, if you prefer, is failing to worship the true God."
Non sequitur!
Why does the conclusion not follow
from the premises?
Because a person can believe that
exactly one God exists (= be monotheistic),
without regard to how many Gods exist.
This seems to be an enthymematic argument,
but what the unstated premise is, is not clear.
It could be
[1] Exactly one God exists, or maybe
[2] No more than one God exists, or maybe
[3] Either the Christian's belief or the
Muslim's belief is correct.
The person who wrote this is well trained
in syllogisms, so it looks like he inadvertently
said something he did not mean to say.
-- Mark Spahn (West Seneca, NY)
Posted by: Mark Spahn | Friday, February 20, 2015 at 07:12 PM
Rev. Dr Mark Durie has written an entire book on this subject.
http://www.markdurie.com/books-dvds/libertytothecaptives
His blog is a useful resource.
http://blog.markdurie.com
Posted by: Lorenzo from Oz | Friday, February 20, 2015 at 08:28 PM
Thanks for the references. And Durie's thesis in a couple of sentences?
Posted by: BV | Saturday, February 21, 2015 at 05:32 AM
Mark,
You're right: my argument as it stood was enthymematic. But as it now stands it is not: I supplied the tacit premise.
Thanks for reading carefully.
Posted by: BV | Saturday, February 21, 2015 at 05:54 AM
Dear Bill,
it seems to me that there are some more considerations to be made.
First, an alternative to be pondered is that "God" is a Kripkean proper name whose reference has been fixed not through baptism but by means of a description (like "Jack the Ripper"). (This seems to me actually to be the case, more or less.)
Furthermore: even if we go for the descriptive theory, it need not be assumed that any properties that a given religion ascribes to God actually enter the meaning of the name "God", i.e. serve to pick out the referent. Otherwise we would have to say that on the descriptive theory Aquinas, Scotus and Ockham did not worship the same God (since their notions of God are incompatible), or worse: that at best one of them actually worshipped the true God.
My view on this matter is that it is in fact a pragmatic matter how a reference of a given term is fixed: the speaker decides. One can use a name so that he intends it to apply to whomever satisfies certain description in any possible world (a non-rigid, Russellian use), or, one can use it so that he intends it to apply in all possible worlds to the individual that satisfies certain description in the actual world (a rigid use, yet mediated by a description), or one can use is to apply in all possible worlds to the individual that is located at the root of the Kripkean causal chain, or perhaps some other possibilities (in fact, I believe that the third alternative reduces to the second, since having a name refer to the individual located at the root of the causal chain is nothing else than having it refer to the individual satisfying the description "the individual located...etc."). In other words, rigidity or non-rigidity is pragmatic, both descriptions and proper names can be used either way (which is an empirical fact, IMHO).
So, IMO it is not in fact a matter of deep questions of philosophy of language, but of the intentions of the authoritative speakers of the given religions. It all boils down to the question: if an authoritative representant of a given religion came to believe that God does not posses a given attribute A after all, would he interpret it as "I was mistaken about God's attributes", or as "I believed in a wrong God"? If the former, then A does not enter into the description by means of which the reference of "God" is fixed for that religion; if yes, it does. And then we just have to see whether the resulting descriptions are compatible or not.
Lukas
Posted by: Lukas Novak | Saturday, February 21, 2015 at 12:28 PM
Lukas,
Thank you for the good, challenging comments. For now I will respond to one point.
>>even if we go for the descriptive theory, it need not be assumed that any properties that a given religion ascribes to God actually enter the meaning of the name "God", i.e. serve to pick out the referent.<<
For example, Aquinas ascribes to God the property of being simple, while Plantinga does not. Presumably you want to say that being simple, while an attribute of God, is no part of the sense of the definite description through which the reference is routed when Aquinas refers to God.
This is not clear to me. For when Aquinas argues for the simplicity of God he proceeds a priori by conceptual analysis and not by an empirical inspection of God's attributes. For example, Aquinas proves that God is not a body by arguing that (i) God is the unmoved mover; (ii) no body moves unless moved by another; ergo, (iii) God is not a body. From there he concludes that there is no matter-form composition in God since every body has both matter and form.
My point is that Aquinas proceeds by adding step by step to the sense of 'the first cause' or 'the unmoved mover' so that being simple becomes part of the very sense of 'God' for Aquinas.
Now if Aquinas means by 'God' a simple being, then Aquinas and Plantinga mean different things by 'God' despite the considerable overlap of their God-conceptions.
I may be going wrong. Where exactly?
Posted by: BV | Saturday, February 21, 2015 at 01:52 PM
Dear Bill,
Thanks. I think that a priori detection of necessary attributes of an object referred to by an expression by means of a concept does not necessarily involve "adding to the sense" of that expression, or "adding to the comprehension" of that concept.
The expressions "(eucleidic) triangle" and "(eucleidic) polyhedron whose angles add up to 180°" have different senses, although their senses are implied in each other and can be a priori cross-proved about each other. Even if we know a good lot about triangles, we need not cram all that stuff into our working concept of triangle that serves as the sense of the term "triangle". Senses are hyper-intensional, not just intensional items, and so their logical equivalence does not entail their identity (nor does their entailment imply parthood).
This is especially important for reasoning about God - for otherwise even the slightest error in our knowledge about Him would cause our notion of God to be inconsistent (assuming that God has all His properties necessarily). I doubt that would leave any human at all to succeed in referring to God.
Posted by: Lukas Novak | Saturday, February 21, 2015 at 02:17 PM
Lukas,
I agree that one need not import into one's concept *Euclidean triangle* everything that can be proven a priori about such triangles. But a fully explicit concept would contain all that information. And so one could add to one's concept all that information.
Suppose there are two master geometers, one Euclidean, the other non-Euclidean. Each, unlike you and me, has a complete concept of triangle. It is just that one concept includes the Fregean mark (Merkmal) *has interior angles that sum to 180 degrees* while the other doesn't, (and all the entailments of those different marks).
Clearly, these two different concepts cannot be instantiated by one and the same object.
Aquinas, let us assume, has thoroughly thought through his concept of God and has added to it everything that he thinks can be proven about God philosophically. So he adds simplicity to the marks of the concept. Plantinga, let us assume, does the same, but adds the complement of simplicity to his concept.
Clearly, no one entity can fall under both concepts. Suppose God in reality is simple. Then God as conceived by Plantinga does not exist, and Plantinga worships a nonexistent God.
Perhaps what I am trying to say is this. The description theory of names entails the view that existence is instantiation. So the existence of God is just the instantiation of some concept. But God is an individual, so the concept must be an individual concept that is complete. Now no one thing can instantiate both Aquinas' and Plantinga's complete concept. So there is no one existing object that both concepts are concepts of.
Please define 'hyperintensional.'
Posted by: BV | Saturday, February 21, 2015 at 03:19 PM
Bill,
Ad "hyperintensional": well, I think that in this context I could go for something like this: An item is hyperintensional iff it cannot be substituted by a logically equivalent item salva veritate.
I don't see why description theory of names entails the view that existence is instantiation.
I agree there may be, or in a sense that there is, a complete Aquinas-God-concept and a complete Plantinga-God-concept. But I deny that these concepts must be the concepts that serve as the respective senses of the name "God" as these people use them; and I very much doubt that they actually are/were.
Of course Aquinas might think that he has thought through his concept of God thoroughly and that he has all his divine attributes correct. But suppose he wanted to discuss natural theology with Plantinga. In order to be able to do so, he would have to choose such a concept of God that would (1) identify God as the object of discourse, and yet (2) be sufficiently "thin" so that Plantinga would not object that no such entity exists. Do Aquinas and Plantinga disagree about the attributes of one and the same individual, or do they disagree about existences of two different individuals? I think that they would both confirm the former option - which implies that the senses they assign to "God" are not their incompatible "thick" notions of God, but a common "thin" concept of God.
How do you define a "complete concept"? There are many different concepts that uniquely identify God as an individual and still are infinitely far from describing Him completely. Some of them commonly serve as the sense of "God" for various speakers. And there is only one consistent complete notion that could be remotely regarded as a notion of God - this is why it would be unwise to use the complete (or any "too thick") concept of God as the sense of "God". The danger of failure of reference would be unnecessarily high, given our fallibility.
Posted by: Lukas Novak | Saturday, February 21, 2015 at 06:21 PM
Thanks from France for your blog and this brilliant analysis;but you shouldn't say "abrahamic religions".So far i know,this expression comes from Pierre Massignon,a christian typically "ismaelophile"(oops!)and Islam denies Sarah his wife; she isn't "a beverage in the hands"of Abraham;Leibniz,and you too,could explain that.(excuse my bad English;probably you speak better french...)
Posted by: jpascal | Sunday, February 22, 2015 at 02:02 AM
jpascal,
Your English is better than my French.
I believe you mean Louis Massignon. You may be right that I ought to stop referring to Islam as an Abrahamic religion. I'll have to look into that.
Thank you for the comment.
Posted by: BV | Sunday, February 22, 2015 at 03:36 AM
>>Ad "hyperintensional": well, I think that in this context I could go for something like this: An item is hyperintensional iff it cannot be substituted by a logically equivalent item salva veritate.<<
Can you give an example? What is the difference between 'intensional' and 'hyperintensional'?
Posted by: BV | Sunday, February 22, 2015 at 03:40 AM
Well: a proposition conceived Carnap-wise as a function from possible worlds to truth-values is intensional. All logically equivalent propositions are identical.
On the other hand, a proposition qua that item which is the object of propositional attitudes (e.g. belief) is hyperintensional.
1 + 1 = 2 and i^2/i^2 = 1 expres one and the same Carnapian proposition (the one that maps all possible worlds to TRUE) but two different hyperintensional senses (as my son believes the former without believing the latter).
Posted by: Lukas Novak | Sunday, February 22, 2015 at 04:31 AM
Thank you, Lukas. I see your distinction but I frown upon the terminology.
To me it is absurd to maintain a view that implies that *2 + 2 = 4* is the same proposition as *7 + 5 = 12.* That is because I incline toward a Fregean view of propositions acc. to which a proposition (Gedanke) is the sense (Sinn) of a declarative sentence (Satz) from which all indexical elements, including tenses of verbs, have been extruded.
They are not the same (identical), they are different, but logically equivalent, where logical equivalence is the necessitation of material equivalence.
I would say that they are EXTENSIONALLY equivalent across all logically possible worlds.
We seem to be making the same distinction but couching it in different terms. My extensional/intensional distinction is your intensional/hyperintensional distinction.
Agree?
It is a pleasure talking philosophy with you.
Posted by: BV | Sunday, February 22, 2015 at 05:25 AM
Bill, you said to Lukas,
I don't understand how 'completeness' of concept figures in this, but if you are contrasting the two concepts,why can't both these concepts be instantiated in one and the same object, for example, a triangle?Posted by: David Brightly | Sunday, February 22, 2015 at 11:30 AM
David,
They can. My contrast is not between (T1) and (T2), but between a Euclidean triangle and either a hyperbolic (Lobachevskian) triangle or an elliptical (Riemannian) triangle.
Now unless I am making some mathematical mistake, for which you will correct me, nothing, such as a portion of the Earth's surface, can be both a Euclidean and a Riemannian triangle. (I. e. can have the geometrical properties of both).
Posted by: BV | Sunday, February 22, 2015 at 01:50 PM
One way I approach the question of 'sameness' is this: are the 'stories' of the god(s)-in-question the 'same' stories?
In general, the story of the God worshiped by Christians is like this:
Creation→Fall→Israel→Jesus Christ→The Church. I think those are the necessary 'plot points' that all Christians could agree on. Any other story would not be 'the same'. There are, of course, billions of sub-plots!
It is not a very sophisticated approach, but I like it for its usefulness: everyone knows what a story is, after all, and comparing stories, comparing plot points, brings into sharp relief whether we are talking about the 'same' Author.
$.02
Posted by: Dave Bagwill | Sunday, February 22, 2015 at 11:07 PM
Thank you Bill, I see now. This is a very interesting example. Arguably, both your geometers have the same concept of triangle---three sided polygon---and the same concept of side---segment of a straight line---and the same concept of straight---distance minimising. But these concepts are relative to, or presuppose, some concept of space, be it flat (Euclidean) or curved (Riemannian, say) so that no instance of triangle relative to a Euclidean space has the same properties as an instance of triangle relative to a Riemannian space.
What you call 'completing' a concept I would prefer to call 'refining'. The conditions that are being added, such as the requirement that the interior angle sum be 180 degrees, are not intrinsic to the concept triangle. Extra premises, extrinsic to the concept triangle, in this case the flatness of space, are required in order to derive such conditions. So we arrive at three refinements of the concept triangle: triangle-in-flat-space, triangle-in-elliptic-space, and triangle-in-hyperbolic-space. But an instance of each refinement is still an instance of triangle.
Posted by: David Brightly | Monday, February 23, 2015 at 02:57 PM
A quick follow-up to my post re: 'stories' above.
If I was discussing the question of the 'same' God with a Muslim (as in fact I have), I could give the short story as follows, avoiding metaphysics to a great extent:
"The God I'm talking about created the universe and all that is in it including mankind; and pronounced it all 'very good'.
The representative Man, Adam, chose to sin and therefore gave up his high calling, and as a result of this Fall, sin infected the human race like a disease, which explains both the glory and the misery of humans. This Fall also affected the creation itself, according to St. Paul.
The call of Abraham was the beginning of God's healing the creation/mankind. Thus eventually Israel came to be, and was given the privilege of bringing God's love to the world. Apparently, they failed. It's right there in the scriptures.
God sent His Son Jesus in the fulness of time, the last Adam, Who accomplished in Himself what Adam and Israel did not. Those who are joined to Jesus in truth and in spirit become the Church, whose high calling and responsibility is to live and love their neighbors, and spread a new but good 'disease' - the love and spirit of God.
The Church has the first four acts of a five-act play - Creation, Fall, Israel, Christ - and is called upon to divine the Author's intent and methods, and act out the final act.(To be followed by a much greater Story, so we're led to believe)."
That is scandalously abbreviated of course - but I could ask my Muslim friend - is that the story of Allah? Is The Father of Jesus Christ, as understood by Christians, the SAME as Allah?
That's why I think the story approach can be useful.
Posted by: Dave Bagwill | Tuesday, February 24, 2015 at 02:27 PM
I should add a quick note: I mentioned that Israel 'failed' - the Hebrew scriptures do state that - but St. Paul goes to great lengths to say to Jews and Gentiles - 'we are all in the same boat, don't boast, and don't think you are better than the other group."
Posted by: Dave Bagwill | Wednesday, February 25, 2015 at 12:31 PM
Bill: Yes, I agree (thanks for the compliment and /rereading my posts/ apologies for my terrible English!). I've been under the impression that "extension across possible worlds" is the standard meaning of "intension". ("Proposition" is notoriously polysemous.)
Posted by: Lukas Novak | Thursday, February 26, 2015 at 01:18 PM
Apologies in advance for posting this link here. I do so for two reasons. One, you do not allow comments on your posts related to matters Islamic. And two, as much as i respect and have learned from you, your passions, it seems to me, get the better of you when it comes to Muslims. so, here: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/02/what-muslims-really-want-isis-atlantic/386156/
Posted by: Ishaq | Friday, February 27, 2015 at 05:43 PM
Ishaq,
Scroll down and you will see that I have already linked to that very article, and I quote from it!
Posted by: BV | Saturday, February 28, 2015 at 04:01 AM
good sir,
it isn't. the article i linked to is a response to the one you quote from and linked to.
Posted by: Ishaq | Saturday, February 28, 2015 at 08:00 AM
Sameness can vary depending on what you are trying to do with it. For example, Sally & Nancy each ask a friend about the handsome man in the corner. Nancy's friend says that his name is Thomas; he is a player but good in the sack. Nancy is interested. Sally's friend says that his name is Jake and that he's quiet & sweet. Sally is interested. At least one of them is going to be sadly disappointed.
Are the descriptions talking about the same man? In one sense, yes; they both purport to describe "the handsome man in the corner", who for the purposes of this example is a well defined (!) entity. But the descriptions are widely divergent; at least one clearly does not represent reality. But our basis for concluding this - knowing nothing else about the man - is grounded in the singularity of the man about whom they are making claims! If they were clearly speaking about two different men, they would not be inherently contradictory.
Same with Allah and YHWH. To claim that they are interchangeable is nonsense. But the overlapping nature of the claims provides a common starting point for discussion that is absent when discussing with a panthiest or athiest
Posted by: Andrew W | Monday, March 02, 2015 at 11:13 PM