The following entry draws heavily upon W. Matthews Grant, "Divine Simplicity, Contingent Truths, and Extrinsic Models of Divine Knowing," Faith and Philosophy, vol. 29, no. 3, July 2012, pp. 254-274.
It also bears upon my discussion with Professor Dale Tuggy. He holds that God is a being among beings. I deny that God is a being among beings, holding instead that God is Being itself. This is not to deny that God is; but it does entail affirming that God is in a radically unique way distinct from the way creatures are. We can call this radically unique way or mode of Being, simplicity. So my denial, and Dale's affirmation, that God is a being among beings is logically equivalent to my affirming, and Dale's denying, the doctrine of divine simplicity.
A particularly vexing problem for defenders of the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS) is to explain how an ontologically simple God could know contingent truths.
The problem may be cast in the mold of an aporetic tetrad:
1. God is simple: there is nothing intrinsic to God that is distinct from God.
2. God knows some contingent truths.
3. Necessarily, if God knows some truth t, then (i) there an item intrinsic to God such as a mental act or a belief state (ii) whereby God knows t.
4. God exists necessarily.
The plausibility of (3) may be appreciated as follows. Whatever else knowledge is, it is plausibly regarded as a species of true belief. A belief is an intrinsic state of a subject. Moreover, beliefs are individuated by their contents: beliefs or believings with different contents are different beliefs or believings. It cannot be that one and the same act of believing has different contents at different times or in different possible worlds.
That the tetrad is inconsistent can be seen as follows. Suppose God, who knows everything there is to be known, knows some contingent truth t. He knows, for example, that I have two cats. It follows from (3) that there is some item intrinsic to God such as a belief state whereby God knows t. Given (1), this state, as intrinsic to God, is not distinct from God. Given (4), the state whereby God knows t exists necessarily. But then t is necessarily true. This contradicts (2) according to which t is contingent.
Opponents of the divine simplicity will turn the tetrad into an argument against (1). They will argue from the conjunction of (2) & (3) & (4) to the negation of (1). The classical theist, however, accepts (1), (2), and (4). If he is to solve the tetrad, he needs to find a way to reject (3). He needs to find a way to reject the idea that when a knower knows something, there is, intrinsic to the knower, some mediating item that is individuated by the object known.
So consider an externalist conception of knowledge. I see a cat and seeing it I know it -- that it is and what it is. Now the cat is not in my head; but it could be in my mind on an externalist theory of mind. My awareness of the cat somehow 'bodily' includes the cat, the whole cat, all 25 lbs of him, fur, dander, and all. Knowledge is immediate, not mediated by sense data, representations, mental acts, occurrent believings, or any other sort of epistemic intermediary or deputy. Seeing a cat, I see the cat itself directly, not indirectly via some other items that I see directly such as an Husserlian noema, a Castanedan ontological guise, a Meinongian incomplete object, or any other sort of merely intentional object. On this sort of scheme, the mind is not a container, hence has no contents in the strict sense of this term. The mind is directly at the things themselves.
If this externalism is coherent, then then we can say of God's knowledge that it does not involve any intrinsic states of God that would be different were God to know different things than he does know. For example, God knows that I have two cats. That I have two cats is an actual, but contingent fact. If God's knowledge of this fact were mediated by an item intrinsic to God, a mental act say, an item individuated by its accusative, then given the divine simplicity, this item could not be distinct from God with the consequence that the act and its accusative would be necessary. This consequence is blocked if there is nothing intrinsic to God whereby he knows that I have two cats.
We will have to take a closer look at externalism. But if it is coherent, then the aporetic tetrad can be solved by rejecting (3).
Hi Bill,
Regarding Matthews' "knowledge externalism" proposal, this looks to me like an implicit denial of divine omniscience.
Consider three worlds, W1, W2, and W3. As a necessary being, God exists in all three worlds. In W1 there exists A, B, and C, but no D, E, or F. In W2 there exists D, E, and F, but not A, B, or C. In W3 God and God alone exists. According to Matthews, God in W1 is intrinsically identical to God in W2 and to God in W3.
Now suppose that W1 is actual. In virtue of what does God know that W1 is actual and not W2 or W3? Here the knowledge externalist will appeal to external relations. But I don't see how this can capture omniscience. Compare God with Schmod. Schmod is just like God on the assumption of divine simplicity. That is, there is nothing intrinsic to Schmod that is distinct from Schmod. But Schmod, unlike God, is not omniscient. Rather, Schmod is like Aristotle's "thought thinking itself". Schmod knows all necessary truths, but no contingent truths. Whatever possible world is actual, Schmod's knowledge is exactly the same. Schmod, we might say, is epistemically indifferent with respect to contingent reality. Now, on Matthews' view there is no intrinsic difference between God and Schmod. But then isn't it simply gratuitous for him to insist that God, unlike Schmod, is omniscient?
Now, I agree with Matthews that God is immediately acquainted with all of reality. But I don't think it follows that what God is immediately acquainted with makes no intrinsic difference to God. If it doesn't make an intrinsic difference, then what I do think follows is that either (a) everything is necessary or (b) God's supposed "knowledge" of contingent realities is not the genuine article (because there's no intrinsic difference between God and Schmod).
Posted by: Alan Rhoda | Wednesday, May 20, 2015 at 04:47 PM
Here's another way to put my objection to Matthews: I'm basically arguing that (2) entails (3), and thus that not-(3) entails not-(2). If there's no intrinsic difference between a God who knows only necessary truths and a God who knows all truths, then either (a) there are no contingent truths or (b) there are contingent truths and neither God is omniscient.
Either way, it follows that classical theism understood as commitment to (1), (2), and (4) is untenable.
Posted by: Alan Rhoda | Thursday, May 21, 2015 at 10:17 AM
Very interesting criticism, Alan.
>>Now, on Matthews' view there is no intrinsic difference between God and Schmod. But then isn't it simply gratuitous for him to insist that God, unlike Schmod, is omniscient? <<
Well, God and Schmod are not intrinsically different, but they are relationally different. God on Matthews' view is omniscient in that, in each world, God knows whatever contingent states of affairs are there to be known. It is just that he knows them without there being anything intrinsic to God in virtue of which he knows them.
Posted by: Bill Vallicella | Thursday, May 21, 2015 at 04:01 PM
>> Well, God and Schmod are not intrinsically different, but they are relationally different.
That's Matthews' view, of course. But on my view, that relational difference is a mere "Cambridge" difference, not a real or genuine difference. As I see it, the difference amounts merely to the fact that we (stipulatively) conceptualize God as externally related to contingencies and Schmod as not so related.
Matthews affirms DDS in part at least because he believes that any being-- construe that in a manner that does imply that God is a "being among beings"--that didn't satisfy DDS would not be God. In contrast, I deny DDS because I believe that any being that satisfied it would not be God (because not omniscient, among other things).
Posted by: Alan Rhoda | Thursday, May 21, 2015 at 07:09 PM
Alan,
I think you are just opposing Matthews, not really refuting him.
I think a better tack to take would be to ask whether ultimately it makes sense to affirm externalism whether for us or for God. I suspect that it does not, and that for this reason Matthews' sol'n to the above problem does not work.
Posted by: Bill Vallicella | Friday, May 22, 2015 at 05:25 AM
I don't see why Matthews is committed to the view that there is no intrinsic difference between God and Schmod. Why can't he say that God intrinsically differs from Schmod in such a way that we can truly say of God that he is epistemically sensitive to contingent reality and Schmod not? I take it there is more than one way of being simple.
Of course, this intrinsic difference cannot vary from world to world, but I don't why that should be a problem.
Another tack would be to argue that there is not more than one way of being simple, and that being simple entails being epistimically sensitive to contingency, and so the hypothesis of a simple being that lacks this feature (Schmod) is impossible.
Posted by: Matt Hart | Saturday, May 23, 2015 at 05:30 AM
Good point, Matt. Schmod is intrinsically such as to know only necessary truths. God is not. So God and Schmod differ intrinsically.
What say you, Alan?
Posted by: Bill Vallicella | Saturday, May 23, 2015 at 02:50 PM