Having somewhat churlishly accused Daniel M. of failing to understand my post Does Classical Theism Logically Require Haecceitism, he wrote back in detail demonstrating that he did understand me quite well. I will now post his e-mail with some responses in blue.
I'm sorry. I've re-read your post, and it strikes me as quite clear, and I think I understand it. So perhaps the problem lies in my rather compressed e-mail, and not in my understanding of your post. Any rate, if this is wrong then this message should reinforce that. I elaborate a bit below on my earlier email, but this isn't meant to stop you from writing another post about the matter if that was your intent.
1. I agreed with your claim that classical theism does not entail haecceitism. I did not mean to imply, in saying this, that I agree either with the specific view of pre-creation divine knowledge you articulated, or with Mason's view. I agree that classical theism doesn't entail haecceitism because I don't think that the nature of classical theism forces a particular choice on this issue, either between your view or Mason's view or another.
BV: Good. I agree that a particular choice is not forced by the nature of classical theism.
2. I agreed (or rather said I'm inclined to agree) that there are no *non*-qualitative individual essences / haecceities prior to creation.
BV: I missed this; thanks for the clarification. It now seems we are on the same page. To spell it out: prior to God's creation of Socrates, and thus prior to the latter's coming into existence (actuality), there was no such non-qualitative property as identity-with-Socrates, or any other property involving Socrates himself as part of its very content. The modal analog holds as well: in those metaphysically possible worlds in which Socrates does not exist, there is no such property as identity-with-Socrates.
Of course, I am not saying that when Socrates does exist, then there is the haecceity property identity-with-Socrates instantiated by Socrates; I am saying that there are no haecceity properties at all, where an haecceity property is an abstract object that exists in every metaphysically possible world but is instantiated in only some such worlds, and furthermore satisfies this definition:
A haecceity property is a property H of x such that: (i) H is essential to x; (ii) nothing distinct from x instantiates H in the actual world; (iii) nothing distinct from x instantiates H in any metaphysically possible world.
An item is abstract iff it does not exist in space or time. An item is concrete iff it is not abstract.
Please note that when I say that there are no haecceity properties in the sense defined, that does not exclude there being haecceity properties in some other (non-Plantingian) sense. Note also that there might be haecceities that are in no sense properties. The materia signata of Socrates is not a property of him; so if someone holds that the haecceity (thisness) of Socrates either is or is grounded in his materia signata, then he would be holding that there are haecceities which are not properties. Similarly if spatiotemporal location is the principium individuationis, and if a thing's thisness = its principium individuationis.
Thus, if I am right, there is no sense in which the identity and individuality of Socrates somehow pre-exist his actual existence as they would pre-exist him if there were such a property as his nonqualitative haecceity property identity-with-Socrates. If so, then divine creation cannot be understood as God's bringing it about that the haecceity property identity-with-Socrates is instantiated. We would then need a different model of creation.
3. I then said that, notwithstanding (1) and (2), I defend a view that is close to haecceitism. I'll just elaborate a bit more here on where I'm coming from.
It seems to me you articulate a view like Robert Adams in his 1981 "Actualism and Thisness", and Christopher Menzel in his 1991 "Temporal Actualism and Singular Foreknowledge", with two key components.
First component: (A) Prior to creation, God's knowledge of what he might create is exclusively qualitative or pure in content (no reference to particular individuals). In light of my (2) above, I'm inclined to agree with this. Now let's say (this is admittedly imprecise, but I'm trying to be concise) that an item Q of qualitative knowledge *individuates* a particular possible creature C just in case Q's instantiation would be sufficient for C's existence and exemplification of Q.
Second component: (B) None of the aforementioned qualitative knowledge individuates a particular possible creature (such as Socrates). The reason for this is that for any relevant item of knowledge Q, there are multiple possible creatures that might exemplify Q (e.g., Socrates and Schmocrates), and so Q's instantiation is not *sufficient* for a *particular* possible creature to exist and exemplify Q.
The view I'm attracted to accepts (A) but denies (B). I think that purely qualitative knowledge could individuate possible creatures. (Thus far this view looks like Leibniz's, as I understand it.) So, were I arguing against you, your paragraph on Socrates/Schmocrates and the next paragraph on the Biblical / Platonic contrast would be areas of focus.
BV: Now I think I understand what your project is. You are right to mention Leibniz. I was all along assuming that the Identity of Indiscernibles is false: it is broadly logically possible that there be two individuals that share all qualitative or pure properties, whether essential or accidental, monadic or relational. I believe my view is committed to the rejection of the Identity of Indiscernibles. Could there not have been exactly two iron spheres alike in every respect and nothing else? This is at least thinkable if not really possible. You on the other had seem committed to the Identity of Indiscernibles: it is not broadly logically possible that there be two individuals sharing all the same qualitative or pure properties.
Suppose the Identity of Indiscernibles is true. And suppose God has before his mind a wholly determinate, but merely possible, concrete individual. Let it be an iron sphere. Equivalently, he has before his mind a conjunctive property the conjuncts of which are the properties of the sphere he is contemplating creating. Call this conjunctive property a qualitative individual essence (QIE). It is qualitative in that it makes no reference to any actual individual in the way identity-with-Socrates does. It is an individual essence in that only one thing in the actual world has it, and this thing that has it must have it. If creation is actualization, all God has to do to create the wholly determinate mere possible iron sphere is add existence to it, or else bring it about that the qualitative individual essence is instantiated.
But then how could God create Max Black's world in which there are exactly two indiscernible iron spheres? He couldn't. There would be nothing to make the spheres numerically distinct. If x and y are instances of a QIE, then x = y. For there is nothing that could distinguish them. Contrapositively, if x is not identical to y, then it is not the case that x and y are instances of the same QIE. That is what you are committed to if you uphold the Identity of Indiscernibles.
On my view of creation, divine creation is not the bestowal of actuality upon pre-existent individuals; God creates the very individuality of individuals in creating them. In doing so he creates their numerical difference from one another. This is equivalent to the view that existence is a principle of numerical diversification, a thesis Aquinas held, as it would not be if existence were merely the being instantiated of a property. Thus individuals differ in their very existence: existence and individuality are bound up with each other. This view of creation involves God more intimately in what he creates: he creates both the existence and the identity of the things he creates. Thus he does not create out of mere possibles, or out of haecceity properties, whether qualitative or nonqualitative: he creates out of nothing!
On Plantinga's scheme, as it seems to me, creation is not ex nihilo but out of a certain 'matter,' the 'matter' of haecceity properties. Since they are necessary beings, there are all the haecceity properties there might have been, and what God does is cause some of them to be instantiated.
The view I've described might seem to commit me to this: (C) prior to creation, there exist *qualitative* haecceities (again, using your definition of 'haecceity') or individual essences for *every* possible creature. And the (compressed) part of my email about a "new kind of essence" is meant to challenge the implication of (C). (Here is where my view departs from Leibniz's.) I think that God can know precisely which individuals he will get (not just which pure descriptions would be satisfied), even if *some* possible creatures lack qualitative haecceities. However, I was imprecise at best in telling you that my view is "close to" haecceitism. Given that you define haecceitism as the view that there are haecceities, I think the view I've described is committed to haecceitism - it just isn't committed to the view that *every* possible creature has a haecceity. I don't claim to have adequately explained or motivated, either in this email or the last, this particular view of pre-creation knowledge. I was only trying to quickly sketch the view I defend in the paper I mentioned.
BV. Very interesting. Perhaps you could explain this more fully in the ComBox. I don't understand how any possible creature could lack a qualitative haecceity. Only wholly determinate (complete) mere possibles are fit to become actual. This is because it is a law of (my) metaphysics that existence entails completeness, though not conversely. Completeness is thus a necessary condition of (real) existence. But if x is complete, then has a qualitative thisness which can be understood to be a conjunctive property the conjuncts of which are all of x's qualitative properties.
So why do you think that some possible creatures lack qualitative haecceities?
Hi Bill,
Thanks for the comments! So we are thinking of properties as necessarily existing abstracta, and let's say that an individual essence E of x is a property the having of which is (a) necessary and (b) sufficient for being x. I take an individual essence to be a haecceity property, as you define the latter. (My (a) covers (i) in your definition, and (b) covers (ii) and (iii).).
We agree there are no *non-qualitative* individual essences (e.g., "being [identical with] Socrates"), or indeed non-qualitative properties of any sort (e.g., "sitting next to Socrates"). If we allowed properties to exist contingently / temporarily, I myself would be happy to grant their existence, but the salient point is that they aren't around prior to creation to ground any divine knowledge or capacities vis-a-vis creation.
So God's pre-creation knowledge of possible objects of creation is purely qualitative in content (I called this component "A" in the post), and the issues arises whether such knowledge can individuate possible creatures or not. (Should we accept or reject component "B"?) I want to say yes ("qualitative individuation"), in which case it is indeed natural to think I'm committed to the Identity of Indiscernibles (though I revisit this below). If I understand you, you want to say no ("no qualitative individuation"), but I think there is a tension in your comments on this matter.
You said: "I don't understand how any possible creature could lack a qualitative haecceity. Only wholly determinate (complete) mere possibles are fit to become actual. This is because it is a law of (my) metaphysics that existence entails completeness, though not conversely. Completeness is thus a necessary condition of (real) existence. But if x is complete, then has a qualitative thisness which can be understood to be a conjunctive property the conjuncts of which are all of x's qualitative properties."
But you also say you have been assuming the falsity of the Identity of Indiscernibles. So consider Black's spheres. Neither has a qualitative individual essence, i.e., a qualitative haecceity property, since any qualitative property possibly had by one is possibly had by the other, in which case no qualitative property is such that having it is *sufficient* (and hence necessary and sufficient) for being a particular sphere. So if Black's world is possible, some possible creatures lack qualitative individual essences, i.e. qualitative haecceities. To be sure, Black's spheres could still have a "complete" qualitative property, C, where this is a conjunction of all possessed qualitative properties. C is "complete" in that it leaves no qualitative property out, and indeed, if a property is a necessary abstractum, leaves no *property* at all out. But nevertheless, C is not an individual essence, since both spheres have C. It is not "wholly determinate", at least in this sense: it does not distinguish Black's two spheres (even if it distinguishes each sphere from every other possible creature). An individual essence is a complete / wholly determinate property, but - if the Identity of Indiscernibles if false - the converse fails.
The reason I think some possible creatures lack qualitative haecceities (individual essences) is that I, like you (I surmise), reject the Identity of Indiscernibles. This is where things get really interesting. I want to say that purely qualitative pre-creation divine knowledge can individuate possible creatures, and this position has indeed typically been attached to accepting the Identity of Indiscernibles (a la Leibniz). So what I try to do is sever that attachment, that is, argue that qualitative knowledge can individuate even if the Identity of Indiscernibles is false - and hence, even if some possible creatures lack qualitative individual essences.
Let p be a wholly determinate qualitative fact or proposition about Black's world, that takes the form of an existentially quantificational fact. For example:
(p) ExEy(Fx & Fy & Rxy);
where 'F' captures the spheres' intrinsic character, 'R' their extrinsic character (e.g. spatial separation), and 'E' is the existential quantifier "there is" (I can't write it backwards). We can define up a qualitative property by knocking out one of the quantifiers in p. For example:
x has G just in case, by definition: Ey(Fx & Fy & Rxy).
That is, G is a qualitative property had by something just in case that thing is F and stands in R with something ("y") that is F. We can also define up a qualitative relation by knocking out both quantifiers in p. For example:
x and y stand in S just in case, by definition: Fx & Fy & Rxy.
Now clearly no qualitative *property* in Black's world constitutes an *individual* essence of either sphere, since they share all their qualitative properties. But I want to say that there can be a qualitative *relation* instantiated by Black's spheres that constitutes what we can call a *collective* essence of the spheres. Whereas an individual essence would be a property the having of which constitutes a single individual as the very individual it is, a collective essence would be a relation the instantiation of which constitutes a multiplicity of individuals as the very individuals they are.
A typical view of pre-creation divine knowledge is that God is acquainted with properties that "proxy" or "stand in" for the - at that point - non-existent creatures. I want to say we should broaden our view of what the proxies can be, so as to include relations and not just properties. Black's spheres show that there is an important distinction here. No property could ground individuating knowledge of either sphere, whereas I think a relation could. This view admittedly commits me to a kind of "holism", in the sense that the spheres' natures, and God's corresponding knowledge thereof, are inextricably connected. (Compare, say, the identities of the x-, y-, and z-axes in a coordinate system - we define them together, not one by one.)
So in a nutshell: I think the notion of a *collective* qualitative essence allows us to say that God's pre-creation knowledge is (a) purely qualitative but also (b) individuating, *even if* (c) the Identity of Indiscernibles is false and some possible creatures lack *individual* qualitative essences. I think I've covered the substance of my argument, but I'm sure it will be controversial and I don't claim to be able to adequately defend it in the space I've given it here.
Let me conclude this with a bit about models of creation. It seems one worry you have with the Plantingan approach is that it seems to involve God's creating out of a kind of matter, at least in some sense, violating at least the spirit of creation ex nihilo. Creation is not just bestowing a property on an essence. I certainly want to deny that abstracta are literally a material cause of creatures. But it seems to me that we can deny this in a way that is orthogonal to the choice between individuating versus non-individuating knowledge. Consider a sculptor, with an idea of what he wants to create. The created object is not at all *made of* the sculptor's idea, nor any associated mental state - regardless of how specific / determinate his idea is.
Posted by: Daniel | Thursday, March 17, 2016 at 07:37 AM
Thank you for the rich and detailed response, Daniel.
>>But nevertheless, C is not an individual essence, since both spheres have C. It is not "wholly determinate", at least in this sense: it does not distinguish Black's two spheres (even if it distinguishes each sphere from every other possible creature). An individual essence is a complete / wholly determinate property, but - if the Identity of Indiscernibles if false - the converse fails.<<
Here we disagree. It seems to me that there is no difference between C and a qualitative individual essence. This commits me to saying that Black's two spheres share one and the same qualitative individual essence. What is wrong with saying this?
I would say that C is wholly determinate in the only way a property could be wholly determinate: by including every qualitative property of the thing of which C is the property. The whole point of Black's thought experiment was to show that there could be numerical-existential difference that cannot be accounted for in terms of a difference of property.
More later, perhaps tomorrow.
Posted by: BV | Friday, March 18, 2016 at 04:55 PM
Thanks Bill.
>>This commits me to saying that Black's two spheres share one and the same qualitative individual essence. What is wrong with saying this?<<
A haecceity property of x, i.e. an individual essence of x, is a property the having of which is necessary and sufficient for being x. Or as you have put it: (i) H is essential to x; (ii) nothing distinct from x instantiates H in the actual world; (iii) nothing distinct from x instantiates H in any metaphysically possible world.
So consider Black's world, and consider a complete qualitative property, C, shared by the spheres, Castor and Pollux. C cannot be an individual essence of Castor, because your condition (iii) is not satisfied. Something distinct from Castor, namely Pollux, instantiates C in some metaphysically possible world (namely, the Black world itself, containing Castor and Pollux). Alternatively, if we consider the Black world as if it were actual, condition (ii) fails. It may be that having C is necessary for being Castor (Pollux) (clause (i) may hold), but having C is not sufficient for being Castor (Pollux).
>>I would say that C is wholly determinate in the only way a property could be wholly determinate: by including every qualitative property of the thing of which C is the property. The whole point of Black's thought experiment was to show that there could be numerical-existential difference that cannot be accounted for in terms of a difference of property.<<
I agree that the metaphysical possibility of Black's world shows this, and I also have no problem with calling C "wholly determinate". But it seems that, if we accept such a metaphysical possibility, we need to distinguish wholly determinate properties and individual essences: a property of the former kind is not necessarily one of the latter kind (as Castor and Pollux illustrate).
Posted by: Daniel | Saturday, March 19, 2016 at 10:36 AM
Your comment was again sent to the Spam Corral. I just now found it.
I appreciate your careful reasoning.
I think our difference may be merely terminological, due to my sloppiness.
There is a modal and a nonmodal conception of essence. Modal: if E is an essence of x, then x cannot exist without E. On the nonmodal conception, essence = whatness = quiddity = nature. (D M Armstrong, e.g.) When I spoke of a qualitative individual essence of x what I meant was a conjunctive property the conjuncts of which are all of the pure properties of x. Such a property is an essence in the nonmodal sense and it is individual in the sense that it individuates x in the actual world.
But you are of course right to point out that C of x is not an essence of x in the modal sense of 'essence.'
But now consider the following monstrosity: a disjunctive property each disjunct of which is a conjunctive property each conjunct of which is a pure property of x in world W. That is not a very elegant way of putting it, but perhaps you catch my drift. Take Socrates. For each world in which he exists, there is a conjunctive property of all the pure properties he has in that world. Now make a huge disjunctive property out of all those conjunctive properties.
This property, if it exists, deserves to be called the qualitative haecceity of Socrates, or the qualitative individual essence of Socrates.
Whether or not there is this qualitative haecceity of Socrates, my claim is that there is no nonqualitative haecceity of Socrates.
Posted by: BV | Sunday, March 20, 2016 at 05:38 AM
Sorry, no idea why it was sent to Spam Corral - presumably not because of length that time. I'm using my other browser with this post.
I grant a distinction between a modal and non-modal sense of essence, and between an "individuating" and "non-individuating" sense, though I suspect these distinctions cross cut each other.
(1) Modal + non-individuating: properties the having of which are necessary for being x. E.g., being human is essential to Socrates, but so is being such that if P then P, for any proposition P.
(2) Modal + individuating: properties the having of which are necessary and sufficient for being x.
(3) Non-modal + non-individuating: properties the having of which constitute "what x is". Anything essential in sense (3) is presumably essential in sense (1), but not vice versa. Being such that if P then P may be irrelevant to "what Socrates is", even if it is necessarily had by him.
(4) Non-modal + individuating: properties the having of which constitute "what x is" *and* that distinguish x from all other possible things, whether actual or merely possible.
It seems to me that as far as pre-creation divine knowledge is concerned, an interesting question is whether there are any essences of type (2) or (4). That is, are there individuating essences? If we focus on non-modal essences, supposing someone said that Socrates and Plato have "the same essence" (e.g., rational animal), that would suggest to me a denial of essences of type (4). Leibniz, I gather, would go further and think that anything has a robust non-modal essence in sense (4) not just (3) (by adding differentia to differentia, getting something so specific that could not be shared, either within or across possible worlds)
Black's spheres would lack any type-(4) *property* essences, since no qualitative properties are such that having them is *sufficient* for being a particular sphere. (As noted in my longer post, I try to defend the idea of a two-place *relation* essence that simultaneously constitutes the identity of *both* spheres.) And if every possible world, w, containing Socrates is such that there is a possible duplicate, w*, that contains a distinct individual Schmocrates instead of Socrates in Socrate's "role" or "place", then the disjunction of conjunctions you describe would also seem to fail to be an essence in either sense (2) or (4), though it could be in (1) and/or (3).
Posted by: Daniel | Monday, March 21, 2016 at 09:57 AM
I would be interested in whether you agree with my post on haecceitism and future individuals. (Scroll up.)
Posted by: BV | Tuesday, March 22, 2016 at 06:04 AM