Skeptical in Philosophy, Committed in Politics

Recently over the transom:

Greetings from a long time reader and fan of your blog.

 

I'm often struck by the difference in tone (representing a difference in your doxastic stance?) when you discuss ontological issues and when you discuss political issues. This was brought home forcibly by 'Does Evil Disprove the Existence of God’ and your ongoing commentary on US politics.

 

When discussing ontology and philosophical theology you often insinuate that the existence of multiple rationally tenable answers to a given problem gives cause to question the very possibility of finding a solution, and thus that one should be at least cautious about claiming to have the correct answer. Yet, when commenting on politics you freely make moral condemnations and normative announcements [pronouncements].  

 

What explains this discrepancy? Are you of the opinion that political philosophy questions have easier answers than those of the 'Ontology Room'? As you have admitted that politics' meta-ethical foundations largely depend on metaphysics one adopts, I find that hard to believe. Or do you hold that in principle the same qualifications apply, albeit for the sake of every day communication don't give them every time you comment? (I had assumed it was something along the lines of the latter).

 

As one of the things that drove me to Philosophy was the realisation that many people dogmatise about every-day social/political issues, but often throw up their hands—becoming skeptics, agnostics, or contradicting themselves—when faced with fundamental metaphysical or existential questions, I'm interested to hear your answer.

 

Best wishes from the land of Ockham and Whitehead,

D. C.

My reader accurately observes that my tone is very different when discussing philosophical questions and when engaging in political commentary.  When discussing philosophy the position I take is often that of a solubility skeptic.  To simplify my view and present it in the form of a slogan:

 

The classical problems of philosophy are all of them genuine, some of them humanly important, but none of them humanly soluble.

 

And of course I hold this view tentatively and non-dogmatically.  This implies that my solubility skepticism extends to the meta-philosophical problem of the solubility of philosophical problems.  I don't  claim to have solved it!  I claim only that a very strong rational case can be made for my slogan, or rather, for my slogan properly 'exfoliated,' i.e. properly unwrapped and unpacked and qualified with all key terms defined. 

 

Of course, one doesn't have to subscribe to my solubility skepticism to think that philosophical questions should be discussed carefully, cautiously, and calmly.

 

When it comes to politics, however, my stance is more often than not partisan and polemical. I have been know to say things like, "Anyone who holds such-and-such a view is moral scum and ought to be morally condemned."  But of course I would never accuse a philosopher of moral turpitude should he adopt a regularity theory of causation or accept a Meinongian semantics. Subject to some  qualifications, there is no place for polemics in philosophy proper.  There is also not much need for it since the problems that fascinate us professional philosophers are often not exactly 'pressing.' 

 

Now one distinction that needs to be made, and that my reader seems not to be making, is between political philosophy and politics.  The first is philosophy, the second is not.  The philosopher aims at understanding the world in its deepest and most pervasive features.  His task is theoretical, not practical.  Politics, however, is practical, a matter of action.  To borrow a beautiful line from Plato's Republic at 486a, the philosopher is a "spectator of all time and existence."  The state and the political in general are among the objects of the philosopher's calm and unhurried contemplation.  But of course no human being is a pure transcendental spectator, not even the philosopher who meets the stringent Platonic demands and possesses magnificence of mind and a proper sense of the relative insignificance of human affairs; he is also an animal embedded in nature.  As indigent, at-risk participants in natural and social life, as possessing what Wilhelm Dilthey called a Sitz im Leben, we must act to ward off threats and secure our continuance. And we must act in 'Cave-like' conditions where the lighting is bad and much is unclear.  Here is the province of  politics.  As Schopenhauer observes, the world is beautiful to behold, but terrible to be a part of.  We are both: spectators and participants.  We are beholders of it and beholden to it.  As participants, we must act to secure our material existence so that we can engage in the higher pursuits.

 

And so we must battle our enemies. When one's liberties, way of life, or very existence are under threat one must take a stand.  This involves what might be called the 'dogmatism of action.'  There is a certain benign skepticism that is essential to the life of inquiry;  doubt, I like to say, in the engine of inquiry.  But one cannot suspend judgment and refrain from the necessary one-sidedness of action in the face of one's enemies.

 

The human condition is indeed a predicament.  We must act even though we lack full insight into how we ought to act.  And we must patiently inquire into how we ought to act and live even though calm inquiry can impede action.  We have to avoid both a thoughtless decisionism and the paralysis that can result from excessive analysis.

 

If we distinguish, as we should, between political philosophy and political action,  then the "discrepancy" my reader notes does not boil over into a contradiction within my 'system.'  It would eventuate in a contradiction were I to maintain both of

a. Solubility skepticism is a rational position with respect to all classical philosophical problems

 and

 

b. Solubility skepticism is not a rational position with respect to the problems of social and political philosophy.

 

But of course I don't maintain both of these propositions. I maintain (a) and the negation of (b).   I would also be in trouble if I fell into a sort of performative inconsistency by  upholding (a) while acting and writing as if I also uphold (b).  But I don't think I am doing that.  For when I do battle with political opponents I am operating in the political sphere, not the philosophical sphere, and therefore not in the political-philosophical sphere.

 

"But why battle your opponents?  Why not get along with them?"  Because they won't allow it.  You cannot get along with someone who labels you a racist for opposing illegal immigration.  You cannot get along with someone who thinks it perfectly legitimate to use the awesome power of the state to destroy the livelihoods of bakers and florists who refuse to violate their consciences by supplying goods and services to same-sex 'marriage' events.  And so on through dozens of examples.

 

As I said, polemics has no place in philosophy.  But politics is not philosophy and its is hard to imagine politics without a sizeable admixture of polemics.  I wish it were not true, but politics is war conducted by other means.  That is clearly how our opponents on the Left view it, and so that is how we must view it if we are to oppose them effectively. 

As a culture warrior, I do battle with my enemies.  As a philosopher, I seek truth with my friends.

Another very important distinction that is relevant here is that between philosophy-as-inquiry and philosophy-as-worldview.  A worldview could be characterized as a system of ideas oriented toward action.  Worldviews are action-guiding.  Since we must act, and since we must act in some principled way, we need worldviews.  But which worldviews are in the long  run conducive to human flourishing?  Here is where philosophy-as-inquiry comes into the picture. 

My reader speaks of the Ontology Room; he should have spoken more broadly of the Philosophy Mansion in which there are many rooms, one of them being the Political Philosophy Room.  In this mansion and in all of its rooms, polemics and invective are out of place.  But the Philosophy Mansion can exist only if she is defended against her enemies.  Manning the ramparts and minding the moats are the culture warriors who defend the mansion so that the acolytes of our fair mistress Philosophia can carry on as they have for millennia.  (Similarly for churches and monasteries and synagogues and ashrams and zendos.  Nazis and Commies and Islamists  have a history of destroying them.)

As one of the things that drove me to Philosophy was the realisation that many people dogmatise about every-day social/political issues, but often throw up their hands—becoming skeptics, agnostics, or contradicting themselves—when faced with fundamental metaphysical or existential questions, I'm interested to hear your answer. 

My reader is speaking of the average Joe and Jane.  These types are not skeptical in my sense since they are not inquirers.  They have no interest in the ultimate truth about the ultimate matters.  They are, for the most part, bottom-of-the-Cave types who are lazy and thoughtless and simply want an excuse to not think about the so-called Big Questions. The are typically anti-philosophical: they think philosophy is hot air, word games, and mental masturbation.  But when it comes to hot-button issues, they adopt absurd philosophical views that they are incapable of recognizing as philosophical.  One hears, for example, the opinion that a human fetus is "just a bit of tissue."

 

To sum up.

 

There is no inconsistency in my position as far as I can see either logically or performatively.  Political philosophy must be distinguished from politics.  The first is a theoretical enterprise.  It ought to be pursued non-polemically and non-tendentiously.  Politics, however, is a form of action in which we must engage in order to preserve ourselves and our way of life.  This involves battling enemies. Here polemics is not only admissible but unavoidable.  One must act and one cannot be sure that one's actions are right.  That is just the predicament we are in.

 

Philosophers who shirk their political responsibilities abdicate what little authority they have.

 

Comments enabled.  But don't comment on my solubility skepticism.  That's not the point of the post.

 

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Does Evil Prove the Nonexistence of God?

Does the Atheist Deny What the Theist Affirms?

Soloveitchik on Proving the Existence of God

Comments

[Ben]

Bill,

I understand your distinction, and I'm in agreement that there is no inconsistency, theoretically or performatively, concerning how you write about philosophy and politics on this blog.

Yet, I must ask: What's your opinion on discourse that seemingly blends both philosophy and politics? Is this what you mean by "philosophy-as-worldview"? I have a couple of examples in mind:

1) Christian apologetics: Apologist William Lane Craig, for example, is indeed a philosopher, and the Kalam cosmological argument requires knowledge of philosophy in its presentation and defense, which Craig clearly exhibits. However, is not apologetics also essentially political? It seems to me apologetics is employed to render the Christian worldview rational and turn back the advance of the militant New Atheists who are intent on driving Christians and Christian ideas from the public square as a matter of identity politics. And to combat this assault against us, we utilize philosophy, e.g., debunking the meme that atheism is a "mere lack of belief" or the scientism most members of the Cult of Gnu are tacitly committed. I can't cite the post or posts in which it occurs, but you posit on this blog roughly that one of the roles of philosophy is to expose bad philosophy. Surely then, demonstrating the New Atheists' and their acolytes' as piss-poor philosophers is a legitimate use of philosophy that might indeed require polemics for the sake of defending the body of Christ from encroaching secular totalitarianism.

2) Philosophy that is intended to catalyze social change or revolution: In this I refer to Marxism and its pernicious offspring, Critical Theory. As I understand him, Marx eschewed the label of philosopher -- as you oft repeat here: "The philosophers have variously interpreted the word; the point, however, is to change it." But in order to understand Marx, Gramsci, Lukacs, Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, one must understand dialectical materialism, which necessitates an understanding of Hegel and other philosophers who influenced Marx, e.g., Feuerbach and Nietzsche.

Therefore, how would you then characterize the theories of Marx and the Frankfurt School? Are they not philosophy? Perhaps, their tradition is not a closet in the room of social philosophy in the greater mansion, but a porch or deck that is still attached yet outside the domicile.

If this is so, then it appears philosophy and politics are wedded once again, especially because I see the traces of Critical Theory everywhere in politics. For instance, race baiters want to have a conversation about "systemic racism" and white power "structures." Are they not referring to what Marx deemed as society's superstructure, which is what critical theorist scrutinize as opposed to the means and modes of production that Marx emphasized? Does not "cultural oppression," according to critical race theorists ("critical" being another dead give away), refer to the notion that the values of personal and fiscal responsibility are considered good in society because it serves the interests of the white bourgeoisie and maintains their dominance over the black proletariat? Is this not a racial riff on the Gramscian concept of cultural hegemony?

The examples are legion, but the point is, don't we need to rely on and do philosophy in political discourse to expose the Marxism latent in mainstream politics? One paramount way to deal with Leftist obfuscation, in my opinion, is to make abstract distinctions, which is the essence of philosophy. But even more to the point of blending philosophy and politics, should we also not polemically hoist them on their own Critical petard and make them hold their Marxist theoretical baggage? After all, Marx is still somewhat a dirty four-letter word in the mainstream. If black campus imbeciles rail against "cultural appropriation" of tacos and yoga, we should retort that they are intellectually indebted to Frankfurt Jews, who otherwise would be considered white, and thusly they are the ones who should apologize for their "cultural appropriation," their unwitting plagiarism of white German Marxist ideas. The average social justice warrior is so enamored by their own righteousness, to be condemned as a Marxist, a "useful idiot," does more to shut them up than trying to purely reason with them. I don't see how this politics, this war by other means, can be successfully waged without transforming "fair mistress Philosophia" into a shield maiden.

I've waxed on enough.

Thanks,

Ben

[BV]

Very good comments, Ben. Thanks.

I said "Subject to some qualifications, there is no place for polemics in philosophy proper." You are supplying some of the qualifications.

Ad (1). >>However, is not apologetics also essentially political?<<

I don't see that Christian apologetics is essentially political, but I'll grant that it is often political and that it is political at the present time. Suppose Christians are asked by honest inquirers to defend their views, honest inquirers who have no desire to suppress them. And let's also suppose that the Xians have no desire to impose any specifically Xian doctrines or practices on others. In such a situation apologetics would not be political.

There are branches of philosophy that have no political implications. The philosophy of set theory, for example. Much of ontology. What are the political implications of trope theory?

But if I give a strictly philosophical argument against the moral acceptability of abortion, that will have political implications if one also holds that some practices that are immoral ought to be illegal and that abortion is one of these practices. There needn't however be anything polemical about my strictly philosophical argument against abortion.

>> Surely then, demonstrating the New Atheists' and their acolytes' as piss-poor philosophers is a legitimate use of philosophy that might indeed require polemics for the sake of defending the body of Christ from encroaching secular totalitarianism.<<

Why must polemics enter into it? Someone who maintains that atheism is merely a lack of belief in God or gods maintains something that can be easily and calmly refuted.

Similarly, I can non-polemically argue that it is wrong for the state to force a baker to cater a same-sex 'marriage' event. Polemics comes into it when the wielders of state power refuse to be moved, or simply are not persuaded, by one's arguments. Then one is forced to fight to defend one's way of life. Polemics enters at this point verbally and perhaps also physically.

[BV]

>>Therefore, how would you then characterize the theories of Marx and the Frankfurt School? Are they not philosophy? Perhaps, their tradition is not a closet in the room of social philosophy in the greater mansion, but a porch or deck that is still attached yet outside the domicile.<<

Very good question. Marxism is clearly a worldview or ideology in my sense: a system of action-guiding beliefs including beliefs about what ought to be done. It is in this sense a philosophy, one among many. But is it philosophy? Is it an attempt to get at the truth?

The Marxism of the 'cultural Marxists' is better described as anti-philosophy, as either indifferent to truth or dismissive of it altogether. Earlier Marxists thought they were doing science, a dialectical science of nature and society.

>>For instance, race baiters want to have a conversation about "systemic racism" and white power "structures." Are they not referring to what Marx deemed as society's superstructure, which is what critical theorist scrutinize as opposed to the means and modes of production that Marx emphasized? Does not "cultural oppression," according to critical race theorists ("critical" being another dead give away), refer to the notion that the values of personal and fiscal responsibility are considered good in society because it serves the interests of the white bourgeoisie and maintains their dominance over the black proletariat? <<

The idea is that morality, religion, philosophy, law and all such cultural products are nothing but bourgeois ideology whose sole function is to legitimate the capitalist status quo, keeping those in power in power.

So it is not really philosophy but a dressing-up in ideas of the will to power of certain groups who feel themselves to be oppressed. That is why they don't care whether their 'critical race theory' is true.

[BV]

>>The examples are legion, but the point is, don't we need to rely on and do philosophy in political discourse to expose the Marxism latent in mainstream politics? One paramount way to deal with Leftist obfuscation, in my opinion, is to make abstract distinctions, which is the essence of philosophy.<<

Don't forget my distinctions. Political philosophy is not the same as political action. The first needn't be polemical and shouldn't be. Part of political philosophy is the critique of Marxism and its offshoots.

Your 'political discourse' is ambiguous. Do you mean discourse within political philosophy or discourse as part of political action?

[Ben]

Bill,

Thanks for answering and clarifying. I apologize for taking so long to respond, but I haven't had time this week to sit down and do so.

Anyway, you write: "The Marxism of the 'cultural Marxists' is better described as anti-philosophy, as either indifferent to truth or dismissive of it altogether. Earlier Marxists thought they were doing science, a dialectical science of nature and society."

But here's the rub, as I understand them, they presuppose truth even in their denial or indifference to it. And as much as the likes of Adorno likes to ululate against the "affirmability of being" because of the Holocaust, he and his compatriots are making an inference from the occurrence of the Holocaust to an ontological conclusion; on the contrary to the Frankfurt School, the transcendent truth seems to be out there for them even if--as you wryly have noted recently on this blog--"there is no God, and Marx is his prophet." Or perhaps more accurately, if we continue the Islamic parallel, Marx only holds a Jesus-like role in that he received only part of the transcendent revelation, and it is in fact they who are the final, greatest receivers of transcendent revelation like Muhammad. In other words, there is still no God, but it's the Frankfurt School, not Marx (Peace be upon him), who is his prophet.

They don't believe in "pie in the sky," but as I understand it, they believe it's at least possible for "pie on earth" to be baked and had by all. They seem to operate from the premise that people participate in their own oppression and are unable to see the truth of their own enslavement, being both blinded and subjugated by the likes of popular music, TV, cinema, social norms, etc. as it's true. They make positive arguments about these sort of things. So as much as they don't care for the truth, they seem to assume it in their own enterprise, and their philosophy-as-worldview seems rife with it.

So is this incoherence just typical continental sloppiness? Have I been too charitable in my interpretation of their views, projecting my own realist tendencies onto their anti-philosophy?

"So it is not really philosophy but a dressing-up in ideas of the will to power of certain groups who feel themselves to be oppressed. That is why they don't care whether their 'critical race theory' is true."

I've come to same conclusion based on just the sheer level of inconsistency in applying what they cite as objective justification when they argue, if they do so at all.

"Don't forget my distinctions. Political philosophy is not the same as political action. The first needn't be polemical and shouldn't be. Part of political philosophy is the critique of Marxism and its offshoots.

Your 'political discourse' is ambiguous. Do you mean discourse within political philosophy or discourse as part of political action?"

I mean discourse as part of political action, say an editorial or a public debate at a college. When I refer to making distinctions, I'm talking about, for instance, in regard to Leftist anger toward Georgia's religious freedom bill, separating the sexual orientation of a person (homosexual or heterosexual) with an action chosen by a person (getting married to the someone of the same sex). Agents of the Left refuse to grant this basic distinction, conflating a freely acted upon behavior as if it's an immutable characteristic intrinsic to personhood. That's why, in my mind, they need to be hit with both barrels, so to speak, for reliably being so willfully obtuse and threatening our way of life as Christians.

Anyway, the act of distinguishing between the two ontological categories of being and behavior here seems useful in diffusing, polemically or civilly, the charge of bigotry. Is philosophy not the art of making critical distinctions like the one so described? Can it not occur in discourse-as-political-action just perhaps without jargon such as "ontological"?

If I understand your qualifications in regard to my original questions, I think you and I are in agreement. It's been my experience that New Atheists and or Leftists are seldom this respectful or charitable in these sorts of affairs, and that's why resorting to polemics supplemented by the pertinent philosophical distinctions in discourse-as-political-action is permissible. It's not "pure" philosophy, but I still see philosophy--in knowledge and execution of it--as integral in fending off these totalitarian defilers of Western civilization and culture.