Bare Particulars and Prime Matter: Similarities and Differences

This entry continues the discussion of prime matter begun here. That post is a prerequisite for this one.

Similarities between Bare Particulars and Prime Matter

S1. Bare particulars in themselves are property-less while prime matter in itself is formless.   The bare particular in a thing is that which exemplifies the thing's properties.  But in itself it is a pure particular and thus 'bare.'  The prime matter of a thing is the thing's ultimate matter and while supporting forms is itself formless.

S2. Bare particulars, though property-less in themselves, exemplify properties; prime matter, though formless in itself, is formed.

S3. There is nothing in the nature of a bare particular to dictate which properties it will exemplify.  This is because bare particulars do not have natures.  Correspondingly, there is nothing in the nature of prime matter to dictate which substantial forms it will take. This is because prime matter, in itself, is without form.

S4.  Bare particulars, being bare, are promiscuously combinable with any and all first-level properties. Thus any bare particular can stand in the exemplification nexus with any first-level property.  Similarly, prime matter is promiscuously receptive to any and all forms, having no form in itself.

S5.  Promiscuous combinability entails the contingency of the exemplification nexus.  Promiscuous receptivity entails the contingency of prime matter's being informed thus and so.

S6. Bare particulars are never directly encountered in sense experience.  The same holds for prime matter.  What we encounter are always propertied particulars and formed matter.

S7. A bare particular combines with properties to make an ordinary, 'thick' particular.  Prime matter combines with substantial form to make a primary (sublunary) substance.

S8. The dialectic that leads to bare particulars and prime matter respectively is similar, a form of analysis that is neither logical nor physical but ontological.  It is based on the idea that things have ontological constituents or 'principles' which, incapable of existing on their own, yet combine to from independent existents.  Hylomorphic analysis leads ultimately to prime matter, and ontological analysis in the style of Bergmann and fellow travellers leads to bare or thin particulars as ultimate substrata.

Differences Between Bare Particulars and Prime Matter

D1. There are many bare particulars each numerically different from every other one.  In themselves, bare particulars are many.  It is not the case that, in itself, prime matter is many.  It is not, in itself, parceled out into numerically distinct bits.

D2. Bare particulars are actual; prime matter is purely potential.

D3. Bare particulars account for numerical difference.  But prime matter does not account for numerical difference. (See Feser's manual, p. 199)  Prime matter is common and wholly indeterminate.  Designated matter (materia signata) is the principle of individuation, i.e., differentiation.

Related articles

Bare Particulars versus Aristotelian Substances

Van Inwagen, Properties, and Bare Particulars

Van Inwagen: No Truck with Tropes or Constituent Ontology Generally

J. P. Moreland on Constituent Ontology: Is Exemplification a Spatial Container Relation?

A Question for Trope Theorists

Reply to Ken Hochstetter on Divine Simplicity

Comments

[Eric Levy]

That was a succinctly informative post – a pleasure to profit from.

Regarding numerical distinction, some commentators disagree with your claim: “But prime matter does not account for numerical difference.” I also refer to this issue in point #8 of my second response to your earlier post on prime matter.

Consider first Joseph Owens: “Analysis shows that the form is most immediately known. Through it the different singulars are known. An explanation has to be given of how that same form is found in a plurality of singulars, without the least addition to its knowability. From this situation the presence of unknowable matter is deduced. By means of that matter the singulars are the same in form, but different in matter, specifically the same but numerically different, and the same form can be in different things” (1963, 392-93).

Next, Thomas Ainesworth: “It is perfectly consistent to say that Socrates is one man because of his form, which unifies his matter into a single whole, and he is a numerically distinct individual from Callias because his matter is numerically distinct from Callias’ matter” (“Form Vs. Matter,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2016).

Finally, Michael J. Loux, who cites instantiation as guaranteeing numerical distinction: “According to Aristotle, although the property, whiteness, is equally exhibited by white objects, a, b,…n, the instantiations of whiteness in a, b,…n (i.e., the whiteness of a, the whiteness of b,…, the whiteness of n) are all numerically different entities" (1978, 159).

[Eric Levy]

In my preceding post, I should have omitted the reference to Loux, as he is not talking about prime matter. Instead, he is discussing instantiation of the universal in primary substance - that is, the composite of form and matter.

[Josh]

>>Bare particulars in themselves are property-less<<

Do bare particulars exist? If so, then you would have this aporetic triad, right?

1. Bare particulars exist (by definition).
2. "Exists" is a first-level property.
3. Bare particulars are barren of all first-level properties.

[BV]

To put it more exactly:
1. Bare particulars exist.
2. Existence is a first-level property.
3. Bare particulars are bare of all first-level properties.

Sorry for the pedantry, but 'exists' is not a property but a predicate.

The triad is inconsistent, but not a strict aporia since (2) is eminently deniable. And I would deny it. Individuals do not exist by exemplifying/instatiating existence. One reason is that an individual's existence is a necessary condition of its standing in the instantiation relation. I go over this in painful detail in my existence book.

[Eric Levy]

That is very agile and cogent logic - as long as existence is considered to be a predicate. But does the argument stand up to Kant's claim that existence is not a property? I know that Anselm would agree with your reasoning.

[Eric Levy]

You are far more deeply aware than I that there are many ways to construe the relation between existence and essence. Spinoza, for example, as Gilson interprets him, posits “the real identity of essence and existence in finite beings, since the being of actual existence is the being of essence as found outside God, namely in things after they have been created by God” (1952, 111). To Aquinas, again according to Gilson, existence and essence are distinct, though with this qualification: “Existence is not distinct from essence as one being from another; yet, in any given being, that whereby a being both is and actually subsists is really ‘other than’ that whereby it is definable as such a being in the order of substantiality” (1952, 172).

[Josh]

>>Sorry for the pedantry, but 'exists' is not a property but a predicate.<<

Right, thanks for the correction.