Could it be Morally Wrong to Philosophize?

A Czech reader sent me some materials in which he raises the title question.  One of them is a YouTube video.  I will unpack the question in my own way and then pronounce my verdict.

Suppose what ought to be evident, namely, that we are morally responsible for our actions.  Among actions are those that could be labeled 'theoretical.'  Among theoretical actions are those we engage in when we do philosophy.  (And please note that philosophy is indeed something we do: it is an activity even if it culminates in contemplation.)  Philosophical actions include raising questions, expounding them, entering into dialog with others, consulting and comparing authorities, drawing inferences, generalizing, hunting for counterexamples, testing arguments for validity, deciding which issues are salient, and so on.  

Given our moral responsibility for our actions, including our philosophical actions, there is the admittedly farfetched possibility that we do wrong when we philosophize.  Given this 'possibility' are we not being intolerably dogmatic when we just 'cut loose and philosophize' without a preliminary examination of the question of the moral justifiability of philosophical actions?

Suppose someone were to issue this pronunciamento:  It is wrong, always and everywhere, to do anything whatsoever without first having established the moral acceptability of the proposed action!

Or as my correspondent puts it:  No action can [may] be performed before its ethical legitimation!  He calls this the "methodical rule of the ethical skeptic."

 My Verdict

The draconian demand under consideration is obviously self-referential and in consequence self-vitiating.  If it is wrong to act until I have shown that my action is morally permissible, then it is wrong to engage in all the 'internal' or theoretical actions necessary to determine whether my proposed action (whether theoretical or practical)  is morally permissible until I have shown that the theoretical actions are morally permissible.  It follows that the ethical demand cannot be met.  (A vicious infinite regress is involved.)  

Now an ethical demand that cannot be met is no ethical demand at all.  For 'ought' implies 'can.'  If I ought to do such-and-such, then it must be possible for me to do it, and not just in a merely logical sense of 'possible.'    But it is not possible for me to show the moral permissibility of all of my actions.  

I conclude that one is not being censurably dogmatic when one just 'cuts loose and philosophizes,'  and that we have been given no good reason to think that philosophizing is morally wrong.

Related articles

Philosophers Who Compartmentalize and Those Who Don't

Georg Lichtenberg, Aphoristically, on the Freedom of the Will, with Pedantic Commentary

Comments

[Mark Riess]

Not a publish-worthy comment here, but i see the "comment' button so infrequently, that while looking for a way to email a simple "Thank you" for your generosity in blogging, I'm taking the opportunity to slip it in. Not looking for response, just have to express that I really appreciate your giving. Not morally wrong to sneak in a thank you, right?

I check your site daily. Have been since before typepad. Can't always keep up with you, but always appreciate your voice, perspective, heart and mind.

Wishing you the best, lots of encouragement & support, and a long long run.
M

[BV]

Thanks for the very kind words, Mr. Riess. If you click on About to the right, you will find my e-mail address. Thank you for being a loyal reader all these years.

[JakubM]

Thanks a lot for replying to my e-mail in this blog, Mr. Valicella!
Generally I agree with your verdict. I have two questions related to topic:

1) Could it be possibly morally wrong (or morally inadvisable) to try to gain some particular philosophical knowledge? Absurd example: maybe it is due to some reason wrong to gain philosophical knowledge about substance. I think there are situations in our life when we say about something "better not to know it" ...
2) Due to your verdict: I think that from the same self-referential and self-vitiating reasons you cannot prove (demonstrate) validity of basic principles of thinking (and reality) such as principle of contradiction. But this Czech philosopher, which was one of my teachers of philosophy, insists upon that this principles are possible to be demonstrated, have to be demonstrated and if we do not demonstrate it, we are dogmatic and sceptics are winners. His key distinction in his "demonstration" is between logical (vicious) circle and so-called methodical circle, concerning presupposing the validity of what has to be demonstrated - in methodical circle it is not important that the to-be-demonstraded was used but HOW it was used. He says that it wasn´t used as the premise which is sufficient for escaping the vicious circle. Do you think this can work?
https://www.amazon.co.uk/Illusions-Sceptics-Jiri-Fuchs/dp/3868385681/280-6766142-3741423?ie=UTF8&*Version*=1&*entries*=0
Of course, the whole thing also depends upon the definition of 'demonstration'.

[BV]

Since LNC is the principle of all demonstration, it cannot itself be demonstrated in a non-circular manner. I don't understand what Fuchs' "methodical circle" is supposed to be.

[JakubM]

I´ll try to specify more the first question by analogy:
Let´s say that we are able to clone humans. Or "create" new people by fertilization "in vitro". We are able to successfully perform it. We can - but should we? Shouldn´t we, due to some moral reasons, avoid doing this although we are able to?
Analogically with gaining philosophical knowledge: we are able to gain some philosophical knowledge for example about God. But should we really try to gain it? What if there is some probably moral reason (for example danger of getting proud by gaining such knowledge) for which gaining such knowledge could/should be prohibited?