I stated that the reason for carefully vetting Muslims who aim to immigrate into the USA is political rather than religious. I had several points in mind, one of them being that it is the theocratic character of Islam that renders it incompatible with Western values, but not its specifically religious character. Theocracy is a form of political organization whereas there is nothing in the nature of the religious as such that requires that a religion be theocratic. Theocracy is a political concept. Religious character is -- wait for it -- a religious concept. These are different concepts. That should be obvious. If it is not obvious, argument up ahead!
It struck me as important to make the distinction between the political and the religious because the political reasons for vetting or even excluding Muslims or some proper subset thereof, perhaps the 'Medina Muslims,' are consistent with the commitment to religious liberty enshrined in the First Amendment to the U. S. Constitution. According to this amendment, the government shall not interfere with the free exercise of religion. Now while the First Amendment applies only to citizens, not to would-be citizens, it expresses a value that is universal in scope, that of religious liberty. The value/right comes first; the amendment merely protects it.
Note also that according to the Article VI of the Constitution, there shall be no "religious Test" for would-be holders of public office. So it is not the fact that Muslims have a different religion than most of us that supplies a reason for carefully vetting them; it is because their religion is a hybrid ideology, a political-religious ideology, the political component of which is manifestly incompatible with American political principles. I hope it is obvious that a totalitarian theocracy is incompatible with limited government.
Canadian philosopher Jacques, however, questions my distinction between the political and the religious. He writes,
What are political grounds? I doubt there could be any kind of political theory that isn't ultimately based in some (implicitly) religious attitude. Consider the very idea that religion and politics are different realms, or should be or could be. It's an idea that Protestants find easy enough to accept, because of their peculiar religious beliefs. People in a Protestant-derived society such as the USA find it easy to accept because they have been shaped by Protestantism. But if Islam is true, there is no such distinction.
I am afraid I cannot agree with this. First of all, it is obvious that at the notional level there is distinction between the concept of the political and the concept of the religious. The distinction holds even if one or both concepts are empty. The first concept would be empty or uninstantiated if there were no states, just people organized in non-state or sub-state ways. But there are, we know, states. We don't know, however, if there is anything corresponding to the concept of the religious. Here are some typical religious 'objects': nirguna Brahman, saguna Brahman, Nirvana, The One of Plotinus, Deus qua ipsum esse subsistens (Aquinas), Allah, Yahweh, immortal souls . . . . Suppose that naturalism is true and that there are no religious 'objects' at all, where naturalism is the thesis that reality is exhausted by space-time and its contents. There would still be a distinction between the political and the religious. They are clearly distinct at the conceptual level. I hope Jacques is not denying the distinction at the notional or conceptual level.
Jacques appears to be claiming that every type of political theory is based in some implicitly religious attitude. That would be false for the political theory of a naturalist. I should think it is obvious that one could have a political doctrine that did not entail or presuppose any religious doctrine. A libertarian doctrine of the state as outlined in, say, Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia, is consistent with the view that religion is a purely private matter.
Jacques tells us that "if Islam is true, then there is no such distinction" as that between the political and the religious. But surely if two concepts are extensionally equivalent, it does not follow that they are the same concept. To borrow a Quinean example, x is a cordate iff x is a renate, but it doesn't follow that being cordate and being renate are the same property or concept. So even if Islam is true -- God forbid! -- there would still be a distinction between the religious and political character of Islam. And that is all I need for the points I am making.
But if we think about this carefully, we see that there is not even an extensional equivalence. Not every religious item in Islam is a political item. For example, take the following doctrinal item: There is no god but God! Call it Radical Monotheism. Consider it and all its entailments. Among the entailments: God/Allah exists, is radically one, is not a trinity, is radically transcendent of the world, etc. None of these metaphysical propositions has, by itself, any political implication. One could, in all logical consistency, accept all of these propositions and also accept American principles of government. Case in point: Dr. M. Zuhdi Jasser, a moderate Muslim who battles what he calls "political Islam" in A Battle for the Soul of Islam: An American Muslim Patriot's Fight to Save his Faith, Simon and Shuster, 2012. My tribute to Dr. Jasser here.
A reformed Islam that is consistent with American values is not only possible but also actual in the case of Dr. Jasser and a few others. So, obviously, the political and religious aspects of Islam can be prised apart. They are distinct. I should add that, while there are a few moderate Muslims, the vast majority are not. These are the ones that subscribe to Islamic law (sharia) and have no intention of assimilating to the West and its values. I am afraid that Dr. Jasser's noble attempt at a reform of Islam is bound to fail. But that is a separate issue.
Jacques continues:
Probably the same goes for Catholicism (on the most honest and coherent interpretation) and Hinduism or lots of Amerindian religions. It makes no sense, on these various religious views, to isolate some particular realm of human affairs as being just 'political' rather than religious. Just as it makes no sense, on most religious views, to isolate an area that is just 'ethical' or 'artistic' without also being religious. Just as it makes no sense for progressives to isolate an area that's just 'personal' and not political.
With respect to Catholicism, Jacques is on very shaky ground. Jesus himself provides the charter for temple/church - state separation with his "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's; render unto God the things that are God's." That saying presupposes for its very sense that the political and the religious are not identical. The saying occurs in all three of the synoptic gospels. It is of course subject to different interpretations, but the Catholic reading is something like the following. Although our main obligations are to God, we also have obligations to the political authorities, where 'Caesar' represents the political authorities of whatever time and place. So of course the political and religious spheres are distinguishable.
And surely it is false that the concepts of the ethical and the religious coincide, or that no ethics is possible that does not rest on religious tenets. This would have shocked old Aristotle whose eudaimonistic ethics rests on no religious bases. There is of course a primum mobile in Aristotle's system, but it has no religious meaning. The Prime Mover, just as such, is precisely NOT "what all men call God." (Aquinas, Quinque viae)
Jacques tells us that progressives or as I call them, 'progressives,' do not separate the personal from the political. But of course they have to, at the notional or conceptual level, if there are to be in a position to say something meaningful albeit stupid such as The personal is political. This is an informative identity claim only if the senses of 'personal' and 'political' are different -- he said with side-long glance in the direction of Frege. On the level of reference, however, it is true that the person is political for 'progressives.' But so what? They're wrong. Jacques concludes:
Protestant theology holds up individualism and autonomy as very important values, ultimately for theological reasons. Take away Protestantism, or some similar theology, and it's not clear why we should care so much about these things -- for example, why we should care that society has some tolerance for religious diversity or a non-religious conception of politics. So I'm suggesting that, if Islam is not a 'pure' religion then western liberalism or conservatism is not a 'pure' political theory.
Jacques seems to be saying that there are no non-theological reasons for caring about the toleration of religious diversity. Well, try this reason on for size: We tolerate religious diversity because we do not know which religion is true; nor do we know if any extant or possible religion is true. Given deep and intractable disagreement within religions, across religions, and between religion and anti-religion, toleration makes possible comity (social harmony) and prevents foolish, costly, and sometimes bloody conflicts. There is no need for a theology to underpin this commitment to toleration. Atheists and naturalists have no theology, but that does not prevent them from espousing toleration.
"So I'm suggesting that, if Islam is not a 'pure' religion then western liberalism or conservatism is not a 'pure' political theory." I can't agree with this either. Islam itself -- not Islam 'lite,' some Jasserian reformed, de-politicized Islam -- is as much a political ideology as a religion. It is very far from being just a religion. But much of American conservatism is mostly free of religious elements. Correct me if I am wrong, but nowhere in the U. S. Constitution or its Amendments is there any reference to God or to any religious doctrine.
Article VII of the U.S. Constitution:
"Attest William Jackson Secretary done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present the Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and Eighty seven and of the Independance of the United States of America the Twelfth In witness whereof We have hereunto subscribed our Names,..."
I know this is not exactly what you meant, but does it count as a reference?
Posted by: Kurt | Monday, June 27, 2016 at 04:54 PM
Thanks, Kurt. That is relevant. The word 'Lord' does indeed appear in the Constitution. But is this a reference to Jesus Christ, and thus indirectly to God? I would say it is a reference to a certain man, Jesus of Nazareth, who some believe to be divine and some do not, a man whose birth starts off our calendar. That's all.
So there is no reference to God in the Constitution, nor is any theological doctrine a part of the Constitution.
Posted by: BV | Tuesday, June 28, 2016 at 04:49 AM
Even if there were a reference to God in the Constitution, unless it specified that some particular principle were required as a matter of religious doctrine, the document would still not be a religious one.
To invoke God's blessing on our attempt to design and maintain a political system, or to seek God's protection as we try to find our way in the darkness and impose order upon chaos, does not make the political religious.
Posted by: Malcolm Pollack | Tuesday, June 28, 2016 at 06:06 PM
Hi Bill,
Thanks for this very interesting response. Let me see if I can clarify what it is that we are (maybe) disagreeing about.
For me, a position is 'religious' if people who hold the position are rationally committed to religious beliefs (in virtue of holding that position). So it doesn't matter that the US Constitution says nothing explicit on any clearly religious topics. And I consider atheism a religious position.
A hypothesis: God has a deal with the Jewish people requiring them to uphold hundreds of strict rules as a community, and if they renege on the deal, He is going to inflict terrible multi-generational vengeance on all of us. If you thought that hypothesis was fairly probable, it would be irrational for you to think that individual Jews should get to decide for themselves whether to follow all the rules. You'd have grounds for thinking that individual Jews who break away from the community's norms are putting all of us in grave danger, and presumably also doing something very immoral. A rational person who thinks religion should or may be treated as a private matter should think this hypothesis is very improbable. (And, not coincidentally, it seems that almost every tolerant secularist you can find does in fact think this.)
If you thought it was highly probable that God had commanded everyone on earth to live by the Sharia, how could you reasonably regard Nozick's libertarian doctrines as true or reasonable? How can Nozick reasonably regard them as true without regarding Islam (or some versions of it) as highly improbable?
I agree with you that there is a conceptual difference between politics and religion. But this is tricky. In _our_ way of thinking these are terms with different intensions. Using our concepts, my claim is that the extension of 'politics' or 'political beliefs' always overlaps with the extension of 'religion' or 'religious beliefs'. If Islam is true we misconceive these concepts or intensions (or we correctly conceive of an intension with no actual extension). If Islam is true the _correct_ conception of the political--what politics really is, the norms governing the political realm--is partly a religious conception. Who has the correct concept? That depends in part on whether Islam is true. But I admit I'm a bit unsure how exactly to frame my ideas about this in terms of conceptual content, etc. You've raised some tricky points that I need to think over some more...
An analogy: There's a distinction between philosophy and logic. Sometimes people are just doing logic, and sometimes they're doing philosophy rather than just doing logic. But there's no such thing as philosophizing in the absence of any logical beliefs or habits or dispositions, and there's overlap in conceptual content of 'philosophy' and 'logic'. Does that help, at least to clarify things?
Posted by: Jacques | Tuesday, June 28, 2016 at 06:20 PM
One more thought. You say:
"Jacques seems to be saying that there are no non-theological reasons for caring about the toleration of religious diversity. Well, try this reason on for size: We tolerate religious diversity because we do not know which religion is true; nor do we know if any extant or possible religion is true. Given deep and intractable disagreement within religions, across religions, and between religion and anti-religion, toleration makes possible comity (social harmony) and prevents foolish, costly, and sometimes bloody conflicts. There is no need for a theology to underpin this commitment to toleration. Atheists and naturalists have no theology, but that does not prevent them from espousing toleration."
The argument is convincing enough for me. But why do I accept the premise "We do not know which religion is true"? I accept it because I have certain religious beliefs. For example, I don't believe that the King James Bible is the kind of testimony about the past that could provide me with knowledge about the past--knowledge that Jesus walked on water and rose from the dead, that Jesus was the Son of God. I believe that just trusting in the pronouncements of the Catholic Church, in the absence of any attempt to rationally assess those pronouncements, is not a way of acquiring knowledge. And I believe that because I don't believe (or disbelieve) that Catholicism is true. Some people do believe these things, or they have other religious beliefs that would rationally commit them to denying this premise. Yes, atheists and naturalists have no theology, but I think they believe the premise "We do not know which religion is true" only because they believe God does not exist. They believe that we don't know because they believe Christianity is not true, and every other religion is also not true (and they know that non-truths can't be known). If they didn't have such beliefs could they still rationally accept this argument for toleration? Can you have rational beliefs about what human beings know, or what they can know, which don't ultimately depend on religious beliefs?
Posted by: Jacques | Tuesday, June 28, 2016 at 06:35 PM
Good point, Malcolm.
Posted by: BV | Thursday, June 30, 2016 at 03:45 AM
Thanks for the response, Jacques.
>>And I consider atheism a religious position.<<
I thought this might be a source of our disagreement. I don't consider atheism a religious position. From your definition, the people who hold atheism are committed to religious beliefs. I don't talk that way. We can agree, though, that atheists take a position on the question whether God exists: they deny that there is any such thing.
Or at least that is one view of what atheism is. As you know, some will argue with it.
You also bring probability into the discussion, which will 'probably' be another bone of contention. If God exists, he necessarily exists; if he does not exist, he is impossible. No room for probability here. Nonsense to say: the probability of God's existence is .376. As for epistemic probability, what exactly is that? And is it wholly in the clear?
Posted by: BV | Thursday, June 30, 2016 at 04:05 AM
Are you saying that the extension of 'political beliefs' and of 'religious beliefs' is the same or are you saying that political beliefs are a proper subset of religious beliefs? What do you mean by 'overlap'?
Let me see if I understand your analogy. I agree that one cannot philosophize without being disposed to accept certain inferences as correct and certain other ones as incorrect, and thus without having beliefs about logic. Likewise, you think that one cannot do politics without presupposing answers to religious questions (Does God exist? Did he reveal himself? To Muhammad?)
But why can't one 'bracket' -- in roughly Husserl's sense -- religious beliefs when doing politics, and work out a politics that is neutral with respect to whether God exists and cognate questions?
Posted by: BV | Thursday, June 30, 2016 at 04:23 AM
>>The argument is convincing enough for me. But why do I accept the premise "We do not know which religion is true"? I accept it because I have certain religious beliefs.<<
No offense, but I think you are "playing fast and loose" as Wm James would have said with 'religious.' You accept the premise for reasons that are broadly epistemological. Example. You have noticed the extreme diversity of opinions on religious questions, even among people that are well-informed, intelligent, sincere, etc. The best and the brightest disagree. The disagreement quite reasonably gives you pause.
Posted by: BV | Thursday, June 30, 2016 at 04:43 AM
>>Yes, atheists and naturalists have no theology, but I think they believe the premise "We do not know which religion is true" only because they believe God does not exist. They believe that we don't know because they believe Christianity is not true, and every other religion is also not true (and they know that non-truths can't be known). If they didn't have such beliefs could they still rationally accept this argument for toleration? Can you have rational beliefs about what human beings know, or what they can know, which don't ultimately depend on religious beliefs?<<
Naturalists accept a metaphysics that rules out theism. But that is not because they have religious beliefs; they have beliefs in metaphysics that rule out the truth of all such claims as that God exists, is triune, etc.
No one knows whether Islam is true, but suppose counterfactually that some dude, Ali, KNOWS this. Would he not be justified in imposing sharia on all for their own ultimate good, if Ali had the power to make the imposition?
I am inclined to say Yes. Others will say No.
Posted by: BV | Thursday, June 30, 2016 at 04:57 AM
Hi Bill,
I'm going to say more about this later but first a quick comment on probability. I am not sure that the existence of the Abrahamic God is necessary existence. That may depend on whether that Being is the same as the God of later Hellenistic philosophers. But in any case it's not clearly nonsense to say "Probably God exists" even if He exists necessarily or not at all. Someone unsure of the sum of two numbers can intelligibly say "Probably the sum is 204329" despite the necessity of the sum
Think of the evidential argument from evil: the conclusion (atheism) may rationally appear to the arguer to be merely probable, even if the arguer grants that God exists necessarily or not at all. But if this is a sticking point just replace "probable" with "seems reasonable to believe".
Posted by: Jacques | Thursday, June 30, 2016 at 09:53 AM
"But why can't one 'bracket' -- in roughly Husserl's sense -- religious beliefs when doing politics, and work out a politics that is neutral with respect to whether God exists and cognate questions?"
Well, to pursue this analogy with the 'overlap' (as I'm calling it) between logic and philosophy, imagine trying to work on some philosophical problem while bracketing all beliefs or presuppositions about logic. For example, I might reason that, logic to one side, contradictions might well be true, or possibly true. Then I might reason that, since they might be, the correct theory of freedom might be that everything is determined, but compatibilism is false, and yet people are still robustly free to choose. Setting aside the fact that any bit of 'reasoning' I could carry out would already involve logical presuppositions, even when I try to put logical presuppositions to one side, the result would then be a philosophical position incompatible with certain logical beliefs, e.g., the belief that contradictions can't be true. So in taking that position, or taking it seriously, I'd already be setting myself against other positions based on other logical beliefs; I'd be rationally committed (however irrationally) to rejecting some of those, in virtue of my philosophical theory of freedom.
You asked what I meant by 'overlap', whether I claim the extensions of 'religion' and 'philosophy' are the same. They aren't the same, for reasons you point out. There are probably some purely political statements, I guess, statements about politics (even normative politics) that are compatible with any and every religious position. But I claim that any reasonably worked-out, comprehensive, action-guiding political world-view will carry rational commitments to some specific answers to questions about God, the afterlife, the soul, etc. So the idea is that, for any such political worldview, many of the basic statements or axioms in the system are also in the extension of 'religion' in some broad sense.
"Naturalists accept a metaphysics that rules out theism. But that is not because they have religious beliefs; they have beliefs in metaphysics that rule out the truth of all such claims as that God exists, is triune, etc."
I don't really think you can have beliefs about metaphysics that are independent of any religious beliefs (in my sense--beliefs about the correct answers to questions about the existence and nature of God, and so on). I don't think you have to first answer religious questions, then figure out metaphysics. But I think you can't do metaphysics without being already involved in lots of essentially religious questions, whether you realize it or not. (Most philosophers nowadays seem not to realize.)
Posted by: Jacques | Thursday, June 30, 2016 at 11:22 AM
I am inclined to agree with Bill on at least the possibility of there being non-religious aspects of a religious culture that render it incompatible with the culture and government of the USA. But (a) I don't think this distinction is ultimately important, and (b) I'm disinclined to think that Islam can be ruled out using that distinction in the first place. The reason that the distinction is ultimately not important is that there certainly could be religions that are, qua religion, incompatible with the culture and government of the USA. So, even if we don't need to rule out Islam qua religion, there are, at least, hypothetical religions that we would have to rule out that way. The bit in the First Amendment about there being no laws prohibiting the free exercise of religion is either paradoxical or must be understood as applying to only religions that are consistent, at least, with the idea of religious tolerance expressed in the First Amendment itself as well as the other principles of the Constitution. So, we don't need to worry too much about whether Islam is incompatible qua religion or qua something that's non-religious, because, unless we feel the need to adhere to an ultimately incoherent interpretation of the First Amendment, we can indeed prohibit the free exercise of certain religions in the USA.
Is Islam even compatible, qua religion, in the first place? Well, doesn't it require intolerance of other religions? Doesn't it also require intolerance of criticism of Islam itself? If so, that seems to me to render it, qua religion, incompatible with principles of the Constitution.
Posted by: Anonymous | Thursday, June 30, 2016 at 04:38 PM
Thanks for the comments, gentlemen. Immersed as I am in preparations for my 2016 Big Unplug, I cannot do your comments justice. Perhaps we cam return to these topics in mid- to late August.
Posted by: BV | Saturday, July 02, 2016 at 02:17 PM