If man is made in God's image and likeness, does it follow that God is essentially embodied?
Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram . . . (Gen 1, 26) Let us make man in our image and likeness. . .
Et creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam. . . (Gen 1, 27) And God created man in his image. . .
I used to play chess with an old man by the name of Joe B., one of the last of the WWII Flying Tigers. Although he had been a working man all his life, he had an intellectual bent and liked to read. But like many an old man, he thought he knew all sorts of things that he didn’t know, and was not bashful about sharing his ‘knowledge.’ One day the talk got on to religion and the notion that man was created in the image and likeness of God. Old Joe had a long-standing animus against the Christianity of his youth, an animus probably connected with his equally long-standing hatred for his long-dead father.
Recalling some preacher’s invocation of the’ image and likeness’ theme, old Joe snorted derisively, "So God has a digestive tract!?" In Joe’s mind this triumphal query was supposed to bear the force of a refutation. Joe’s ‘reasoning’ was along these lines:
1. Man is made in God’s image.
2. Man is a physical being with a digestive tract, etc.
Therefore
3. God is a physical being with a digestive tract, etc.
But that’s like arguing:
1. This statue is made in Lincoln’s image.
2. This statue is composed of marble.
Therefore
3. Lincoln is composed of marble.
Joe’s mistake, one often repeated, is to take a spiritual saying in a materialistic way. The point is not that God must be physical because man is, but that man is a spiritual being just like God, potentially if not actually. The idea is not that God is a big man, the proverbial ‘man upstairs,’ but that man is a little god, a proto-god, a temporally and temporarily debased god who has open to him the possibility of a Higher Life with God, a possibility whose actualization requires both creaturely effort and divine grace.
In Feuerbachian terms, the point of imago dei is not that God is an anthropomorphic projection whereby man alienates his best attributes from himself and assigns them to an imaginary being external to himself, but that man is a theomorphic projection whereby God shares some of his attributes, such as free will, with real beings external to him though dependent on him.
Which is true? Does man project God, or does God project man? Is man the measure, or the measured? Does man 'create' God, or God man?
Note first the following asymmetry. If God is literally an anthropomorphic projection, then God does not exist. It would be absurd to say that God exists as an anthropomorphic projection when it is built into the very concept of God that he be a se, from himself, i.e., incapable of any kind of ontological dependency. But if man is a theomorphic projection, then man exists to a degree greater than he would exist if there were no God. For if man is a creature of God, and indeed one created in the image and likeness of God, then man has the possibility of a Higher Life, an eternal life.
The paradox is that when atheistic man tries to stand on his own two feet, declaring himself independent of God, at that moment he is next to nothing, a transient flash in the cosmic pan. But when man accepts his creaturely status as imago Dei, thereby accepting his radical dependence, at that moment he becomes more than a speck of cosmic dust slated for destruction. Thus Jean-Paul Sartre had it precisely backwards in thinking that if God exists then man is nothing; it is rather that man is something only if God exists. For if man exists in a godless universe he is but a cosmic fluke and all the existentialist posturing in the world won't change the fact.
Is "image and likeness" a redundant phrase, or does it mark a distinction? Arguably the latter. To be created in God’s image is to be granted the potentiality for sharing in the divine life, a potentiality that may or may not be actualized and is shared in equally by all human beings without their consent. Likeness, however, results from man’s free actualization of that potentiality. Whereas the image of God is imposed on man, likeness to God is not, but requires the free cooperation of the creature. (Cf. Harry Boosalis, Orthodox Spiritual Life, St. Tikhon’s Seminary Press, 1999), pp. 28-29.)
I am not free with respect to the image of God within me since I am not free to renounce my potential for divine sonship; but I am free with respect to the likeness since it is up to me whether I actualize the potential.
Well, does God exist or not? Before one can answer this question, one must understand it. In particular, one must understand that it cannot be dismissed as one the answer to which is obvious. To wax Continental for a moment, one must restore the question (die Frage) to its questionableness (Fragwuerdigkeit), where ‘questionable’ means not only able to be questioned, but, as the corresponding German term suggests, worthy of being questioned, of being raised as a question. And for that it is necessary not to take phrases like imago Dei in a crude materialistic way in the manner of old Joe and so many others.
One reason so many are atheists is because they are crude materialists: they cannot conceive how anything could be real that is not material. This, in turn, is aided and abetted by, and perhaps grounded in, their concupiscence: The lusts of the flesh have persuaded them that the sensible alone is real.
One must see that there is nothing obvious in the Feuerbachian suggestion, even though the weight of our culture favors this obviousness; one must see that the opposite and much much older suggestion, according to which man is a theomorphic projection, is just as reasonable.
But reasonable is not the same as true; so in the end one must decide what one will believe and how one will live.
In these regions of inquiry one cannot prove anything. To think otherwise is to fail to grasp the concept of proof.
Bill:
I have a few tangential thoughts.
1) Why "in the image of God" rather than "to the image of God?" I know that this writing is philosophical and not exegetical, but if you are going to use Sacred Scripture to stimulate (comment on?.. anchor?...) the philosophical effort, a better translation seems better able to aid the effort, because the shades of meaning are different. For example, St. Jerome's Latin which you quote, "ad imaginem" suggests a motion and direction that "in the image" does not.
2) Your comment on Sartre reminds me of a book by Eugene Rose (later Hieromonk Seraphim Rose) called "Nihilism: The Roots of the Revolution of the Modern Age," especially the chapter on "Theology and the Spirit of Nihilism." He claims that the nugget of truth at the center of nihilism is that man is entirely contingent, and is, but for God's gratuitous creation, essentially nothing. It is a thorough analysis of nihilism; if you haven't seen it, please check it out: http://oodegr.co/english/filosofia/nihilism_root_modern_age.htm
3) Perhaps you have a post you can direct me to where you discuss your notion of proof. Doesn't the existence of any thing necessarily imply the existence of the uncreated creator? You are certainly familiar with such proofs, so I wonder what your meaning or disagreement must be.
Posted by: John Detwiler | Saturday, June 25, 2016 at 10:22 PM
Thanks for the comments, John.
Ad 1) In this context I see no difference between 'in' and 'to.' They are stylistic variants of each other. Besides, the stock English phrase is 'in the image' not 'to the image.' A conservative never innovates without a good reason.
And as you know, Genesis was not written in Latin. Besides, are you sure about the exact sense of *ad* to St Jerome?
New Yorkers stand ON line, but I would never do such a thing: I stand IN line. Seriously, is there anything worth quibbling over here?
Ad 2) Thanks for the reference. You could also say that the nihilist correctly discerns the essential nullity or non-entity of finite things when taken on their own apart from God. But he thinks there is nothing beyond the finite. The theist, we could say, is a nihilist with respect to the finite, but thinks there is something beyond the finite.
The nihilist is arguably closer to God that the 'positivistic' believer.
Posted by: BV | Sunday, June 26, 2016 at 05:11 AM
John,
Read 'than' for 'that' in the last sentence above.
As for proof, see here: http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2016/06/neither-the-existence-nor-the-nonexistence-of-god-is-provable.html
and here:
http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2016/06/god-and-proof.html
Posted by: BV | Sunday, June 26, 2016 at 05:18 AM
But see Benjamin Sommer, The Bodies of God and the World of Ancient Israel, which opens ‘The god of the hebrew bible has a body. This must be stated at the outset, because so many people, including many scholars, assume otherwise. The evidence for this simple thesis is overwhelming, so much so that asserting the carnal nature of the biblical God should not occasion surprise.’
Posted by: Astute correspondent | Sunday, June 26, 2016 at 06:58 AM
Sommers p.2.
Note the emphasis, which is the author’s own, of the importance spatio-temporal location.
Posted by: Astute correspondent | Sunday, June 26, 2016 at 07:12 AM
Astute,
The whole point of my post is to counter Sommer's thesis. Dale, you will recall, made reference to Sommer's book.
The question is not whether God can manifest himself in bodily form, or (if this is different, and I think it is) bring about his Incarnation. The question is whether God is essentially embodied, or essentially carnal.
That is an absurd suggestion, and the depictions of God as inhaling, exhaling, walking around, must be interpreted allegorically.
God is a pure spirit.
Posted by: BV | Sunday, June 26, 2016 at 03:53 PM
Bill:
I've glanced at those posts on proof, and I'll have to take time to read them more carefully. Thanks for directing me to them.
Regarding the point about "ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei."
There's a short burst of arguments there, culminating in the question, "is there anything worth quibbling over here?" I'll try to respond to each. (I will also follow your wry lead in your mode of listing the replies. I found it amusing.)
(Before I begin, though, about "quibbling." If you think I'm arguing about petty words to avoid the topic of the post, about God's body, I'm not trying to. As I mentioned at the start of my reply, these are admittedly tangential thoughts -- not intended as a reply to the post. I hoped you'd reply, if you found the thoughts provocative.
If you think the question petty, in itself, and that's why you call it quibbling -- well, I guess that hangs on whether the understanding of a word in one of the most influential parts of the most authoritative text in human history is a petty point to argue about. I don't think so.)
Ad 1) -- "the stock English is phrase is 'in the image...'" I suppose it's fair to say that I'm not English, but Catholic. I don't mean this as snarky. Insofar as Catholics have been reading the Bible in English, they have been reading from the Douay Rheims translation as distinct from the King James translation. The Catholic rendering is "to the image."
Insofar as Catholicism and Protestantism are notably distinct, I think this bids fair to saying there are two standard renderings in the English language, "in the image" and "to the image," and at this time, neither is an innovation.
Ad 2) -- "Genesis was not written in Latin." Not originally, for a certainty, but in St. Jerome's capable hands, it was.
The question about proper sources for Biblical text is not about its origin, but about its publication. God published Genesis through Moses, in a Semitic tongue. He then approved the Greek translation of the Septuagint by using it when He preached as the Christ. Finally, He officially declared St. Jerome's Vulgate to be without error through His Church. I think this means that all three such versions are approved, and give us a chance to triangulate meaning.
Anyway, that brings us to the third argument.
Ad 3) "Are you sure about the exact sense of *ad* to St. Jerome?" Well, no, as far as that goes, I don't know which better translates his meaning. I implied above that I try to triangulate the meaning, and seeing the Greek "kata" and the Latin "ad," the translation "to the image" seems more fitting. I did a quick search for all the uses of the word "image" and looked to see if St. Jerome had "in imagine," rather than "ad imaginem." He never did. So I couldn't find a distinction made there.
In can mean "within" or "into." There is a distinction between "ad" and "in" even when both express direction. "Ad" implies motion toward, but from a distance. "In" implies motion towards, ending together.
As St. Thomas puts it, "Therefore there is in man a likeness to God; not, indeed, a perfect likeness, but imperfect. And Scripture implies the same when it says that man was made "to" God's likeness; for the preposition "to" signifies a certain approach, as of something at a distance." (See again, the standard Catholic phrase, *to* God's likeness.)
Ad 4) "What if the Greek or Hebrew is better translated "in the image?" You didn't ask this, but it's a clear corollary. I tend to think that St. Jerome's scholarship is better than mine, and his understanding of the Hebrew of the Scriptures, being 1600 years closer, is better. So, if he thinks "ad" expresses it, I take it as important clarification.
So, where does that all leave us? I'm not sure. The question of what's a better translation of Genesis (given all three undeniably official languages) into modern English might require more careful thought. But I hold that "to the image" is not innovation, it's a competing standard tradition.
Posted by: John Detwiler | Sunday, June 26, 2016 at 09:32 PM
>>The whole point of my post is to counter Sommer's thesis.
Sommer’s thesis is that (a) this is what pre-Millenial cultures in the Middle East believed and (b) this is what the Hebrew Bible says. Your post does not address the first claim.
On the matter of scriptural interpretation, you give a number of arguments.
1. The Lincoln argument. Something can be an image or likeness even though the matter (e.g. marble is different from flesh). OK, but what about form? An image of Lincoln needs to look like him, no?
2. That the depictions of God as inhaling, exhaling, walking around, must be interpreted allegorically, otherwise they are absurd.
Sommer considers the second claim in detail, and argues that the idea emerged in the middle ages with Maimonides. Aquinas seems to follow Maimonides – see Summa I Q3 A1. Sommer's reply is that nothing in the Hebrew Bible suggests allegory. This is a projection by later commentators who, struck by the apparent absurdity of the idea of walking around etc., suggested it must have been intended allegorically. This argument works for anything of course. Virgin birth is absurd, ergo allegory. Resurrection from the dead is absurd, ergo allegory. Supernatural interference in the course of nature etc etc.
There is a separate Strawsonian argument connecting of spatio-temporal location and identity through time, which we might consider later.
Posted by: Astute | Monday, June 27, 2016 at 05:00 AM
Astute,
You quoted Sommer: "The god of the hebrew bible has a body. This must be stated at the outset, because so many people, including many scholars, assume otherwise. The evidence for this simple thesis is overwhelming, so much so that asserting the carnal nature of the biblical God should not occasion surprise."
Look, if the God of the Hebrew Bible is the true God, as I assume, and Dale Tuggy assumes, and perhaps as you assume as well, then God cannot have a body. God is pure spirit. So Sommer is plainly wrong.
But there is this wrinkle: The opening sentence is ambiguous. It could be read as saying that the God is described in the Hebrew bible using terms that imply that he has a body, and that is all metaphor.
God does not literally breathe; he brings in about that this animal Adam who evolved from lower forms is the first animal to be a spiritual animal, a man.
Suppose I describe some Englishman, call him Tom, as insular. Now, literally, no man is an island. (You get the pun.) By a certain semantic extension, an analogical shift, we can say, again literally, that Dean is insular inasmuch as he lives on an island. But if I say that Tom is insular to convey that he is isolated in his thinking from Continental and other foreign influences, then I am speaking metaphorically.
Posted by: BV | Monday, June 27, 2016 at 12:29 PM
Astute,
If I understand Strawson, he is saying that the concept of person is such that persons are essentially embodied, that it is impossible that there be an unembodied person. It follows that God does not exist if God is a person.
So the important question is whether God is essentially embodied. This is not the same as the question whether God has the power to manifest himself bodily. Perhaps Sommer is maintaining merely that God has this 'theophanic' power.
By the way, Strawson pere does seem to mix metaphysics and epistemology since crucial to his argument are considerations of identification, in the epistemological sense.
Posted by: BV | Monday, June 27, 2016 at 12:40 PM
1. Sommer’s position hangs upon intricate points of scriptural interpretation, including what is called the ‘argument from silence’, which I am not really qualified to comment on.
2. ‘Strawson pere does seem to mix metaphysics and epistemology since crucial to his argument are considerations of identification, in the epistemological sense.’ This is the more philosophically interesting question. I agree that Strawson’s presentation of his own argument does appear to mix metaphysics and epistemology.
However his pupil Gareth Evans considerably developed the argument, invoking what he called ‘Russell’s Principle’: ‘In order to be thinking about an object or to make a judgment about an object, one must know which object is in question – one must know which object it is that one is thinking about. Evans called this ‘knowing which’ a discriminating conception. So the question is whether we have a discriminating conception of a pure individual consciousness, in Strawson’s sense. This turns the epistemological question into a semantic one.
What does ‘I am depressed’ mean, as uttered by you, and as understood by you? If you argue that your understanding is somehow richer or different from mine, because the ‘I’, as understood by you, refers to your soul or ego or individual consciousness, then according to Russell’s Principle, there must be a discriminating conception of the referent. But there isn’t one. We can only know which object you are talking about by locating your body in space and time. I.e. ‘know which’ in the semantic sense, as in ‘know what you are talking about’.
Posted by: Astute | Tuesday, June 28, 2016 at 03:36 AM
Is perception required to know which object? I should think not. I am now thinking about the square root of 9, and I am thinking that it is is an odd number. But I have no sensory acquaintance with the object of my thought.
Posted by: BV | Tuesday, June 28, 2016 at 05:16 AM
>>Is perception required to know which object?
Not necessarily, but Evans's claim is that we must have a discriminating conception of the object. Conception is not perception.
Posted by: Astute | Tuesday, June 28, 2016 at 05:27 AM