Thinking and Speaking about the Absolute: Three Views

Univocity.  There is an absolute reality.  We can speak of it literally and sometimes truly using predicates of ordinary language that retain in their metaphysical use the very same sense they have in their mundane use.  For example, we can say of Socrates that he exists, and using 'exists' in the very same sense we can say of God that he exists.  Accordingly, 'exists' is univocal in application to creature and creator.  Corresponding to this sameness of sense there is a sameness in mode of Being: God and Socrates exist in the very same way.  No doubt God exists necessarily whereas Socrates exist contingently; but this is a mere different in modal status, not a difference in mode of Being.  It is the difference between existing in all possible worlds and existing in some, but not all, possible worlds.

And the same holds for non-existential predicates such as 'wise.' We can say of Socrates that he is wise, and using 'wise' in the very same sense we can say of God that he is wise.  Accordingly, 'wise' is univocal in application to creature and creator.  Corresponding to this sameness of sense there is sameness in mode of property-possession: God and Socrates both have wisdom by instantiating it.

Analogicity.  Theological language is literal, but analogical.  I won't discuss this view now.

Negative Theology.  The absolute reality is beyond all our concepts. God is utterly transcendent, radically other. Nothing can be truly predicated of God as he is in himself, not even that he exists, or does not.  The problem with this approach is that it threatens to render theological language unintelligible.

So why not adopt the Univocity View?  Is there any good reason not to adopt it?

I think there is a good reason, namely, that the UV implies that God is a being among beings; that God as absolute reality cannot be a being among beings;  ergo, etc.  

But what does it mean to say that God is a being among beings?  As I see it, to say that God is a being among beings is to say that God is no exception to the logical and ontological principles (pertaining to properties, property-possession, existence, modality, etc.) that govern anything that can be said to exist.  It is to say that God fits the ontological or general-metaphysical schema that everything else fits. It is to say that God is ontologically on a par with other beings despite the attributes (omniscience, etc.) that set him apart from other beings and indeed render him unique among beings. To spell it out.  If God is a being among beings, then:

a.  Properties. Some properties are such that God and creatures share them.  Consider the property of being a self.  For present purposes we may accept Dale's definition: "a being capable of consciousness, with intelligence, will, and the ability to intentionally act."  God is a self, but so is Socrates.  Both are selves in the very same sense of 'self.'  'Self' is being used univocally (not equivocally and not analogically) in 'God is a self' and 'Socrates is a self' just as 'wise' is being used univocally in 'God is wise' and 'Socrates is wise,' and so on.

Some are  uncomfortable with talk of properties and seem to prefer talk of concepts.  Well then, I can put my present point by saying that some concepts are such as to be common to both God and creatures, the concept self being one example.

b. Property-possession. God has properties in the same way that creatures do.  My first point was that there are some properties that both God and creatures share; my present point is a different one about property-possession: the having of these shared properties is the same in the divine and creaturely cases.  Both God and Socrates instantiate the property of being a self, where first-level instantiation is an asymmetrical relation or non-relational tie that connects individuals and properties construed as mind-independent universals.

The point could be put conceptualistically as follows.  Both God and Socrates fall under the concept self, where falling under is an asymmetrical relation that connects individuals and concepts construed as mind-dependent universals. 

c. Existence. God is in the same way that creatures are.  Given that God exists and that Socrates exists, it does not follow that they exist in the same way.  Or so I maintain.  But part of what it means to say that God is a being among beings is to say that God and Socrates do exist in the very same way.  Whatever it is for an item to exist, there is only one way for an item to exist, and God and Socrates exist in that very same way. For example, if what it is for x to exist is for x to be identical to some y, then this holds both for God and Socrates.

d. It follows from (a) and (b) taken together that God is really distinct from his properties, and that his properties are really distinct from one another.  God is in this respect no different from Socrates. Really distinct: distinct in reality, apart from our mental operations.  (What is really distinct need not be capable of separate existence.)  And both items have their properties by instantiating them.

e. It follows from (c) that God is really distinct from his existence (just as Socrates is really distinct from his existence) and that God is really distinct from existence (just as Socrates is distinct from existence). 

f. It follows from (d) and (e) taken together that God is not ontologically simple.  Contrapositively, if God is ontologically simple, then God is not a being among beings as I am using this phrase.  It is therefore no surprise that Dale Tuggy ansd other evangelical Christians reject divine simplicity whereas I am inclined to accept it.  See my SEP entry for more on this.

To conclude, my argument against the Univocity View is as follows: 

A. If the UV is true, then God is a being among beings in the sense explained.
B. If God is a being among beings, then God is not ontologically simple.
C. An absolute being must be ontologically simple.
D. God is the absolute being.
Ergo
E. God is ontologically simple.
Ergo
F. God is not a being among beings.
Ergo
G. The Univocity View is not true.

So I reject the UV.  If the other two views are also rationally rejectable, then we have an aporia, which, I suggest, is what we have. We are at an impasse, as usual in philosophy.  

Related articles

Is God Beyond All Being?

God and Socrates: Two Different Ways of Existing?

Review of Barry Miller, A Most Unlikely God

Comments

[Vlastimil]

Bill,

I endorse (a). How am I committed to (b)?

Likewise, in his critique of Hick, Plantinga endorses (a). How does that commit him to (b)?

[Astute]

This is a useful summary of the logical connection between divine simplicity and negative theology. As I understand you, divine simplicity implies non-univocity. And non-univocity implies either Analogicity or Negative Theology. Yes?

[Astute]

I thought this article in the IEP was also useful.

Alvin Plantinga’s critique of simplicity in his Does God Have a Nature (1980) has become a touchstone in the contemporary debates.

One of Plantinga’s major criticisms is that simplicity is incompatible with God appearing to have multiple attributes. According to the doctrine, “[God] doesn’t merely have a nature or essence; he just is that nature, ... [and] each of his properties is identical with each of his properties...so that God has but one property.” But this “seems flatly incompatible with the obvious fact that God has several properties; he has power and mercifulness, say, neither of which is identical with the other” (1980, 46–47).

Something else for me to look at.

[Astute]

To Vlastimil's question about Plantinga, is this not answered by my quote above, i.e. 'One of Plantinga’s major criticisms is that simplicity is incompatible with God appearing to have multiple attributes'?

[BV]

V,

Are you referring to (a) or (A)?

If the former, you are just not getting it. The point of that section was to explain what it means to say that God is a being among beings.

[BV]

>> As I understand you, divine simplicity implies non-univocity. And non-univocity implies either Analogicity or Negative Theology. Yes?<<

That's exactly what I am saying.

If God is simple, then "he is what he has" as St Augustine puts it. For example, he is wisdom as opposed to instantiating it. But then 'wise' cannot have the same sense in application to God and in application to Socrates.

Do you follow that?

[BV]

What the author of the IEP article says is correct.

For Plantinga, God is necessarily unique: necessarily one of a kind. He is the one and only possible instance of the divine attributes.

But I follow Aquinas and go a step further: God is unique in a 'supereminent' sense: he is such that in him there can be no distinction between instance of a kind and kind, instance of a nature and a nature.

Next stop: a doctrine of analogical predication (on the semantic plane) together with analogia entis on the ontological plane, OR the via negativa (Pseudo-Dionysus, et al.)

[Astute]

This is quite helpful for my book. It seemed to me there must be a connection between negative theology and classical theism. If you hold that divine simplicity is the crucial tenet of classical theism, as some do, then you have to choose between some form of analogy or negativism. So I look forward to your next post (which I assume you meant by ‘next stop’?).

As I am understanding Kant (Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason) he holds an extreme version of negative theology. There is some sort of ‘space for faith’, but not much that I can see, for he wholly rejects ideas like miracles, except in some passages which are clearly ironic, divine intervention. Also the specialness of Christianity, given the ‘ought implies can’ principle.

[Vlastimil]

Bill,

I am referring to (a), not (A).

I get (a), (b), etc. are parts of what you mean by the locution 'God is a being among other beings'.

But I've had the impression that you believe one can't hold to (a) without holding to the rest. Which I doubt.

When I hear Hick, or someone like him, saying that God is beyond concepts or not a being among other beings, I take him to oppose (a). Maybe some other things, too, but (a) at least. And when I hear Plantinga's refutation of Hick, I take Plantinga to defend (a). I don't take him to take a stance on the issue of divine simplicity. That happens elsewhere in Plantinga, not in that part of his refutation of Hick that you quote and try to undermine in your previous post.