After MacIntyre: Can a Normative Conclusion be Derived from Purely Factual Premises?

Are there any valid arguments that satisfy the following conditions:  (i) The premises are all factual  in the sense of purporting to state only what is the case; (ii) the conclusion is normative/evaluative?  Alasdair MacIntyre gives the following example (After Virtue, U. of Notre Dame Press, 1981, p. 55):

1. This watch is inaccurate.

Therefore

2. This is a bad watch.

MacIntyre claims that the premise is factual, the conclusion evaluative, and the argument valid.  The validity is supposed to hinge on the functional character of the concept watch.  A watch is an artifact created by an artificer for a specific purpose: to tell time accurately.  It therefore has a proper function, one assigned by the artificer.  (Serving as a paperweight being an example of an improper function.)  A good watch does its job, serves its purpose, fulfills its proper function. MacIntyre tells us that "the concept of a watch cannot be defined independently of the concept of a good watch . . ." and that "the criterion of something's being a watch and something's being a good watch . . . are not independent of each other." (Ibid.)  MacIntyre goes on to say that both sets of criteria are factual and that for this reason arguments like the one above validly move from a factual premise to an evaluative conclusion.

Speaking as someone who has been more influenced by the moderns than by the ancients, I don't quite see it.  It is not the case that both sets of criteria are factual. The criteria for something's being a good watch already contain evaluative criteria.  For if a good watch is one that tells time accurately, then that criterion of chronometric goodness involves a standard of evaluation.  If I say of a watch that it is inaccurate, I am not merely describing it, but also evaluating it.  MacIntyre is playing the following game, to put it somewhat uncharitably.

He smuggles the evaluative attribute good into his definition of 'watch,' forgets that he has done so thereby generating the illusion that his definition is purely factual, and then pulls the evaluative rabbit out of the hat in his conclusion.  It is an illusion since the rabbit was already there in the premise.  In other words, both (1) and (2) are evaluative.  So, while the argument is valid, it is not a valid argument from a purely factual premise to an evaluative conclusion.

So if the precise question is whether one can validly move from a purely factual or descriptive premise to an evaluative conclusion, then MacIntyre's example fails to show that this is possible.

I think what MacIntyre needs is the idea that some statements are both factual and evaluative.  If (1) is both, then the argument is valid, but then it is not an argument from a purely factual premise to an evaluative conclusion.

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Comments

[Opponent]

I think this is valid:

1. This device fails its purpose
2. Any device that fails its purpose is a bad device
3. This is a bad device.

Premise (1) is factual. Premise (2) is definitional. I think.

[Bill JK]

Is it an evaluation of a statement to say it is purely factual?

[BV]

Opponent,

Suppose neutron bombs are deployed and each one is a dud. Would those devices be bad devices?

In any case (2) strikes me as evaluative even if definitional.

Bill,

I would say No. A statement can be factual without being true.

[Steven]

Bill,

There is no coherent way to define a watch except teleologically, and insofar as it is defined teleologically, various facts about its functioning will imply various evaluative statements about its quality as a watch. If there is no other coherent way to speak about a watch except teleologically, then there is no reason to offer an argument for the conclusion that some statements can be both factual and evaluative. The opposite position -- that statements cannot be both -- is unsubstantiated and taken for granted, but not for any good reason that I can think of, except of course on the basis of the rejection of a teleological metaphysics.

Regarding the defective neutron bombs, yes, they would be bad devices -- that is, they would be bad as neutron bombs. Whether they are bad in a moral sense clearly depends on the manner in which they are and can be used. If they can only be used immorally, then they would be bad devices in a moral sense, but for a different reason and with respect to a different set of teleological considerations. They would be extrinsically bad, perhaps we might say.

[Thomas]

Dear BV,

for the acnients there is no 'deriving norms from facts', there is simply normativity 'all the way down', as some might say. Thinkers like Aristotle and Aquinas do not have a gulf that must be bridged between what is normative and what is factual. There is not non-normative factual reality that must be accounted for. Consider Aquinas' convertibility thesis, whatever exists is good. Goodness and being are convertible. If goodness is defined in terms of desirability- that is what all things desire is the good- that is referring to a thing's appetite, its natural inclination or disposition to some end, then it is the fulfillment of those appetites that constistute as goodness (in this case, the proper functioning of a watch, albiet it is not a natural thing), and the unfulfillment of these capacities that is bad- for evil is merely defency for Aquinas.

[BV]

Thomas,

You are right about A and T.

This is consistent with what I concluded: "So if the precise question is whether one can validly move from a purely factual or descriptive premise to an evaluative conclusion, then MacIntyre's example fails to show that this is possible."

[Thomas]

Deaer BV,

I admit I read through your post rather hastily (being so excited to come across this post since I'm studying Aquinas at the moment) and so missed your conclusion. I do like your conclusion because it seems to me that if one wants to argue that 'factual things' are also normative, then arguing within the framework of the moderns- that is trying to bridge the gap- is not the right way to go. One ought to simpy deny that there is a gap and thus avoid the so called naturalistic fallacy altogether.

But if we go your route and say that some factual statements are also normative or evaluative, does this commit us to a kind of convertibility of being and goodness? Or is this merely a matterof propositions, and not reality itself?

Cheers

[Paul]

What's a "purely" factual premise? Is this one:

1) Either 2+2 =5 or one ought not murder

If so, then:

2) 2+2=4

3) Thus, one ought not murder.

[BV]

The premise is a disjunctive proposition one of the disjuncts of which is normative; hence, the premise is plainly not purely factual.