Edith Stein on Cognitio Fidei: Is Faith a Kind of Knowledge?

One finds the phrase cognitio fidei in Thomas Aquinas and in such Thomist writers as Josef Pieper. It translates as 'knowledge of faith.' The genitive is to be interpreted subjectively, not objectively: faith is not the object of knowledge; faith is a form or type of knowledge. But how can faith be a type of knowledge? One ought to find this puzzling.

On a standard analysis of 'knows,' where propositional knowledge is at issue, subject S knows that p just in case (i) S believes that p; (ii) S is justified in believing that p; and (iii) p is true. This piece of epistemological boilerplate is the starting point for much of the arcana (Gettier counterexamples, etc.) of contemporary epistemology. But its pedigree is ancient, to be found in Plato's Theaetetus.

It is obvious that on the standard analysis mere belief is inferior to knowledge since if I believe what is false I don't have knowledge, and if I believe what is true without justification I don't have knowledge either. How then can mere belief be a form or type of knowledge? It is rather a necessary but not sufficient condition of knowledge. Or so it seems to the modern mind.

Another puzzle has to do with certainty. Whether or not knowledge entails certainty, it seems to the modern mind that belief definitely does not entail certainty: what I believe but do not know I cannot be certain about since if I believe but do not know, then either truth is lacking or justification is lacking or both. How then can mere belief be said to be certain? And yet we read in Aquinas that "It is part of the concept of belief itself that man is certain of that in which he believes." (Quoted from Pieper, Belief and Faith, p. 15).

It is easy to understand how one who believes but does not know that p can be subjectively certain that p; but it is difficult to understand how such a person can be objectively certain that p. Objective certainty, however, alone has epistemic value.

We now turn to the remarkable Edith Stein (1891-1942), brilliant Jewish student of and assistant to Edmund Husserl, philosopher, Roman Catholic convert, Carmelite nun, victim of the Holocaust at Auschwitz, and saint of the Roman Catholic church. In the 1920s Stein composed an imaginary dialogue between her two philosophical masters, Husserl and Aquinas. Part of what she has them discussing is the nature of faith.

One issue is whether faith gives us access to truth. Stein has Thomas say:

. . . faith is a way to truth. Indeed, in the first place it is a way to truths — plural — which would otherwise be closed to us, and in the second place it is the surest way to truth. For there is no greater certainty than that of faith . . . . (Edith Stein, Knowledge and Faith, tr. Redmond, ICS Publications 2000, pp. 16-17)

Now comes an important question. What is it that we as philosophers want? We want the ultimate truths about the ultimate matters. If so, it is arguable that we should take these truths from whatever source offers them to us even if the source is not narrowly philosophical. We should not say: I will accept only those truths that can be certified by (natural) reason, but rather all truths whether certified by reason or 'certified' by faith. Thus Stein has Aquinas say:

If faith makes accessible truths unattainable by any other means, philosophy, for one thing, cannot forego them without renouncing its universal claim to truth. [. . .] One consequence, then, is a material dependence of philosophy on faith.

Then too, if faith affords the highest certainty attainable by the human mind, and if philosophy claims to bestow the highest certainty, then philosophy must make the certainty of faith its own. It does so first by absorbing the truths of faith, and further by using them as the final criterion by which to gauge all other truths. Hence, a second consequence is a formal dependence of philosophy on faith. (17-18)

But of course this cannot go unchallenged by Husserl. So Stein has him say:

. . . if faith is the final criterion of all other truth, what is the criterion of faith itself? What guarantees that the certainty of my faith is genuine? (20)

Or in terms of of the distinction made above between subjective and objective certainty: what guarantees that the certainty of faith is objective and not merely subjective? The faiths of Jew, Christian, and Muslim are all different. How can the Christian be sure that the revelation he takes on faith has not been superseded by the revelation the Muslim takes on faith?  And what about contradictory faith-contents? God cannot be both triune (as the normative Christian believes) and not triune (as the normative Muslim believes).  So Christian and Muslim cannot both be objectively certain about their characteristic beliefs; at most they can be subjectively certain. Subjective certainty, however, has no epistemic value.  

Stein's Thomas replies to Husserl as follows:

Probably my best answer is that faith is its own guarantee. I could also say that God, who has given us the revelation, vouches for its truth. But this would only be the other side of the same coin. For if we took the two as separate facts, we would fall into a circulus vitiosus [vicious circle], since God is after all what we become certain about in faith. [. . .]

All we can do is point out that for the believer such is the certainty of faith that it relativizes all other certainty, and that he can but give up any supposed knowledge which contradicts his faith. The unique certitude of faith is a gift of grace. It is up to the understanding and will to draw the practical consequences therefrom. Constructing a philosophy on faith belongs to the theoretical consequences. (20-22)

For Thomas and Stein, the certainty of faith is a gift of God.  As such, it cannot be merely subjective.  It is at once both subjective and objective, subjective as an inner certitude, objective as an effect of divine grace.  Husserl, however, will ask how the claim that the certainty of faith is a divine gift can be validated.  It is after all, a contestable and contested claim.  How does one know that it is true? For Husserl, the claims that God exists and that the Christian revelation is his revelation are but dogmatic presuppositions.  They need validation because of the existence of competing claims such as those made by Jews and Muslims and atheists.

If, as Stein says, "faith is its own guarantee," then, since the faith of the Christian and the faith of the Muslim are contradictory with respect to certain key propositions, it follows that one of these faiths offers a false guarantee.  You can see from this that the Thomas-Stein stance leaves something to be desired.  But Husserl's approach has problems of its own.  Closed up within the sphere of his subjectivity, man cannot reach the truly Transcendent, which must irrupt into this sphere and cannot be constituted (Husserl's term) within it.  The truly Transcendent is not a transcendence-in-immanence.  It cannot be a constituted transcendence.

If man is indeed a creature, there is something absurd about measly man hauling the Creator before the bench of finite reason there to be rudely interrogated about his credentials.  On the other hand, the claim that man is a creature is a claim like any other, and man must satisfy his intellectual conscience with respect to this claim.  It is precisely his freedom, responsibility and love of truth that drive him to ask: But is it true?  And how do we know?  And isn't it morally shabby to fool oneself and seek consolation in a fairy tale?

Paradoxically, God creates man in his image and likeness, and thus as free, responsible, and truth-loving; characteristics that then motivate man to put God in the dock.

So there you have it. There are two opposing conceptions of philosophy, one based on the autonomy of reason, the other willing to sacrifice the autonomy of reason for the sake of truths which cannot be certified by reason but which are provided by faith in revelation, a revelation that must simply be accepted in humility and obedience. It looks as if one must simply decide which of these two conceptions to adopt, and that the decision cannot be justified by (natural) reason.

My task, in this and in related posts, is first and foremost to set forth the problems as clearly as I can. Anyone who thinks this problem has an easy solution does not understand it.  It is part of the tension between Athens and Jerusalem. 

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On a standard analysis of 'knows,' where propositional knowledge is at issue, subject S knows that p just in case (i) S believes that p; (ii) S is justified in believing that p; and (iii) p is true. This piece of epistemological boilerplate is the starting point for much of the arcana (Gettier counterexamples, etc.) of contemporary epistemology. But its pedigree is ancient, to be found in Plato's Theaetetus.

It is obvious that on the standard analysis mere belief is inferior to knowledge since if I believe what is false I don't have knowledge, and if I believe what is true without justification I don't have knowledge either. How then can mere belief be a form or type of knowledge? It is rather a necessary but not sufficient condition of knowledge. Or so it seems to the modern mind.

Another puzzle has to do with certainty. Whether or not knowledge entails certainty, it seems to the modern mind that belief definitely does not entail certainty: what I believe but do not know I cannot be certain about since if I believe but do not know, then either truth is lacking or justification is lacking or both. How then can mere belief be said to be certain? And yet we read in Aquinas that "It is part of the concept of belief itself that man is certain of that in which he believes." (Quoted from Pieper, Belief and Faith, p. 15).

It is easy to understand how one who believes but does not know that p can be subjectively certain that p; but it is difficult to understand how such a person can be objectively certain that p. Objective certainty, however, alone has epistemic value.

We now turn to the remarkable Edith Stein (1891-1942), brilliant Jewish student of and assistant to Edmund Husserl, philosopher, Roman Catholic convert, Carmelite nun, victim of the Holocaust at Auschwitz, and saint of the Roman Catholic church. In the 1920s Stein composed an imaginary dialogue between her two philosophical masters, Husserl and Aquinas. Part of what she has them discussing is the nature of faith.

One issue is whether faith gives us access to truth. Stein has Thomas say:

. . . faith is a way to truth. Indeed, in the first place it is a way to truths — plural — which would otherwise be closed to us, and in the second place it is the surest way to truth. For there is no greater certainty than that of faith . . . . (Edith Stein, Knowledge and Faith, tr. Redmond, ICS Publications 2000, pp. 16-17)

Now comes an important question. What is it that we as philosophers want? We want the ultimate truths about the ultimate matters. If so, it is arguable that we should take these truths from whatever source offers them to us even if the source is not narrowly philosophical. We should not say: I will accept only those truths that can be certified by (natural) reason, but rather all truths whether certified by reason or 'certified' by faith. Thus Stein has Aquinas say:

If faith makes accessible truths unattainable by any other means, philosophy, for one thing, cannot forego them without renouncing its universal claim to truth. [. . .] One consequence, then, is a material dependence of philosophy on faith.

Then too, if faith affords the highest certainty attainable by the human mind, and if philosophy claims to bestow the highest certainty, then philosophy must make the certainty of faith its own. It does so first by absorbing the truths of faith, and further by using them as the final criterion by which to gauge all other truths. Hence, a second consequence is a formal dependence of philosophy on faith. (17-18)

But of course this cannot go unchallenged by Husserl. So Stein has him say:

. . . if faith is the final criterion of all other truth, what is the criterion of faith itself? What guarantees that the certainty of my faith is genuine? (20)

Or in terms of of the distinction made above between subjective and objective certainty: what guarantees that the certainty of faith is objective and not merely subjective? The faiths of Jew, Christian, and Muslim are all different. How can the Christian be sure that the revelation he takes on faith has not been superseded by the revelation the Muslim takes on faith?  And what about contradictory faith-contents? God cannot be both triune (as the normative Christian believes) and not triune (as the normative Muslim believes).  So Christian and Muslim cannot both be objectively certain about their characteristic beliefs; at most they can be subjectively certain. Subjective certainty, however, has no epistemic value.  

Stein's Thomas replies to Husserl as follows:

Probably my best answer is that faith is its own guarantee. I could also say that God, who has given us the revelation, vouches for its truth. But this would only be the other side of the same coin. For if we took the two as separate facts, we would fall into a circulus vitiosus [vicious circle], since God is after all what we become certain about in faith. [. . .]

All we can do is point out that for the believer such is the certainty of faith that it relativizes all other certainty, and that he can but give up any supposed knowledge which contradicts his faith. The unique certitude of faith is a gift of grace. It is up to the understanding and will to draw the practical consequences therefrom. Constructing a philosophy on faith belongs to the theoretical consequences. (20-22)

For Thomas and Stein, the certainty of faith is a gift of God.  As such, it cannot be merely subjective.  It is at once both subjective and objective, subjective as an inner certitude, objective as an effect of divine grace.  Husserl, however, will ask how the claim that the certainty of faith is a divine gift can be validated.  It is after all, a contestable and contested claim.  How does one know that it is true? For Husserl, the claims that God exists and that the Christian revelation is his revelation are but dogmatic presuppositions.  They need validation because of the existence of competing claims such as those made by Jews and Muslims and atheists.

If, as Stein says, "faith is its own guarantee," then, since the faith of the Christian and the faith of the Muslim are contradictory with respect to certain key propositions, it follows that one of these faiths offers a false guarantee.  You can see from this that the Thomas-Stein stance leaves something to be desired.  But Husserl's approach has problems of its own.  Closed up within the sphere of his subjectivity, man cannot reach the truly Transcendent, which must irrupt into this sphere and cannot be constituted (Husserl's term) within it.  The truly Transcendent is not a transcendence-in-immanence.  It cannot be a constituted transcendence.

If man is indeed a creature, there is something absurd about measly man hauling the Creator before the bench of finite reason there to be rudely interrogated about his credentials.  On the other hand, the claim that man is a creature is a claim like any other, and man must satisfy his intellectual conscience with respect to this claim.  It is precisely his freedom, responsibility and love of truth that drive him to ask: But is it true?  And how do we know?  And isn't it morally shabby to fool oneself and seek consolation in a fairy tale?

Paradoxically, God creates man in his image and likeness, and thus as free, responsible, and truth-loving; characteristics that then motivate man to put God in the dock.

So there you have it. There are two opposing conceptions of philosophy, one based on the autonomy of reason, the other willing to sacrifice the autonomy of reason for the sake of truths which cannot be certified by reason but which are provided by faith in revelation, a revelation that must simply be accepted in humility and obedience. It looks as if one must simply decide which of these two conceptions to adopt, and that the decision cannot be justified by (natural) reason.

My task, in this and in related posts, is first and foremost to set forth the problems as clearly as I can. Anyone who thinks this problem has an easy solution does not understand it.  It is part of the tension between Athens and Jerusalem. 

Comments

[Richard Hennessey]

The discussion (to call it a debate would be to prejudge the outcome) which I would like to see imagined is one between Thomas, advocating the thesis that faith represents a genuine knowledge, and Aristotle, examining it; the two would, as I imagine it, have come to full agreement on all matters purely philosophical, so that the focus would be on the thesis alone that faith represents a genuine knowledge. I would further imagine Averroes as an intensely attentive member of the audience.

[Elliott]

Bill,

As you rightly note, this is a difficult philosophical problem.

It might help to clarify what is meant by ‘faith.’ Arguably, the Christian conception of faith is not just a matter of believing that God exists. Rather, it is trust in God and his revelation. If one trusts in something, one acts as if it is true. Of course, trust in God presupposes belief that God exists. But belief that God exists need not be mere belief. Given the arguments for God’s existence, belief that God exists can be at least a matter of justified belief, if not JTB.

If Christian faith is a matter of trust in God, then this can be reasonably construed as (at least) a way of obtaining knowledge. Consider a common example:

A new student of logic takes a college course in logic. The Ps and Qs are gibberish to him. Modus ponens and the constructive dilemma make no sense to him. He has never seen such material before. His instructor says “I know this looks strange to you now. But if you memorize the rules of deductive inference and you complete all of your proof exercises over the next few weeks, you’ll come to understand. At this point, you must trust me and accept what I teach, even though it seems strange.)

Perhaps religious faith is comparable to normal cases in which we must trust an authority in order to obtain knowledge. But there is at least one important difference, as you recognized. Christian faith is a matter of divine grace and, according to orthodox Christianity, is warranted by the inner witness of the Holy Spirit.

[BV]

Good to hear from you, Elliot.

I agree with your second paragraph. There is belief-that and belief-in, and the latter involves trust. And I agree that belief that God exists can be justified, whether or not it is true.

And I agree that one must trust one's teacher in order to learn what he has to teach.

Now suppose I put my faith and trust in Muhammad and learn what he has to teach. Unfortunately, what he teaches is mainly false. In this case the certainty of my trusting faith does not amount to knowledge.

It is merely subjective.

[Elliott]

And from you, Bill. Merry Christmas!

Right, in that case the certainty would be merely subjective and would fall short of knowledge, since truth would be absent. If trust in a teacher is to successfully produce knowledge, the teacher must be trustworthy.

Suppose the following: knowledge does not require certainty, either subjective or objective; one can have JTB w/o either form of certainty that God exists; one has reason to view the teaching of Christ as being the correct conception of God; the teaching of Christ is true. (Granted, there a several suppositions here!)

So one trusts in Christ, and learns and practices his teaching. He becomes subjectively convinced of its truth.

He is now subjectively certain. Is he also objectively certain, since his subjectively certain belief is true and justified? Did he, via faith, move from JTB w/o certainty to JTB with certainty?

[Elliott]

Regarding the nature of certainty, the following definition from Chisholm might be helpful as a starting point for discussion:

p is certain for S = Df For every q, believing p is more justified for S than withholding q, and believing p is at least as justified for S as is believing q

(Theory of Knowledge, Third Edition, p. 12)

[BV]

I don't think so.

Suppose I am subjectively certain that Christ's teaching is true and his promises reliable, and suppose the teaching is in fact true and also that I am justified in considering it true. This still doesn't get us to objective certainty since the justification involves flimsy and external factors. You have to believe ancient accounts of Christ's resurrection, his appearances to the disciples after the Resurrection, his Ascension body and soul into heaven, etc.

Surely there is no objective certainty here. This all has to be taken on faith. One has to believe things that appear logically contradictory, for example, that Christ ascended soul AND BODY into a purely spiritual realm, thereby importing materiality into the Godhead -- which implies that God is a pure spirit prior to the Ascension, but not after! And thus that the immutable God changed due to an historical event.

[BV]

Glad to see you are reading Chisholm. That df. is of subjective certainty since it is relativized to a subject S.

[Elliott]

Good points. I suppose, regarding the accounts of the Resurrection, we’d need to discuss the reliability of historical reasoning and to evaluate the relevant accounts.

Regarding the Ascension of soul and body, I recall J.P. Moreland noting somewhere that there are problems with the commonly accepted definition of matter, and suggesting a definition of matter (or body) as “the capacity to become spatially located.” (Unfortunately, I don’t have a reference for JPM. I’d need to hunt it down.)

If this definition of matter is accurate, and if God eternally possesses the capacity to become spatially located, then the Ascension of soul and body would seem to fit.

[BV]

The question is not whether sense can be made of Christ's Ascension. The point is that nothing one says about it will be objectively certain.

[Elliott]

And it seems quite a high standard for subjective certainty!

[BV]

Indeed. Did Chisholm give some examples?

And how could one apply this definition?

For example, *My wife is shorter than me.* To evaluate whether that proposition is certain for me I would have to consider every other proposition. A rather large task!

[Elliott]

Chisholm ranked certainty as the highest level of epistemic justification. He wrote that his concept of certainty is illustrated by two types of propositions: self-presenting ones; and logical and metaphysical axioms which form the basis of what we know a priori. (p. 12)

Example of the former:

1) “If feeling sad is a self-presenting property and if S feels sad, then S is at least as justified in believing that he feels sad as he is in having any other belief” (p. 19)

Examples of the latter:

2) “If Jones is ill and Smith is away, then Jones is ill”
3) “The sum of 5 and 3 is 8”
4) “All squares are rectangles” (p. 28)

It seems to me that, on the assumption that one’s subjective certainty about p requires being as justified in believing p as he is in believing that the antecedent of (2) entails the consequent of (2), then even if he could consider every proposition, to achieve subjective certainty he would still need to justify p at a level equivalent to deductive entailment, not to mention mathematical axiom. A tall order!

Also, some of Chisholm’s comments lead me to wonder if he intended his concept of certainty to be objective, even though his df. is relativized to a subject S.

[Elliott]

“Surely there is no objective certainty here. This all has to be taken on faith.”

You seem to suggest that, regarding at least some religious doctrines, if one accepts them, one either knows them with objective certainty or takes them by faith. Is this your position?

Also, do you hold that knowledge requires objective certainty? How would you define objective certainty? As something like JTB plus infallibility (i.e., the impossibility of being mistaken)?

Lastly, if knowledge is JTB plus the impossibility of being mistaken, then is mere JTB a form of faith? Something less than knowledge but more than faith?

[BV]

>>You seem to suggest that, regarding at least some religious doctrines, if one accepts them, one either knows them with objective certainty or takes them by faith. Is this your position?<<

Not quite. One can have evidence for the Resurrection, but it surely doesn't make it obj. certain. So faith comes into it.

>>Also, do you hold that knowledge requires objective certainty? How would you define objective certainty? As something like JTB plus infallibility (i.e., the impossibility of being mistaken)?<<

I incline to the view expressed here: http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2011/03/knowledge-as-absolute-impossibility-of-mistake.html

>> Lastly, if knowledge is JTB plus the impossibility of being mistaken, then is mere JTB a form of faith? Something less than knowledge but more than faith?<<

As you suggested, rightly, faith involves trust in a person. So if I have JTB without objective certainty, that it not faith.

I'm about to punch out for the night. Merry Christmas!