Luke 2:21: Can the Not-Yet-Existent be Named?

Luke 2:21 (NIV): On the eighth day, when it was time to circumcise the child, he was named Jesus, the name the angel had given him before he was conceived. (emphasis added)

This New Testament passage implies that before a certain human individual came into existence, he was named, and therefore could be named.  The implication is that before an individual comes into existence, that very individual can be an object of irreducibly singular reference by a logically proper name.  That is by no means obvious as I shall now argue.

To simplify the discussion let us revert to a mundane example, Socrates, to keep the particulars of Christian incarnational theology from clouding the issue.  We will have enough on our plates even with this simplification.  At the end of this entry I will return to the theological question.

A Remarkable Prophecy

Suppose there had been a prophet among the ancient Athenians who prophesied the birth among them of a most remarkable man, a man having the properties we associate with Socrates, including the property of being named 'Socrates.'  Suppose this prophet, now exceedingly old, is asked after having followed Socrates' career and having witnessed his execution: Was that the man you prophesied?

 

Does this question make sense?  Suppose the prophet had answered, "Yes, that very man, the one who just now drank the hemlock, is the very man whose birth I prophesied long ago before he was born!"  Does this answer make sense?  

An Assumption

To focus the question, let us assume that there is no pre-existence of the souls of creatures.  Let us assume that Socrates, body and soul, comes into existence at or near the time of his conception.  For our problem is not whether we can name something that already exists, but whether we can name something that does not yet exist.

Thesis 

I say that neither the question nor the answer make sense.  (Of course they both make semantic sense; my claim is that they make no metaphysical or broadly logical sense.)  What the prophet prophesied was the coming of some man with the properties that Socrates subsequently came to possess.  What he could not have prophesied was the very man that subsequently came to possess the properties in question.  

What the prophet prophesied was general, not singular:  he prophesied that a certain definite description would come to be satisfied by some man or other. Equivalently, what the prophet prophesied was that a certain conjunctive property would come in the fullness of time to be instantiated, a property among whose conjuncts are such properties as being snubnosed, being married to a shrewish woman, being a master dialectician, being  accused of being a corrupter of youth, etc.  Even if the prophet had been omniscient and had been operating with a complete description, a description such that only one person in the actual world satisfies it if anything satisfies it, the prophecy would still be general. 

Why would the complete description, satisfied uniquely if satisfied at all, still be general?  Because of the possibility that some other individual, call him 'Schmocrates,' satisfy the description.  For such a complete description, uniquely satisfied if satisfied at all, could not capture the very haecceity and ipseity and identity of a concrete individual.

We can call this view I am espousing anti-haecceitist:  the non-qualitative thisness of a concrete individual cannot antedate the individual's existence.  Opposing this view is that of the haecceitist who holds that temporally prior to the coming into existence of a concrete individual such as Socrates, the non-qualitative thisness of the individual is already part of the furniture of the universe.

My terminology is perhaps not felicitous.  I am not denying that concrete individuals possess haecceity.  I grant that haecceity is a factor in an individual's  ontological 'assay' or analysis.  What I am denying is that the haecceity of an individual can exist apart from the individual whose haecceity it is.  From this it follows that the haecceity of an individual cannot exist before the individual exists.

But how could the non-qualitative thisness of a concrete individual be thought to antedate the individual whose thisness it is?  We might try transforming the non-qualitative thisness of a concrete individual into an abstract object, a property that exists in every possible world, and thus at every time in those worlds having time.

Consider the putative property, identity-with-Socrates.  Call it Socrateity.   Suppose our Athenian prophet has the power to 'grasp' (conceive, understand) this non-qualitative property long before it is instantiated. Suppose he can grasp it just as well as he can grasp the conjunctive property mentioned above.    Then, in prophesying the coming of Socrates, the prophet would be prophesying the coming of Socrates himself.  His prophecy would be singular, or, if you prefer, de re: it would involve Socrates himself.  

What do I mean by "involve Socrates himself"?  Before Socrates comes to be there is no Socrates.  But there is, on the haecceitist view I reject, Socrateity.  This property 'deputizes' for Socrates at times and in possible worlds at which our man does not exist.  It cannot be instantiated without being instantiated by Socrates.  And it cannot be instantiated by anything other than Socrates in the actual world or in any possible world.  By conceiving of Socrateity before Socrates comes to be, the Athenian prophet is conceiving of Socrates before he comes to be, Socrates himself, not a mere instance of a conjunctive property or a mere satisfier of a description.  Our Athenian prophet is mentally grabbing onto the very haecceity or thisness of Socrates which is unique to him and 'incommunicable' (as a Medieval philosopher might say) to any other in the actual world or in any possible world.

But what do I mean by "a mere instance" or a "mere satisfier"?

Let us say that the conjunctive property of Socrates mentioned above is a qualitative essence of Socrates if it entails every qualitative or pure property of Socrates whether essential, accidental, monadic, or relational.  If Socrates has an indiscernible twin, Schmocrates, then both individuals instantiate the same qualitative essence.  It follows that, qua instances of this qualitative essence, they are indistinguishable.  This implies that, if the prophet thinks of Socrates in terms of his qualitative essence, then his prophetic thought does not reach Socrates himself, but only a mere instance of his qualitative essence.  

My claim, then, is that one cannot conceive of an individual that has not yet come into existence.  For until an individual comes into existence it is not a genuine individual.  Before Socrates came into existence, there was no possibility that he, that very man, come into existence.  (In general, there are no de re possibilities involving future, not-yet-existent, individuals.)  At best there was the possibility that some man or other come into existence possessing the properties that Socrates subsequently came to possess.  To conceive of some man or other is to think a general thought: it is not to think a singular thought that somehow reaches an individual in its individuality.

To conceive of a complete description's being satisfied uniquely by some individual or other it not to conceive of a particular individual that satisfies it.  If this is right, then one cannot name an individual before it exists.

Back to Theology

Could an angel have named Jesus before he was conceived?  If I am right, no angel, nor even God, could name Socrates before he came to be.  But the case is different for Jesus on classical Trinitarian theology.  For while there is on Christian doctrine no pre-existence of the souls of creatures, there is on Christian doctrine the pre-existence of the Word or Logos, the Second Person of the Trinity.  So one could possibly say that the angel named the pre-existent Word 'Jesus.' 

Comments

[Michael Umphrey]

Jeremiah 1: 4-5

4 Then the word of the LORD came unto me, saying,

5 Before I formed thee in the belly I knew thee; and before thou camest forth out of the womb I sanctified thee, and I ordained thee a prophet unto the nations.

------------

Perhaps orthodox Christianity is somewhat out of alignment with Scripture, due mainly to philosophers under the influence of the Greeks.

[Opponent]

It happened before that. Isaiah, writing around 8th C BC.

Isa 9:6 For to us a child is born, to us a son is given, and the government will be on his shoulders. And he will be called Wonderful Counselor, Mighty God, Everlasting Father, Prince of Peace.

You will probably say that the terms here are definite descriptions, rather than referring terms. I.e. ‘Prince of Peace’ not a proper name, but a disguised description. In the book I argue that a Russellian description is essentially indefinite and general ‘whatever is uniquely F’, and therefore cannot be semantically equivalent to a definite description, which is essentially definite and singular. Note also the italicised ‘he’ in Isaiah’s prophecy. ‘He’ refers to the child who was going to be born.

[BV]

Michael,

Thanks for the verse.

>>Perhaps orthodox Christianity is somewhat out of alignment with Scripture, due mainly to philosophers under the influence of the Greeks.<<

I think your point would be better put as follows: "Perhaps orthodox Christianity is somewhat out of alignment with Scripture, due mainly to theologians under the influence of Greek philosophy."

(It is an interesting question whether 'Greek philosophy' is a pleonasm.)

My quick response to my reformulation of your point is that Platonism is essential to Christianity as Joseph Ratzinger argues in Intro to Xianity.

[BV]

Opponent,

Yes, that is what I'd say.

Give me an example of a definite description that is essentially definite and singular.

'He' does not support your thesis. It refers to whomever satisfies the Russellian description.

[Opponent]

>>Give me an example of a definite description that is essentially definite and singular.

Any description prefixed by the article 'the'. A Russellian dd by contrast is an indefinite description ('an F that is uniquely F').

>> It refers to whomever satisfies the Russellian description.

So it refers to that person, and no other.

[BV]

An idiosyncratic understanding of Russell. But I have the sense that discussing this won't get us anywhere.

[Astute opponent]

>>An idiosyncratic understanding of Russell

I am sure he said that 'the F is G' is to be analysed as an x is F, no more than one x is F, and x is G', or something like that.

What is your understanding of the Theory of Descriptions?

[David Brightly]

Hello Bill, Could you expand a bit on this passage, please?

Before Socrates came into existence, there was no possibility that he, that very man, come into existence. (In general, there are no de re possibilities involving future, not-yet-existent, individuals.) At best there was the possibility that some man or other come into existence possessing the properties that Socrates subsequently came to possess.

To my untrained ear it sounds wrong. Surely there was such a possibility of that very man's existing? That very man's coming into existence made it actual.

[BV]

Happy New Year, David. I hope you are well.

Suppose there was a period of empty time during which no concrete individual exists. And then suddenly at time t two indiscernible iron spheres pop into existence. These spheres are alike in every monadic and relational respect. For example, each is two meters from an iron sphere. And yet they are numerically distinct: there are two of them. And nothing else concrete.

Let D be a complete description of the spheres. Prior to t, there is the possibility that an iron sphere come into existence: there is the possibility that D be satisfied. But this possibility leaves open which of the two spheres actualizes it. One or the other or both? The possibility is that a sphere of a certain description come into existence. The possibility is general, not singular. The possibility does not involve either sphere or both.

>>Surely there was such a possibility of that very man's existing? That very man's coming into existence made it actual.<<

You appear not to be distinguishing between the reality of a mere possible and its actuality.

I hold that the merely possible is not nothing; it has ontological status despite not existing!

[BV]

David,

I suspect the above did not convince you or perhaps even make sense to you.

So we need to back up to more basic questions.

Let me ask you a very simple question. If a possible state of affairs S becomes actual at time t, does it first come to be at t? Of course, when S becomes actual at, it becomes actual at t. But that's not what I am asking. I am asking whether S has being when it is merely possible, i.e., possible but not actual?

A normal light bulb will shatter if dropped from a suitable distance onto a hard floor. Suppose a particular light bulb B never shatters or breaks (it ceases to exist by being melted, say). Is there not the unactualized/unrealized possibility of B's shattering at every time at which B exists? Would you say that there IS this possibility even if never actualized? If not, why not?

[Opponent]

There is a possibly connected point in Swinburne The Christian God p.176. He asks whether a divine individual can have thisness or haecceity. But if so, there will always be possible divine individuals which have the same essential properties (those essential to divinity and any further individuating properties), and so no reason for bringing about one rather than another. Hence if divine individuals have thisness, there can be only one of them.

[BV]

What is a divine individual if it is not God?

[Astute opponent]

>>What is a divine individual if it is not God?

Has to be understood in the context of his claim that 'there is overriding reason for a first divine individual to bring about a second divine individual and with him to bring about a third divine individual, but no reason to go further'.

[David Brightly]

Yes, Bill, thank you, and a Happy New year to you too!

I haven't read much, if anything, on this. The view I've arrived at is that sentences involving 'possibility' can be re-written into sentences involving just 'possibly', and that our modal notions arise from our encounter with inference. I'm happy to say, There is the possibility that the bulb will shatter---we say things like that all the time---provided it's understood to mean, Possibly, the bulb will shatter. I certainly don't want to commit myself to things called possibilities, unless they can be seen as constructions out of sentences, roughly, Possibly, S ≡ The truth value of sentence S cannot be determined from what we currently know together with deduction from known principles. Can you persuade me otherwise? A 'big topic' I would imagine!