Maverick Philosopher

Andrew Klavan on Fake News

A PragerU video, about five and a half minutes long.

Here are links to my Klavan posts.

Harry Binswanger on Why Language Matters

I am not a Libertarian or an Objectivist. But I do agree with much of what Harry Binswanger says here. (HT: C. Cathcart) I've been harping on similar themes for years. I'll pull some quotations.

. . . since words *are* the tools of language, they are the tools of thought. That means you must resist unto death using the terminology of your enemy. The side that controls language controls thought.

Or as I have said more than once, "He who controls the terms of the debate controls the debate."

This is why it is utter folly for a conservative to acquiesce in such misbegotten terminological innovations  as 'Islamophobia' and 'Islamophobe.'  These are question-begging leftist coinages the whole purpose of which is to stymie serious discussion. A phobia is an irrational fear. To accuse someone of being an Islamophobe is to imply that he is irrational and beyond the pale of rational discussion, when it is most eminently rational to sound the alarm concerning Islam.

If you are a conservative, don't talk like a 'liberal'!  

As for 'liberal,' Binswanger talks sense:

"Liberal" is another word that is booby-trapped. Joe Lieberman is the last living liberal--a museum piece, really. Barack Obama, Nancy Pelosi, Paul Krugman, and the rest are not liberals but Leftists, if you want a shorter term than "anti-capitalists." Today's Leftists have nothing of substance in common with those we used to know as "liberals"--JFK, Hubert Humphrey, Scoop Jackson. 

The word "liberal" derives from "liberty." Liberty is the last thing on the mind of today's Leftists. They seek to stamp out not only economic freedom but freedom of speech and freedom of thought. Just make a visit to your local university. The term "liberal" should never be used for people whose driving ideology is, to use a proper term, statism.

Exactly right.  Accurate terms to describe our ideological opponents are leftist, statist, and totalitarian, but not progressive. If you use 'liberal,' do as I do and put sneer quotes around it.  There is little that is liberal about contemporary 'liberals.'  Is that not obvious by now?

It is the totalitarian nature of the Left and of Islam that helps explain what is otherwise rather puzzling, namely, the fact that leftists are tolerant of Islam even in its most violent and anti-liberal manifestations but decidedly less tolerant of Christianity which, at the present time, is no threat to anyone.  For a thorough discussion, see Why the Left Will Not Admit the Threat of Radical Islam.

Words matter because words stand for concepts--abstract ideas that join certain things and separate others. Your ideological enemy is your ideological enemy in part because he divides the world up differently from you. He works with different concepts, different classifications. Where you see the opposition of freedom vs. government force, he sees the opposition of "exploitation" vs. "equality." Where you see earning vs. freeloading, he sees "luck" vs. "compassion."

Even little, innocuous concepts are game-changers. Take "access." Is there some national, collective problem in the fact that some people don't have "access" to quality medical care? What if we rephrase the question to be: do some people have the right to force other people to pay for their medical care? Sounds a little different, doesn't it? I don't have "access" to your car, your home, and your bank account. That's a disgrace!

However one comes down on the health care issue one ought to understand that there is a serious underlying question here that ought to be out in the open and discussed: Is there a right to be provided by the government, and thus by taxpayers, with health care services?  

For an unpacking of the issue, see A Right to Health Care?

All intellectually honest people ought to admit that it is wrong to obliterate this issue by linguistic hijacking and terminological fiat. But that is what 'liberals' do. Ergo, etc.

Walter E. Williams on Secession

I do not advocate secession. But in these trying times all options must be explored. Professor Williams' Were Confederate Generals Traitors? (HT: Bill Keezer) concludes:

Confederate generals were fighting for independence from the Union just as George Washington and other generals fought for independence from Great Britain. Those who’d label Gen. Robert E. Lee as a traitor might also label George Washington as a traitor. I’m sure Great Britain’s King George III would have agreed.

If a civil war is a war for control of a central government, the U. S. Civil War was not a civil war but a war of secession.

Professor Williams is a black man. There are loons on the Left who will call him a traitor to his race. But one can be a traitor to one's race as little as one can change one's race.  The world is not social construction all the way down. To think otherwise is one of the marks of a leftist. 

One of the reasons secession is under lively discussion is because we need to find ways to get away from these destructive fools. We need the political equivalent of divorce. The hard questions pertain to the how. I have made the somewhat anemic suggestion of a return to federalism, but there must be other possibilities shy of secession.

 

Related entries:

Social Justice or Subsidiarity?

Can Federalism Save Us?

Related articles

Politics and Ridicule in a Post-Consensus Age

A Case Against Withdrawal

Same-Sex Marriage: No Surprise Conservatives Lost

Physicalist Christology? Notes on Merricks

 "And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us . . . . (John 1:14)

Physicalism is popular among philosophers these days. So it is no surprise that Christian philosophers are drawn to it as well, including those who subscribe to the central teaching that God the Son, the second person of the Trinity, the Logos or Word, became man in Jesus of Nazareth. 

Incarnation, whatever else it involves, involves embodiment. How is God the Son during his earthly tenure related to his body? Trenton Merricks assumes that "God the Son . . . is related to his body just as you and I are related to our respective bodies." ("The Word Made Flesh," 261.) One might have thought that the embodiment relation that connects the Son to his body would have to be very special  or even sui generis; after all, the Logos is sui generis and so it might naturally be thought that any relation into which it enters would inherit that sui-generic quality. Merricks, however, assumes that divine and human cases of embodiment are cases of one and the same embodiment relation. The divine case is just a special case. Call this the Same Relation assumption. (My tag, not Merrick's).

And what relation is that?  On physicalism, "You have a body if and only if you are identical with that body." (294)  So the Same Relation assumption in conjunction with physicalism yields the conclusion that the Incarnate Son is "identical with the body of Jesus." (294) So in becoming human, the Incarnate Son "became [numerically identical to] a body."

This does not make much sense to me and I find it more worthy of rejection than of acceptance.  My problems begin with physicalism itself.

Physicalism

The physicalism in question is not physicalism about everything, but about beings like us, minded organisms, if you will, which include all human animals. (If there are so-called 'abstract objects,' then they are not physical, and presumably before the Incarnation, no member of the Trinity was a physical object.)  Physicalism is "the claim that each of us is a physical object." (294). Now there is a sense in which it is obviously true that each of us is a physical object, and that is the sense in which it is obviously true that each of us has a body; but one quits the precincts of the obvious and the datanic  and enters the space of philosophical theories when one claims that one has a body by being numerically identical to a body, or that the the 'is' in 'Each of us is a body' is the 'is' of identity.

For this is not obvious. How do you know that the 'is' in 'Each of us is a body' is not the 'is' of composition? (Compare: 'Each of these statues is bronze.' That can't mean that each of the statues is identical to bronze or to a particular hunk of bronze. A statue and its proximate matter have different persistence conditions both temporally and modally.)  

But we are discussing  physicalism. I am not asserting that we are composite beings. And I am not espousing substance dualism either. I am merely considering whether physicalism about minded organisms is an intellectually satisfying position. Does it command our assent? Merricks thinks it is "pretty obvious" that physicalism is true. (294) I don't find it obvious at all. And as Hilary Putnam once quipped, "It ain't obvious what's obvious."

On physicalism, I am identical to the living, breathing, sweating animal wearing my clothes. Of course, I am not always sweating and not always wearing clothes; but if I cease breathing, I cease living and, on physicalism, I cease existing. (The physicalist claim is obviously not that I am identical to a corpse or an inanimate hunk of  human-looking flesh and bones wearing my clothes.)  To underscore the obvious, when I speak of identity I mean numerical identity. 

One might find physicalism hard to swallow.  If x and y are identical, then whatever is true of x is true of y and vice versa.  That is necessarily so, and part of what we mean by 'identity.'  But it is true of me that I am a "spectator of all time and existence," (Plato, Republic VI) whereas that is not true of my body.  So I can't be identical to my living body. To take a less grand example, I am now thinking of a girl I used to know. So is my body thinking of her?  The whole body? Some proper part or parts  thereof?  Presumably not the plantar fascia in my left foot.  My brain? The whole brain? Some proper part thereof?  How could any portion of the brain be the subject of acts of thinking?  That doesn't make much sense. In fact, it does not make any sense. A bit of highly organized meat is the subject of acts of thinking in the broad Cartesian sense of 'thinking' which includes memorial acts? Are you serious?

Could it nonetheless be true that what thinks in me when I think is the brain or some portion thereof? I suppose, but then it would be a mystery how it is true.  The Incarnation may be a mystery, but if we are trying to understand the Incarnation physicalistically, then physicalism had better not be a mystery too. I'll come back to this point below.

The obviousness of physicalism seems to have vanished.  Merrick does not give the following invalid argument, but what he says on 294 ff. suggests it:

Whatever has physical properties is a physical object.
Socrates has physical properties. 
Therefore
Socrates is a physical object.
Therefore
Physicalism is true.

The argument is rendered invalid by an equivocation on 'is' as between the 'is' of class inclusion and the 'is' of identity.

What I have said does not refute physicalism, but it does show that physicalism is far from obvious and does not follow from such Moorean facts as that you and I have shape and mass.  So I balk at Merricks' "it seems pretty obvious that physicalism . . . is true." (294) It is not obvious at all.

Property Dualism

Can these objections be met by adopting property dualism?  Merricks' view is that while we are physical objects having physical properties, we are not merely physical objects: we also have mental properties. "Persons also have mental properties." (295) Furthermore, these mental properties are irreducible to physical properties. Merricks tells us that his physicalism is consistent with property dualism. (295) I think it is fair to say that with respect to beings like us, he is a substance monist and a property dualist.

The idea is that the human individual having properties is a physical object, but that it has two different mutually irreducible sorts of properties, physical properties and mental properties.  But how does this help? I am thinking about a girl I used to know, a particular girl, Darci. Is there a mental property corresponding to the predicate '___ is thinking about Darci'? I doubt it, for reasons I don't have ther space to go into, but suppose there is this strange property.  Call it 'D.' Presumably it is an abstract object unfit to do any thinking.  So it is not the subject of the thinking, that in me which thinks when I think.

Should we say that I am thinking about Darci in virtue of my instantiating of D? But who am I? On physicalism, I am identically this living body. So this animal body instantiates the mental property. But this brings us right back to our earlier question as to which part of the animal body does the thinking.  Introducing a dualism of properties does not answer this question.

How Could a Non-Physical Object Become a Physical Object?

But even if physicalism is true, how could it, in tandem with the Same Relation assumption mentioned above,  be used to make sense of the Incarnation, or rather the embodiment the Incarnation implies?  How could the second person of the Trinity, a purely spiritual, nonphysical person, at a certain point in history become numerically identical to the body of Jesus?  How could an immaterial being become a material being? I should think that an item's categorial status is essential to it. So if an abstract object such as the number 7 or the set of primes  is nonphysical, then this object is nonphysical in all  possible worlds in which it exists, and indeed in all possible worlds, full stop, given that 7 and the number of primes are necessary beings.  If so, then in no possible world could the number 7 or the set of primes become a concrete item sporting causal properties and spatiotemporal locations.

Something similar holds for that necessary being which is the second person of the Trinity. Its purely spiritual, wholly nonphysical nature is essential to it.  So, on the face of it, its embodiment in a particular human being cannot be understood as its becoming numerically identical to that human being.  For then, per impossibile,  it would have to quit its kind and become another kind of thing.

Rejecting Kind-Essentialism

Now the above is an obvious and obviously powerful objection to which Merricks makes a daring response.  He recommends rejecting the kind-essentialism that is at the back of it:

Believers in the Incarnation must reject kind-essentialism. Once kind-essentialism is rejected, it is hard to see why the non-physical God the Son could not become [numerically identical to] a human organism. Perhaps this is the sort of thing that might not seem possible merely upon reflection, given no relevant revelation.  But the same thing goes for God the Son's becoming human. This is the mystery. (296)

I don't follow the reasoning here. Let us assume that we accept as revealed truth that God became man in Jesus of Nazareth. And let us assume that the Incarnation is, as Merricks says, a mystery. Now faith seeks understanding. Fides quarens intellectum.  In this case we want to understand how God became man. How is understanding helped by the rejection of what appears to the unaided intellect as obviously true, namely, kind-essentialism? Is its falsity supposed to be a mystery too?

If I want to understand the  Incarnation, I have to use principles that to the unaided discursive intellect appear secure. If I use the Incarnation to reject kind-essentialism, which is one of the principles that appear secure to the finite intellect, then I haven't made sense of the Incarnation; I have wreaked havoc on the discursive intellect.  Would it not be better simply to rest with the Incarnation as mystery and forgo desperate attempts to make sense of it that violate very secure principles that are arguably definitive of finite understanding?

Why Not Reject the 'Same Relation' Assumption?

Suppose one wants to retain one's physicalism about humans at all costs and to accept the Incarnation as well. Would it not be better to jettison the 'same relation' assumption? Would it not be better to say that embodiment in the divine case is a different relation from embodiment in (merely) human cases?  Suppose that in the merely human cases, to have a body, i. e., to be embodied, is just to be a body, i.e., to be identical to a (living) body, while in the divine case to have a body is something else, something perhaps incomprehensible to us in our present state. One could then be a physicalist without rejecting kind-essentialism.

Note that Merricks is not a physicalist about God or any of the persons of the Trinity prior to the Incarnation.   He does not hold that every mind is physical. He makes an exception for the divine mind. Well, then he can make an exception in the way a divine mind becomes embodied should such a mind become embodied.

There seems to be two ways to go for one who aims to accept the Incarnation while also accepting physicalism about minded organisms. Accept either package A or package B:

Package A

Incarnation; physicalism; 'same relation' assumption; rejection of kind-essentialism.

Package B

Incarnation; physicalism; 'different embodiment relation' assumption; acceptance of kind-essentialism.

I should think that Package B is the more attractive of the two.

Merricks' paper is here. Many thanks to Professor Andrew M. Bailey for uploading it!   Ditto to Kevin Wong for drawing my attention to it and for supplying me with a bibliography of recent work on physicalist Christology. Mr. Wong is a gentleman and a scholar!

Care of Soul and Body

Care for your soul as if you will die tomorrow; care for your body as if it will last indefinitely. 

(The formulation is mine; the thought is borrowed from Evagrios Pontikos.)

John Pepple is Burned Out

I’m burned out and will take a break from blogging. Don’t expect to hear much from me before September. Basically, I’m up against total irrationality, and I think it’s worthless to engage in rational argument.

Agreed, liberals and leftists are beyond the reach of rational argument. They need defeat not debate. Let's hope it can be achieved by political means. Nevertheless, there are reasons to continue writing political posts. One is to develop one's ideas. Another is to support and inspire fellow conservatives. A third is to persuade the open-minded and undecided.

Summer of Love, Winter of Decline

The down side of the 'sixties.

The counter-culture validated styles of living once considered coarse, delinquent, tragic, or mad. It was said to be about Love. Was that eros, or philia, or agape? One cannot be sure, but the gross hypersexualization of entertainment and culture since suggests eros, down and dirty.

The point is essentially correct, but I would add needed nuance by making a tetrapartite distinction among eros, philia, agape, and sexus. It is true that the word  eros puts most in mind of sex, raw and raunchy, down and dirty. And it is true that eros, the love of the lower for the higher, is often mixed with purely sexual desire and sometimes perverted by it. But the love of the spiritually empty for that which might fulfill them is erotic, even when freed of the sexual.  The longing love of the Good, the True, and the Beautiful, the love of Wisdom, the love of God are not examples of philia or agape. Philia is friendship, and friendship is between equals. But I am not the equal of Wisdom or Justice or the Good; I merely aspire to be wise, just, and good.  

This aspiration for the higher is erotic. But it may be best to introduce a different word to ward off confusion: the aspiration is erothetic. In a decadent, corrupt, sex-saturated society any talk of eros and the erotic is bound to be misunderstood. Erothetic love is love that aspires and seeks to acquire. It is rooted in need and lack, spiritual need and lack.

As for agape, it is the love of the higher for the lower. It is a love that bestows, grants, helps. To put the point in a way that exploits the ambiguity of the genitive construction, the love of God (objective genitive) is erothetic; the love of God (subjective genitive) is agapic.  The same goes for the love of Christ. God does not lack anything; nor does he aspire or seek to acquire. The divine plenitude does not allow for aspiration or acquisition.

My point, then, is that eros is not to be condemned; it is not inherently "down and dirty." The love of the Good and the desire to be good, the desire to imitate the Good and participate in it are noble aspirations. (The Christian and Platonic allusions will not be missed by the well-educated, e.g., imitatio Christi, methexis.)

What ought to be condemned is not eros, but sex when it is divorced from such ennobling adjuncts as the erothetic, the philiatic, and the agapic.  What ought to be condemned is sex reduced to the 'hydraulic,' to the exchange of bodily fluids for the sake of mere sensuous gratification.¹  This perversion is well-conveyed by the contemporary phrase 'hook-up.' I hook up a hose to a tank to fill it. But we live in a sick society getting sicker with each passing day and I am something of a vox clamantis in deserto. So I don't expect many even to understand what I am saying, let alone agree with it.

These topics are deep and rich. If you want to gain some insight into them you need to begin at the beginning, or at least at the 'Athenian' beginning, as opposed to the 'Hierosolymic' beginning, with the 'divine' Plato and his Symposium. Then work your way through the history of thought, philosophical and theological. One good guide in Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros.

But to have the time and energy for this you will have limit your consumption of media dreck, not to mention your tweeting, facebooking, and what all else.

NOTES

¹ Of course, sexual intercourse involving one or more humans is never a mere exchange of bodily fluids. Even among sub-human animals, sexual intercourse is never purely hydraulic in nature: sentience is involved and various emotions. Filling my gas tank in the usual manner would be an example of a purely hydraulic exchange. Insofar as humans approach the hydraulic in their 'love'-making, humans degrade themselves. This degradation is a free act possible only because humans are spiritual animals. An animal consumed by lust cannot degrade himself, but a man can. We could say that when a man tries to become less than an animal he proves that he is more than one.

The Marvellous Powers We Misuse

Thought, speech, free action, sexual generation.

Don't Harbor the Negative

When negative thoughts drift into port, note them, but don't let them drop anchor. Let them drift out again.

Names on Grave Stones

The names on grave stones are proper names for a time, while the memories of survivors provide reference-fixing context. But with the passing of the survivors the names revert to commonality. After a while the dead may as well lie in a common grave. 

What lies below the stone is not Patrick J. McNally, but a Patrick J. McNally.  And not even this; rather, the bodily remains of a Patrick J. McNally.  The person has fled or no longer exists.

Continence

The Catholic Church is in sad shape. Have you heard a good sermon lately? I could do better off the top of my head, and I am a very poor public speaker.

Here are some notes for a sermon I will never give, unless this weblog is my pulpit.

Remind people of the importance of continence both for their happiness here below, and for the good of their souls. Distinguish the following sorts of continence: mental (control of thoughts), emotional (control and custody of the heart), sensory-appetitive (custody of the eyes together with sexual restraint). Explain the importance of containing the outgoing flow, whether mental, emotional, or sensory-appetitive, and the misery consequent upon incontinence.

Illustrate by adducing the sad case of Bill Cosby.

Explain the key words and phrases. Don't use words like 'adduce.'  Attention spans in these hyperkinetic times are short, so keep it short.

The abdication of authorities has lead to the dumbing-down of the masses. Don't expect much.

Do You Remember the 'Sixties?

According to the old joke, if you do, you weren't there.  This is worth a look. 

Filed under: 'Sixties

The Antithesis of Obstruction

Andrew C. McCarthy:

The “collusion” narrative was a fraud, plain and simple. We know that now. Hopefully, it won’t take another six months to grasp a second plain and simple truth: Collusion’s successor, the “obstruction” narrative, is a perversion.

[ . . .] 

To be clear, the Russia investigation is not a fraud. The Trump collusion narrative is. Russia did try to interfere in our election, as it always does. And there were associates of Trump’s who had business with Russian interests. Nothing unusual about that either. No one had shadier business with Kremlin cronies than Bill and Hillary Clinton. The difference is that the Clintons did collude in the Russian regime’s acquisition of American uranium assets. There is no evidence that Trump colluded in Russia’s election meddling. To stoke suspicions to the contrary was fraudulent.

Related articles

On 'Disenfranchise' and Hillary's Will to Power

More Liberal-Left Insanity

Will You Vote for Hillary?

Saturday Night at the Oldies: Varia

Punch Brothers, Rye Whisky

Lonely Heartstring Band, Ramblin' Gamblin' Willy

Bonnie Owens, Philadelphia Lawyer

Cowboy Jack Clement, A Girl I Used to Know

Bobby Bare, Lullabies, Legends, and Lies

Brewer and Shipley, One Toke Over Line. Forgot how good this song is!

The Flying Burrito Brothers, To Ramona.  A very nice cover of a song from Dylan's fourth album, Another Side of Bob Dylan.

John Fogerty and the Blue Ridge Rangers, You're the Reason

The Springfields, Silver Threads and Golden Needles

Ramblin' Jack Elliot, Roving Gambler.  'Ramblin' Charles Adnopoz' lacking the requisite resonance for a follower of Woody Guthrie, this Jewish son of a New York M.D. wisely changed his name. 

Joan Baez, Rock Salt and Nails 

Patsy Cline, She's Got You

Simon and Garfunkel, The Dangling Conversation.  A lovely song, if a bit pretentious.  Paul Simon was an English major.

And we spoke of things that matter
With words that must be said.
Can analysis be worthwhile?
Is the theater really dead?

Beatles, We Can Work It Out.  Listen for the time signature change from 4/4 to 3/4. Knowing a little music theory adds to one's enjoyment.

Smokey Robinson and the Miracles, You Really Got a Hold on Me

Barbara Lynn, You'll Lose a Good Thing.  Her moves and appearance are reminsicent of Jimi Hendrix -- or the other way around.  Check out how she strums that left-handed Telecaster.

EmmyLou Harris, Save the Last Dance for Me.  That's one big guitar.

Marty Robbins, Blue Spanish Eyes.  What a wimpy guitar!

Dalida, O Sole Mio.  Das Ewig-Weibliche zieht uns hinan!  Che bella donna!

Melina Mercouri, Never on Sunday.  Ditto!

Nana Mouskouri, Farewell Angelina.  One of Bob Dylan's most haunting songs.  Hats off in homage to the angel-throated ladies such as Nana and Joan, but nothing touches the mood & magic of Dylan's spare mid-60s renditions such as this one.

Freddy Fender, Cielito Lindo.  Tex-Mex version of a very old song.

Marty Robbins, La Paloma.  Another old song dating back to 1861. 

Related articles

Maverick Philosopher: Saturday Night at the Oldies: Weather Conditions

Epitaph on a Pessimist

I'm Smith of Stoke, aged sixty-odd,

    I've lived without a dame

From youth-time on: and would to God

    My dad had done the same.

Thomas Hardy, 1840-1928. The Faber Book of Epigrams and Epitaphs, ed. Grigson, 1977, p. 186.

Votes by Non-Citizens May Have Cost Trump the 2016 Popular Vote

On 10 December of last year in an entry entitled 'Post-Truth' I wrote the following:

For the Left, Donald Trump is the prime post-truther, the post-truth poster boy if you will, the prima Donald of the practice of post-truth. Ruth Marcus of the Washington Post doesn't expect him to truth up anytime soon. "Indeed, all signs are to the contrary — most glaringly Trump’s chock-full-­of-­lies tweet that 'I won the popular vote if you deduct the millions of people who voted illegally.' "

A very stupid example, Ms. Marcus!  There is not even one lie in the tweet, let alone a bunch of them.  Although verifiable in principle, Trump's tweet is unverifiable in practice.  Trump had no solid evidence for the truth of his assertion.  Still, it could be true.  Don't forget the 'necro-vote' (a word I just coined) and the illegal vote. Trump's epistemic 'sin' was not that he stated what is not the case with the intention to deceive but that he confidently asserted something for which he had insufficient evidence.  He pretended to know something he could not know.  Very annoying, and possibly a violation of a Cliffordian ethics of belief, but not a lie.  

So he didn't lie.  What he did was close to what Harry Frankfurt defines as bullshitting in On Bullshit, a piece of close analysis, fine, not feculent, that was undoubtedly more often purchased than perused. The bullshitter doesn't care how things stand with reality. The liar, by contrast, must care: he must know (or at least attempt to know) how things are if he is to have any chance of deceiving his audience.  Think of it this way: the bullshitter doesn't care whether he gets things right or gets them wrong; the liar cares to get them right so he can deceive you about them. 

So you could fairly tax Trump in this instance with bullshitting.  He shot his mouth off in a self-serving way without much concern over whether what he said is true.  But why pick on Trump?

Because you are a leftist and thus a purveyor of double standards.

Obama bullshits with the best of them.  A prime example was his outrageous claim that 99.9% of Muslims reject radical Islam. It is false and known to be false. (You can check with PEW research if you care to.)   Now was Obama lying in this instance or bullshitting? A lie is not the same thing as a false statement.  Let us be perhaps excessively charitable: Obama made a false statement but he had no intention of deceiving us because he did not know the truth.  (Compare: G. W. Bush was wrong about the presence of WMDs in Iraq, but he did not lie about them:  he was basing himself on the best intelligence sources he had at the time.)

But that Obama is pretty clearly bullshitting is shown by the cliched and falsely precise 99.9% figure.  The whole context shows that Obama doesn't care whether what he is saying is true.  He said it because it fits his narrative: Islam is a religion of peace; we are not in a religious war with Islam; Muslims want all the same things we want, blah, blah, ad nauseam.  The difference between this case and the Trump tweet is that we know that Obama was wrong, whereas we don't know that Trump was wrong.

So once again we have a double standard.  Trump is 'post-truth'; but Obama and Hillary are not?

So that's what I said back in December. But now we have evidence that Trump was right:

We don't know the exact number of illegal votes. No one does. But the data that are available suggest that the number of illegal votes was substantial — probably in the millions, as Trump said — and likely had a significant impact on the election's outcome.

Even Democrats should find this troubling; every vote cast by a noncitizen voter negates the vote of a citizen voter. It's that simple. It's time the Democratic Party started living up to its name and stop encouraging noncitizens and illegal aliens to vote in our election.

But of course the Democrats will not live up to their name, being elitists and globalists; and of course they are not troubled by the votes of non-citizens. The best proof of this is their opposition to photo ID at polling places. Their intention is transparent: to win by any means, legal or illegal.

 

Would You Go into Business with this Person?

If not, why are you marrying her?

Marriage is undoubtedly more than an economic arrangement. But it is that.

Cornelius Plantinga on Cicero on Growing Old

Here

The Left and Political Violence

A very interesting Vanity Fair article.

Does Your Disagreement Give Me Good Reason to Question My Position?

In general, no. For you may be foolish or ignorant or otherwise incompetent with respect to the subject matter under discussion. Or you may be morally defective: a bully, a blowhard, a bullshitter, a quibbler, a sophist.  But suppose none of these predicates attach to you.  Suppose you are my moral and intellectual peer, and what's more, a competent practitioner in the discipline or subdiscipline which is home to the thesis we are disputing. Thus we are both competent, and we are equally competent. And suppose I believe you to be as intellectually honest and as competent as I am.

Suppose further that I have given careful thought to my thesis and have advanced it in respectable, peer-reviewed journals.

If you disagree with me, does this fact supply a good reason for me to question my thesis?  Ought I question it? Or would I be justified in ignoring your disagreement?

We note that this is a meta-question that sires a meta-disagreement.  This meta-disagreement is between the Conciliationist and the Steadfaster.

I am a Conciliationist. Thus I tend to think that your disagreement with me (given the stipulations above) ought to give me pause. It ought to cause me to re-examine my view and be open to the possibility of either rejecting it or withholding assent from it.  It ought to undermine my epistemic self-confidence. I tend to think I would be intellectually amiss, less than intellectually honest, were I simply to dismiss your disagreement. I tend to think I would be unjustifiably privileging my own point of view, preferring it over yours simply because is is mine. This seems wrong to me given that we are trying to arrive at the objective and impersonal truth.  Truth cannot be mine or yours.

The Steadfaster stands fast in the face of disagreement. Whereas the Conciliationist allows the fact of disagreement to undermine his epistemic self-confidence, the Steadfaster takes the fact of disagreement to undermine his prior conviction that his interlocutor is as morally and intellectually capable as he initially thought he was. So when you disagree with me, I question whether I am right. But when I disagree with you, you question my competence, rationality, probity, etc.

But now a puzzle arises. If I am a Conciliationist, then my position would seem to require that I question my Conciliationism due to the fact that the Steadfaster disagrees with me.  (Assume that the Steadfaster is as morally and intellectually well-endowed as I am and that I believe him to be such.)

It seems that the consistent Conciliationist cannot be steadfast in his Conciliationism given that there are Steadfasters out there who are, and whom he believes to be, his moral and intellectual equals.  So what should our Conciliationist do? Should he:

• Suspend judgment and neither affirm nor deny Conciliationism?
• Make an exception for the Conciliationst thesis itself by steadfastly adhering to it ar the meta-level while remaining otherwise a Conciliationist?
• Reject Conciliationism and become a Steadfaster?
• Do something else?

Related articles

Politics and Ridicule in a Post-Consensus Age

Test Your Bullshit Detector Against the . . .

Turbo Encabulator!  (HT: Dave Bagwill)

Companion post: There is no Truth, Only Bullshit

Andrew M. Bailey's Analytic Philosophy Generator and the 'Scholasticism Charge'

The AnalPhilGen is a bit of humor from occasional MavPhil commenter Andrew Bailey.  I generated the following using Bailey's 'device': 

It is a consequence of proper functionalism that polyadic predicates reduce to non-human consciousness.

On the standard Kripkean modal semantics, trope theories supervene on something like Rawls' famous Difference Principle.

Intuitively it seems obvious that both definite descriptions and proper names always lead to zombie arguments.

I came to Bailey's Analytic Philosophy Generator by way of a crappy article that complains about the 'scholasticism' of contemporary philosophy "talking about itself to itself in its own jargon."  The article suggests that most of what analytic philosophers write is as meaningless as the above three sentences. The just-quoted phrase suggests that the problems of philosophy discussed by academic philosophers in their narrowly-focused, jargon-laden books and articles are not 'real,' but are merely artifacts of a highly ingrown way of talking.  

This is simply not the case. 

If you are a philosophy 'insider' you know this; if an 'outsider' then you probably cannot be 'reached.'  Or maybe you can. Let someone else try.

Here is the crappy article.

A Quasi-Pyrrhonian Metaphilosophical Puzzle

Some of us are tempted by the metathesis (MT) that every substantive philosophical thesis is such that the arguments for it and the arguments against it are equally plausible and thus 'cancel out.' But the metathesis is itself a philosophical thesis. So if the metathesis is true, then every argument in support of it is cancelled out by an equally plausible argument against it.  But then (MT), if true, is such that we cannot have any good reason to accept it.

Is there a genuine problem here for a latter-day quasi-Pyrrhonian who subscribes to the metathesis?

Definitions

D1. An argument A1 for a thesis T cancels out an argument A2 for the negation of T just in case both arguments are equally plausible to the producers(s)/consumers(s) of the arguments, assuming that these individuals are 'competent practitioners.'

Plausibility is relative to an arguer and his audience, if any.  Thus plausibility is unlike soundness, which is absolute, like truth herself.  Note that there cannot be sound arguments both for a thesis and its negation. For if there is a sound argument for T, then T is true. And if there is a sound argument for ~T, then ~T is true. This is 'fallout' from the definition of 'sound,' see D2 below. But then (T & ~T) is true which violates the Law of Non-Contradiction.

Canceling out is symmetrical: If A1 cancels A2, then A2 cancels A1. It seems to follow that canceling out is also conditionally reflexive, which is to say that if A1 cancels A2, then A1 cancels itself. Right? 

A competent practitioner is not the same as an epistemic peer.  A number of individuals may be epistemic peers, but all incompetent. I won't try for a crisp definition of 'competent practitioner,' but if Tom is a competent practitioner in the philosophy of religion, say, then he is a a sincere truth seeker, not a quibbler or a sophist; he knows logic and the empirical disciplines that bear upon the arguments he is discussing; he is familiar with the relevant literature; and so on.

D2. An argument is sound just in case it is valid and all of its premises are true.

D3. An argument for a thesis is unopposed just in case there is no argument for its negation plausible to all competent practitioners.

D4. A proposition is rationally acceptable just in case it involves no logical contradiction, and coheres with the rest of what we know or justifiably believe.

Rational acceptability, like plausibility, and unlike truth, is a relative property: That water is an element was rationally acceptable to the ancient Greeks, but not to us.

The Puzzle as an Aporetic Tetrad 

1) Every substantive philosophical thesis is such that the arguments pro et contra cancel out. (MT)

2) MT is a philosophical thesis.

3) A philosophical thesis is rationally acceptable only if there is at least one good unopposed argument for it.

4) MT is rationally acceptable.

Solutions

The quartet of propositions is inconsistent. Any three limbs, taken in conjunction, entail the negation of the remaining one. Which should we reject? (2) is not plausibly rejectable: metaphilosophy is a branch of philosophy.

One could hold that the first three propositions are true, but the fourth is false. This implies that a proposition could be true but not rationally acceptable.  But if MT is true but not rationally acceptable, what reason could we have for believing it?

A better solution of the tetrad is by rejection of (1). This is the position of the optimist about philosophical knowledge. He holds that some theses are supported by unopposed arguments and that we know what these arguments are.

I accept (1) on the basis of strong inductive evidence which renders it rationally acceptable. Accepting as I do (1), (2), and (4), I must reject (3).  Well, why not?

Why can't I say the following? 

3*) A philosophical thesis is rationally acceptable just in case there are some good arguments for it accepted by some competent practitioners.

Why Accept the Metathesis?

MT expresses a very bold claim; I imagine most philosophers would just deny it. To deny it is to affirm that there is at least one philosophical thesis that can be conclusively demonstrated.  Can anyone give me an example? It has to be a substantive thesis, though, not, for example the thesis that it is contradictory to hold that it is absolutely true that all truths are relative.  Here are some examples of substantive philosophical theses:

• There are no nonexistent objects.
• There are uninstantiated properties.
• There are no modes of existence.
• The properties of particulars are tropes, not universals.
• God exists.
• The soul is immortal.
• The human will is libertarianly free.
• Each of us is numerically identical to his living body.
• I am not my living body; I merely have a living body.
• Anima forma corporis.
• Die Welt ist meine Vorstellung.
• Laws of nature are just empirical regularities.
• Truths need truth-makers.
• Only facts could serve as truth-makers.
• There are no facts.
• Relations reduce to their monadic foundations.
• There are no properties, only predicates.
• The predicate 'true' serves only as a device for disquotation.
• Race is a social construct.
• Social and economic inequalities are justified only if they benefit the worst-off.
• And so on.

Out of Power, the Left Resorts to Violence

In power, leftists denounce the politics of personal destruction and issue hypocritical calls for 'civility'; out of power, the end justifies the means, personal destruction is full on, and civility is out the window. George Neumayr:

Liberalism, philosophically speaking, is proudly unprincipled, insofar as it recognizes no divine law prior to man’s will. The arrogant humanism underpinning liberalism, combined with fallen human nature, makes the temptation to violence irresistible, especially in times of political exile. When safely ensconced in positions of power, liberals demand “civility” and the like (remember the ludicrous “civility” commissions set up during the Clinton era to counter Rush Limbaugh and company). But once out of power, liberals flirt with ends-justify-the-means radicalism.

That certainly seems to be what is going on as quisling 'conservatives,' i.e., Never-Trumpers, aid and abet Deep State operatives, the Democrat Party, and the liberal media in their attempt to destroy the Trump administration by any means.

For example, Trump is supposed to have colluded with the Russians to swing the election in his favor. No evidence of this has emerged despite months of searching. But we know all about the Clinton Foundation's role in the Russian uranium deal, and we know about it from The New York Times! So why isn't the former Secretary of State being investigated?  Because it is Trump who needs to be destroyed. 

Related articles

More Liberal Insanity: 'Trigger Warning' for Kant's Critiques

More Liberal-Left Insanity

There is Nothing Liberal About Contemporary Liberals

The Architecture of Regime Change

The 'architecture' is laid out in convincing detail by Victor Davis Hanson in yet another piece of penetrating analysis.

We are witnessing a desperate putsch to remove Trump before he can do any more damage to the Obama project. Political, journalistic, and cultural elites of a progressive coastal culture aim at destroying the Trump presidency before it can finish its full four-year term.

The branches of this insidious coup d’état are quite unlikely anything our generation has ever witnessed.

Guest Post: On the Vapidity of the Popular Music of the 1950s

By London Ed.

Possibly vapid music

Bill writes ‘The creativity of the 1960s stood in stark contrast to the vapidity of '50s popular music’, citing as a prime example Perry Como’s Magic Moments (1960).

This is a sentiment I recognise and still identify with. I grew up with what is now called ‘British light music’, supposedly a ‘less serious’ form of Western classical music, a prime example of which would be Puffin' Billy, the theme of the BBC Light Programme's ‘Children's Favourites’, from 1952 to 1966. Note the Light Programme, one of precisely three radio stations in early 1960s Britain, the other two being the Home Service (news and interviews) and the Third Programme (classical music and improving highbrow stuff like interviews with Iris Murdoch). The idea of American style radio with disc jockeys and music other than serious and less serious was not entertained until the advent of pirate radio. When I first heard Burning of the Midnight Lamp (Hendrix, 1967), it was obvious the world had changed, and I joined my peers in a complete rejection of everything that had gone before. I still unconsciously divide all music into what came before 1967, and everything thereafter. 

That said, there is music that is not ‘serious’, but which clearly has a merit within its own genre and perhaps beyond, which never conformed to the 60s progressive ethos.  Once I grew up in the 1970s, I realised its value, and continue to listen with pleasure. Here is some of it: 

1. All The Things You Are (Jerome Kern 1938). In this version by Dorothy Kirsten and Percy Faith (1951) it is close to schlock. Yet it is transcendent, with its complex harmonic structure, and qualities that were recognised by jazz musicians from early on, particularly by the devotees of the bebop genre. This Charlie Parker version is a classic. 

2. You Win Again (Hank Williams 1952) is a simple and timeless story ‘of an utterly defeated narrator who cannot bring himself to leave his love despite her infidelities’. Country music like this was utterly despised by thinking people in the 1960s and 70s. I had a girlfriend who refused to let my Williams records in her apartment. Yet country music is really the same music as folk music, absent the left wing rhetoric. The timeless qualities it appeals to (women who cheat, lonely men drinking at bars) sadly cannot be politicised. 

3. Old Cape Cod (Rothrock/Yakus/Jeffrey 1957)  Best known in the version by Patti Page. While her earlier Doggie In The Window (1953) is without any redeeming properties, ‘Old Cape Cod’ was revived by hipster house music group Groove Armada in 1997, who clearly saw something of value therein. 

4. Route 66 (Nelson Riddle 1962) Not the well known Bobby Troup song. It was written by Riddle as the theme for the 1960s American television drama of the same name, after CBS decided to commission a new song rather than pay royalties to Troup. Riddle is best known for his schmaltzy backing arrangments for Nat King Cole, and his music never appealed to thinking people and leftists. Yet he is a master of arrangement, and the number is clever (in my view). 

5. Up Up and Away (Jimmy Webb 1967) Recorded by The Fifth Dimension and released in July 1967, barely a month before Woodstock, it is difficult to see how anyone would take this seriously, and it is exactly the sort of music the Woodstock generation loathed. But it was written by Jimmy Webb, who also penned Wichita Lineman, thought to be the  first existentialist country song, and MacArthur Park, another existential song recorded by many, including country artist Waylon Jennings in 1969. Listen to these two fine songs first, and then to ‘Up Up and Away’, upon which it becomes clear that they are by the same writer, and that what distinguishes the last two, also makes the first notable, at least in some odd way. 

6. September Song (Kurt Weill 1938). At last some material by a bona fide leftist, a people’s songwriter who cut his teeth in the Novembergruppe group of left leaning Berliners that included communist scribbler Bertold Brecht. Its intellectual credentials are solid, yet here it is in a fine version by Frank Sinatra (1965), sounding just like the sort of vapid 1950s muzak the progressives so despised. 

7. Dancing Queen (Andersson/Ulvaeus/Anderson 1975) recorded by the Swedish pop group ABBA. I like this version from the1999 film Mamma Mia for its uncompromising fluffiness. Its value is in conveying precisely the sentiment it wishes to convey. Intellectuals now take Abba seriously, but why didn’t they tell us so at the time, instead of making us listen to the Soft Machine?

The Summer of Hate

Fifty years after the Summer of Love, the summer of 2017 is shaping up as the Summer of Hate.

The Left has come full circle, from (talk of) peace and love to resistance and hate.

Their resistance is tantamount to sedition. Lefties posture as like unto the brave members of the French Resistance who opposed by assassination and sabotage the Nazi occupation.  But Trump was duly elected, and to date no evidence of collusion with the Russians has emerged. The leftist posturing belongs in the Theater of the Absurd. Leftists are in effect opposing our system of government.

As for hate, prominent liberals, leftists, 'progressives,' are working to incite it. They should be held morally accountable and not allowed to hide behind the First Amendment.  Good advice from Victor Davis Hanson:

The Trump administration should insist that all universities and colleges that receive federal funds guarantee to their students First Amendment protections of free speech, due process, civil rights, and the right to assemble peacefully. If they cannot or will not comply with the Bill of Rights, then campuses should come under review of their funding from Washington.

Moreover, anyone who makes a direct threat or clear allusion to killing the president of the United States should be put on a terrorist no-fly list for six months, an act that can be done without a formal indictment and trial. If revving up a crowd in Washington by yelling out a personal wish to blow up the White House and its occupants, or holding up a facsimile of the decapitated head of the president to galvanize a video audience does not constitute enough suspicion to take a breather from flying, then nothing much else does. If Madonna had to take a slow freighter back to London, then she might curb her macabre enthusiasm at her next rally.

The only way that the Resistance can be halted is to insist that its efforts remain lawful. If they are not, perpetrators must be held accountable.

The first of Hanson's point is rock-solid. The second raises the ticklish question of when hate speech ceases to be protected speech. See first of the related articles below.

You should read the whole of Hanson's latest.

Related articles

VFW Declares Kathy Griffin Unprotected By First Amendment

SCOTUS and Benedict

On the Meaning of 'Resistance'

More Liberal-Left Insanity

The Several-Storied Thomas Merton: Contemplative, Writer, Bohemian, Activist

Sunday Afternoon at the Oldies: Scott McKenzie, San Francisco, Summer of Love

Bending to popular demand, here is some more about the Summer of Love, now 50 years in the past. A re-do and clean-up of an entry from five years ago.

..................

Nostalgia time again.  Scott McKenzie, famous for the 1967 anthem "San Francisco" penned by John Phillips of The Mamas and the Papas, died at 73 in 2012.  Gen-X-er Mick LaSalle gets it exactly right in his commentary:

The thing about that song is that . . . however naive and even sanctimonious it might be, it is so clearly a true expression of a mindset, of a vision, of a moment in time, of a generation, of an aspiration that, even if it is singing about a San Francisco that never happened and a dream that never came true and never really had a chance of coming true, and that had only a scant relationship with reality . . . it’s a precious thing.  It’s a document of a moment, but more than that, a perfect poetic expression of that moment.

It was not MY youth, but I can recognize in that song and in the purity of McKenzie’s vocal something that is as unmistakably honest, in its way, as Gershwin playing the piano, or Fred Astaire dancing, or Artie Shaw playing the clarinet.  It is youth finding itself in the world and saying the most beautiful thing it can think of saying at that particular moment. You can’t laugh that away.  You have to treasure that.  Really, you have to love it.

Speaking of the Mamas and Papas, here are some of my favorites:  Dedicated to the One I Love (1967), a cover almost as good as the Shirelles original.  But it is hard to touch the Shirelles.

[Correction: H. Fisher in a comment points out that the "5" Royales did it first, in 1957. Or at least before the Shirelles. Some of these songs go back a long way.]

Twelve Thirty.  Creeque Alley with great video. California Dreamin'.

And then there's Eric Burdon and the Animals, San Franciscan Nights from '67.

The so-called Summer of Love transpired 50 years ago. (Some of my reminiscences of the Monterey Pop Festival of that same summer of '67 are reported here.) Ted Nugent, the guru of kill and grill, and a rocker singularly without musical merit in my humble opinion,  offers some rather intemperate reflections in a Wall Street Journal piece, The Summer of Drugs. Excerpts:

The 1960s, a generation that wanted to hold hands, give peace a chance, smoke dope and change the world, changed it all right: for the worse. America is still suffering the horrible consequences of hippies who thought utopia could be found in joints and intentional disconnect.

[. . .]

While I salute and commend the political and cultural activism of the 1960s that fueled the civil rights movement, other than that, the decade is barren of any positive cultural or social impact. Honest people will remember 1967 for what it truly was.

Although I am not inclined to disagree too strenuously with Nugent's indictment, especially when it comes to drug-fueled self-destruction, Nugent misses much that was positive in those days. For one thing, there was the amazing musical creativity of the period, as represented by Dylan and the Beatles above all. The summer of '67 saw the debut of the Sgt. Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band LP of the lads from Liverpool. This creativity stood in stark contrast to the vapidity of '50s popular music. Has there been anything before or since in popular music that has come up the level of the best of Dylan? That is what we call a rhetorical question.

Perhaps I should give an example of '50s vapidity. How about Perry Como, Magic Moments? It came out in 1960, I believe, the last year of the 1950s. Of course, songs like this were also found aplenty in the '60s. My point, however, is that they were not characteristic of the '60s as they were of the prior decades in American popular music. Ours was a music of engagement, not escape.  A good example is Phil Ochs' There But for Fortune.

The '60s also offered welcome relief from the dreary materialism and social conformism of the '50s. My generation saw through the emptiness of a life devoted to social oneupsmanship, status-seeking, and the piling up of consumer goods. We were an idealistic generation. We wanted something more out of life than job security in suburbia. (Frank Zappa: "Do your job, do it right! Life's a ball, TV tonight!")

We were seekers and questers, though there is no denying that some of us were suckers for charlatans and pied pipers like Timothy Leary. We took on the Big Questions, even if we did so via dubious popularizers such as Alan Watts. We questioned the half-hearted pieties and platitudes and hypocrisies of our elders. Some of the questioning was puerile and dangerously utopian, but at least we were questioning. We wanted life and we wanted it in abundance in rebellion against the deadness we perceived around us. We experimented with psychedelics to open the doors of perception, not to get loaded. 

(Trivia questions: name the title of the book to which I allude with 'doors of perception,' its author, his place of residence in later life, and the Los Angeles band that took its name from the title.)

We were a destructive generation as well, a fact documented in Peter Collier and David Horowitz, Destructive Generation: Second Thoughts About the '60s. But the picture Nugent paints is onesided. Here is Dylan's "Blowing in the Wind" which was one of the anthems of the Civil Rights movement. It is a great version by Alanis Morissette and uploaded to YouTube by our very own London Ed.

Or give a listen to the Youngblood's Get Together.  This song captures the positive spirit of the '60s, a spirit not much in evidence nowadays. 

Saturday Night at the Oldies: Monterey Pop Festival, June 16-18, 1967

It transpired 50 summers ago, this June, the grand daddy of rock festivals, two years before Woodstock, in what became known as the Summer of Love. Your humble correspondent was on the scene. Some high school friends and I drove up from Los Angeles along Pacific Coast Highway. I can still call up olfactory memories of patchouli, sandalwood incense, not to mention the aroma of what was variously known as cannabis sativa, marijuana, reefer, tea, Miss Green, Mary Jane, pot, weed, grass, pacalolo (Hawaiian term), loco weed, and just plain dope. But my friends and I, students at an all-boys Catholic high school that enforced a strict dress code, were fairly straight: we partook of no orgies, smoked no dope, and slept in a motel. The wild stuff came later in our lives, when we were better able to handle it.

I have in my hand the program book of the Festival, in mint condition. Do I hear $1,000? On the first page there is a quotation from Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice:

How sweet the moon-light sleeps upon this bank! Here we sit and let the sounds of music creep in our ears; soft stillness and the night, become the touches of sweet harmony.

Ah yes, I remember it well, the "sweet harmony" of the whining feedback of Jimi Hendrix's Fender Stratocaster plugged into his towering Marshall amps and the "soft stillness" of the The Who smashing their instruments to pieces. Not to be outdone, Jimi lit his Strat on fire with lighter fluid. The image is burned into my memory. It shocked my working-class frugality. I used to baby my Fender Mustang and I once got mad at a girl for placing a coke can on my Fender Deluxe Reverb amp.

On the last page of the programme book, a more fitting quotation: the lyrics of Dylan's The Times They Are A'Changin', perhaps the numero uno '60s anthem to youth and social ferment. (Click on the link; great piano version. Live 1964 guitar version.) Were the utopian fantasies of the '60s just a load of rubbish? Mostly, but not entirely. "Lately it occurs to me, what a long strange trip it's been."

 

 

 

Tunes and Footage:

The Who, My Generation. I hope I die before I get old."

Mamas and Papas, California Dreamin'

Mamas and Papas, I Call Your Name

Jefferson Airplane, Somebody to Love

Janis Joplin, Down on Me

Otis Redding, Try a Little Tenderness

Scott MacKenzie, San Francisco 

I have in my hand the program book of the Festival, in mint condition. Do I hear $1,000? On the first page there is a quotation from Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice:

How sweet the moon-light sleeps upon this bank! Here we sit and let the sounds of music creep in our ears; soft stillness and the night, become the touches of sweet harmony.

Ah yes, I remember it well, the "sweet harmony" of the whining feedback of Jimi Hendrix's Fender Stratocaster plugged into his towering Marshall amps and the "soft stillness" of the The Who smashing their instruments to pieces. Not to be outdone, Jimi lit his Strat on fire with lighter fluid. The image is burned into my memory. It shocked my working-class frugality. I used to baby my Fender Mustang and I once got mad at a girl for placing a coke can on my Fender Deluxe Reverb amp.

On the last page of the programme book, a more fitting quotation: the lyrics of Dylan's The Times They Are A'Changin', perhaps the numero uno '60s anthem to youth and social ferment. (Click on the link; great piano version. Live 1964 guitar version.) Were the utopian fantasies of the '60s just a load of rubbish? Mostly, but not entirely. "Lately it occurs to me, what a long strange trip it's been."

 

 

 

Tunes and Footage:

The Who, My Generation. I hope I die before I get old."

Mamas and Papas, California Dreamin'

Mamas and Papas, I Call Your Name

Jefferson Airplane, Somebody to Love

Janis Joplin, Down on Me

Otis Redding, Try a Little Tenderness

Scott MacKenzie, San Francisco 

"Some of Us Just Go One God Further"

A revised version of an entry from 26 July 2010.

.....................

I've seen the above-captioned quotation attributed to Richard Dawkins. From what I have read of him, it seems like something he would say. The idea, I take it, is that all gods are on a par, and so, given that everyone is an atheist with respect to some gods, one may as well make a clean sweep and be an atheist with respect to all gods. You don't believe in Zeus or in a celestial teapot. Then why do you believe in the God of Isaac, Abraham, and Jacob?

What Dawkins and his New Atheist colleagues  seem to be assuming is that the following questions are either senseless or not to be taken seriously:   'Is the Judeo-Christian god the true God?'  'Is any particular god the true God'  'Is any particular conception of deity adequate to the divine reality?' 

The New Atheist presupposition, then, is that all candidates for deity are in the same logical boat, and that this boat is one leaky vessel. Nothing could be divine. Since all theistic religions are false, there is no live question as to which such religion is true. It is not as if there is a divine reality and that some religions are more adequate to it than others. One could not say, for example, that Judaism is somewhat adequate to the divine reality, Christianity more adequate, and Buddhism not at all adequate. There just is no divine reality. There is nothing of a spiritual nature beyond the human horizon.  There is no Mind beyond finite mind.  Man is the measure. This is it!

That is the atheist's deepest conviction.  It seems so obvious to him that he cannot begin genuinely to doubt it, nor can he understand how anyone could genuinely believe the opposite. Belief in God is like belief in Santa Claus, the Tooth Fairy, or Ed Abbey's Angry Unicorn on the Dark Side of the Moon. You don't believe in any of those nonentities, do you? Well, Dawkins & Co. just go one nonentity further!

This morning I received a message from a Canadian reader, C. L., who asks whether Dawkins and friends are begging the question against the theist. That depends on whether they are giving  an argument or just making an assertion. It also depends on what exactly 'begging the question' is. If they are just making an assertion then I say: Quod gratis asseritur, gratis negatur. But suppose they intend the following argument:

1) All gods are on an epistemic/doxastic par: they are all equal in point of rational acceptability. Therefore:

2) If one god is such that its existence is not rationally acceptable, then this is true of all gods.

3) There are gods such as Zeus whose existence is not rationally acceptable. Therefore:

4) No god is such that its existence is rationally acceptable.

This is a valid argument: it cannot be the case that the premises are true and the conclusion false. Does it beg the question? The problem here is that it is not very clear what the informal fallacy in question (pun intended) is supposed to be.   If I argue that The Los Angeles Times displays liberal bias because its reportage and editorializing show a left-of-center slant, then I reason in a circle, or beg the question.  That is a clear example.  But suppose I argue that The L. A. Times displays liberal bias because all mainstream media outlets display liberal bias and The L. A. Times is a mainstream media outlet. Have I begged the question? Not so clear. Surely we don't want to say that every valid argument begs the question! (John Stuart Mill floated this suggestion.) On the other hand, it is impossible for a valid argument to have true premises and a false conclusion which suggests that he who accepts the premises of the second argument above has in so doing begged the question: he has at least implicitly committed himself to an affirmative answer to the question, 'Does The L. A. Times display liberal bias?'

'Beg the question,' I suggest, is not a very useful phrase. Besides, people nowadays regularly conflate it with 'raising a question.' See On Begging the Question. It is becoming a useless phrase.

Regarding the above argument, I would say that, while valid, it is nowhere near rationally compelling and is therefore rationally rejectable. What reason do we have to think that all candidates for divine status are on a doxatic/epistemic par?  

In sum, either Dawkins is asserting or he is arguing. If he is asserting, then his gratuitous assertion can be met with a gratuitous counter-assertion. If he is arguing, and his argument is as above, then his argument is easily turned aside.

The fundamental issue here is whether there is anything beyond the human horizon. The issue dividing theists and atheists can perhaps be put in terms of Jamesian 'live options':

EITHER: Some form of theism (hitherto undeveloped perhaps or only partially developed) is not only logically and epistemically possible, but also an 'existential' possibility, a live option;

OR: No form of theism is an existential possibility, a live option.

Theist-atheist dialog is made difficult by a certain asymmetry: whereas a sophisticated living faith involves a measure of purifying doubt, together with a groping beyond images and pat conceptualizations toward a transcendent reality, one misses any corresponding doubt or tentativeness on the part of sophisticated atheists. Dawkins and Co. seem so cocksure of their position. For them, theism is not a live option or existential possibility.  This is obvious from their mocking comparisons of God to a celestial teapot, flying spaghetti monster, and the like. 

For sophisticated theists, however, atheism is a live option. The existence of this asymmetry makes one wonder whether any productive dialog with atheists is possible.  It is probably no more possible than productive dialog with leftists. We live on different planets.

Companion post:  Russell's Teapot: Does It Hold Water?

Related articles

Where Are the Honest Atheists?

Does the Atheist Deny What the Theist Affirms? Reply to a Comment

Nietzsche, Truth, and Power

The Political Equivalent of Seinfeld

The famous show about nothing finds its political equivalent in a certain investigation about nothing.

Thinking Concretely About Death

When my death seems 'acceptable,' a 'natural' occurrence, I wonder whether I am thinking about it concretely and honestly enough.    I wonder whether I am really confronting my own utter destruction as a subject for whom there is a world, as opposed to myself as an object in the world.  If I view myself as object, I can 'hold myself in reserve'  and imagine that I as subject will somehow survive destruction.  I can think of death as a drastic transition rather than as annihilation -- which it may well be.

If you say it is certain that death is annihilation, then I pronounce you a dogmatic fool.

Related articles

Death Penalty, Abortion, and Certainty

Don't Spoil Your Success

You may spoil your success if you compare it with someone else's.  Beware of comparison.  Not all comparison is invidious, but the potential for envy is there.  Invidia is the Latin for 'envy.'  An invidious comparison, then, is one that elicits envy. One can avoid envy by avoiding comparison. To feel diminished in one's sense of self-worth by the accomplishments of another is the mark of a loser. 

One ought to celebrate the accomplishments of others since in many cases they redound to one's own benefit.

If you cannot be satisfied with who you are and what you have, you will never be content.  And if you are never content, then never happy.  There is more to happiness than contentment, but the latter is an ingredient in the former.

Related articles

Same-Sex Marriage: No Surprise Conservatives Lost

One Step Forward, One Step Back

Forward: The Southern border is being secured. And this despite the obstructionism of the donkeys.

Back: U. S. Army goes 'transgender.' Here:

The Army has begun mandatory transgender sensitivity training for soldiers. The training covers everything from “transfemale” soldiers to transgender shower etiquette to dealing with a male soldier who becomes pregnant.

Interesting times, these. How could anyone be bored?

Related articles

A Checkered Past

A Toxic Culture

A toxic culture it is in which lack of self-discipline is promoted, self-indulgence of every sort is encouraged, self-reliance and individual responsibility are ridiculed, everything becomes a disease or addiction, big government is promoted as the solution to every problem, and the right to free expression is misused to spread hate and incite violence.

If Agreement is Out of Reach . . .

. . . then I think there are two conclusions to be drawn. The first is that we ought not allow into our midst individuals and groups with radically different values and commitments.  The second is that we ought to be as tolerant as we can of the differences among those we do admit into our midst.

No comity without commonality.

No comity without toleration.

Can You Obstruct a Fraud?

Andrew C. McCarthy is rock-solid.

'Liberals' Lack Standards

And when they have them they tend to be double standards.

Related articles

Gasthaus Blut und Boden

John D. Caputo's Truth Problem

Is Reason a White Male Euro-Christian Construct?

Plain Talk About Transgenderism

Sometimes the cure for P. C. is C.P. , Camille Paglia, that is:

It is certainly ironic how liberals who posture as defenders of science when it comes to global warming (a sentimental myth unsupported by evidence) flee all reference to biology when it comes to gender. Biology has been programmatically excluded from women's studies and gender studies programs for almost 50 years now. Thus very few current gender studies professors and theorists, here and abroad, are intellectually or scientifically prepared to teach their subjects.

The cold biological truth is that sex changes are impossible. Every single cell of the human body remains coded with one's birth gender for life. Intersex ambiguities can occur, but they are developmental anomalies that represent a tiny proportion of all human births.

And a fortiori for transracialism.

Related articles

Modality, Possible Worlds, and the Accidental-Essential Distinction

Robert Spencer Poisoned in Iceland

Robert Spencer explains on YouTube.

Mark Steyn, The Poisoning of Robert Spencer

Concision at War with Redundancy

One of my faults as a writer is that I am prolix. I almost wrote ‘excessively prolix,’ which would have illustrated the fault in question. Piling ‘excessively’ onto ‘prolix’ would not only have been unnecessary, but would also have suggested that one can be prolix in moderation. But wordiness is a vice, and vices should be extirpated, not moderated.

Some years back, The Wall Street Journal described itself as “the daily diary of the American dream.” A delightful pleonasm: ‘diary’ derives from the Latin dies, day. A daily diary is like one of Al Franken’s lying liars. I learned recently that ‘journal’ also derives from Latin dies even though they have no letters in common. A fact like that excites a guy like me. Dies gave rise to diurnus, which became the Italian giornale and the French journal, passing into English as ‘journal’ circa 1590. (Vide Robert Hendrickson, QPB Encyclopedia of Word and Phrase Origins, 2nd ed., 2004, p. 400) By the way, this is a fascinating book, and I recommend it.

Here are some other examples of redundant expressions, culled from Joseph M. Williams, Style: Toward Grace and Clarity (Chicago, 1990, p. 116): past memories, basic fundamentals, true facts, important essentials, future plans, personal beliefs, consensus of opinion, sudden crisis, terrible tragedy, end result, final outcome, initial preparation, free gift. No doubt some of these are disputable. Suppose you set aside six months to prepare for a marathon. You begin by running 30 miles per week, gradually working up to 45 mile weeks. It would make sense to say that your initial preparation was less demanding than the later phases of your preparation.  There is no redundancy here.

And what about future plans? ‘Plan’ is ambiguous as between the act of planning and its object. No doubt the object of planning is always later than the act of planning, just as the object of remembering is always earlier than the act of remembering. Hence ‘future plan’ is redundant when used to refer to the object of planning. But it is not redundant when used to refer to the act of planning. An act of planning can lie in the future, in the present, or in the past. If every use of ‘future plan’ were redundant, then every use of ‘past plan’ and ‘present plan’ would be oxymoronic. But it is no oxymoron to say, ‘My past plans all went unrealized,’ or ‘My present plan is to sell the vacation house.’

By similar reasoning, one should be able to convince oneself that past memories has non-redundant uses. An old man might complain, ‘My present memories are not as vivid as my past memories.’ This is not redundant because an act of remembering can lie in the past.

One conclusion to be drawn is that good writing is not a mechanical affair: it cannot be reduced to rules and regulations, algorithms and checklists. Did you catch ‘rules and regulations’? That is a redundancy and I used it purposely to test you. ‘Regulation’ is from the Latin regula, meaning rule. There is also the connection to rex, regis, king, ruler. And so on and so forth.

One of my faults as a writer is that I am prolix. I almost wrote ‘excessively prolix,’ which would have illustrated the fault in question. Piling ‘excessively’ onto ‘prolix’ would not only have been unnecessary, but would also have suggested that one can be prolix in moderation. But wordiness is a vice, and vices should be extirpated, not moderated.

Some years back, The Wall Street Journal described itself as “the daily diary of the American dream.” A delightful pleonasm: ‘diary’ derives from the Latin dies, day. A daily diary is like one of Al Franken’s lying liars. I learned recently that ‘journal’ also derives from Latin dies even though they have no letters in common. A fact like that excites a guy like me. Dies gave rise to diurnus, which became the Italian giornale and the French journal, passing into English as ‘journal’ circa 1590. (Vide Robert Hendrickson, QPB Encyclopedia of Word and Phrase Origins, 2nd ed., 2004, p. 400) By the way, this is a fascinating book, and I recommend it.

Here are some other examples of redundant expressions, culled from Joseph M. Williams, Style: Toward Grace and Clarity (Chicago, 1990, p. 116): past memories, basic fundamentals, true facts, important essentials, future plans, personal beliefs, consensus of opinion, sudden crisis, terrible tragedy, end result, final outcome, initial preparation, free gift. No doubt some of these are disputable. Suppose you set aside six months to prepare for a marathon. You begin by running 30 miles per week, gradually working up to 45 mile weeks. It would make sense to say that your initial preparation was less demanding than the later phases of your preparation.  There is no redundancy here.

And what about future plans? ‘Plan’ is ambiguous as between the act of planning and its object. No doubt the object of planning is always later than the act of planning, just as the object of remembering is always earlier than the act of remembering. Hence ‘future plan’ is redundant when used to refer to the object of planning. But it is not redundant when used to refer to the act of planning. An act of planning can lie in the future, in the present, or in the past. If every use of ‘future plan’ were redundant, then every use of ‘past plan’ and ‘present plan’ would be oxymoronic. But it is no oxymoron to say, ‘My past plans all went unrealized,’ or ‘My present plan is to sell the vacation house.’

By similar reasoning, one should be able to convince oneself that past memories has non-redundant uses. An old man might complain, ‘My present memories are not as vivid as my past memories.’ This is not redundant because an act of remembering can lie in the past.

One conclusion to be drawn is that good writing is not a mechanical affair: it cannot be reduced to rules and regulations, algorithms and checklists. Did you catch ‘rules and regulations’? That is a redundancy and I used it purposely to test you. ‘Regulation’ is from the Latin regula, meaning rule. There is also the connection to rex, regis, king, ruler. And so on and so forth.

The Fallacy of Objections

Via Vlastimil V.:

There is something "which may be called the Fallacy of objections, i.e. showing that there are objections against some plan, theory or system, and thence inferring that it should be rejected; when that which ought to have been proved, is, that there are more, or stronger objections against the receiving than the rejecting of it. This is the main, and almost universal Fallacy of infidels, and is that of which men should be first and principally warned."  Richard Whately, Logic, 1849, ch. V "On Fallacies," p. 82. See here.

How quaint our concern with the lore of logic while jihadi's  cut throats on London Bridge and leftist thugs shout down the sane at universities.  Logic books and books in general are of no use against barbarians and thugs. Magazines are much more effective. 

Redundancy of the Day: 'Future Prognosis'

According to a news report, doctors will not speculate on the 'future prognosis' of Otto Warmbier.  As opposed to what? His present prognosis?

Incitement to Violence

Required reading.

Sullivan is Right: Universalism Hasn't Been Debunked

Andrew Sullivan is down with a very bad case of Trump Derangement Syndrome. But he hasn't lost his mind entirely. He is hip to the absurdity of leftist talk about cultural appropriation.  After wading through yet another load of his anti-Trump hyperventilatory hysteria, I came upon these reasonable words of his:

I love the phrase “long-debunked universalism” by the way. Debunked by whom? Universalism — the idea that human beings can exist as individuals, rather than as members of assigned groups — is far from debunked. It is, in fact, one core premise of liberal society.

Sully is right, but it is not easy to state clearly what is at issue here or what it even means to "exist as individuals rather than as members of assigned groups."   A while back I was complaining about tribalism and I was saying things like: we need to get beyond tribal and racial and other particularistic self-identifications; we need to learn to see ourselves and others as individuals and not as tokens of types or members of groups.  To my surprise, certain alt-righties disagreed with me, seeming to say that what we need to oppose black tribalism, say, is not a transcendence of tribalism, but an equal but opposite white tribalism.

Now that makes no sense to me, except as a sort of interim or stop-gap defensive measure. If some black dude gets in my face about the how great it is to be black, I will be tempted to get in his face and reply in kind.

But that sort of thing does not comport well with my irenic, philosophical nature. We need to transcend our tribalisms and learn to respect each other as persons with equal rights. We are equal as persons!

But what could that mean? Is it not just empty talk? It sounds like the pious verbiage of a preacher or a politician who doesn't really believe what he is saying but says it because he is paid to do so.

Talk of equal rights and respect for persons is indeed empty if naturalism is true. If we are nothing but a species of clever land mammal, then talk of equality is blather. For we are obviously not equal empirically either as individuals or as groups. The alt-righties and neo-reactionaries hammer on this point and they are correct in so doing. So normative equality cannot be grounded in empirical equality if for no other reason than that there is no empirical equality. On the other hand, normative equality cannot 'float in the air.' It cannot subsist independently of any basis in reality.

What then could possibly ground our normative equality as persons with equal rights to life, liberty, and property, if we are nothing but complex physical systems?  If there is no equality in fact, how could there be in norm?

If naturalism is true, what could make it morally wrong always and everywhere and for everyone -- not just pragmatically or prudentially inadvisable in particular circumstances -- for one group to enslave another? Nothing that I can see.  Not the ability to reason since, on naturalism, that is just an empirical feature of human organisms. In any case, the ability is not equally present in human animals.  Hoe could a non-normative property, unequally distributed, ground a right to be tretaed with respect and never to be treated as a means only? If you say that all normal humans have the ability to reason to some degree or other, then you are abstracting away from our differences. How could that abstraction, which remains on the non-normative plane, ground a right to be treated equally?

Here is the problem expressed as an aporetic tetrad:

1) Humans are not empirically equal either as individuals or as groups.

2) Talk of the normative equality of persons, that each ought to be treated as an end and never merely as a means (Kant), is empty if it cannot be provided with a basis in concrete non-normative reality.

3) Naturalism is true: concrete reality is exhausted by the space-time system and its contents.

4) Persons are normatively equal.

The limbs of the tetrad are inconsistent; something has to give. (1) is non-negotiably true as a matter of plain fact. (2) is extremely plausible, and we are committed to (4) if, as our moral intuitions instruct us, slavery, sex trafficking, and the like are moral abominations. So I reject (3). 

If (3) is false, then it is possible that theism is true. If all finite persons are creatures of one and the same infinite person, then all persons are metaphysically equal. This metaphysical fact is then the non-normative basis that grounds the normative equality of persons.

Question for atheists: If you hold that slavery is morally wrong, what on your view makes it morally wrong? 

Related articles

Potentiality and the Substance View of Persons

Maverick Philosopher: Is There a Defensible Sense in Which Human Beings are Equal?

Abortion and Infanticide: What's the Difference?

Is Reason a White Male Euro-Christian Construct?

Is the Enlightenment the Problem?

The Bret Weinstein-Heather Heying Caper at Evergreen State

Having come to expect lunacy from lefties, I was not dismayed, but entertained, by the absurd bigotry that seeps out of the following passage from this Chronicle of Higher Education piece:

Now the couple weighed a new option. A producer for Tucker Carlson Tonight, a prime-time show on Fox News, had asked if Mr. Weinstein wanted to make his case to the conservative commentator and his millions of viewers.

It was a nauseating thought, says Ms. Heying. Theirs was an NPR family. Back in college, Mr. Weinstein had stood up to fraternities at the University of Pennsylvania over sexist and racist behavior at their parties. In an ideal world, says Ms. Heying, they would have talked to The New York Times or The Washington Post. But that’s not who had come calling.

"He was horrified, I was horrified," Ms. Heying told The Chronicle. "Tucker Carlson is someone he mocks in his classes."

Weinstein teaches biology and he wastes class time on political commentary and mockery of talk show hosts?

One thing I do like about lefties, though, is that they eat their own with a hunger and ferocity unlike anything on the Right. The 'progressive' Weinstein, who is now a 'racist,' is learning this the hard way. May he come to his senses. May he come to appreciate that conservatives are the new liberals, and liberals the new fascists. 

I have written a number of articles critical of NPR and PBS. Here is an excerpt from National Public Radio and the Tit of the State:

"If the product is so superior, why does it have to live on the tit of the State?" (Charles Krauthammer)

One answer is that the booboisie  of these United States is too backward and benighted to appreciate the high level of NPR programming.  The rubes of fly-over country are too much enamored of wrestling, tractor pulls, and reality shows, and, to be blunt, too stupid and lazy to take in superior product.

Being something of an elitist myself, I am sympathetic to this answer.  The problem for me is twofold.  NPR is run by lefties for lefties.  That in itself is not a problem.  But it is a most serious problem when part of the funding comes from the taxpayer.  But lefties, blind to their own bias, don't see the problem.  Very simply, it is wrong to take money by force from people and then use it to promote causes that those people find offensive or worse when the causes have nothing to do with the legitimate functions of government.  Planned Parenthood and abortion.  NEA and "Piss Christ."  Get it?

Related articles

Will You Vote for Hillary?

There is Nothing Liberal About Contemporary Liberals

Robert Spencer's Ban from the U.K.

The following from a London correspondent:

Quite incredibly, Spencer is still banned from visiting the UK because of what he says in this short (2:07) YouTube video. The letter from the Home Office, then under the auspices of Theresa May, said:

You are reported to have stated the following:

>>It [Islam] is a religion and a belief system that mandates warfare against unbelievers for the purpose for establishing a societal model that is absolutely incompatible with Western society … because [of] political correctness and because of media and general government unwillingness to face the sources of Islamic terrorism these things remain largely unknown.<<

The Home Secretary considers that should you be allowed to enter the UK you would continue to espouse such views. In doing so. you would be committing listed behaviours and would therefore be behaving in a way that is not conducive to the public good.

You are therefore instructed not to travel to the UK as you will be refused admission on arrival. Although there is no statutory right of appeal against the Home Secretary’s decision, this decision is reviewed every 3 to 5 years.

Astonishing. So it is "not conducive to the public good" to speak the truth because some people (Muslims) will be offended by it and others (ordinary Brits) will be inspired to commit acts of violence against members of a minority? Is that the Home Office reasoning? 

Lord have mercy!

The Islamists have learned how to use our values against us. We value toleration and they exploit our tolerance. That ploy is structurally similar to what Communists did and their leftist successors do. Islam is the Communism of the 21st century. Theresa May plays the role of 'useful idiot.'

And then comes the Orwellian twist: when Spencer points out that Islam is incompatible with Western values such as toleration, and speaks up in defence of toleration, he is denounced as intolerant! So you are intolerant if you won't tolerate your own destruction?

There are many deep issues here, and it is very difficult to set them forth clearly in a few sentences. One issue is whether there is truth at all, or only politically correct opinions. Note the obvious: what is politically correct need not be correct in the sense of true.

For the Left truth doesn't matter since it is all about power in the end and those narratives that are conducive to the gaining and maintaining of power. As I have said more than once,  a story does not have to be true to be a story.  

One of the subterranean links between leftism and Islam concerns the denial of absolute truth. On Islamic voluntarism, truth is subject to Allah's will, which of course implies that truth is not absolute.  That's just a hint. More later.  

Related articles

It Pays to Publish, but Don't Pay to Publish

Rachel Dolezal, the Black White Woman

On Seinfeld

The Decline of the Culture of Free Discussion and Debate

Diplomad on Drawing Mohammed

Is the Enlightenment the Problem?

Infinite Desire and God as Being Itself

Death Penalty, Abortion, and Certainty

Nazis Hid Their Crimes; Islamists Exult in Theirs

By Kevin Myers. The Sunday Times, 11 June 2017. Via Karl White who provided me with the text and who tells me that "Kevin Myers is one of Ireland's most controversial writers." The 'purple passages' are by your humble correspondent.

......................................

A suicide bomber attacking a concert for little girls is a little earlier in the curve of depravity than I’d expected. But a nurse being cut to pieces as she minded the injured on London Bridge — at this point in the descent into the abyss, perfectly predictable. The Nazis hid their crimes. These people exult in theirs, knowing that the path to a moral nadir is paved with the public glorification of the most revolting violence. It is also paved with passivity, excuses and equivalence from the host communities.

Saturday Night at the Oldies: 'Spengler' on Dylan

In mid-October, I wrote,

This brings me to Bob Dylan who was recently awarded the 2016 Nobel Prize in Literature. Now I've been a Dylan fan from the early '60s.  In the '60s  I was more than a fan; I was a fanatic who would brook no criticism of his hero.  And I still maintain that in the annals of American popular music no one surpasses him as a songwriter.  

But the Nobel Prize for Literature?  That's a bit much, and an ominous foreshadowing of the death of the book and of quiet reading in this hyperkinetic age of tweets and soundbites.

I might have added that Dylan is important in the way Kerouac is.  But is Kerouac a great novelist? Obviously not.  I have enough literary sense to realize that my own love of Kerouac is largely determined by my own quirks and generational affiliation.

Ron Radosh, whom I respect highly, thinks that Dylan deserved the prize.  But David P. Goldman, 'Spengler,' whom I also respect, takes a harsh line:

And so it is with Bob Dylan, parodist, satirist, scammer and snake-oil salesman par excellence. He never hid from us what he had in mind: he's been playing with our heads since high school, finding the lever that loosened our tears, and our wallets. He caught a wave in the early 1960s with the folk revival movement, itself a hoax. We Americans are not a "folk," not in the sense that Johann Gottfried Herder used the term. We do not have the deep memory of autochthonous roots that characterizes European cultures, the hand-me-downs of long-lost pagan experience. We are a people self-created by religious and political impulse.

[. . .]

Of course, it was all a put-on. Woody Guthrie was a middle-class lawyer's son. Pete Seeger was the privileged child of classical musicians who decamped to Greenwich Village. The authenticity of the folk movement stank of greasepaint. But a generation of middle-class kids who, like Holden Caulfield, thought their parents "phony" gravitated to the folk movement. In 1957, Seeger was drunk and playing for pittances at Communist Party gatherings; that's where I first met him, red nose and all. By the early 1960s he was a star again.

To Dylan's credit, he knew it was a scam, and spent the first part of his career playing with our heads. He could do a credible imitation of the camp-meeting come-to-Jesus song ("When the Ship Comes In") and meld pseudo-folk imagery with social-protest sensibility ("A Hard Rain's  a' Gonna Fall"). But he knew it was all play with pop culture ("Lone Ranger and Tonto/Riding down the line/Fixin' everybody's troubles/Everybody's 'cept mine"). When he went electric at the Newport Festival to the hisses of the folk purists, he knew it was another kind of joke.

Only someone who was not moved by the music of that period could write something so extreme.  No doubt there was and is an opportunistic side to Dylan.  He started out an unlikely rock-and roller in high school aping Little Richard, but sensed that the folk scene was where he could make his mark.  And so for a time he played the son of Ramblin' Jack Elliot and the grandson of Woody Guthrie.

In his recent Nobel Prize lecture, Dylan mentions early influences. Let's dig up some of the tunes that inspired him.

Buddy Holly, True Love Ways

I think it was a day or two after that that his [Holly's] plane went down. And somebody – somebody I’d never seen before – handed me a Leadbelly record with the song “Cottonfields” on it. And that record changed my life right then and there. Transported me into a world I’d never known. It was like an explosion went off. Like I’d been walking in darkness and all of the sudden the darkness was illuminated. It was like somebody laid hands on me. I must have played that record a hundred times.

Lead Belly, Cotton Fields

It was on a label I’d never heard of with a booklet inside with advertisements for other artists on the label: Sonny Terry and Brownie McGhee, the New Lost City Ramblers, Jean Ritchie, string bands. I’d never heard of any of them. But I reckoned if they were on this label with Leadbelly, they had to be good, so I needed to hear them. I wanted to know all about it and play that kind of music. I still had a feeling for the music I’d grown up with, but for right now, I forgot about it. Didn’t even think about it. For the time being, it was long gone.

Sonnie Terry and Brownie McGhee, Key to the Highway.  Just to vex London Ed who hates Eric 'Crapton' as he calls him, here is his Derek and the Dominoes version with Duane Allman. Sound good to me, Ed!

New Lost City Ramblers, Tom Dooley

Jean Ritchie and Doc Watson, What Will I Do with the Baby-O?

By listening to all the early folk artists and singing the songs yourself, you pick up the vernacular. You internalize it. You sing it in the ragtime blues, work songs, Georgia sea shanties, Appalachian ballads and cowboy songs. You hear all the finer points, and you learn the details.

You know what it’s all about. Takin’ the pistol out and puttin’ it back in your pocket. Whippin’ your way through traffic, talkin’ in the dark. You know that Stagger Lee was a bad man and that Frankie was a good girl. You know that Washington is a bourgeois town and you’ve heard the deep-pitched voice of John the Revelator and you saw the Titanic sink in a boggy creek. And you’re pals with the wild Irish rover and the wild colonial boy. You heard the muffled drums and the fifes that played lowly. You’ve seen the lusty Lord Donald stick a knife in his wife, and a lot of your comrades have been wrapped in white linen.

I had all the vernacular down. I knew the rhetoric. None of it went over my head – the devices, the techniques, the secrets, the mysteries – and I knew all the deserted roads that it traveled on, too. I could make it all connect and move with the current of the day. When I started writing my own songs, the folk lingo was the only vocabulary that I knew, and I used it.

Mississippi John Hurt, The Ballad of Stagger Lee

Mississippi John Hurt, You've Got to Walk That Lonesome Valley

Mississippi John Hurt, You Are My Sunshine

Blind Willie Johnson, John the Revelator

George F. Will, The Prize that Bob Dylan Really Deserves

Related articles

Zimmi Turns 74

Saturday Night at the Oldies: Celebrating Freedom and Independence

On This Date 31 Years Ago and 50 Years Ago: Jim Fixx and Bob Dylan

Saturday Night at the Oldies: Ramblin' Charles Adnopoz

There are Moderate Muslims but No Moderate Islam

This is an important distinction explained with great clarity by Robert Spencer. London Ed summarizes:

He [Spencer] believes that there are moderate Muslims but there is no moderate Islam, giving the example (3:25) of the Catholic Church's official teaching on contraception: "Contraception is wrong, contraception is immoral, don’t contracept." Yet 

"Surveys show that 70-80-90 percent of Catholics use contraception. Now, we would be absolutely wrong, incorrect, to say ‘oh that means the Church doesn’t really teach that contraception is wrong’ . . . it’s just that most Catholics don’t pay attention. Islam really teaches warfare against unbelievers. A lot of Muslims don’t pay attention. That’s just great. The problem is that they have no theological leg to stand on in Islam, and therefore when they are challenged by the jihadis, and even when their children are recruited by the jihadis, they don’t have any answer."

This seems to me to be correct. It follows that I was mistaken when I wrote, on many occasions, of radical Islam. For that phrase suggests that there is a difference between Islam and radical Islam and that 'true' Islam the 'religion of peace' has been radicalized by radicals and militants. The truth is that Islam just is radical Islam. It is a radical and extreme view right out of the box.

There can be moderate Muslims, but there is no such thing as moderate Islam. Spencer mentions Zuhdi Jasser as one of the few moderate Muslims in the world. Dr. Jasser is a moderate Muslim in that he diverges from Islam by, among other things, advocating separation of mosque and state.

Related articles

Despicable Footage of ISIS Desecrating a Catholic Church in Philippines Will Make Your Blood Boil