Are Any Substantive Philosophical Propositions Epistemically Certain?

I asked our Czech colleague Lukáš Novák for examples of philosophical propositions that he considers to be not only true, but knowable with certainty. He provided this list:

a) God exists.
b) There are substances.
c) There are some necessary truths, even some de re necessary truths.
d) Human cognition is capable of truth and certainty.
e) There are no contradictions in reality.

In this entry I will discuss only the first example.

Is it certain that God exists?

My position is that it is true that God exists, but not certain that God exists. How can a proposition be true but not certain? Logically prior question: What is certainty?

We first distinguish  epistemic from psychological certainty. If S is epistemically certain that p, then S knows that p. But if S is psychologically certain that p, i.e., thoroughly convinced that p, it does not follow that S knows that p.  For people are convinced of falsehoods, and one cannot know a falsehood, let alone be epistemically certain of it. There was the case not long ago of the benighted soul who was convinced that Hillary Clinton was running a child-abuse ring out of a pizzeria. He was certain of it! This shows that we must distinguish subjective or psychological certainty from objective or epistemic certainty.  Epistemic certainty alone concerns us.

But what is epistemic certainty?

On one approach, a proposition is epistemically certain just in case it is indubitable.   By indubitability I don't mean a psychological inability to doubt, but a property of some propositions. For example, the proposition I exist has the property of being such that no subject S who entertains and understands this proposition can doubt its truth.  There are any number of propositions about one's state of mind at a given time that are epistemically certain to the subject of these states.  Examples: I seem to see a tree (but not: I see a tree); I seem to recall first meeting her on a April 2014 (but not: I recall meeting her on 1 April 2014).

The facts about one's mental life are a rich source or epistemic certainties. But there is also a class of truths of reason that are epistemically certain, for example propositions true ex vi terminorum, e.g., every effect has a cause, and formal-logical truths such as a proposition and its negation cannot both be true, etc.

God exists, by contrast with the members of the two classes just mentioned, is not indubitable.  One can easily doubt it. Atheists go so far as to deny it. So if epistemic certainty is defined in terms of indubitability, then God exists is not epistemically certain.

We also note that God exists  does not record a fact about anyone's mental life, nor is it true ex vi terminorum. So it belongs to neither class of the epistemically certain.

At this point one might respond that God exists, while not indubitable by itself, is indubitable as the conclusion of an argument. Well, suppose you give a valid deductive argument for the proposition that God exists. The conclusion will be epistemically certain only if each premise of the argument is epistemically certain.  But is there such an argument?

I don't believe there is. I am, however, quite willing to change my view if someone could present one. Indeed I would positively love to be refuted on this point. After all, I have already announced that I believe it is true that God exists; if it is absolutely epistemically certain, then all the better!  To get a feel for the problem, consider the Kalam argument

1) Whatever begins to exist has a cause;

2) The universe began to exist; Therefore:

3) The universe has a cause. (And this all men call God.)

This is a valid deductive argument and the premises are highly plausible. What's more, they may well be true. But they are not both certain.  Is (1) epistemically certain? No. Its negation, Something begins to exist without a cause, is not a formal-logical contradiction. Nor is (1) an analytic or conceptual truth.

If an argument is presented for (1), then I will show that the premises of that argument are not, all of them, certain.

Patrick Toner tells me that the "modal ontological argument [is] compelling," and that we can "know God and the soul with certainty through the use of natural human reason." (emphasis added) In Is the Modal Ontological Argument Compelling?, however, I return a negative answer by showing that the crucial possibility premise is not certain.

An impressive argument, no doubt, but not rationally compelling or such as to deliver epistemically certain insight into the truth of its conclusion.  The same goes for another powerful argument, From the Laws of Logic to the Existence of God.

What say you, Professor Novak?  Can you show me that I am wrong? I would be much obliged if you could.

Related articles

Disagreement in Philosophy: Notes on Jiří Fuchs

Comments

[Lukáš Novák]

Bill,

some preliminary points first:

1) I am inclined to think that there are no indubitable propositions (I just cannot make myself to regard all those who claim that they doubt or disbelieve them as speaking falsity) - perhaps this alone destroys our casus litis?

2) Even if there were indubitable propositions, I would deny that indubitability amounts to epistemic certainty. Epistemic certainty should be factive (truth-implying). Why should indubitability be factive? Why should I believe that it is? Even conceived as a property of a proposition, indubitability is thoroughly psychological, it can only be tested psychologically - and given how little we can know about what is beyond the limits of our psychological capabilities, indubitability seems to be a most unreliable criterion of epistemic certainty.

3) When I defend the existence of epistemically certain substantial philosophical truths, I mean truths that are not indubitable but rationally indubitable: i.e. doubt is (perhaps) possible but irrational, absolutely unjustified.

4) In the Kalam argument, I actually think that premise (2) is the problematic one. Can we know for sure that the universe began to exist? The scholastics used various strategies to show that much (e.g.: there would have to be an actual infinity of immortal souls by now), but most quite complicated and hardly absolutely convincing.

5) The cause of the universe need not have divine attributes. The argument is too weak.

6) Ad Premise (1): I think one can show that whatever has not a cause has divine attributes. This not only safeguards premise (1), but also shows that premise (2) is superfluous and relocates the entire argument to its proper (i.e. metaphysical) level. The point of a theistic proof is not to show that something has a cause, but that something has not (or that uncaused entity is possible - that is enough)! For you can then show that this something has divine attributes and must be actual.

(More on point (6) perhaps later)

7) With respect to the broader context of our discussion (which I am enjoying very much), I would just like to point out that Fuchs's thesis that lack of philosophical consensus does not rule out the possibility of philosophical certainty does not hinge on his (or mine) capability to actually produce an accepted specimen of such a certainty.

[CK]

Bill, Presumably on your account it is not epistemically certain that the sun will rise tomorrow or that water is H2O?

[BV]

CK,

It is 'certainly' not epistemically certain that the sun will rise tomorrow. It is logically and nomologically possible that the Sun go supernova between now and then. Or God might pull the plug on the entire physical cosmos an hour from now. Other scenarios are also imaginable and conceivable. But I am not worried, not one bit.

Your second example is more interesting. If Kripke is right, then the water prop, while synthetic and a posteriori in Kant's jargon, is metaphysically necessary. But certainty and necessity are different properties. I can be certain of a contingent truth and uncertain of a necessary truth.

For example, I am certain that I seem to see a computer, but not certain of *God exists,* which, if true, is necessarily true. Kripke's scheme is uncertain; so I say that I am not certain of the water prop.

[BV]

Lukas writes,

>>Fuchs's thesis that lack of philosophical consensus does not rule out the possibility of philosophical certainty does not hinge on his (or mine) capability to actually produce an accepted specimen of such a certainty.<<

Right, but if you can't give me an example, then your case is considerably weakened.

[JS]

"My position is that it is true that God exists, but not certain that God exists."

This may be slightly off topic, but how do you justify being a Catholic, then, in light of what the Fist Vatican Council says here (which seems to be talking about epistemic not psychological certainty):

"If anyone says that the one, true God, our creator and lord, cannot be known with certainty from the things that have been made, by the natural light of human reason: let him be anathema."

[Lukáš Novák]

Bill writes:

If you can't give me an example, then your case is considerably weakened.

I think you misrepresent the dialectical situation. Fuchs sets out to find out whether philosophical certainty is possible. At this stage, ha has no claims to make or positions to take, no "case", just a project, to do epistemology (or "noetics"). Before he starts, he considers whether there is any easy objection to blow up the enterprise at the very beginning as futile. One of such possible objections is the disagreement among philosophers. All he says is that this objection is not convincing, it does not provide an easy negative solution to the "noetic question", a substantive noetic enquiry is still needed.

Of course, philosophical certainties come, hopefully, at the end of the enterprise, as a fruit of considerable philosophical labour, not as easy, ready-to-use examples.

[BV]

JS,

Fair question. Yes, that is a dogmatic pronouncement of Vatican I. I am wondering, though, was that statement or an equivalent promulgated by any earlier council? The idea that one can know that God exists by natural reason without the aid of revelation is clearly stated by Aquinas; but I am wondering whether the 'anathema' formulation can be found in earlier councils.

[BV]

Lukas,

Unfortunately, Fuchs confuses truth with certainty, and that dooms his project from the start. One thing I like about his book, though, is that he engages Peter Wust, a neglected philosopher well worth reading. I hope to say something about Wust later.

Have you read *Ungewissheit und Wagnis*? I understand it has been translated into Czech.

[Lukáš Novák]

Bill,

- There were no formal anathemas before Vatican I, because natural knowability of God had only been doubted by a few "outsiders" before Hume and Kant. One could argue that before Vatican I it was part of the Ordinary Magisterium.

- No, I have not read Wust.

[Lukáš Novák]

Bill,

You wrote:

If an argument is presented for (1), then I will show that the premises of that argument are not, all of them, certain.

Let us play that game. I believe I have an argument to prove (1) that can be reduced exclusively to obvious conceptual truths. Let's go step by step, you say which premise you doubt and I produce an argument for it.

My kick-off:

(1.1) Whatever does not have a cause and yet exists exists necessarily.
(1.2) Whatever begins to exist never exists necessarily.
Ergo etc.

Which one you doubt?

[Elliott]

Bill,

This is an intriguing topic. What would you say about the following propositions? Is any of them philosophically interesting/substantive? Is any epistemically certain? Nearly certain?

I’m not trying to put you on the spot. I ask because I’d like to get a sense of how you view the relation between a proposition’s degree of certainty and its degree of philosophical interest, which is itself a philosophically interesting topic. Please only address the propositions that you want to address, if any. I’ll try to provide a decent variety of propositions.

- Scientism is false.
- Gender is objectively real. (Or, gender is not a social construction.)
- There is an objectively real difference between being male and being female.
- Metaethical moral realism is true.
- There are objectively real moral and intellectual virtues (e.g., wisdom, courage, etc.)
- There are objectively real moral duties.
- (Non-human) animals are not moral agents.
- (Non-human) animals do not have objective moral rights.
- There can be consciousness without a subject of consciousness.
- Mere matter cannot have intentionality.
- The principle of the indiscernibility of identicals is true.
- No entity can create itself (i.e., no entity can bring itself into existence from non-existence).
- Human reason is a better guide to obtaining knowledge than is human emotion.
- An actual infinite cannot be traversed.
- Human beings have libertarian free will.
- If something is actual, then it is possible.
- Truth is a necessary condition for knowledge.
- Belief is a necessary condition for knowledge.
- If God is logically possible, then God is necessary.
- There are no dialetheias (i.e., dialetheism is false).

[BV]

Thanks for the comments, gentlemen. I hope to respond tomorrow.

[Jesse Newton]

How about the following as examples?

(1) Two objects of the same type cannot be co-located.

(2) It is impossible to change the past.