Rational Argument and the Questioning of Motives

London Ed writes,

. . . my main concern is how rational argument is deflected by questions of motive. Douglas Murray makes the point very well. Consider the proposition ‘Sharia law discriminates against women’. A rational response to this claim would be to investigate the nature of Sharia law, then to settle on a definition of ‘discriminate’, and then finally decide whether Sharia law does or does not fit that definition. This process is aimed at establishing the truth or falsity of the proposition in question. That by definition is rational debate.

Well of course. Who could disagree? The problem, however, is that rational debate does not resolve the main issues that divide us. Argument, even when conducted civilly and in accordance with all the proper canons, is of very limited value. Or can you think of a hot-button issue that has been resolved by rational debate?

But there is another form of response which sidesteps this completely, by questioning the motive of the person making the claim. Since it involves criticism of Sharia and hence of Muslims, the reason for making it must be racism or Islamophobia or whatnot. Note this does not involve any question of truth or falsity. Perhaps the opponent believes it too. No matter. The mere fact of making it [criticism of Sharia] means you are an Islamophobe, and must be shouted down, banned from the country, not allowed a platform etc.

Ed and I of course agree that it is in general wrong in a debate to divert attention from the content of a claim to the motives of the one making it.  The content of a claim is either true or false, either supported or unsupported by evidence, etc.  These properties of the propositional content of the claim are logically independent of anyone's psychology, in particular, the one who makes the claim. For example, here we read that in the U. S. most people with sickle cell disease are of African ancestry.  Clearly, the truth value of that proposition is logically independent of whether or not the person making the claim loves blacks, hates them, wants them all sent back to Africa, etc.  And of course there is nothing 'racist' about pointing out a racial fact like this.

But what I have just said in agreement with Ed is little more than the sort of philosophical boilerplate acceptable to all of us 'competent practioners.'  But it doesn't get us very far.

Here is a much more interesting question: 

Is it ever right to question or impugn motives in a debate?

I say it is sometimes right and sometimes rational. There are those here in the United States who oppose a photo ID requirement at polling places. They claim it 'disenfrachises' certain classes of voters, that it amounts to 'voter suppression.' But of course it does no such thing, and there is not one good argument against photo ID requirements.

The willful and widespread misuse of 'disenfranchise' is by itself a clear indication that the motives of those who misuse the word are unsavory. 

I won't go through these anti-photo ID arguments one more time. But if they are all bad, as I argue that they are, then I have every right to 'psychologize' my ideological enemy and impugn his motives. And that is exactly what I do. More than once I have claimed that leftists oppose photo ID requirements because they want to make the polling places safe for voter fraud. Plain and simple, their motive is to encourage voter fraud. They are out to win any way they can, and in their minds the glorious end justifies the dishonest means. Radicals needn't be inconvenienced by the demands of bourgeois morality. They've read their Alinsky.

I could cite many more examples but one suffices to nail down the general point, which is: it is sometimes right and rational to question motives and indeed, to impute evil motives in explanation of the transparently flimsy arguments our enemies sometimes give, arguments which are mere smokescreens that make a mockery of rational discussion.

So it appears that Ed and I disagree. Surprise!  His claim, if I understand it, is that it is never morally right and rational to question motives in a debate.  My claim is that it sometimes is. 

UPDATE 8/6: Malcolm Pollack responds,

Just read your post on motives. You wrapped it up with:

His claim, if I understand it, is that it is never morally right and rational to question motives in a debate.  My claim is that it sometimes is. 

It seems to me that the thing hinges on that phrase "in a debate". What's a "debate"? In principle it is a joint, rational inquiry, the purpose of which is to arrive at the truth. In that situation, then I'd agree with Ed.

But what we find ourselves dealing with in the social, political, and academic arena these days is rarely "debate", even though it pretends to be ("we need to have a national conversation about [insert left-wing hobby-horse here]"); it's a zero-sum war of conquest. (This is why accusations of inconsistency or hypocrisy, such as pointing out the Left's own widespread racism, so completely miss the point; their consistent principle is always simply that the other side is the enemy, and will be attacked.)

So when we aren't actually having a "debate" at all, then of course I'd agree with you. The key, then, is to be able to tell the difference.

.................

Thanks, Malcolm. And in that situation I would agree with Ed too. But if we use 'debate' for what actually passes for debate, then I agree with me -- and you.

I sense that your parenthetical remark is directed against me, given certain things I have said in the past, which is fine: you and I share enough common ground to make rational discussion possible and perhaps even fruitful.  But your remark may need some refinement. Suppose we distinguish two classes of leftist opponents.

Class 1. These are the ones you are referring to. They operate from the commie/Alinksyite playbook. They have one guiding principle which they apply consistently: do whatever it takes to win; the other side is the enemy; attack them and give no quarter.  Thus they will invoke our principles and values against us when it is convenient and conducive to their ends, even though they have no respect for these 'bourgeois' principles and values. For example, they will invoke free speech rights to get themselves heard, but shout down their opponents.

A naive guy like me comes along, who hasn't fully fathomed the depravity of the leftist mind, and protests their hypocrisy, their deployment of a double standard, the inconsistency of their application of the principle of free speech. And then you point out to me that I am "completely missing the point."  My mistake, I suppose, is to assume that leftists share our values, including aversion to hypocrisy and inconsistency in application of standards.

Have I understood your point, Malcolm?  

But it may be a bit more complicated since not all leftists are of the same stripe.  There are also those who belong to:

Class 2. These are the ones that really are hypocrites and deployers of double standards.  They are the ones that fall into inconsistency in the application of a principle such as that of free speech even while accepting the principle. So I can't have "completely missed the point" if there really are people in Class 2 and I point out their hypocrisy and deployment of double standards.

In sum, your parenthetical remark needs the nuancing that I have just provided. 

Let me know if you would like me to open the Combox to allow a reply.

Comments

[Malcolm Pollack]

Hi Bill,

Actually, no, I wasn't thinking of you when I wrote that parenthetical sentence. You've written some very thoughtful posts about hypocrisy, with which I've generally been in complete agreement. I was simply venting my ongoing frustration with pundits, radio hosts, columnists, bloggers, etc. who seem to think they are scoring points by pointing out hypocrisy and inconsistency in people who very clearly fall into the first of your two classes.

In your posts about hypocrisy you've pointed out that men are weak, and argued that the charge of hypocrisy should be tempered by an understanding that is one thing to truly believe in a principle, and yet be unable to live up to it, and quite another simply to pay it lip service for the sake of appearances. ("Hypocrisy is the tribute that vice pays to virtue", said de la Rochefoucauld.")

In light of that, how are we to understand Class 2 when it comes to this sort of political combat? It is easy, perhaps, to understand the drunkard or womanizer who knows that he sins, but is too weak to resist the Devil that tempts him; I think we can say that he sins -- perhaps with genuine remorse or self-loathing -- despite, in your words, "accepting the principle".

It is much harder, I think, to say the same about someone who calls for systematic demonization of Whiteness while denouncing racism, or who calls for "free speech" only for those opinions he endorses. I very much doubt that such people really "accept the principle" at all; it is simply a potent weapon that, here in the modern West, is always close to hand.

I suppose my question is: when it comes to politics, how often is your Class 2 actually instantiated?

[Malcolm Pollack]

P.S.

A naive guy like me comes along, who hasn't fully fathomed the depravity of the leftist mind, and protests their hypocrisy, their deployment of a double standard, the inconsistency of their application of the principle of free speech. And then you point out to me that I am "completely missing the point." My mistake, I suppose, is to assume that leftists share our values, including aversion to hypocrisy and inconsistency in application of standards.

Have I understood your point, Malcolm?

Yes, that was it exactly. Thank you. (But, again, I wasn't really singling you out at all.)

[BV]

This discussion has been very helpful to me. It has forced me to make explicitly the Class 1 vs. Class 2 distinction, a distinction that stands even if Class 2 is the null class.

>>I suppose my question is: when it comes to politics, how often is your Class 2 actually instantiated?<<

That is a good question. From our discussion I now appreciate that a lot of the people I thought were in 2 are really in 1.

Suppose there is a 'liberal' who really is committed to free speech, but shouts down Charles Murray on the grounds that he is a 'fascist' who would deny free speech rights to non-whites. Such a person would not be in Class 1. He would be in Class 2, right?

[Ostrich]

It’s worth pointing out that this all arose from an email to Bill venting my frustration against other philosophers who were using these Alinskyite tactics. On one occasion, the person, who is a distinguished philospher, refused to look at a publication I had cited because he judged it to be right leaning. I thought that unphilosophical.

Speaking of ‘unphilosophical’ I came to philosophy in the first place, many years ago, for its acceptance of managed argument and managed conflict as the way of doing business. In philosophy there is a ‘quodlibet’ principle that you are absolutely free to discuss anything you like. No one will question you for raising any issue. Nor will they question who you are or what your other beliefs are. In philosophy, it is the reasons and arguments and evidence for your claim that matter, and nothing else. As Malcolm says, it is ‘a joint, rational inquiry, the purpose of which is to arrive at the truth’. Of course there are strict rules, such as ad hominem about what counts as a valid contribution to the rational inquiry, but these are not rules about behaviour, indeed the ad hominem principle is that behaviour essentially doesn't matter.

So my main concern is about philosophers being unphilosophical. Does that matter? You are a philosopher in class, do you have to be a philosopher out of class? A difficult question, and connected with issues about respect and reputation.

[BV]

Malcolm,

You've heard the saying, 'Free speech for me, but not for thee.' Consider a lefty who lives and behaves according to this principle. What should we say about him?

A. He accepts that free speech is a high value but is inconsistent in his application of the FS principle; or

B. He does not accept that free speech is a high value or any value (so that, after the Revolution, no exercise of the FS right will be allowed) but cynically invokes the principle now as a mere means to defeat his ideological enemies.

It seems there is a real difference between (A) and (B). Agree?

[BV]

Very good statement, Ostrich. But you aren't giving me a straight answer to the BOLDED question I pose above.

[Malcolm Pollack]

Bill,

Question 1:

Suppose there is a 'liberal' who really is committed to free speech, but shouts down Charles Murray on the grounds that he is a 'fascist' who would deny free speech rights to non-whites. Such a person would not be in Class 1. He would be in Class 2, right?

Question 2:

You've heard the saying, 'Free speech for me, but not for thee.' Consider a lefty who lives and behaves according to this principle. What should we say about him?

A. He accepts that free speech is a high value but is inconsistent in his application of the FS principle; or

B. He does not accept that free speech is a high value or any value (so that, after the Revolution, no exercise of the FS right will be allowed) but cynically invokes the principle now as a mere means to defeat his ideological enemies.

It seems there is a real difference between (A) and (B). Agree?

In question 1, you've described a nuanced principle that could be seen as a kind of "free-speech utilitarianism", in which free speech is still a top-level principle. In the mind of your imaginary heckler the goal, as described, seems to be to maximize the number of people who may speak freely. In other words, the highest operative principle here is still free speech itself, and the heckler's aversion to fascism only enters the picture as a practical matter, because it works against this sort of utilitarian optimization.

I'm not sure this is inconsistent at all (and neither in class 1 nor 2), but I very much doubt that this is what's going through the mind of your typical college kid yelling at Charles Murray. I think the rationale there (to the extent that reason is involved at all) is much more like "He's bad! Don't let him speak!!" When I speak, as I often do, of modern-day Progressivism as a crypto-religion, I'm thinking of this sort of thing as nothing more or less than silencing the Devil.

In question 2 you describe exactly what's happening all over the West right now. People are getting into serious legal trouble for expressing heretical opinions on social media. I would parse the options a little differently than you have, however:

A. Good old-fashioned Class-1 ruthless Alinskyism;

B. The belief that free speech is not the highest principle, but is subordinate to an even higher one: holy Universalism, the modern West's most sacred belief. Even the venerable Western principles of free speech, rational inquiry, pursuit of truth, stewardship of national heritage -- and indeed, even some of the deepest aspects of our human nature itself -- must be limited and conditioned, and if need be, harshly repressed and punished, if they threaten the central tenets of Universalism (and of salvation through cultural, racial and environmental atonement, this being the only form of salvation the materialistic Progressive mind can any longer conceive of).

We agree about (A), but I wouldn't describe my (B) as cynical or inconsistent; once the structure of this belief system is correctly identified, it's actually quite principled. (I think the principle itself is a horrifying psychological malfunction that is killing our civilization before our eyes, but it isn't inconsistent.)

P.S. Sorry to leave such a long comment. I didn't have time to write a shorter one!

[Ostrich]

>>Very good statement, Ostrich. But you aren't giving me a straight answer to the BOLDED question I pose above.

It would be hypocritical of me to say 'no' since I have done so myself, at least in certain situations. Example, a colleague recently commended a paper on the grounds that the author was a distinguished lecturer at one of England's most distinguished universities. I replied, 'possibly, but you need to look at who funded his chair'.

However I am not sure about this. The colleague was not commending the paper on the grounds of its content (which was poorly thought through and in parts incoherent), but on the distinguished nature of the author and his institution. I try always to look through such arguments from authority (another form of ad hominem). So perhaps I was right to question the authority. OTOH perhaps I should have ignored the commendation and gone straight to the quality of his paper.

[BV]

You're not a hypocrite if you do something you believe one shouldn't do -- otherwise we'd all be hypocrites.

Your view, I take it, is that one ought not ever question motives in a debate. But suppose you do it once or twice. That doesn't make you a hypocrite. It is just a case of moral failure. You would be a hypocrite if you preached your view but made no attempt to put it into practice.

Suppose there are two papers on logic, one written by me, the other by Quine. But you know nothing of their content. Would you not be justified in thinking your time better spent on the Quine paper than on my paper? You o authority. But then can't I non-fallaciously appeal to, or point out, the moral corruption of a person to cast doubt on the truth of his ideas?