Franz Brentano on the Charge of Excessive Rigorism

On his Facebook Page, Vlastimil V. quotes Franz Brentano, approvingly, I think:

It is certain that no man can entirely avoid error. Nevertheless, avoidable or not, every erroneous judgement is a judgement that ought not to have been made, a judgement in conflict with the requirements of logic, and these cannot be modified. The rules of logic are not to be given up merely because of the weakness of our powers of reasoning. Similarly, the rules of ethics are not to be given up because of weakness of will. If a man is weak willed, ethics cannot cease to demand from him that he love what is known to be good, prefer what is known to be better, and place the highest good above all else. Even if one could show (and one cannot) that there are circumstances under which no one could remain true to the highest good, there would not be the slightest justification for setting aside the requirements of ethics. The one and only correct rule would remain evident and unalterably true: Give preference in every case to that which is better. (emphasis added)

Brentano is out to rebut the charge of excessive rigorism laid at his door step; his rebuttal, however, I find unconvincing.

Let's examine the passage sentence by sentence.

It is certain that no man can entirely avoid error. 

True! So far, so good.

Nevertheless, avoidable or not, every erroneous judgement is a judgement that ought not to have been made, a judgement in conflict with the requirements of logic, and these cannot be modified.  

Ambiguous. What is the force of the 'ought not' here? Is it agential or non-agential?  I agree with Brentano if he is speaking of non-agential oughts. Permit me to explain.

It seems to me there are states of affairs that ought to be even in situations in which there are no moral agents with power sufficient to bring them about, and states of affairs that ought not be even in situations in which there are no moral agents with power sufficient to prevent them. In other words, there are non-agential oughts. Here are some examples of non-agential ought statements, statements that express an ought to be or an ought not to be as opposed to an ought to do or an ought not to do.

There ought to be fewer diseases than there are.

There ought never to have been any natural disasters.

There ought to be morally perfect people.

There ought to be perfectly logical people.

Human life ought never to have arisen.  

One can imagine someone like David Benatar making the last claim. He would be saying that it would have been better had human life never arisen. And this despite the fact that no agent on his naturalist scheme could have prevented human life from arising. It even makes sense to say that it would have been better had nothing ever existed at all. Perhaps this view can be laid at Schopenhauer's door step: Ens et malum convertuntur. To be is bad.  Being itself is bad to the bone. Nothingness would have been preferable.

There is a sense in which I ought to be morally perfect whether or not it is in my power to become morally perfect.  And the same holds for my being logically perfect.  This  sense is axiological but not deontic. My being morally perfect is a better state of affairs than my being morally imperfect as I am. And this despite the fact that it is not in my power to perfect myself.

Similarly, the rules of ethics are not to be given up because of weakness of will. 

True, as long as the strong-willed have the ability to abide by the rules. 

If a man is weak willed, ethics cannot cease to demand from him that he love what is known to be good, prefer what is known to be better, and place the highest good above all else.

True, but see preceding comment. 

Even if one could show (and one cannot) that there are circumstances under which no one could remain true to the highest good, there would not be the slightest justification for setting aside the requirements of ethics.

Here is where I disagree.  Consider 'One ought to be morally perfect.' This sentence expresses an axiological requirement but (arguably) not a moral obligation because it is simply not in any human's power to perfect himself, nor is it in any finite person's power or any group of finite person's power to perfect him.

The bolded sentence conflicts with the principle that Ought implies Can. I cannot stand under a moral obligation to do what which I do not have the power to do. Now I do not have the power to perfect myself morally. Therefore, contra Brentano, one is justified, not in setting aside the requirements of ethics, but in so amending them that that reflect what is concretely possible for humans to achieve. 

Comments

[Vlastimil]

"I cannot stand under a moral obligation to do what which I do not have the power to do."

Compatibilists (weak determinists) about freedom and moral responsibility might deny that, right?

Also, others might distinguish two concepts of moral obligation: Suppose, just hypothetically, that given the laws and history of the universe, you must be mean to me. In a sense you are still obliged not to be mean, although you are blameless (here, compatibilists would disagree). Being mean, _you do_ moral wrong, although you do no moral bad.

[bmiller]

Interesting that you've posted this after your post about being touched by grace. I wonder if that was planned or by accident.

Of course, Christians are called "be perfect just as your Father in heaven is perfect". But of course you're right that we as fallible humans can't perfect ourselves.

[BV]

I don't understand. Compatibilists don't deny that people have abilities.

What is the difference between moral wrong and moral bad?

[BV]

bmiller,

Not planned.

But I do have a post, which I cannot seem to locate, in which I present an arg for the ex of God based on the idea that we ought to perfect ourselves, cannot by our own power, therefore . . . .

[bmiller]

"Not planned."

Well, maybe not by you :-)

God bless you. You're one of my favorites.

[Vlastimil]

Bill,

Compatibilists about moral responsibility deny you could have done otherwise even when what you did was wrong (and so you were obliged not to do it). Cf. youtube.com/watch?v=P-enqLRQU6s

The difference btw moral wrong and bad/evil: Morally wrong deeds are those that should not be done. Morally bad/evil deeds are those that are (freely) done with a genuine belief that they should not be done.

Important example:

Suppose we prevent a _huge_ amount of very terrible things if and only if we donate _much_ of our time or money to charities or other good causes. (This even seems true to me. Cf. blog.givewell.org/2015/11/06/the-lack-of-controversy-over-well-targeted-aid) The terrible things may be years and years of extreme poverty, or anything comparably (or even more) important.

Now, many say, even then it isn't wrong not to donate much. Else, we all act wrongly by not donating much. Which is absurd.

Now, I am far from sure it really is absurd. Perhaps, absurd is rather the claim that not giving much is bad/evil. Wrong need not be bad/evil. Similarly Richard Arneson in his paper "Moral limits on the demands of beneficence?" (2004): even "the morally perceptive affluent person, munching his croissants and fingering the keys to his fancy car, does not hold that it is morally justified that he enjoys the good life at the moral cost that others live avoidably wretched lives. His position is, 'Can you blame me?'"

I think we can -- in case he is free, despite his socialization etc., to donate much, and knows that he should donate. For in that case his not donating much is bad/evil and so blameworthy. But otherwise, we cannot.

[BV]

V,

Ought implies Can is not inconsistent with compatibilism. Perhaps you should tell me what Ought implies Can means.

[Vlastimil]

Bill,

It means, if S ought to φ at t, then S can φ at t, given the laws and history of the universe, including his own history, up to t' (the same as or preceding t).

Coompatibilists about moral responsibility deny this since they claim that in some cases S cannot φ at t, given the laws etc., yet is still morally responsible for his (morally wrong) not φ-ing at t.

Maybe all this needs some trimming, but it should be about right.